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PREFACE
When something happens against the grain it is considered unusual or out of the ordinary. And 
indeed, liberalization of agricultural trade was not a generally accepted practice in the 1980's. 
As a result, the negotiations and the outcome of the Uruguay Round may be considered out of 
the ordinary. Moreover, doing something against the grain implies reluctantly acting against 
one's inclinations or preferences. As this book clearly shows, agricultural trade liberalization was 
only reluctantly accepted in France and Germany, against the natural inclinations and wishes of 
farmers and parts of the government bureaucracy. While the title is certainly applicable to the 
subject of this dissertation, I by no means conducted this research against the grain. To the 
contrary, I enjoyed the extensive reading, writing, re-writing (to a somewhat lesser extent), and 
in particular perusing through archival material and conducting interviews. I could not have 
accomplished it, however, without the help, encouragement and support of a large number of 
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First of all, I am very grateful to my supervisors. Thank you Bob, for always overseeing the 
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Political Science. For it is indeed in explaining concepts, theories and methods to students that 
one's own grasp of the matter is put to the ultimate test. Anna, I must have been 'quite a job' 
for you. When I came to Nijmegen my knowledge of research methods was limited and the 
phenomenon of theory-guided research had not yet entered my vocabulary. It is thanks to your 
kind and patient guidance that I was able to design this research project and complete it within 
a reasonable amount of time. You were very good at sensing when I required a deadline or 
when I needed to be left alone. Thank you for your encouragement and empathy, both 
professional and personal: they made you more than an ordinary supervisor.
I would like to thank the rest of my colleagues at the Political Science department: for the 
chit-chat in the hallway, for politically and sometimes even socially relevant conversations during 
lunch, and for your support. In addition, I would like to express my gratitude to the members of 
the WOIB for the tough but constructive discussions of my work during its various stages. 
Sabina, thank you for being a friend and for providing me with useful advice along the way. 
Niels and Kristof, I really enjoyed your company during the ismus-trips to Krakow and Berlin, the 
chocolate-cake-tasting-exercises and the game-playing-nights together with Bertjan, Agnes and 
Diede. Of course, I also loved teaching AV together with you. The continuity in excellent student 
evaluations over the years must undoubtedly be attributed to the fact that a female coordinator 
was pulling the strings.
While conducting my research, I also interviewed people who have taken part in the 
negotiations my research focused on. I am grateful to these interviewees for welcoming me in 
their homes and taking the time to share their experiences. I would further like to thank the
reading-room employees at the archives in Koblenz, Berlin, Fontainebleau and the Hague for 
their assistance and advice during my visits.
Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends for their interest, encouragement and 
support over the years. Mom and dad, thank you for the values you brought me up with and for 
encouraging me to use my God-given talents. I really enjoyed the family gatherings at birthdays, 
family weekends, mother-and-sister-outings, and other activities. They provided the much- 
needed diversion for a busy bee like me. It is thanks to 'Langs de lijn' and the 'boekenclub' that 
I also read literature outside the field of Political Science in the last few years. And if it were not 
for Liane and our punctual weekly swims (ahum), I would probably have gained a few pounds 
due to the delicious chocolate and liquorice provided by Helma and Wilma in the secretaries' 
office. Last but not least, I am very grateful to my loving husband Hein Christiaan. You are the 
one who encouraged me to take on the challenge of writing a dissertation. You cook delicious 
dinners, ready to serve when grumpy little me comes home from a long day at work. But most of 
all, you love me unconditionally, rain or shine. Thank you for being at my side every step of the 
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CHAPTER 1
THE PUZZLE OF CROSS-COUNTRY SIMILARITIES IN FARM 
LOBBY INFLUENCE
1.1 Introduction
The Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations (1986­
1993) went down into history as the last, the longest and the most comprehensive trade round 
ever undertaken before the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In contrast 
with prior GATT rounds, negotiations were no longer restricted to trade in goods, but also 
involved the issues of services and intellectual property. Furthermore, the issue of agriculture 
figured prominently on the negotiating agenda, while previous rounds of negotiations had never 
succeeded in placing this sensitive sector under stricter GATT discipline. Unsurprisingly, 
agriculture turned out to be an important -  if not the most important -  bone of contention in 
the Uruguay Round. The most prominent players in the GATT negotiations, the United States 
and the European Community (EC),1 proved to be the prime antagonists on this issue, the 
former favouring free trade in agriculture, and the latter rejecting it. They crossed swords at 
several occasions. During this debate, France and Germany,2 who did not want to give up the 
protectionist policies in the agricultural sector, under close scrutiny of their farmers, played a 
leading role in internal EC negotiations on which position the EC should defend in the 
agricultural chapter of the Uruguay Round. Given these competing pressures at the international 
and domestic level, how are the French and German preferences on the liberalization of 
agricultural trade during the GATT negotiations to be explained?
It is more or less unproblematic background knowledge among researchers studying 
European politics that in France and Germany farmers dominate national preference formation 
not only when it comes to domestic agricultural policy, but also with respect to international 
agricultural policy. Many an author has argued that French and German farmers have been able 
to wield considerable influence over the positions taken up by their respective national 
governments in the European Council of Ministers and have often succeeded in stalling reform 
of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), or trade liberalization in the context of the GATT in 
the 1980s and 1990s (Andrlik 1981; Philips 1990; Goverde 2000; Keeler 1996; Risse-Kappen 
1995). Although this observation is often thus considered a commonplace, it is a most puzzling 
one in terms of the domestic structure approachto foreign policy (preferences) (e.g., Katzenstein
1 W hen referring to the organization in general, I will use the denom ination EC, but in the empirical 
chapters describing events before 1993, the historical name European Econom ic C om m unity (EEC) is used.
2 Throughout this dissertation, I will use the term Germ any both w hen referring to the Federal Republic of 
Germ any in the period up to 1990 and a reunited Germ any in the period after O ctober 1990.
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1976 and 1978; Risse-Kappen 1991). This approach predicts differences in the impact of 
societal pressure on state preferences as a result of differences in domestic structures. According 
to this approach, one would expect farm influence to be substantial in Germany, but not in 
France, since the German domestic structure is considered to be society-dominated, while the 
French domestic structure is considered to be state-dominated (see further Section 1.4). The 
domestic structure approach is unable to explain the similarity in outcome (the dominance of 
societal interests) in both France and Germany, since the domestic structures of these states are 
dissimilar. The observation therefore poses an empirical puzzle for the domestic structure 
approach. The claim that farm influence must be related to immaterial factors such as the 
special ideological nature of agriculture as policy domain does not offer a solution. If these 
factors indeed play a significant role, then we should still clarify how the immaterial factors 
proposed should be conceptualized as variables within a theoretical explanation and identify the 
scope conditions under which these variables may be expected to be of importance. 
Furthermore, a cursory analysis of German preferences during the agricultural negotiations 
within the GATT Uruguay Round reveals that the belief in the continuous dominance of the farm 
lobby in Germany cannot be taken for granted. Why, for example, did the German government, 
after having defended farm interests in 1990, strongly favour compromising in the agricultural 
negotiations during 1991, while the German farm lobby continued its vehement opposition to 
such a policy? If farmers and their interests are considered to be so special, then why do these 
interests guide state preferences at one moment but not the other?
In International Relations (IR) literature it is generally agreed that in order to understand 
the preferences and behaviour of a state in international relations, we need to take both the 
domestic considerations and the international considerations of that state into account. As Nettl 
pointed out as early as 1968, the state is by its very nature Janus-faced (Nettl 1968; cf. Buzan 
et ai. 1993, 120). During the Uruguay Round, France and Germany were simultaneously 
confronted with international pressure exerted by the United States, the Cairns Group of 
agricultural-exporting nations and the GATT Secretariat, urging them to agree to the 
liberalization of trade in agricultural products on the one hand, and with vehement resistance of 
their farmers against such liberalization initiatives on the other hand.
In this introduction I will show that, with respect to the relative impact of international 
and domestic considerations on state preferences, there is a theoretical lacuna in the existing 
literature, because the common acknowledgement that state preferences are based on domestic 
and international considerations notwithstanding, current theories in IR and Foreign Policy 
Analysis (FPA) are unable to explain under which conditions -  in cases where those 
international and domestic considerations create contradictory behavioural imperatives -  
international considerations will be prioritized over domestic considerations or vice versa. It is 
therefore important, in both empirical and theoretical terms, to undertake a theoretical 
investigation of the relative influence of domestic and international considerations on state 
preferences. The theoretical question guiding this research is therefore:
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Under which conditions will middie-power states like France and Germany give precedence to 
domestic considerations over international considerations or international over domestic ones, 
when forming their foreign policy preferences?
In this dissertation, I will claim that the relative importance of domestic and international 
considerations depends not only on a state's domestic structure, but also on the structure of the 
international system. By developing a model based on these two intervening variables between 
the domestic and international considerations on the one hand, and their actual impact on state 
preferences on the other hand, I seek to explain why states sometimes prioritize domestic 
considerations and at other times international ones. On the basis of a comparative case study 
of French and German preference formation during the agricultural negotiations in the GATT 
Uruguay Round (1986-1993), I will show that only a theory that recognizes both the constraints 
of the international environment and the constraints of the domestic environment, is fully 
capable of explaining the formation of foreign policy preferences.
In the remainder of this introductory chapter I will first argue that international (economic) 
agricultural policy constitutes an excellent example of an issue area in which domestic and 
international considerations play a significant role, and in which the question of the relative 
impact of domestic as compared to international considerations is particularly pressing (Section 
1.2). Section 1.3 will provide an overview of the theoretical debate on preference formation on a 
state's foreign policy, followed by a more thorough exploration of the domestic structure 
approach in Section 1.4. On the basis of the shortcomings noted in Sections 1.3 and 1.4, 
Section 1.5 will provide an outline of the theoretical framework to be developed in Chapter 2. 
Finally, Section 1.6 will give a brief overview of the contents of the dissertation.
1.2 Agricultural Trade Policy and the International Environment
Agricultural trade policy is an issue area in which both domestic and international considerations 
are expected to influence state preferences. International trade agreements can affect the 
relative power position of states by increasing or decreasing their economic resources (see for 
example Grieco 1990). As a consequence, states can be expected to take account of 
international considerations in preference-formation processes regarding international trade. For 
the member states of the EC, agricultural trade is an issue area where policies are for the 
greater part determined at the European level. Since the creation and development of the CAP, 
decision making on agricultural policy takes place mainly in the Council of Ministers. Decision 
making on international trade policy is no longer a national prerogative either, and the 
European Commission negotiates with the EC's trading partners on behalf of the EC as a single 
entity, on the basis of a mandate provided by the Council of Ministers. When formulating their 
preferences on the position they wish the EC to defend in the agricultural trade negotiations, 
France and Germany are therefore subject to international pressure both within the EC and 
within GATT. Moreover, agricultural trade policy as an issue area was characterized at that time
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by its potential for significant conflict with the United States (cf. Woolcock 2000; Butler 1983, 
105). During this period Europe and the United States crossed swords over a number of 
agricultural trade panels in GATT, the most important issue concerning soya. Since the United 
States was both an important provider of security to the EC and an important trading partner for 
many European member states, any disagreements and potential conflict with the United States 
would result in pressure on the European member states to give in to the United States 
demands for trade liberalization. Considering the pressure from the agricultural sector to 
withstand these demands, agricultural trade policy was an area in which domestic and 
international pressures could often pull states in opposite directions.
In a policy area such as agricultural trade in which both domestic and international 
considerations are important and in which domestic and international pressures are likely to pull 
states in conflicting directions, it is of the utmost importance to apply an explanatory model that 
does justice to both a state's domestic and its international considerations and is able to predict 
the relative weight of these domestic and international variables in the formation of state 
preferences. In the next section, I shall argue that current approaches within IR and Foreign 
Policy Analysis (FPA) cannot provide the theoretical model that is required.
1.3 Preference Formation in Foreign Policy Making
The approaches in political science trying to explain a state's foreign policy preferences may be 
classified in three groups. The first group emphasizes international-level factors as explanatory 
variables, while the second group stresses domestic-level variables. The third group applies both 
domestic and international variables in explaining state preferences.
Neo-realism (cf. Waltz 1979; Grieco 1990) and neo-institutionalism (cf. Keohane and Nye 
1989) are two examples of mainstream theoretical approaches that focus on the international 
level alone when explaining state preferences and behaviour. In these theories, the structure of 
the international system and the role of international institutions are the main explanatory 
variables. The second-image reversed literature (cf. Gourevitch 1978; for an overview see 
Almond 1989) studies the effect of international variables on the character of states 
(institutional structures, regime type) (Koch 1997, 39). However, in the context of this research 
it is not the construction of such domestic institutions that requires explanation, but the 
formation of a state's foreign policy preferences.
Theoretical contributions emphasizing domestic-level factors as independent variables in 
explaining foreign policy preferences may be found in FPA, International Political Economy (IPE), 
as well as Andrew Moravcsik's Liberal Intergovernmentalism. Scholars in the field of FPA focus 
primarily on domestic variables such as public opinion, domestic institutions, pressure from 
interest groups and the characteristics of individual leaders as factors explaining state 
preferences (for an overview see Haney et al. 1995; Hudson and Vore 1995; and Hudson 
2007). Haney et al. (1995) reserved the term 'Foreign Policy Analysts' specifically for scholars 
focusing on domestic determinants of foreign policy, treating the international environment
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simply as a contextual variable and not an explanatory one. Valerie Hudson (2007), in her 
overview of classic and contemporary theory of FPA, does not a priori exclude variables at the 
level of the international system, but the fact that of this overview of 223 pages only ten are 
devoted to international variables demonstrates the tendency of FPA to focus on domestic 
explanations of foreign policy. The IPE literature also emphasizes the domestic sources of foreign 
economic policy (cf. Milner 1998; Knopf 1998, 5). In explaining a state's openness to trade 
liberalization, Ronald Rogowski (1989) for example focuses on factors of production (capital and 
labour), while Jeffry Frieden (1991) emphasizes factor specificity. In a state where labour is 
abundant and capital is scarce, Rogowski expects that domestic preferences on trade 
liberalization will vary between the actors providing labour (who will favour trade liberalization) 
and those providing capital (favouring protectionism). Frieden rather expects differences in 
preferences of specific industries, depending on whether they primarily depend on capital or on 
labour. Krasner (1976) argues that the economic power of a state and its economic 
development explain its attitude towards free trade. Finally, in Moravcsik's Liberal 
Intergovernmentalist approach, the government appears to be no more than a transmission belt 
for the preferences of important societal groups. He argues that '[preferences reflect the 
objectives of those domestic groups which influence the state apparatus' (cf. Moravcsik 1998, 
24). Moravcsik thus provides a 'perspective on domestic-international interactions that 
emphasizes how societal actors shape the policies of states' (Katzenstein et al 1998, 668).
Neo-realists and neo-institutionalists acknowledge that the systemic factors they 
emphasize cannot account for all state actions (Keohane 1993, 294). This implies that domestic 
variables must also be included to explain certain state preferences. However, they provide no 
indication of which domestic variables may be relevant. At the same time, foreign policy 
explanations that focus on a multitude of domestic-level variables tend to suffer from a lack of 
parsimony and run the risk of providing ad hoc explanations, focusing on one variable in one 
case and another variable in another, without specifying the scope conditions under which one 
variable can be expected to be more important than another. Unfortunately, these two groups 
of scholars seem not to communicate with one another and to follow their own course. The 
explanation of preference formation is in need of theoretical approaches that systematically take 
both international variables and domestic variables into account. In the words of Peter Evans 
(1993, 400), the discipline is in need of an 'integrative approach to thinking about international 
relations and domestic politics'. This brings me to the third group of scholars: those who apply 
both domestic and international variables to explain state preferences.
The principal approaches that combine domestic and international variables are Robert 
Putnam's 'two-level games' (Putnam 1988; Evans et al 1993), neoclassical realism (e.g. 
Wohlforth 1993: Lieshout 1995; Schweller 1998; Zakaria 1998), and James Rosenau's 'pre­
theories' of foreign policy (Rosenau 1971) and the domestic structure approach (cf. Katzenstein 
1987; Mastanduno et al, 1989; Risse-Kappen 1991 and 1995; Skidmore 1994). In his 
metaphor of 'two-level games', Putnam (1988) argues that international negotiations can be 
regarded as games that take place at two levels simultaneously. At the domestic level, societal
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actors pressure the government to adopt certain policies. At the international level, governments 
have to deal with the demands of other states and seek to minimize the adverse consequences 
of international developments. The government therefore looks for a deal that is acceptable to 
the other international negotiators and at the same time likely to be ratified at the domestic 
level. Although Putnam's metaphor raises some interesting ideas about how the domestic and 
the international level interact, when it comes to the question of the relative impact of the 
domestic and international levels on state preferences, he eventually prioritizes domestic factors. 
His explanatory variables, the most important of which is the potential ratification of the 
outcomes of international negotiations, remain situated at the domestic level.
Neoclassical realists also agree that world leaders can be constrained by both 
international and domestic politics. What distinguishes their approach is that they regard the 
incentives and pressures arising from the international system to be 'translated through unit- 
level intervening variables such as decision-makers' perceptions and domestic structure' (Rose 
1998, 152; cf. Lieshout 1995, 177). Unfortunately, these domestic variables are often applied 
ad hoc, without being systematically integrated into the explanatory model. Furthermore, 
although they apply both international and domestic variables, neoclassical realists ultimately 
tend to treat only international incentives as explanatory variables, while domestic variables are 
seen as intervening variables. Finally, neoclassical realist models also generally fail to make 
predictions concerning the conditions under which domestic variables will be more or less 
important. Walt has summarized these drawbacks as follows: 'Neoclassical realism tends to 
incorporate domestic variables in an ad hoc manner, and its proponents have yet to identify 
when these variables will exert greater or lesser effects' (Walt 2002, 211). Both Putnam's 'two- 
level games' and neoclassical theories thus suffer from two problems: (1) although they both 
apply domestic and international variables, the theoretical 'weight lifting' is ultimately 
performed by either the domestic variables (in the case of the former) or the international 
variables (in the case of the latter); (2) they fail to explain the conditions under which domestic 
considerations can be expected to prevail over international considerations and vice versa.
With respect to the latter, both Rosenau's 'pre-theories' on foreign policy and the 
domestic structure approach appear to offer a solution. In 1971, Rosenau criticized scholars for 
'articulating the premise that international behaviour results from a combination of many 
factors, both international and domestic, without indicating how the various factors combine 
under different circumstances' (1971, 107, emphasis in original). In his 'pre-theory' of foreign 
policy, he introduces five sets of variables underlying foreign policy making, four of which are 
domestic in nature and one international. With respect to the sets of variables relevant to this 
research, he argues that the relative importance of international systemic variables is based 
largely on the size of a state (in terms of its geography and physical resources), small states 
being more susceptible to systemic influences than larger ones. The relative importance of 
societal variables is expected to increase in line with a state's degree of democratic and 
economic development. What is problematic however with respect to Rosenau's pre-theory in 
the context of this research is that France and Germany are neither large nor small states, but
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medium-sized powers. His model does not therefore allow for predictions on the relative 
importance of international variables in these cases. Furthermore, although Rosenau's pre­
theory was a genuine attempt at theoretical integration, Hudson (2007, 169) argues that it 'still 
does not give us the necessary scope conditions or an understanding of the integration of these 
variables that Rosenau himself held up as benchmark for success'. We can only conclude that 
Rosenau's claim of a lack of theoretical integration in the explanation of foreign policy still 
applies today. As Helen Milner argued in 1997 (1997, 2), and Hudson still maintains ten years 
later (2007, 125): 'Although many scholars have recognized the interdependence of domestic 
and international politics, few have developed explicit theories of this interaction'.
In the next section, I will argue that the domestic structure approach, despite suffering 
from a number of important drawbacks, does enable predictions on the relative importance of 
domestic and international variables in explaining national preferences and can therefore serve 
as a foundation for the construction of a theoretical model that is appropriate within the context 
of my research.
1.4 The Domestic Structure Approach and the Puzzle of Similarities in French 
and German Farm Lobby Influence
The domestic structure approach (cf. Katzenstein 1976 and 1978; Risse-Kappen 1991 and 
1995) argues that domestic structure -  in essence the power relations between state and 
society -  influences the degree to which governments are sensitive to domestic pressure, and 
consequently the degree to which they are able to take account of international interests. In 
their model, the domestic structure serves as an intervening variable between societal pressure 
and state preferences. The domestic structure of a state is classified either as 'state-dominated', 
'society-dominated', or as 'democratic corporatist' (Risse-Kappen 1991, 486). The authors argue 
that a government in a state with a state-dominated domestic structure is insulated to a large 
extent from societal pressure and is thus able to take its international interests into 
consideration. Alternatively, a government in a state with a democratic corporatist or a society­
dominated domestic structure can be expected to be heavily influenced by societal actors and 
therefore less able to take account of its international interests (cf. Katzenstein 1978, 323-324; 
Risse-Kappen 1991, 492 and 504). Researchers in this tradition usually classify the domestic 
structure of France as state-dominated and that of Germany as democratic corporatist or 
society-dominated (Risse-Kappen 1991, 492; Krasner 1978, 58; Mastanduno et al. 1989, 470; 
Skidmore 1993, 207; Zysman 1977, 852; Müller and Risse-Kappen 1993, 34; Van der Vleuten 
2001, 87). In view of their domestic structures, it is to be expected that societal groups will be 
more influential in Germany than in France, and that France will be in a better position to 
consider its international interests than Germany.
These theoretical expectations obviously clash with the commonplace observation that 
agricultural groups dominate the decision-making process in both states with respect to their 
negotiating positions in European and international negotiations on trade in agricultural
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products. The domestic structure approach cannot explain the similarity in outcome (the 
predominance of domestic considerations) in both France and Germany, since the domestic 
structures of these countries are dissimilar. Thus, the one approach that has been able to 
formulate propositions on the relative importance of domestic and international considerations 
applicable to French and German preference formation lacks predictive accuracy. We are 
confronted with an empirical problem. It is now important to explore the possible shortcomings 
of the domestic structure approach in greater detail in order to determine whether these 
shortcomings do in fact create the empirical puzzle, and which modifications will increase the 
approach's predictive accuracy.
One of the significant drawbacks of the domestic structure approach is that it can only 
explain differences in the relative impact of societal actors between states that vary with respect 
to their domestic structure, while it cannot explain similarities in domestic influence in states 
with different domestic structures. Neither can the approach explain changes in the relative 
weight of societal actors in any given state over time unless the domestic structure also changes 
(cf. Mastanduno et al 1989). An approach that is only based on 'structural' variables cannot get 
a grip on the dynamics of societal change. Furthermore, Friman (1993) correctly claims that 
domestic structure approaches tend to disregard the role of international pressure as a direct 
source of influence, because the degree to which international pressure is effective depends 
entirely on the degree to which society is able to exert influence -  which in essence depends on 
state-society relations. The approach clearly privileges state-society relations over the role of the 
state as an autonomous actor that weighs both its domestic and international interests (cf. 
Katzenstein, Krasner and Keohane 1998). In the approaches of Thomas Risse-Kappen and Peter 
Katzenstein, the role of the state and the potential influence of international considerations thus 
only come into play if the domestic structure is state-dominated. This underestimates the role of 
the state and implies that insufficient account is taken of the consequences of the anarchic 
international structure. It also results in another problem. In the words of Gourevitch (1978, 
903), the approach 'provides no explanation for the orientation of state policy in the supposedly 
state-dominated countries'. For these countries with a state-dominated domestic structure, 
Risse-Kappen (1991, 504) implicitly admits that international factors will be important, when he 
observes that the concept of state strength will assume a 'policy unhampered by domestic 
constraints and able to concentrate solely on international factors.' However, he does not 
specify which international factors are important and how they may guide state preferences. 
Katzenstein takes a step further by introducing the concept of the 'national interest' as defining 
the preferences of the state (Katzenstein 1978, 298). In his analysis, Katzenstein fails to specify 
this national interest, and only traces policy objectives in various empirical situations 'by 
observing several areas of foreign economic policy' and 'by looking not only at policy makers' 
rhetoric but also at their actions' (Katzenstein 1987, 298). Nevertheless, these descriptions seem 
to imply that the 'national interest' has to do with relative power and economic performance 
vis-à-vis other states, phenomena that are international in nature. Granted, Katzenstein does at 
least provide some clarification on what a state's international considerations may be, but
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labeling these considerations as 'the national interest' and assuming that these will only be 
taken into account if the domestic structure is state-dominated seems to imply, erroneously, that 
societal pressure is by its nature inconsistent with the 'national interest' (cf. Knopf 1998). On 
the basis of my Janus-faced conception of the state, I would argue that the 'national interest' 
includes both international and domestic dimensions and does not necessarily stand in 
opposition to 'societal interests'. The mere fact that societal interests rarely are homogeneous 
indicates that 'the national interest' cannot simply be viewed as the opposite to 'societal 
interests'.
A final drawback of the domestic structure approach is the conceptual and operational 
underspecification of the variable 'domestic structure'. Katzenstein and Risse-Kappen introduce 
three indicators to assess 'domestic structure': the nature of political institutions or state 
structure (centralized versus decentralized), the structure of society (strong and centralized 
versus weak and decentralized), and the policy networks linking state and society (state- 
dominated, society-dominated or democratic corporatist) (cf. Risse-Kappen 1991, 48B). Risse­
Kappen defines these policy networks as 'the mechanisms and processes of interest 
representation by political parties and interest groups that link the societal environment to the 
political system' (Risse-Kappen 1991, 48S). However, in his further elaboration on how to 
measure domestic structure, these policy networks do not appear to be a separate indicator of 
domestic structure, existing alongside state structure and societal structure; rather, the policy 
network is itself a function of state and societal structure. It is shorthand for particular 
combinations of these two structures (e.g. a combination of a centralized state and a 
decentralized and weak society is classified as a state-dominated structure).3 As a result, in 
Risse-Kappen's measurement scheme, state-society relations are essentially defined by the 
degree of centralization of state and society. In addition, neither Katzenstein nor Risse-Kappen 
provides well-defined operational criteria to measure these two central indicators, precisely with 
respect to their degree of centralization. Risse-Kappen indicates that the degree of centralization 
of a state's structure depends on three factors: the locus of executive power, who has the upper 
hand in the bureaucratic infighting between governmental agencies, and the extent to which the 
government controls the legislative process. However, when classifying the United States, Japan, 
France and the Federal Republic of Germany with respect to their domestic structure, the author 
applies different indicators to the various countries (Risse-Kappen 1991, 487-493). As a result, 
the classification of states with respect to their domestic structure is based largely on empirical 
observations that cannot be systematically related to predefined classification criteria.
3 In Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International 
Institutions(1995), Risse-Kappen does treat policy netw orks as a genuinely independent com ponent of 
dom estic structure w ith a content separate from  the content of state structure and the structure of society, 
distinguishing between consensual and polarized policy netw orks. A lthough  this distinction w as effective in 
classifying non-dem ocratic states (and contrasting them  w ith liberal dem ocratic states), it provides no 
additional means of contrasting, for exam ple, the dom estic structures of France and Germ any and is 
therefore not a useful m eans of assessing policy netw orks for this research.
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Katzenstein et al (1998, 668) conclude that domestic structure approaches suffer from 'the 
absence of a general and systematic taxonomy for classifying domestic structures.'
Despite the drawbacks outlined above, I wish to argue that the variable of domestic 
structure is still a relevant variable for a theoretical model seeking to explain the relative 
influence of domestic and international considerations on state preferences. The idea on which 
the domestic structure approach is based -  namely, that structural power relations between 
state and society have an impact on the importance of various considerations in the political 
processes of preference formation or decision making -  is well conceived. I will therefore take 
the domestic structure approach as the point of departure for a new theoretical model. This will 
include improvements by providing solutions to the drawbacks of the domestic structure 
approach indicated earlier: the static nature of the structural explanation, its lack of attention to 
international factors as explanatory variables, and the conceptual and operational 
underspecification of the variable of domestic structure. In the next section, I will briefly describe 
how the theoretical model that will be presented in this research addresses these issues.
1.5 Directions for a New Theoretical Framework
An important premise of this research is that the state is the central actor that takes both its 
international and its domestic interests into consideration when forming foreign policy 
preferences. I further assume that these domestic and international interests do not only have a 
political dimension, but also an economic dimension -  in the sense that a state will try to seize 
economic benefits from the GATT negotiations -  and an ideological dimension in that the state 
wishes to take actions that are in accordance with existing policy paradigms and support the 
state's identity. These dimensions of state interests will be elaborated on in Chapter 2 and 
measurements for the different dimensions will be introduced in Chapter 3.
In answering the question of the relative influence of domestic as compared to 
international considerations on state preferences, the theoretical framework that will be 
elaborated in Chapter 2 is innovative in that it combines two structural variables -  domestic 
power relations (which I will label domestic polarity, and the power structure at the 
international level (which I will label international polarity -  which have not previously been 
combined to generate hypotheses on the relative importance of international and domestic 
factors. I thus propose a model that seeks to combine the strengths of the domestic structure 
approach on the one hand and the strengths of realist theories on the other hand, while 
simultaneously avoiding their respective relative neglect of international and domestic influences 
on foreign policy. By combining domestic structure and international structure as intervening 
variables between a state's domestic and international interests (independent variables) and a 
state's preferences (dependent variable), the disadvantages of a model solely based on the 
domestic structure approach will be avoided. Apart from providing expectations on the relative 
impact of domestic as compared to international considerations, the theoretical model proposed 
in Chapter 2 also allows for the formulation of propositions on the relative impact of material
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(political and economic) as compared to immaterial (ideological) considerations. As for the 
operationalization of domestic structure, a systematic and specific taxonomy for classification, 
based on earlier work by Anna van der Vleuten (2001) will be introduced in order to solve the 
problem of conceptual and operational underspecification from which the domestic structure 
approach suffers. Furthermore, in order to address the lack of dynamics in an explanatory model 
based only on structural variables, two process variables will be introduced -  the degree of 
societal mobilization and the degree of governmental sensitivity -  enabling the explanation of 
different outcomes in cases with similar domestic and international structures in a theoretically 
grounded manner. The introduction of these process variables will increase predictive accuracy, 
while at the same time the limited number of variables added ensures theoretical parsimony. In 
accordance with this inclusion of process variables, the empirical analysis in this research will 
not only focus on the measurement of the structural variables, but will also trace the preference­
formation process itself. While those scholars who have claimed that farm lobby influence in 
France and Germany is substantial have usually relied on previous research and often failed to 
analyse the actual decision-making processes, the process tracing that I will conduct in the 
empirical part of my research will enable me to provide an well-grounded answer to the 
question of whether farm lobby influence in France and Germany was really as significant as is 
commonly claimed.
This research thus offers three important contributions, which are respectively theoretical, 
methodological and empirical in nature. The theoretical contribution is that it provides a model 
that explains the relative impact of domestic and international considerations and the relative 
impact of material as compared to immaterial considerations on state preferences. The theory 
explains why states want what they want. The methodological contribution is to be found in the 
improved measurement of the variable of 'domestic structure'. Finally, by actually analysing 
preference-formation processes, the influence of farm lobbies is investigated rather than 
assumed.
1.6 Overview of the Content of this Dissertation
The question at the core of this research concerns the conditions under which states will 
prioritize international interests over domestic interests, and vice versa. I shall investigate 
whether a model applying domestic structure and international structure as intervening variables 
acting upon a state's international and domestic interests, is able to explain French and German 
preference formation with respect to the agricultural chapter of the Uruguay Round of GATT 
(1986-1993). In Chapter 2, I develop my theoretical framework. I will argue that each 
combination of the variables of domestic and international structure affects the relative influence 
of international and domestic constraints differently. From this theoretical framework, four main 
predictions are deduced. The first is that, in cases in which the state is in a strong position 
relative to civil society and the international system has a relatively unstable, multipolar 
structure, international considerations will be decisive. The second is that, in cases in which the
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state holds a relatively weak position relative to civil society and the international system has a 
relatively stable, bipolar structure, domestic considerations will have the upper hand. My third 
prediction is that in cases in which the state holds a strong position relative to society and the 
international system has a relatively stable, bipolar structure, ideological considerations (both 
domestic and international) will be prioritized over political and economic considerations. The 
fourth is that, in cases in which the state holds a relatively weak position in relation to civil 
society and in which the international system has a relatively instable, multipolar structure, the 
process variables of the degrees of societal mobilization and governmental sensitivity will be 
decisive in tilting the balance towards either international or domestic considerations. In Chapter
3, I shall focus on the methodological aspects of my research. I will explain why French and 
German preference formation with regard to the Uruguay Round are appropriate cases for 
testing the theoretical model. I will also explain how the central variables in the predictions will 
be measured, and which sources will be employed. The empirical part of the thesis consists of 
five chapters. Chapter 4 contains a chronological overview of the run-up to the new round of 
GATT-negotiations, as well as the negotiations during the actual Uruguay Round. This overview 
describes the wider international background against which French and German decision 
making concerning the agricultural chapter of the Uruguay Round took place. The remaining 
four empirical chapters contain the actual cases in the context of which the predictions derived 
from the theoretical framework will be tested. To this end, I will divide French and German 
decision making into two cases each: one before the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end 
of the Cold War (the period 1982-1989), and one after (the period 1990-1993). Chapters 5 and
6 deal with French and German preference formation between 1982 and 1989, while Chapters
7 and 8 analyse French and German preference formation between 1990 and 1993. Finally, the 
explanatory power of the theoretical framework will be evaluated in Chapter 9.
CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 Introduction
This chapter sets out the theoretical framework that will be used in this research project. It 
explores the conditions under which states will give precedence to domestic or international 
considerations during the process of preference formation on economic foreign policy. Two 
central variables are introduced in particular -  which I shall call international polarity and 
domestic polarity, respectively -  to generate hypotheses on the hierarchy of interests during the 
process of preference formation. Section 2.2 introduces the general assumptions underlying the 
theoretical framework and argues why a three-dimensional view on state interests -  
distinguishing between political, economic and ideological interests -  is appropriate in order to 
answer my research question. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 focus on the respective effects of the 
international structure and the domestic structure on national preference formation. In Section 
2.5, the international and domestic pillars of the framework are combined. On the basis of this 
framework, I will formulate a number of hypotheses concerning both the primacy between the 
domestic and international interests of a state, and the priority within the domestic and 
international interests of the state (with respect to the three different dimensions). I argue that 
on the basis of various combinations of scores on the variables of international polarity and 
domestic polarity, the relative role of different interests in the formation of foreign policy 
preferences can be explained, because these variables affect the primacy of different dimensions 
of the state interests. Section 2.6 renders the theoretical framework more dynamic by 
introducing two process variables and indicating their effects on preference formation, given 
specific combinations of domestic and international polarity. Section 2.7, finally, provides a short 
summary of the theoretical framework.
Figure 1 depicts the theoretical framework that will be elaborated in the following 
sections. Section 2.2 focuses on the independent variables, Sections 2.3 and 2.4 elaborate on 
the intervening variables, and Section 2.6 focuses on process variables.
Figure 2.1: Theoretical framework
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2.2 The State and its Interests
2.2.1 The State
The State is the central actor in this study.4 This choice is methodologically appropriate in view 
of my research aim, which is to gain an understanding of the relative impact of domestic and 
international variables in the process of state preference formation with respect to foreign 
(trade) policy. Within the international system, states are considered the most important units, 
being the only units which are sovereign, can legitimately use force, and make rules others have 
to abide by (e.g. Waltz 1979, 95). When it comes to decision making within the GATT or the EC, 
only states can actually decide whether or not to agree to and sign an agreement, which sets 
them apart from other actors such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
multinationals. Within the domestic system, governments have a privileged position with respect 
to the execution of foreign policy. This affords the government a central role when it comes to 
aggregating domestic preferences. Here, the assumption is that eventually the State will 
consider and balance its domestic and international interests (see Section 2.2.2) and decide on 
the national preference that it will defend in the international arena.
Further, I assume that States are rational actors. By this, I mean to say that a State will 
order the expected outcomes of those behavioural options that it perceives as being available, 
on the basis of the utility that it attaches to those outcomes, and makes its decision on that 
basis. The State is assumed to be utility maximizing and thus to prefer the option with the 
highest expected utility attached to it. The utility a State attaches to different behavioural 
options depends on the degree to which it expects the different behavioural options to lead to 
its goals. The ultimate goal of the State is to safeguard the national interest (Section 2.2.2. will 
elaborate on how I conceptualize the national interest). In actual international negotiations, the 
state defends specific preferences which -  on the basis of the rational actor assumption -  are 
assumed to be consistent with the State's national interest. Regarding the interests attributed to 
States, or the content of the utility States wish to maximize, the rationality assumption does not 
itself imply specific interests. Both material (e.g. power) and immaterial interests (e.g. 
reputation) may be taken into considerations in a rational calculation of preferences (for a 
similar argument see Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 910, 912; Lieshout 1995, 47-50). I will now 
turn to this 'content' of a State's national interest.
4 In the rem ainder of this study, I will d istinguish between the state as an actor in the international system 
and the state as an actor in the dom estic system. The form er will be referred to as the 'state', and the latter 
will be referred to as the 'governm ent'. The capitalized term 'State', m eanwhile, is reserved for the state as 
a mental construct: the State w hich  has to w eigh  up its international (state) interests and its dom estic 
(governm ental) interests in the process of preference form ation.
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2.2.2. State interests
It is assumed that the ultimate interest of the State is to survive. Both domestically and 
internationally, States are confronted with threats and opportunities concerning their survival. 
The degree to which the State has to worry about its international and domestic interests 
depends on the structure of the international system and the domestic structure of the state, as 
will be explained in Sections 2.3 and 2.4. For now, it will suffice to say that the State operates 
within an environment which is, to some extent, uncertain and within which its primary goal is 
to ensure its own survival. A distinction can be made between the international and the 
domestic interests of the State, or between the interests of the state to survive in the 
international system and the interests of the government to survive in the domestic system. As a 
consequence, the preference ordering of behavioural alternatives depends on the expected 
effects that realizing these alternatives would have on the survival of the State. A general 
critique on the assumption of an interest in survival is that it is 'so general as to be 
indeterminate' (Weldes 1996, 278). This critique is certainly valid, and therefore the idea of 
survival merits consideration in greater depth. In this respect, Van der Vleuten (2001, 50) has 
introduced a useful specification by distinguishing between three dimensions of the interest in 
survival: the political, economic and ideological dimensions (see also Bull 1977 (1995ed), 63).
The political dimension of the national interest essentially covers the relative power 
positions of the state and the government. For the government, it is assumed that its objective is 
to remain in office and defend its position in relation to society. In this respect, it is important to 
notice at this point, that the cases in this research involve democratic states. Being re-elected is 
therefore considered to be a primary goal within the government's political interest. The political 
interest of the state is to safeguard its power position (e.g. militarily) within the international 
system. In addition to these material aspects, the political dimension of a State's interest also 
includes an immaterial, less tangible feature: credibility. According to the definition of Robert 
Lieshout (1995, 58), ' [t]he credibility of i  refers to j s  expectation that i  is able and willing to 
execute the threats and to fulfil the promises that, according to j  seem to be involved in is  
behaviour'. Credibility is relevant to the relations between states, because the more credible a 
state is, the less power it will need to employ in order to influence other states. Especially when 
a state expects further interaction with a state (or group of states) in the future, credibility will 
provide it with greater leverage in these interactions (cf. Lieshout 1995, 59). Governments also 
have an interest in maintaining their own credibility, as a reputation for keeping their promises 
is likely to strengthen its position with respect to society.
Wealth is the central aspect of the economic dimension of State interests. As far as trade 
issues are concerned, this includes an interest in a stable, transparent and well-organized 
international trade regime. Furthermore, within this regime, states have an interest in a specific 
structure of rules and agreements. They will prefer liberalization in sectors in which they have a 
comparative advantage, and they will prefer protectionism in sectors in which they produce
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relatively inefficiently.5 In international negotiations, states will thus strive for an agreement 
which favours their specific mix of competitive and uncompetitive sectors.6
Finally, the ideological dimension of the State's interests needs further elaboration. Hans 
Morgenthau has already argued that the fundamental national interest of any state is to 'protect 
[its] physical, political, and cultural identity against encroachment by other nations' 
(Morgenthau 1952, 972). Morgenthau's 'cultural identity' is part of what I call the ideological 
dimension of a State's interests. Central to the concept of identity are self-images. In the words 
of Peters (2002, 10): 'Every [state] has stocks of symbols and meanings, some of which pertain 
in a special way to an understanding of the social unit itself'. This social unit can take the form 
of a 'state-bounded society' (Peters 2002, 12). Collective self-images can be images of a 
'common past' or 'collective orientations towards the future' such as 'ideas about progress and 
perfection' and 'a sense of mission in the world' (Peters 2002, 13-14).7 Identity is thus also 
linked to the role that a state assigns itself in the international system. This distinction between 
how a state sees itself and the role it assigns itself internationally is the difference between an 
internal dimension of identity (national identity) and an external dimension of identity (state 
identity). National identity refers to the 'shared norms and narratives that sustain we-ness' and 
state identity refers to the 'self-placement of the polity within specific international contexts' 
(Banchoff 1999, 268). It is in the State's international ideological interest to defend both 
national identity and state identity. In the process of preference formation, the international 
ideological costs and benefits attached to different behavioural options are based on the degree 
to which these options accord with the relevant aspects of national identity and state identity.8
5 Classical econom ic theories of trade argue that all states, in the long run, benefit from trade liberalization 
as it leads to the relocation of means of production to sectors w ith com parative-cost advantages. Apart 
from the fact that, in order to substantiate these claim s, a num ber of auxiliary assum ptions have to be 
made w hich are em pirically problem atic (unrestricted shifts of m eans of production between sectors and no 
transportation costs), my research focuses on the econom ic costs and benefits as perceivedbystates, w hich 
primarily focus on their short term interest. A nd in the short term, selective protectionism  and free trade is a 
more attractive option.
6 This could be labelled as m axim izing their trade opportunity structure. A lthough  this term is not usually 
applied in IR or IPE literature, the literature on social movements (e.g. Kriesi et al. 1995, R oggeband 2002) 
applies the equivalent term of political opportunity structure as the determ inant of 'strategies of the 
members of the political system in general, and of political authorities in particular, w ith regard to the 
mobilization of social m ovem ents'. As much as social m ovements will prefer a political opportunity structure 
that enhances their influence, states will prefer a trade opportunity structure m axim izing their gains from 
trade.
7 An example of the latter w ould be the French vocation exportatrice (see Section 3.3.3).
8 Constructivists em phasize the im portance of problem atizing the concept of identity itself, to show  that 
identity is socially constructed, and how  this occurs (Ruggie 1998). I focus on the effects of given state 
identities on state preferences rather than focusing on the construction of these identities them selves. To 
the extent that constructivists investigate the effects of identity on interests and preferences, they 
distinguish between regulative effects on the one hand and constitutive effects on the other hand. 
A ccording to them , apart from regulating actors' behaviour, identity also 'creates or revises actors or 
interests' (Tsygankov 2 000, 106; see also Banchoff 1999, Finnemore 1996, Katzenstein 1996). In other 
w ords, identity constitutes actual actors and actual interests rather than only affecting the utility of specific
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Domestically, governmental policy principles and policy paradigms are central to the domestic 
ideological dimension of a State's interest. These concepts are more dynamic than national and 
state identity and they are not based on nation-wide conceptions of identity, but on political 
ideologies, which are not necessarily shared by the nation as a whole. Therefore, a change in 
government can lead to a paradigm shift, affecting the domestic ideological considerations of a 
State, without actually changing national identity. In the process of preference formation, the 
domestic ideological costs and benefits attached to different behavioural options are based on 
the degree to which these options are in accordance with governmental policy paradigms. 
Unlike political and economic considerations, ideological considerations do not only affect the 
attractiveness of different behavioural options, but also the legitimization of behaviour. In the 
rhetoric of state leaders, references to state identity and policy paradigms serve as justifications 
for behaviour (the actual selection of a particular behavioural option).9 Behaviour that 
corresponds with the state's self-image is primarily beneficial in the longer term. Such 
behaviour, when it is consistently repeated over time, yields benefits by holding the nation 
together and confirming the role of the state in the international system. The state is intrinsically 
motivated to act in accordance with its own self-image as long as this does not damage its 
political and economic interests.
Both the political and economic dimensions are more acute (or short term) than the 
ideological dimension of a State's interests when it comes to the actual survival of the state 
within the international system and the survival of the government within the domestic system. 
Internationally, wealth contributes to and, to a certain extent, is a prerequisite for the political 
power of the state. Wealth and political power are therefore likely to go hand in hand to a large 
extent. Due to the electoral constraints that face governments domestically, they can be 
expected to have relatively short time-horizons. Political considerations are of particular 
importance for the government in the short term. Nevertheless, in deciding which party to vote 
for, voters also take general economic developments into account. Keeping society satisfied is 
therefore also linked to safeguarding economic growth and rising standards of living (Milner 
1998, 23; Keohane and Nye 1978, 38-41; Henisz and Mansfield 2006, 190). As a result, 
periodical elections also make economic interests shorter term, even though economic interests 
are usually considered to be more long term than political interests. A distinction can thus be
behavioural options based on the degree to w hich these accord with the actor's identity. Since my 
explanatory fram ew ork only takes on identity as one of the dim ensions of state interests in a rationalist 
utility function (thus using it as a constraint), constructivists w ould  argue that the approach neglects the 
constitutive effects of identity on interests. My choice to focus on constraining effects only is inspired by 
m ethodological reasons, as it avoids m utually constitutive effects and continuing constitutive circles w hich 
are hard to establish empirically.
9 W e need to take into account the possibility that the choice of a behavioural option is primarily based on 
political and econom ic considerations, but that governm ent leaders frame this choice in terms of its 
correspondence w ith state identity in order to legitim ize their actions. Nevertheless, the fact that these 
argum ents are applied w ith a certain degree of consistency indicates that they are considered a source of 
legitim ization and that ideological considerations are of importance.
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made between the political and economic dimensions on the one hand, which are short-term, 
and the ideological dimension on the other hand, which is a long-term interest. All three 
dimensions of State interests taken together explain State preferences and behaviour. A 
summary of the different dimensions of a State's interests is provided in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Dimensions o f the interest in survival o f state and government
IN TERN A TIO N A L DO M ESTIC
Political interests Political interests
Material:
Defending the relative power position of the 
state
Material:
Remaining in office (re-election)
immaterial:
Safeguarding the state's credibility
Immaterial:
Safeguarding the government's credibility
Economic interests Economic interests
Striving for a stable and transparent 
international trade regime with rules and 
agreements beneficial to a state's specific mix 
of competitive and uncompetitive sectors
Stabilizing and/or Improving economic livlng- 
standards
Ideological interest Ideological interest
Defending state identity and national identity Defending governmental policy paradigms
2.2.3 The preference-formation process concerning international trade negotiations
Before turning to the explanatory framework, it is important to conceptualize the process of 
preference formation, because this underscores the relevance of theoretical expectations on the 
hierarchy of interests within both the domestic and international column and the hierarchy 
between the two columns. Preference formation is the process that occurs when the State 
considers the effects of each of its (subjectively available) behavioural options on the different 
dimensions of a State's interests. The government, first of all, considers its preferences in 
relation to those of society and in relation to other domestic constraints. The state considers its 
preferences in relation to those of other states and in relation to other international constraints.
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Finally, the State balances the effects of the different behavioural options on its domestic and 
international interests and finally arrives at a national preference ordering.10 Behavioural options 
can have three sorts of effects for each of the State's interests: a neutral effect, producing 
neither costs nor benefits or similar amounts of both; a positive effect, producing benefits by 
contributing to the State's interest; or a negative effect, producing costs by damaging the 
State's interest. During the process of preference formation, the State arrives at decisions on the 
basis of its perception of the costs and benefits attached to different behavioural options.
The incentives arising from the range of State interests can be mutually reinforcing, but 
they may also be contradictory. This can be the case both within one column and between the 
international and domestic columns. The former indicates situations in which a behavioural 
option either simultaneously has positive effects on one governmental interest (e.g. its political 
interests) and negative effects on another governmental interest (e.g. its ideological interests), 
or it has positive effects on one state interest and negative effects on another state interest. The 
latter indicates a clash between governmental interests and state interests (or domestic State 
interests and international State interests). The issue area central to this research project -  
liberalization of agricultural trade -  gives rise to clashing constraints. A straightforward 
empirical example of this is the United States demand that the EC liberalizes its agricultural 
trade, while farmers in the EC member states lobby their governments for protectionist 
measures. It is therefore important to explore the conditions under which the State will attach 
relatively more importance to a certain dimension of its interests as compared to another during 
the process of national preference formation.
2.3 International Structure
The structure of the international system 'constrains and enables' (Waltz 1979, 74). Or in the 
words of Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (1978, 241), 'system-level attributes play a crucial role in 
establishing the constraints imposed on decision makers'. The international structure affects 
preference formation because it influences the costs and benefits attached to different 
behavioural options from the whole range of options available to the state. As such, the 
international structure makes some behavioural options more, and others less attractive. First of 
all, it influences the conditions under which domestic or international considerations can be 
expected to play a larger or smaller role. Secondly, it affects the priority of certain dimensions 
within the set of international interests. Two structural characteristics of the international system 
in particular are relevant here: the principle by which the system is ordered and the polarity of 
the system (distribution of capabilities).
10 Of course, this is a conceptual representation of the process, in w hich the actions of governm ent, state 
and State are bracketed as it were. In reality, multiple actors perform these tasks sim ultaneously. 
Nevertheless, for the purposes of analysis, it is im portant to make a clear conceptual distinction between 
the processes w hich take place at the different levels of analysis.
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2.3.1 The principle by which the international system is ordered
The principle by which the international system is ordered is anarchy. In international relations, 
anarchy 'refers to the situation that the international system lacks an agency that if necessary 
can force the members of the system, even the most powerful ones, to abide by the rules and 
keep their promises' (Lieshout forthcoming 2010). An anarchical system is a system of self-help. 
Since I assume that a state, above all, wishes to survive, an anarchic structure implies that a 
state has to ensure its survival on its own (Waltz 1979, 107). The more capabilities (political, 
economic and ideological) a state has at its disposal, the better it is able to ensure its survival, 
since these capabilities 'permit a state to induce changes it desires in the behaviour of other 
states or to resist what it views as undesirable changes in its own behaviour sought by others' 
(Grieco 1990, 93). This also means that states cannot afford to take their relative power 
position for granted. In terms of assigning priority within the dimensions of the international 
State interests, this means that we can expect political and economic considerations to be more 
important than ideological considerations. After all, the state's political and economic interests 
are more closely related to the actual survival of the state as an autonomous political unit. 
However, variation is possible within the anarchic international system on the basis of the 
division of capabilities within the system (international polarity). As I will argue below, the one 
type of polarity is more stable than the other. Therefore, on the basis of differing divisions of 
power within the international system, more specific expectations than on the basis of anarchy 
alone can be formulated on how priority will be assigned to the various state interests.
2.3.2 International polarity
International polarity indicates the power-relations between states in the international system, 
based on the division of capabilities (e.g. natural resources, national income, military power, 
demographic characteristics). Polarity refers to the degree to which power is concentrated within 
the system of states and increases as the capabilities in a system are distributed more unevenly 
(Lieshout 1999, 18). On the basis of the distribution of capabilities, a distinction can be made 
between multipolar, bipolar, and unipolar systems, all within an anarchic international system. 
The polarity of the international system influences the national preference formation of States 
because it affects the stability of the international system.11 The more unstable the international 
system is, the more a State has to take its international interests into account if it is to survive. 
International polarity thus explains the degree to which international interests are likely to 
influence state preferences and behaviour, as well as the extent to which States have leeway to 
take domestic interests into account.
11 In the rem ainder of this chapter, the focus will be on bipolar and m ultipolar systems, because the 
empirical part of this research project focuses on preference form ation during the Uruguay Round (1 9 8 6 ­
1993: bipolarity up to 1990 and multipolarity between 1990 and 1993). This classification will be further 
discussed in Section 3.3.1.2.
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Bipolar systems (high polarity) are generally considered to be more stable than multipolar 
systems (low polarity) (e.g. Waltz 1964). The behaviour of the superpowers in a bipolar system 
is more predictable than the behaviour of the great powers in a multipolar system. In a bipolar 
system, each superpower has its own sphere of influence which it seeks to protect from the 
influence of the other superpower. Their relative strength is clear, as are their intentions. The 
two superpowers each provide a check on the other's behaviour, discouraging behaviour that 
would be likely to bring them into conflict with each other and which could lead to their mutual 
destruction. The chance of arbitrary behaviour on the part of the superpowers is reduced by 
internal balancing, thereby reducing the uncertainty in the international system as a whole. As 
Kenneth Waltz argues: the virtue of the 'inequality of states' is that it 'makes peace and stability 
possible' (Waltz 1979, 132). Furthermore, changes in the power positions of one of the poles as 
well as changes in the power positions of one of the other middle-powers pose relatively small 
threats for the superpowers. For their part, middle-power states need not be concerned by an 
increase in power of one of the superpowers, as these are far more powerful than they are 
anyway.12 An increase in power of one of the other middle-power states does not cause them 
much concern either, because one of the superpowers can be expected to correct the power 
relations if the middle-power state in question were to become too powerful. Moreover, if 
conflicts arise between small and middle-power states (e.g. as part of the struggle for power 
between these states), these are likely to be limited in extent and duration, and intervention of 
one of the superpowers is likely to end the conflict (Waltz 1964, 882). Middle-power states can 
therefore depend on the superpowers to defend their territory, as the superpower is interested in 
preserving the status quo. As a result, a bipolar system (and the relative position of states within 
this system) is relatively stable, both for the superpowers and for the middle-power states. It can 
be concluded that a middle-power state may be relatively less concerned about its power 
position in a bipolar system. One exception needs to be mentioned, however: a middle-power 
state that is not aligned with either of the superpowers. As these states are not integrated 
within the competing blocks, they may for example become the subject of superpower 
competition (cf. Lieshout 1995, 180-182).
Multipolar systems, in which capabilities are divided more equally, are relatively unstable. 
If the number of poles within the international system increases, 'the level of decision-making 
uncertainty about the consequences of particular actions in the international arena increases' as 
well (Bueno de Mesquita 1978, 243).13 The argument is that as the number of actors increases, 
the number of information sources also increases; however, decision makers are unable to 
interpret and analyse this increased flow of information (see also Waltz 1979, 165). Decision 
makers are thus confronted with greater uncertainty. They are less able to anticipate the
12 As indicated in the introduction, in this research the focus will be on m iddle-pow er states.
13 Some authors argue that uncertainty is highest during periods of pow er transition -  that is w hen polarity 
is actually changing (Bueno de M esquita 1978, 245; Starr and Morton 2001, 51). This is a plausible 
argum ent, and it underscores the increased degree of uncertainty im m ediately follow ing the collapse of the 
Soviet Union w hich ended the period of bipolarity.
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behaviour and reactions of others, and thus the potential consequences of their own actions. A 
multipolar system is likely to be characterized by shifting alliances and the absence of a 
superpower which could intervene in and end conflicts unilaterally. The 'tendency of coalitions 
to gain and lose partners' makes the 'resolve of opposing states and also the size and strength 
of opposing coalitions [...] hard to calculate' (Mearsheimer 1990b, 37). This illustrates how a 
multipolar international structure increases uncertainty, because the behaviour of the great 
powers within a multipolar system is less predictable. A change in the capabilities of one of the 
great-power states within the system is problematic as this immediately affects the power 
positions of the other great-power states. Moreover, the chance of conflicts between the great- 
power states within a multipolar system is greater than the chance of conflict between the 
superpowers within a bipolar system. The system is also less stable for middle-power states. 
These states are confronted with the unpredictable behaviour of the great-power states and are 
subject to great-power intervention as part of the power-struggle between the poles of the 
system (cf. Lieshout 1995, 180-182). Unlike middle-power states in a bipolar system, middle- 
power states in multipolar system cannot count on the help of one of the (other) poles and have 
to defend their own territory. Middle-power states therefore need to be more concerned about 
their power position in a multipolar system than in a bipolar system.
The effects of the polarity of the international system on foreign policy preference 
formation are twofold. In the first place, polarity affects the weight a State is likely to attach to 
its international interests. In a relatively uncertain and unstable international system 
(multipolarity), the position of a state is more uncertain and insecure than in a relatively stable 
international system (bipolarity), as a result of which the state must be more concerned about its 
relative power position.14 The probability then increases that the State will prioritize its 
international interests and that the State will pay less attention to domestic concerns. On the 
other hand, the relative stability which a bipolar system implies results in less acute concerns 
about the State's international power position and provides it with more leeway to take account 
of its domestic interests.
Secondly, variation in the stability of the international system will affect the relative 
importance that a state attaches to its political and economic interests on the one hand and its 
ideological interests on the other. In systems that are relatively unstable, states are forced to 
prioritize their political and economic interests and ignore their ideological interests if these 
clash with their political and economic interests. As the stability of the international system
14 In the rem ainder of this chapter I will also use the term constraintto  refer to the necessity to take account 
of specific considerations (dom estic/international, political and econom ic/ideological) in the process of 
preference form ation. For exam ple, I speak of strong international constraints w hen the State specifically 
needs to take account of its international interests. This is a situation in w hich policy options w hich 
safeguard these interests are relatively more attractive than others. The degree of constraint is based on the 
polarity of the international and dom estic system. The use of the term is thus theory-driven, indicating 
expectations (based on the explanatory variables) that the actor will prioritize certain considerations. In the 
end though, the actor decides. Constra int is thus not similar to actual influence, but to expected influence, 
based on the explanatory variables of the theoretical fram ework.
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increases, the insecurity of the position of states within the system decreases. As a result, the 
state is able to take its ideological interests into account on an equal footing with its political 
and economic interests. Another reason for the increased salience of ideological interests is that 
an increase in the stability of the international system results in a decrease in the discounting of 
future gains in the preference-formation process. In other words, long term benefits are valued 
more highly in a stable system than in an unstable system. As I have argued earlier, political and 
economic considerations are relatively short-term in nature, while ideological considerations are 
long-term in nature. A relatively stable system will therefore mean that a state attaches 
relatively more importance to its ideological interests, because state identity (its self-image and 
the role it assigns to itself in the international system) is formed over the long term, and 
confirmed by the consistency of a state's actions and how it justifies these actions in accordance 
with its self-image. Under conditions of a relatively low priority for political and economic 
interests, ideological considerations will gain in relative importance in the preference-formation 
process.
2.4 Domestic Structure
The structure of the state also influences preference formation, making some policy options 
more attractive than others. On the basis of state structure, expectations can be formulated on 
both the priority of domestic relative to international considerations and on the priority of 
specific dimensions within a State's international and domestic interests.
2.4.1 The principle by which the state is ordered
In contrast with the anarchic ordering of the international system, hierarchy is the principle by 
which states are ordered.15 The government is the most powerful authority within the state, with 
substantial capabilities to govern. Absent tight material constraints, the government's policy 
paradigm can be assumed to prestructure its primary motivations for action. However, even 
though the government is the most powerful authority within the state, this does not imply that 
these domestic ideological considerations are necessarily ranked above domestic political and 
economic considerations in the process of preference formation. The political constraints facing 
democratic leaders, especially electoral constraints, should not be underestimated. Ideological 
considerations will only become relatively more important in the process of preference formation 
when the saliency of political and economic considerations decreases or when political and 
economic costs are limited. After all, the government first of all depends on political support in 
order to be re-elected. The degree to which the domestic structure will constrain the 
government, varies according to the polarity of the domestic system. I will therefore turn to this 
domestic polarity now.
15 Failed states have more the character of an anarchical system, but as France and Germ any definitely do 
not fall w ithin this category, I shall disregard these types of states.
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2.4.2 Domestic Polarity
As international polarity indicates the degree to which power is concentrated in the international 
system, domestic polarity refers to the degree to which power is concentrated within the state.16 
Domestic polarity essentially focuses on the government's ascendancy in power in relation to 
society.17 The greater the capability of the government to impose its will on other domestic 
actors (or to pursue policies against the will of these domestic actors) the higher the domestic 
polarity (Van der Vleuten 2001, 39). The greater the 'autonomy' -  the term introduced by 
Christopher McGrory Klyza and Eric Mlyn (1995) -  of the government vis-a-vis societal actors, 
the higher the domestic polarity. To the extent that the domestic polarity is higher, societal 
actors will need to exert a greater degree of pressure in order to be able to influence the 
government.18
Domestic polarity influences the process of preference formation in two ways. First of all, 
the weight a State attaches to its international interests is likely to increase as domestic polarity 
increases. This is because the higher the domestic polarity, the greater the room for manoeuvre 
for the government, and the more the State will be able to take account of its international 
interests in the preference-formation process. In other words, the weight a State can attach to 
its international interests is likely to increase as domestic polarity increases. As long as the 
domestic and international dimensions of State interests prioritize similar policy options, the 
expectation formulated above remains irrelevant. However, hypotheses on the relative 
importance of domestic and international considerations gain in importance when the 
preference ordering of behavioural alternatives dictated by domestic considerations differs from 
the one dictated by international considerations. This occurred regularly during the Uruguay 
Round of GATT negotiations, when France and Germany were simultaneously confronted with 
conflicting demands from their farmers on the one hand, who lobbied for protection, and 
pressure from trading partners (especially the United States) on the other hand, who demanded 
they liberalize their trade in agricultural products. Secondly, domestic polarity affects the priority
16 I use the term polarity, fo llow ing Van der Vleuten (2001), because it can both be applied at the dom estic 
and at the international level, indicating the degree to w hich pow er is concentrated in the hands of the 
governm ent at the dom estic level, and indicating the degree to w hich pow er is concentrated in the hands 
of a small num ber of states at the international level. As such, it resembles W altz's third characteristic of 
'structure', w hich is the distribution of capabilities across the units of the system (W altz 1979, 81). I am 
aware that the term polarltyis not com m only used to qualify relations within states. My understanding of 
dom estic polarity closely resembles w h at is often labelled the distinction between weak and strong states 
(e.g. Krasner 1978) in com parative politics, or state-societyrelationsin  the dom estic structure literature. 
W ith respect to the form er, I w ould argue that the term inology is less appropriate in IR literature and could 
easily be confused w ith a reference to the relative pow er of a state in the international system (M astanduno 
et al. 1998 use the terms weakand strong state in that sense for example). The term state-society relations 
fails to capture the structural character of the variable.
17 W ith the term 'society', I refer to dom estic non-state actors, including corporatist actors and societal 
m ovements.
18 This corresponds w ith w hat David Skidm ore and Hudson (1993, 8-9) call the weak statist view , w hich 
argues that 'if [a] state is strong and insulated [...], then societal opposition can be ignored, at least until it 
reaches very high levels'.
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attributed to different governmental (domestic) interests. When domestic polarity is low, the 
government's capabilities to govern are weak and therefore its leverage over society. As a result, 
the government will attach relatively more weight to its short-term interests (political and 
economic) than to its longer term ideological interests. As domestic polarity increases, power 
relations within the state become more stable, and as a result the necessity to attend to political 
and economic interests diminishes, and there is more scope for the government to carry out its 
ideological agenda. Low domestic polarity thus prioritizes political and economic considerations, 
while high polarity provides the government with more leeway to give higher priority to 
ideological motivations.
Based on Van der Vleuten (2001, 39-40), I shall use three institutional factors to estimate a 
government's capability to govern: (1) The degree to which power is centralized within the 
state; (2) Power relations between government and parliament; (3) The existing system of 
interest mediation.19 These three institutional indicators I shall now discuss in turn.
A. The degree to which power is centralized within the state
The degree of centralization of power within a state affects a government's capability to govern 
because it indicates the degree to which the consent of other levels of government is required 
before the central government is able to take policy-decisions. I operationalize the degree of 
centralization on the basis of whether a state is unitary or federal. In a unitary state, the degree 
of centralization is high and in a federal state, the degree of centralization is low.
In addition to the degree of centralization of power within the state, the degree to which 
decision-making power is centralized within the government also affects its capability to govern. 
In a presidential system, such as that of France, we need to establish whether the President and 
Prime Minister belong to the same political party or coalition. If this is not the case, the degree 
of centralization of power decreases. Furthermore, when decision-making power is decentralized 
within the government -  either because ministers have a large degree of autonomy to take 
decisions within their own ministerial domain, or because decision-making power in one specific 
policy area is shared between several ministries (in both cases this limits control of the 
government leader) -  this impairs the capability to govern. Under these circumstances the 
government is not likely to be a strong central actor, for it has to deal with an increasing 
number of domestic veto-points.20 Moreover, ministers in a government within which power is
19 These indicators, w ith the exception of the system of interest m ediation, correspond w ith indicators used 
in the literature on veto-points (e.g. Henisz and M ansfield 2006; Schm idt 1993, 1996) or veto-players 
(Tsebelis 1995, 2003). As the num ber of veto-points increases, im plying that the consent of a larger num ber 
of actors is necessary in order for the governm ent to pursue a certain policy, dom estic polarity decreases, 
and it becom es more difficult for the governm ent to im pose its will on other dom estic actors.
20 This also underscores the im portance of unity w ithin the governm ent, or 'congruence', as George Tsebelis 
(1995) calls it.
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decentralized are more likely to take different (and potentially contradictory) positions in 
international negotiations, which can harm the state's bargaining position.
The more decision-making power is centralized in the government, the higher domestic 
polarity; conversely, the less decision-making power is centralized within the government, the 
lower domestic polarity.
B. Executive-Legislative Relations
Executive-legislative relations also affect the capacity to govern, because they indicate the 
degree to which parliament constitutes an actor whose opinions the government has to take 
into account. This has a bearing on whether the government is able to push its favoured policies 
through parliament, or whether these can easily be blocked by parliament. I distinguish between 
executive-legislative relations that are executive-dominated, balanced or legislative-dominated. 
The more that executive-legislative relations are executive-dominated, the less governments are 
constrained, and the greater the degree of domestic polarity. I measure these relations on the 
basis of two indicators: whether the government has majority support in parliament and 
whether the legislature has extensive powers (e.g. strong veto power).21 Section 3.3.I.3. will 
explain how these indicators lead to specific classifications.
C The degree to which interest representation is institutionalized
The degree to which interest representation is institutionalized also affects the capacity to 
govern, because it indicates the degree to which societal groups can block the policies proposed 
by government. When the degree of institutionalization is high, this is termed a corporatist 
system of interest representation and when the degree of institutionalization is low, the system 
of interest representation called pluralist.22 A corporatist system of interest representation grants 
the sectoral societal groups involved a veto-player status (Tsebelis 1995, 308), as a corporatist 
system of interest representation is characterized by 'direct, continuous, regularized involvement 
of associational leaders with the state in the formulation, adoption, and administration of public 
policy' (Nordlinger 1981, 166), which results in 'agreements that are binding to all partners'
21 W ith respect to the powers of the legislature I focus on its powers in general and not on its specific 
powers w ith regard to international (agricultural) trade negotiations or agreem ents. If the governm ent is 
vulnerable in one dom ain, this tends to have a knock-on effect on its position in other dom ains. I aim to 
measure the division of pow er in general and do not speak of dom estic polarity w ith respect to one specific 
issue, but of dom estic polarity in general, assum ing that this polarity affects overall governm ental 
capabilities.
22 The pluralism -corporatism  distinction should not be confused w ith the pluralism -statism  distinction used 
in the literature (e.g. Krasner 1984, Milner 1997). The latter does not indicate the degree to w hich interest 
representation is institutionalized, but indicates different theories of dom estic politics in general. This 
explains w hy pluralism  in the latter sense is associated w ith a large degree of societal influence on national 
preferences, w hereas pluralism in the form er sense is associated with strong governance capacity.
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(Lijphart 1999, 172). Because corporatism increases the number of veto-points, it decreases the 
capability to govern, which means lower domestic polarity.
A pluralist method of interest representation does not grant sectoral societal groups veto­
power, and does not constrain a government's capability to govern (Nordlinger 1981, 157; 
Culpepper 1993, 306). In a pluralist system these groups have no formal role in decision making 
and they compete with one another for the government's favour. Apart from the lack of formal 
decision-making power, this 'presence of several competing interests could in principle mean 
that they will prevent one another from realizing their interest directly' (Van Waarden 1992; 
44). We may posit that the higher degree of institutionalization of interest representation, the 
lower the domestic polarity.
In the methodological chapter, the scores of France and Germany on the three indicators 
described above will be elaborated to establish whether domestic polarity was low, intermediate 
or high in these states during the Uruguay Round (Table 3.5). For now, I conclude that low 
domestic polarity increases the salience of the State's domestic interests and reduces its ability 
to take account of international considerations, while high domestic polarity places the 
government in a more powerful position relative to society, increasing its scope for prioritizing 
international considerations.
2.5 Combining the International and the Domestic
In the preceding sections I have focused on the influence of international and domestic structure 
on preference formation. I will now combine these two strands in order to establish under which 
conditions either domestic or international considerations will gain the upper hand in the 
preference-formation process. Furthermore, I shall formulate hypotheses on the priority of 
political and economic interests on the one hand, and ideological considerations on the other 
hand, within both the international and the domestic dimensions of State interests.
Expectations concerning the effects of international polarity on a State's preference formation:
Hypothesis 1a: The lower the polarity of the international system, the greater the probability 
that a State will attach more importance to its international interests than to its domestic 
interests.
Hypothesis 1b : The higher the polarity of the international system, the greater the probability 
that a State will attach more importance to its domestic interests than to its international 
interests.
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Expectations concerning the effects of international polarity on a state's preference-formation:
Hypothesis 2a:
The lower the polarity of the international system, the greater the probability that a state will 
attach more importance to its political and economic interests than to its ideological interests.
Hypothesis 2b: The higher the polarity of the international system, the greater the probability 
that a state will attach more importance to its ideological interests than to its political and 
economic interests.
2
Expectations concerning the effects of domestic polarity on a State's preference-formation:
Hypothesis 3a: The lower a state's domestic polarity, the greater the probability that a State 
will attach more importance to its domestic interests than to its international interests.
Hypothesis 3b: The higher a state's domestic polarity, the greater the probability that a State 
will attach more importance to its international interests than to its domestic interests.
Expectations concerning the effects of domestic polarity on a government's preference­
formation:
Hypothesis 4a: The lower a state's domestic polarity, the greater the probability that the 
government will attach more importance to its political and economic interests, than to its 
ideological interests.
Hypothesis 4b: The higher a state's domestic polarity, the greater the probability that the 
government will attach more importance to its ideological interests than to its political and 
economic interests.
Combining the theoretical expectations concerning the relative impact of domestic and 
international interests on preference formation, based on the structural variables of international 
and domestic polarity, yields four possible outcomes, as shown in Table 2.2.
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Table 2.2: Domestic polarity, international polarity, and state preferences
Domestic Polarity
Hiqh Low
International
High
A
Ideological considerations gain in 
importance compared to political 
and economic considerations.
B
Domestic considerations will be 
decisive. When political and 
economic interests clash with 
ideological interests, the former will 
prevail.
Polarity
Low
C
International considerations will be 
decisive. When political and 
economic interests clash with 
ideological interests, the former 
will prevail.
D
Political and economic 
considerations, both domestic and 
international, will determine 
national preferences.
In two of the possible combinations of domestic and international polarity, Boxes B and C, 
expectations based on the domestic and international polarity regarding the primacy of the 
domestic or international interests are mutually reinforcing.
Box B -  the scenario of low domestic polarity and high international polarity -  represents 
the case in which the State is confronted with relatively weak international constraints and 
strong domestic constraints. The low domestic polarity forces the State to take its domestic 
interests into account, and, due to the relatively weak international constraints, the State is 
provided with the opportunity to do this. I therefore expect that in cases of low domestic polarity 
combined with high international polarity, domestic considerations will prevail. Within the 
domestic dimension of State interests, domestic political and economic considerations should 
gain the upper hand.23 Figure 2.2 depicts the causal model for box B.24
23 However, this does not imply that ideological considerations are of no importance. They are relatively\ess 
im portant and political and econom ic considerations are likely to carry the day if they clash w ith the 
dom estic ideological interests. Furthermore, even in case of low  dom estic polarity, dom estic ideological 
considerations can gain im portance w hen the dom estic process variables confront the governm ent w ith 
relatively low  political and econom ic costs. I will pay more attention to this possibility in Section 2.6.1.
24 The thickness of the arrows indicates the degree of influence of the independent variable in question on 
the dependent variable. The thicker the arrow, the stronger the expected influence. W ithin the rectangles 
of both the international and the dom estic interests, the hierarchy in interests is indicated by printing the 
relatively more im portant set of interests in bold.
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Figure 2.2: Causal model under conditions o f high international polarity combined with low  
domestic polarity (Box B)
2
Box C -  high domestic polarity and low international polarity -  represents cases in which the 
State is confronted with strong international constraints and relatively weak domestic 
constraints. Due to the strong international constraints, the State is unable to ignore its 
international interests. Since domestic constraints are relatively weak, the State is provided with 
the opportunity to give priority to its international interests. I therefore expect that where there 
is high domestic polarity combined with low international polarity, international considerations 
will prevail. Within the international dimension of state interests, political and economic 
interests will carry relatively more weight than the ideological interests. Figure 2.3 depicts the 
causal model for box C.
Figure 2.3: Causal model under conditions o f low international polarity combined with high 
domestic polarity (Box C)
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In cases in boxes A and D the structural variables do not allow for clear-cut predictions 
concerning the primacy of either domestic or international considerations. Box A -  high 
international polarity and high domestic polarity -  represents cases in which the State is neither 
confronted with strong international constraints nor strong domestic constraints. What will a 
State do when it finds itself in this situation? What will determine its preferences? On the basis 
of the expectations of how a State will assign priority within both the international and the 
domestic dimension of State interests, we can predict that the State will be inclined to prioritize 
its ideological interests over its political and economic interests. Figure 2.4 depicts the causal 
model for box A.
Figure 2.4: Causal model under conditions o f high international polarity combined with high 
domestic polarity (Box A)
Box D -  low international polarity and low domestic polarity -  represents cases in which the 
State is heavily constrained by both the international structure and the domestic structure. These 
are the cases in which the State finds itself in an extremely difficult position. It has to take into 
account both its international interests and its domestic interests. With respect to the priority 
within both the international and domestic dimension of State interests, I expect -  based on the 
low domestic and international polarity -  that political and economic considerations will carry 
the day. The State has to seek a compromise between its domestic and international political 
and economic interests. This is likely to result in a long, drawn-out preference-formation 
process. Figure 2.5 depicts the causal model for box D.
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Figure 2.5: Causal model under conditions o f tow international polarity combined with tow 
domestic polarity (Box D)
2
2.6 The Process of Preference Formation
The three previous sections have developed a parsimonious model from which I, on the basis of 
two structural variables, have derived hypotheses on the expected primacy of particular State 
interests (domestic vs. international, political and economic vs. ideological) in the process of 
national preference formation. These structural variables both constrain and enable, leaving the 
State with a number of policy options from which to choose.25 Process variables -  variables that 
only take on certain values in actual interaction processes -  enable expectations to be 
formulated concerning the direction in which the balance is likely to tilt under different 
circumstances. Two process variables will be introduced in this section: societal mobilization or 
pressure, and governmental sensitivity. These two process variables will be discussed in Section
2.6.1, resulting in the formulation of Hypothesis 5. In Section 2.6.2 I will elaborate on the 
potential effects of these variables under different combinations of domestic and international 
polarity (Boxes A, B, C and D from Section 2.5).
25 In line w ith Putnam 's two-level gam es, a governm ent that has a w eak pow er position in relation to 
society may choose to fight for another preference in the international arena than the preference that 
w ould be based on the national political costs and benefits, if this other preference entails a policy that 
w ould strengthen the governm ent's position in relation to society (see also Van der Vleuten 2001, 55-56). 
Furthermore, the governm ent could use a tied hards strategy, convincing its international negotiating 
partners it is unable to make additional concessions due to dom estic constraints, or, conversely, a cu ttin g  
sla ck strategy, persuading dom estic actors that the outcom e reached w as the optim al result given the 
strong pressure exerted by its negotiating partners.
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2.6.1. The degree of societal mobilization and governmental sensitivity
The variable of societal mobilization or pressure relates to the domestic political costs and 
benefits that are attached to different behavioural options. To some extent, mobilization is a 
prerequisite for societal influence. As levels of mobilization rise, the political costs or benefits the 
government is confronted with increase. However, similar degrees of mobilization need not 
produce the same constraints for governments under all circumstances. Mobilization becomes 
more effective to the extent that domestic polarity is lower, and less effective when domestic 
polarity is higher. This implies that in case of high domestic polarity, a higher degree of societal 
mobilization is required in relative terms in order to create similar constraints on government 
than in a situation of low domestic polarity. As long as societal mobilization is unidirectional -  
the mobilized societal groups are confronting the government with similar demands -  increased 
mobilization is likely to lead to an increase in societal influence. However, if mobilization is 
multidirectional, indicating a lack of unity within society, this will reduce the influence of societal 
pressure in the process of preference formation, thereby increasing the government's room for 
manoeuvre. Finally, a policy proposal must be perceived to affect the interests of societal groups 
to a certain extent in order for them to mobilize in favour or against that policy proposal. The 
policy proposal can affect them either because it provides benefits or because it imposes costs 
(Milner 1997, 63). When the effects of a proposal are uncertain or unclear, mobilization is less 
likely and the domestic political and economic considerations will diminish in importance relative 
to domestic ideological considerations (for a similar argument see Rankin 2001, 371).
Transnational mobilization -  the mobilization of international non-state actors -  can 
increase the effectiveness of domestic societal mobilization if the transnational actors 'throw 
their weight behind domestic pressure' (Van der Vleuten 2005, 457; see also Keck and Sikkink 
1998, 12). In this manner, coalitions between domestic and transnational actors 'result in the 
sandwiching of domestic state institutions, putting them simultaneously under international and 
domestic pressure' (Van Esch 2001, 114, emphasis in original). In this research, transnational 
mobilization is thus not treated as an independent international variable, but as a variable that 
affects the effectiveness of the domestic process variable of societal mobilization.
The second process variable concerns governmental sensitivity. When a government is 
more sensitive, it will attach greater importance to its domestic political and economic interests. 
Sensitivity increases particularly when elections are pending (Van der Vleuten 2001, 53), and 
when the position of the government is unstable (e.g. as a result of domestic conflicts or censure 
votes in parliament). In such circumstances, societal mobilization will relatively easily result in 
political costs and/or benefits for the government and increase the importance of domestic 
political and economic considerations. As such, increasing sensitivity has a similar effect as 
decreasing domestic polarity and can be conceptualized as a non-institutional factor influencing 
domestic polarity.
On the basis of the information provided above, a fifth hypothesis can be formulated, related to 
the impact of process variables on preference formation.
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Hypothesis5  The higher the degree of societal mobilization and governmental sensitivity, the 
greater the probability that the State will attach more importance to its domestic political and 
economic interests than to its domestic ideological and international interests.
2.6.2 The potential effects of process variables under different combinations of domestic 
and international polarity
Although the general expectation that higher degrees of societal mobilization and governmental 
sensitivity will lead to a greater role of domestic political and economic considerations in the 
process of preference formation is in principle applicable to all the cases in this research, the 
specific effects may differ per case due to the variation in domestic and international polarity.
In Box A (high international polarity combined with high domestic polarity), high degrees 
of societal and transnational mobilization, particularly when combined with a high degree of 
governmental sensitivity, may neutralize the expectation based on domestic and international 
polarity alone. This expectation was that ideological considerations would be most salient, 
because both the domestic and the international structural constraints were weak. In case of 
high degrees of societal mobilization and governmental sensitivity, the process variables 
increase domestic constraints, inducing the State to take more account of its domestic political 
interests. Low degrees of societal mobilization and governmental sensitivity are not likely to be 
consequential in Box A, as these values of the process variables merely reinforce the expectation 
based on the structural variables.
In Box B (high international polarity combined with low domestic polarity), high degrees of 
societal mobilization and governmental sensitivity underscore the expectation based on the 
structural variables, that domestic political and economic considerations will prevail in the 
preference-formation process. Here, high values on the process variable contribute to the 
political and economic constraints on the government. A more consequential effect (in the sense 
that it leads to the adaptation of original expectations based on the structural variables) for 
cases in Box B, may be expected when the degree of mobilization is low or absent altogether 
and governmental sensitivity is limited. In cases of low domestic polarity, relatively limited 
degrees of societal mobilization are likely to affect State preference formation. Nevertheless, an 
absence of pressure (or totally contradictory pressures exerted by different groups), will lessen 
the domestic political constraints on the government and increase the relative importance of 
domestic ideological and international considerations in the preference-formation process.
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Table 2.3: The impact o f process variables on the expected effects o f different combinations of 
international and domestic polarity on State preferences
International
Polarity
High
Low
Domestic Polarity
High Low
A
Original expectation: Ideological 
considerations gain in importance 
compared to political and economic 
considerations.
• High degrees of societal 
mobilization and governmental 
sensitivity may neutralize the 
original expectation and result 
in increased importance of 
domestic political and economic 
interests.
• Low degrees of societal 
mobilization and governmental 
sensitivity underscore the 
original expectation based on 
domestic and international 
polarity.____________________
C
Original expectation: International 
considerations will be decisive.
• High degrees of governmental 
sensitivity and societal 
mobilization may neutralize the 
original expectation and result 
in increased importance of 
domestic political and economic 
interests.
• Low degrees of societal 
mobilization and governmental 
sensitivity underscore the 
original expectation based on 
domestic and international 
polarity.____________________
B
Original expectation: Domestic 
considerations will be decisive.
• High governmental sensitivity in 
combination with sufficient 
degrees of societal mobilization 
increases the domestic political 
and economic constraints and, 
therefore, underscores the 
original expectation.
• Low degrees of societal 
mobilization and governmental 
sensitivity may neutralize the 
original expectation and result in 
increased importance of 
domestic ideological and 
international interests.
D
Original expectation: Political and 
economic considerations, both 
domestic and international, will 
determine national preferences.
• High degrees of governmental 
sensitivity and societal 
mobilization will tilt the balance 
in the direction of domestic 
interests.
• Low degrees of societal 
mobilization and governmental 
sensitivity will tilt the balance in 
favour of international political 
and economic interest.
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With respect to cases in Box C (low international polarity combined with high domestic polarity), 
as was the case in Box A, high degrees of societal mobilization and governmental sensitivity 
may neutralize the expectation based on domestic and international polarity alone. In this case 
the expectation was that international considerations (particularly political and economic 
considerations) would prevail. If process variables increase domestic constraints by a 
considerable degree, then the government will have to take account of its political interests, 
notwithstanding the high domestic polarity. Low degrees of societal mobilization and 
governmental sensitivity in Box C underscore the original expectation based on domestic and 
international polarity.
Finally, in Box D (low international polarity combined with low domestic polarity) process 
variables are likely to tilt the balance in the direction of either domestic or international 
interests. On the basis of the structural variables the expectation for cases in this Box was that 
the State would seek to balance its domestic and international political and economic interests. 
Based on the process variables, it can be expected that the higher the degrees of societal 
mobilization and governmental sensitivity, the higher the domestic political and economic costs 
or benefits, and the more important the domestic interest will be in the preference-formation 
process. If domestic and transnational mobilization as well as governmental sensitivity are low 
or absent, international political and economic interest are more likely to prevail. The effects of 
the two process variables on cases from the different Boxes are summarized in Table 2.4.
2.7 Conclusion
It is important both in empirical and theoretical terms to develop a theoretical framework that 
enables predictions concerning the primacy of either domestic or international interests in the 
preference-formation process. Taking the structural variables of international polarity and 
domestic polarity as the point of departure, expectations have been formulated with respect to 
the primacy of domestic or international interests, and also on the priority of political and 
economic as compared to ideological considerations within the international and domestic 
interests in the preference-formation process. Variation in these structural variables (either high 
or low domestic polarity and high or low international polarity) strengthens or weakens 
international and domestic constraints, resulting in different expectations on the primacy of 
particular interests. When there is high domestic polarity and low international polarity, the 
State is confronted with relatively strong international constraints and weak domestic 
constraints; international interests are therefore expected to prevail. On the opposite side, when 
there are strong domestic constraints and weak international constraints (low domestic polarity 
combined with high international polarity), domestic interests are likely to prevail. When the 
State is confronted neither with strong international constraints, nor with strong domestic 
constraints (high domestic polarity combined with high international polarity) it is expected to 
base its preferences primarily on its ideological interests. When both domestic and international 
constraints are strong (meaning a low domestic polarity combined with a low international
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polarity), this is likely to result in a long and slow preference-formation process during which the 
State seeks a compromise between its domestic and international political and economic 
interests.
When we add two process variables -  the degree of societal and transnational 
mobilization, and the degree of governmental sensitivity -  we can be still more specific. This 
enables us to identify conditions under which the original prediction based on the combination 
of domestic and international polarity is likely to be neutralized or, on the contrary, underscored. 
In cases of high domestic polarity and high international polarity, as well as in cases of high 
domestic polarity and low international polarity, high degrees of societal mobilization and 
governmental sensitivity are expected to neutralize the original expectation and increase the 
importance of domestic political interests, while low degrees of societal mobilization and 
governmental sensitivity underscore the original expectation. In cases of low domestic polarity 
and high international polarity, high degrees of societal mobilization and governmental 
sensitivity underscore the original expectation of dominance of domestic interests, while low 
degrees of mobilization and governmental sensitivity may neutralize this original expectation 
and result in the increased significance of international interests. Finally, in cases of low 
domestic polarity combined with low international polarity, process variables enable 
specification of the original expectation of the importance of both domestic and international 
political and economic interests. When the degrees of societal mobilization and governmental 
sensitivity are high, domestic political and economic considerations will prevail, while in case of 
low degrees of societal mobilization and governmental sensitivity, international political and 
economic interests will dominate.
The expectations derived from the theoretical framework will be tested in the empirical 
chapters on preference formation in France and Germany with respect to the liberalization of 
agricultural trade during the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations (1986-1993). Before turning 
to these empirical chapters, the next chapter will focus on the methodological aspects of this 
research. In that chapter I will explain why German and French preference formation with 
respect to the GATT Uruguay Round are appropriate cases with the help of which to test the 
research hypotheses, as well as how the relevant concepts will be operationalized in the context 
of this research.
CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH STRATEGY AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter presented a theoretical model that aims to explain the relative influence of 
domestic and international factors on state preferences, or, more specifically, the conditions 
under which international factors will gain precedence over domestic factors or vice versa. This 
chapter defines the research strategy and the methods applied in order to test the hypotheses 
derived from the theoretical model. Section 3.2 will make the case for a comparative case study 
as the most appropriate research design for this research, and present the four cases selected. 
The variables of the theoretical model are operationalized in Section 3.3, while Section 3.4 
focuses on the conceptualization and assessment of influence. Subsequently, Section 3.5 
provides an overview of the data sources and analytical methods used in the empirical part of 
the research. Section 3.6 elaborates on what kinds of evidence will be seen as corroborating or 
refuting the hypotheses. The main findings of this chapter are summarized in the conclusion.
3.2 Research Design and Strategy
3.2.1 Case study method
The research strategy applied in this project is the case study method. Many different definitions 
of case study research are applied in the social sciences, the most familiar one probably being 
Yin's definition of a case study as 'an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-live context' (2003: 13, see also Swanborn 1996, 22). Although 
this definition may be a good starting point when it comes to defining a case study in general, it 
is a rather broad conceptualization that does not sufficiently capture the aim of using case 
studies here. The aim of using case studies in this research is to test the theoretical framework 
set out in the previous chapter by means of conducting several case studies.26 This is more in 
line with Alexander George and Andrew Bennett's (2004, 5) definition of the case study method 
as 'the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode' in order to test and develop 
theoretical explanations (George and Bennett 2004, 5). This definition relates case studies to 
the testing of theoretical propositions and views cases as instances of a more general 'class of
26 Case studies can also serve a theory-developing purpose to the extent that the outcom es of case studies 
can lead to changes in the theoretical fram ew ork w hich  can subsequently be tested in new  case studies.
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events' to which these theoretical propositions apply (George and Bennett 2004, 17-18; cf. 
Gerring 2007, 19-20 and 37).
Now that the definition and the goal of the case study method have been established, we 
can turn to the question of why this method is the most suitable in this particular research 
project, which investigates the conditions under which states will prioritize either international 
or domestic considerations in the process of preference formation. Chapter 2 elaborated a 
theoretical framework, establishing independent and intervening variables and how various 
combinations of these variables lead to different expectations with respect to the primacy of 
either international or domestic considerations in the preference-formation process. The testing 
of this theoretical framework requires in depth investigations into the preference-formation 
processes that occur within states. Since case studies enable the examination of 'the operation 
of causal mechanisms in individual cases in detail' (George and Bennett 2004, 21) and 'trace 
changes over time' (Yin 2003, 123), the case study method appears to be very appropriate for 
this research. Furthermore, using case studies not only allows us to determine whether specific 
outcomes are congruent with certain theoretical expectations, they also enable us to evaluate 
the causal process that has been proposed by applying the method of process tracing (see 
Section 3.2.4). It is sometimes argued by those employing statistical methods that the case 
study method does not allow causal inferences to be made. However, case studies do in fact 
enable us to do this, provided the cases are selected rigorously within a cross-case design (an 
issue which I will address in more detail below) (George and Bennett 2004, 137-140; Gerring 
2007, 42 and 44).
Although using statistical methods to test the hypotheses derived from the theoretical 
framework would not be impossible (a large number of preference-formation processes are 
available), a large-N study would be less appropriate for this particular research. The process of 
preference formation in general, and specifically the causal process by which particular factors 
lead to certain preferences, are central to this research project. The case study method is better 
suited to study these causal mechanisms than a large-N study. Unlike case studies, large-N 
studies offer insufficient information about such processes and do not allow us to analyse them. 
We may conclude that, at this stage, the best way to proceed is by conducting case studies. If a 
large number of case studies -  more than the four case studies used in this dissertation -  were 
to provide corroborating evidence for the causal mechanisms that have been hypothesized, then 
statistical analysis (which does not question the validity of the hypothesized causal mechanisms) 
could be performed to test the theoretical framework.
3.2.2 Multiple case analysis
The selection of cases has been guided by the theoretical framework elaborated in Chapter 2. 
Within this theoretical framework, two variables -  international polarity and domestic polarity -  
are of particular importance, since these indicate the extent to which a state is internationally 
constrained on the one hand and domestically constrained on the other hand. Based on the
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possible combinations of these two variables, a two by two matrix was presented with four 
combinations, on the basis of which different outcomes of the preference-formation processes 
were hypothesized (see Section 2.5). The matrix is reproduced in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Domestic polarity, international polarity, and state preferences
Domestic Polarity
High Low
International
High
A
Ideological considerations gain in 
importance compared to political 
and economic considerations.
B
Domestic considerations will be 
decisive. When political and 
economic interests clash with 
ideological interests, the former 
will prevail.
Polarity
Low
C
International considerations will be 
decisive. When political and 
economic interests clash with 
ideological interests, the former 
will prevail.
D
Political and economic 
considerations, both domestic and 
international, will determine 
national preferences.
3
In order to test the theory, cases that provide variation on both domestic and international 
polarity need to be selected. In other words, all the boxes should be filled in order to be able to 
establish the explanatory power of the theoretical framework, because on the basis of this 
framework a specific outcome is expected for each of the possible configurations of domestic 
and international polarity. If my assertion is that in cases of high international polarity and low 
domestic polarity (Box B of Table 3.1), domestic factors will be more important in the 
preference-formation process than in cases where domestic polarity is high, studying only cases 
from quadrant B would not be a sufficient test of the hypothesis. It would be necessary to 
include cases which combine high international polarity and high domestic polarity. In that way,
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if domestic factors also turn out to be dominant in these cases, it could be concluded that low 
domestic polarity does not fully explain the dominance of domestic factors and it would be 
questionable whether the variable of domestic polarity sufficiently explained the relative impact 
of domestic and international factors on state preferences. Similarly, in order to verify whether 
the variable of international polarity actually influences preference formation in the manner 
hypothesized, both cases with high international polarity and cases with low international 
polarity would need to be included in the comparative case study in order to be able to fully test 
the theoretical framework.
3.2.3 Case Selection
France and Germany were selected as cases on the basis of the differences in their domestic 
polarity. In France, domestic polarity is generally considered to be high, reflecting a state- 
dominated domestic structure. In Germany, meanwhile, domestic polarity is considered to be 
low, reflecting a society-dominated domestic structure (cf. Katzenstein 1978, 232-234; Krasner 
1978, 58; Mastanduno et ai 1989, 470; Risse-Kappen 1991, 492 and 504; Skidmore 1993, 
207; Van der Vleuten 2001, 87). Section 3.3.1 will discuss the domestic polarity in France and 
Germany in further detail. France and Germany thus vary on one of the key explanatory 
variables in the theoretical framework, although they are comparable in other important 
respects.27 Their position in the international system is comparable (both are middle powers), as 
is the importance of their role within Europe: the Franco-German axis is generally considered to 
be the engine of European integration (cf. Cogan 2003, 89). Furthermore, agricultural groups 
are considered politically important actors in both Germany and in France, although employment 
in the farming sector decreased dramatically in the decades after World War II (cf. Keeler 1987). 
The selection of France and Germany as cases implies a most similar design. In most similar 
multiple case study designs, the cases selected are similar with respect to all the theoretically 
relevant independent variables except one: the independent variable which is expected to result 
in a difference in the value of the dependent variable (George and Bennet 2004, 81; Gerring 
2007, 131-139). Although it is impossible to find identical cases and control for all potentially 
explanatory variables, one can control for the variables which are considered important in the 
theoretical framework applied. The cases selected are thus 'theoretically' most similar. 
Furthermore, comparisons across cases can also be complemented with within-case analysis by 
means of the methods of congruence and process tracing. I will discuss these methods in 
Section 3.2.4.
The Uruguay Round of GATT-negotiations (1986-1993), including the run-up to this new 
trade round (1982-1985) was selected as the period in which to investigate French and German 
preference formation relating to the agricultural negotiating position of the EC, because it
27 In John Gerring's term inology this implies that w ithin the 'diverse' (m ultiple) case study design, I selected 
extreme cases of low  versus high dom estic polarity.
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provides variation on the variable of international polarity.28 Until the end of the Cold War, the 
international system was characterized by bipolarity (high international polarity). After the end 
of the Cold War -  at least until 1993 -  the international system can best be categorized as 
multipolar, a claim I will substantiate more thoroughly in Section 3.3.1. In the terminology of 
George and Bennett, this would lead to the division of a 'single longitudinal case into two -  the 
'before' case and an 'after' case that follows a discontinuous change in an important variable' 
(George and Bennett 2004, 81).29 The French and German cases are thus each divided into two 
periods: before the end of the Cold War and after the end of the Cold War. An important 
question which needs to be addressed, however, is whether the polarity of the international 
system is the only theoretically relevant variable which has changed after the end of the Cold 
War. An alternative variable that immediately comes to mind is the reunification of Germany, 
which also introduces variation between the two time periods. We now need to assess whether 
German reunification resulted in important changes in the value of the variables of the 
theoretical framework. I would argue that this is not the case: domestic polarity remained low 
and Germany retained its middle-power status within the world order. Upon reunification, the 
large-scale East German farms became part of the German agricultural sector, which had 
previously been characterized by small-scale farming (Führer 1997, 62), but this affected neither 
the state's domestic polarity nor the relations between government and farm groups. 
Undoubtedly, Germany's geopolitical power capabilities increased following reunification,30 
leading many Realists to expect a shift in Germany's foreign policy style towards power politics 
-  the exercise of power in order to influence outcomes at the international level (Mearsheimer 
1990a, Layne 1993). However, these expectations failed to materialize in the early 1990s. 
Shortly after German reunification, Kohl reconfirmed the importance Germany attached to the 
Franco-German axis as the engine of European integration (New York Times 29.3.1992). Volker 
Rittberger and Frank Schimmelfennig argue that between 1990 and 1993, German foreign 
policy continued to 'display a preference for multilateral coordination' and 'great eagerness to 
reach agreement with its Western European partners and a strong commitment to deepening 
the Western European integration' (Rittberger and Schimmelfennig 1997, 5-7). Hans-Peter 
Schwarz (1994) and Hacke (1993), who -  in line with Realist thinking -  had expected Germany 
to adopt power politics and take up the role of the central power in Europe, were forced to 
admit that Germany did not 'bring its power to bear on its partners' (Rittberger and
28 Chapter 4, w hich provides a historical overview of these negotiations, will show  that initiatives for a new  
trade round were developed as early as 1982, but the actual Uruguay Round itself did not start until 1986.
29 A  before-after design is often regarded a stronger version of a most sim ilar case design. However, even 
'before' and 'after' cases often do not perfectly match, because 'other im portant variables may also change 
in value from  the "before" case to the "after" case' (George and Bennett 2004, 81). Here, w ithin-case 
analysis may prove helpful again to check w hether variation in other relevant variables could account for 
differences in the value of the dependent variable.
30 However, w ith respect to Germ any's econom ic capabilities, total GDP only increased by 1 0 %  after 
reunification and indicators such as GDP per capita decreased and the balance of paym ents deteriorated 
(Rittberger 1992, 21 1).
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Schimmelfennig 1997, 5). Despite Germany's undeniable increase in power, it did not challenge 
the position of France in the European Union. It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that 
international polarity was the variable that changed most significantly between the first period 
of research (1982-1989) and the second (1990-1993). This results in a total of four cases, filling 
all the quadrants of Table 3.2.
Each case serves a specific purpose within the case study design because it 'predicts 
contrasting results' (Yin 2003, 47). Case selection is thus based on a replication logic, the 
essence of which is the assumption that similar values of the theoretically relevant explanatory 
variables will lead to similar outcomes. As a consequence, after conducting the comparative 
case study, generalizations can be made at the level of the theory under test. The comparative 
case study provides information on whether the theoretical assertions are empirically valid. If 
this turns out to be the case, the results can be generalized to other instances of events to which 
the theory applies. Outcomes of this research project can therefore be generalized to preference­
formation processes in liberal democratic middle power states.
Table 3.2: Domestic polarity, international polarity, and the four cases
Domestic Polarity
High Low
International
Polarity
High
France: U r u g u a y  R o un d 1 9 8 2 - 1 9 8 9 G e r m a n y : U r u g u a y  Ro und  1 9 8 2 - 1 9 8 9
Low
France: U r u g u a y  R o un d 1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 3 G e r m a n y : U r u g u a y  Ro und  1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 3
3.2.4  W ithin-case analysis
Within-case analysis will be used in this research to complement the comparison across cases in 
order to arrive at more robust causal inferences. I will make use of a 'pattern matching logic', 
which encompasses a comparison of empirically observed patterns with predicted patterns (Yin 
2003, 116). Two subtypes of pattern matching are the congruence method and the process 
tracing method. Mahoney (2003, 363) emphasizes the importance of both when he states that:
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An important part of causal analysis involves establishing that there is some 
association between explanatory variables and an outcome variable. Yet, for many 
comparative historical analysts, an equally important part involves identifying the 
causal mechanisms that link explanatory variables with the outcome variable.
The congruence method is very straightforward. The investigator 'establishes the value of the 
independent and dependent variables in the case at hand, and then compares the observed 
value of the dependent variable with that predicted by the theory, given the observed 
independent variables' (George and Bennett 2004, 179). If the empirical and the theorized 
patterns match, then a possible causal relation has been found. In this research project, using 
the congruence method first of all means establishing the domestic and international political, 
economic and ideological costs associated with different policy options (e.g. liberalizing 
agricultural trade as opposed to implementing protectionist measures). Subsequently, given the 
specific combination of international and domestic polarity in the case in question, and the 
theoretical expectations of whether domestic or international considerations will prevail on the 
basis of the values of the variables, the value of the dependent variable (the preference) can be 
predicted and contrasted with the empirical findings. It should be noted, however, that 
congruence between independent and dependent variables does not establish a causal relation 
between the two. Such a correlation may be spurious.
The problem of spuriousness can be addressed by applying the method of process tracing. 
This method 'attempts to identify the intervening causal process -  the causal chain and causal 
mechanism -  between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent 
variable' (George and Bennett 2004, 206). It can therefore assess whether the consistency 
noted by means of, for example, the congruence method is spurious or causal, thereby 
enhancing internal validity (Yin 2003, 36). Process tracing is thus an important complement to 
controlled comparison because it establishes whether 'potential causal variables in the 
imperfectly matched cases can, or cannot, be ruled out as having causal significance' (George 
and Bennett 2004, 214). Furthermore, the method of process tracing may be appropriately 
combined with a decision-making method of assessing influence (see Section 3.4), because this 
method 'aims at analyzing decisions in specific issue-areas, in order to reconstruct the 
contribution of players to the final outcome' (Arts 1998, 76). Aggarwal used the method of 
process tracing in this way, arguing that: '[i]n process tracing, the decision making procedure in 
a negotiation is systematically analysed with an eye to identifying the degree to which 
participants appear to respond to international systemic or other constraints' (Aggarwal 
1985,16).
3.3. Operationalization of Variables
Before data can be collected and analysed, measures must be established for the variables in 
the theoretical framework. I will first elaborate on how domestic polarity, international polarity
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and the relative position of a state in the international system will be measured. France and 
Germany will then be classified with respect to their degree of domestic polarity and their 
relative position in the international system. The period of the Uruguay Round (1982-1993) will 
be classified with respect to the variable of international polarity. The second group of variables 
to be operationalized concerns the process variables indicated in the theoretical framework: the 
degree of societal mobilization and the degree of governmental sensitivity. Thirdly, measures will 
be developed to assess the international political, economic and ideological costs and benefits, 
on the one hand, and the domestic political, economic and ideological costs and benefits on the 
other hand. It is important that these variables are measured in a similar manner in each case 
study, so that the case studies can be compared easily. On the basis of these costs and benefits, 
and by taking into account the values of the intervening variables, theoretical expectations can 
be formulated on the preference that the state will defend in the international arena. These 
theoretical expectations are subsequently contrasted with the preference that the state defended 
in reality.
3.3.1 Structural variables
3.3.1.1 France and Germany's power positions in the international system
In order to establish whether France and Germany should be regarded as great powers, middle 
powers or small powers, I have made use of the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) 
of the Correlates of War Project and the GDP (Gross Domestic Product) measures taken from 
Angus Maddison's Historical Statistics of the World Economy. The CINC is based on an average 
of relative capabilities across six variables: total population, urban population, iron and steel 
production, energy consumption, military personnel, and military expenditure. The variables of 
iron and steel production and energy consumption are often regarded as indicators of a state's 
economic development, but they fail to include the service sector, which is an important part of 
most developed economies. For this reason, I added the measure of overall GDP. Table 3.3 
shows the scores of the United States, the Soviet Union/Russia, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Belgium on the CINC index, as well as their GDP. Assuming that the United 
States and the Soviet Union are superpowers, and that Belgium and the Netherlands small 
powers, the French and German scores should be substantially lower than the superpower 
scores and substantially higher than the small power scores in order for them to be classified as 
middle powers.
Table 3.3 does indeed show that the CINC scores for the United States and the Soviet 
Union are substantially higher than the French and German scores, while the Dutch and Belgian 
scores are substantially lower than the French and German scores. With the exception of the 
Soviet scores, the GDP patterns are consistent with the CINC scores. The explanation for the low 
scores of the Soviet Union on GDP could be that the Soviet Union was always principally a 
military power, while its command economy and lack of international trade limited its potential
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for economic growth. In addition, the collapse of the Soviet Union was also detrimental to the 
economic growth in the ex-Soviet states. Based on their overall capabilities, Germany and 
France may thus be qualified as middle powers.
Table 3.3.: Correlates of War Composite Index of National Capability and GDP
CINC
1986
GDP
1986
CINC
1990
GDP
1990
CINC
1993
GDP
1993
United States 13,57 5.110.480 14,10 5.803.200 15,65 6.14.210
USSR/Russia31 17,37 1.940.336 12,82 1.151.040 5,70 853.593
Germany 2,55 1.202.151 2,98 1.264.438 3,09 1.350.421
France 1,81 898.129 1,95 1.026.491 2,16 1.048.641
The Netherlands 0,60 227.570 0,62 258.059 0,68 271.352
Belgium 0,49 149.854 0,50 171.442 0,52 175.552
3
The CINC-scores indicate the relative measure of state material capabilities figured as a percentage of the total
capabilities of all the states in the system
Source CINC: Correlates of War National Material CapabilitiesData.
Source GDP: Angus Maddison's Historical Statistics of the World Economy: 1-2006AD.32 GDP in millions of 
US$.
3.3.1.2 International polarity
In order to measure international polarity -  the degree to which power is concentrated in the 
international system -  we need to establish whether the international system is unipolar, bipolar 
or multipolar. The smaller the number of poles, the higher international polarity. Furthermore, in 
periods of power transition during which lack of clarity concerning the precise division of 
capabilities leads to greater uncertainty, international polarity is regarded to be low (see Section 
2.3.2).
The period of the Uruguay Round (1982-1993) must be divided into two periods for the 
purposes of assessing international polarity: before and after the demise of the Soviet Union. 
From the mid-1950s until the year 1989, the international system is usually classified as bipolar, 
with the United States and the Soviet Union being the two superpowers. Scholars failed to agree 
whether the international system at the beginning of the 1990s, following the fall of the Berlin 
Wall and the demise of the Soviet Union, was unipolar or multipolar. On the one hand, John 
Mearsheimer (1990a), Christopher Layne (1993) and Waltz (1997) argued that the political 
international system was on its way to multipolarity. In the words of Waltz (1997, 915):
31 For 1986, I included the GDP for the USSR in total. For 1990 and 1993, I included the G DP for Russia, as 
the USSR started to fall apart in that period. The G D P for the USSR as a w hole in 1990 and 1993 w ould 
respectively have been 1 .987.995  and 1.436.101 million dollars.
32 http://ww w .ggdc.net/m addison/
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'Multipolarity is developing before our eyes: to all but the myopic, it can already be seen on the 
horizon'. Charles Krauthammer (1990), on the other hand, argued that the international system 
was unipolar, with the United States in the role of hegemon. The period between 1990 and 
1993 in any case appears to have been a period of transition during which it was not clear in 
which direction polarity was developing. Since a period of power transition involves a high 
degree of uncertainty and instability, it most closely resembles what I classify as low 
international polarity, despite the lack of agreement on whether the international system was in 
fact multipolar or not.
3.3.1.3 Domestic polarity
Three institutional indicators will be used to measure domestic polarity: the degree of 
centralization of executive power, executive-legislative relations, and the degree to which 
interest mediation is institutionalized (see Section 2.4.2.). I will now turn to each indicator in 
turn and classify France and Germany with respect to these indicators.
The centralization of executive power is first of all measured on the basis of whether the 
state is unitary or federal (compare Lijphart, 1999: 185-200). A  unitary state is related to a high 
degree of domestic polarity, while a federal state is related to a low degree of polarity. In 
addition, if we are dealing with a presidential system in a unitary state, we need to establish 
whether the President and Prime Minister belong to the same party or coalition. If this is not the 
case, the centralization of power and domestic polarity will diminish. Finally, we need to assess 
whether individual ministers enjoy a high degree of decision-making authority within their 
domains or whether the leader of the government is free to intervene in the domains of 
individual ministers. The former situation is associated with a lower degree of centralization and 
thus with a lower degree of domestic polarity.
Germany is a federal state, while France is a unitary state (for French and German scores 
with regard to centralization indexes see Lijphart 1999, 189 and Strom et al 2004, 668). 
However, during periods of cohabitation in France, when the President and the government 
have different party affiliations, executive power is divided between President and government. 
This was the case in France between 1986 and 1988, as well as from March 1993 onwards. In 
Germany, individual ministers enjoy a high degree of decision-making authority in their domains 
on the basis of the Ressortprinzip (Thuner and Stoiber 2002, 564), while in France executive 
power is mainly centralized in the hands of the President and the Prime Minister (cf. Kessler 
1999, 192-196).
Executive-legislative relations can be characterized by executive dominance, an executive­
legislative balance or by legislative dominance. The classification of a state into one of these 
categories depends on whether the government has a stable majority in parliament or not, and 
on the extent of parliamentary competences. When governments have a stable majority in 
parliament (in both chambers, in the case of a strong bicameral system) and parliament disposes 
of extensive powers, an executive-legislative balance exists. The combination of a majority
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government and limited parliamentary powers results in executive-legislative relations that are 
dominated by the executive. In the case of minority governments or governments with a narrow 
majority in parliament (in one or both of the chambers in a strong bicameral system) and 
extensive parliamentary powers, executive-legislative relations are legislative-dominated. The 
combination of a minority government and limited parliamentary powers results in an executive­
legislative balance. As Table 3.4 shows, executive dominance is related to a high degree of 
domestic polarity (a score of 2 points), executive-legislative balance to an intermediate degree (a 
score of 1 point) and legislative-dominated relations to a low degree of domestic polarity (a 
score of 0 points).
Table 3.4: Executive-legislative relations and domestic polarity
Stable majority in 
parliament?
Extensive parliamentary 
powers?
Total score Executive-legislative
relations
Yes (1) Yes (0) 1 Executive-legislative
balance
Yes (1) No (1) 2 Executive dominance
No (0) Yes (0) 0 Legislative
dominance
No (0) No (1) 1 Executive-legislative
balance
The German parliamentary system is characterized by strong bicameralism. The upper chamber, 
the Bundesrat, has extensive powers including the power of veto in specific issue areas. During 
the Uruguay Round, the German government enjoyed a stable majority in the lower chamber, 
the Bundestag,.33 However, in the Bundesrat, the government only enjoyed majority support until 
1989 (Rudzio 2003, 328). In 1990, the opposition won control over the Bundesrat and from 
1991 onwards the picture is mixed, ranging from a small majority for the governing coalition 
between November 1990 and May 1991 to a minority from May 1991 until the end of the 
Uruguay Round (Schwarze 2001, 318; Saalfeld 2005, 63-64).34 Executive-legislative relations 
were thus balanced in Germany until 1990, after which they were legislative-dominated.
Although France has a bicameral legislature consisting of a lower chamber AAssembléê) and 
an upper chamber (Sénat), the powers of the Sénat are limited when compared to the powers of 
the German Bundesrat. The Sénat has no veto powers (Tsebelis 1995, 311). Since domestic 
polarity is essentially the capability of the government to impose its will on other domestic 
actors or pursue policies against the will of those domestic actors, a majority in the upper 
chamber is only relevant insofar as this chamber may be regarded a genuine veto-player. The
33 http://www .bundestag.de/parlam ent/w ahlen/sitzverteilung/1543.htm l
34 A  com plicating factor is that after 1990 the num ber of Lander governments consisting of parties from 
both the governm ent and the opposition at the federal level increased. In those mixed cases it is d ifficult to 
label the seats of these Landerin the Bundesratas governm ent-controlled or opposition-controlled.
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French Sénat is not a veto-player, which also explains why in Schmidt's index of veto-points, 
France does not qualify as having 'strong bicameralism' (Schmidt 1996, 387). This means that 
to establish the legislative relations in France, only the majority of the government in the 
Assemblée needs to be taken into account. The socialist governments between 1982 and 1986, 
as well as the centre-right governments between 1986 and 1988 and from March 1993 
onwards, enjoyed majorities in the Assemblée. The socialist government that was in office from 
1988 until March 1993 is most often labelled a minority government in the literature (Tsebelis
1995, 311; Thiébault 2004, 338; Elgie and Maor 1992). During this period, the governing 
Socialist Party had no overall majority in the Assemblée and was only able to govern with the 
support of centrist splinter groups. This resulted in fragile parliamentary coalitions based on 
narrow and unstable majorities. It should come as no surprise that there were four changes of 
government in this five-year period. Since the government could not depend on a stable majority 
in the Assemblée, I regard the four socialist governments between 1988 and 1993 as minority 
governments. Combined with the relatively narrow French parliamentary powers, this leads to a 
classification of executive-legislative relations as executive dominated between 1982 and 1988, 
executive-legislative balanced between 1989 and March 1993, and executive dominated again 
from March 1993 onwards.
The third indicator of domestic polarity is the degree to which interest mediation is 
institutionalized. In states with a corporatist system of interest mediation, the degree of 
institutionalization is high, while it is low in states with pluralist systems of interest mediation. A 
pluralist system is therefore related to a higher degree of domestic polarity, while a corporatist 
system is related to a lower degree of polarity.
Various indices of corporatism are consistent in showing modest to strong corporatism in 
Germany and a low degree, or even an absence of corporatism in France (Siaroff 1999, 180­
184; Lijphart and Crepaz 1991, 239-240). It must be noted that it is debatable whether one 
should establish the degree of corporatism for a state as a whole, or classify different sectors 
separately. For example, it is sometimes argued that, although the system in France is essentially 
pluralist, the agricultural sector is characterized by sectoral corporatism (Keeler 1987). In 
response to these claims, I argue that, firstly, when it comes to measuring the structural power 
relations between government and society, corporatism or pluralism measured at the national 
level is a better indicator than sectoral corporatism or pluralism. This is because corporatism in 
the sense of systematic 'cooperation between the government and the relevant socio-economic 
interest groups of employers' associations and trade unions aimed at forging a consensus over 
the formulation and implementation of socioeconomic government policies' (Woldendorp 1997, 
49-50, cited in Siaroff 1999, 176), denotes a relatively strong position for societal actors in 
domestic policy networks, which affects decision making in all issue areas. Secondly, even if one 
were to focus on separate sectors, it is still debatable whether government-society relations in 
the French agricultural sector would be classified as corporatist.35 A comparison of the policy
35 See the debate between John Keeler (1985) and Frank W ilson (1982, 1983, 1985).
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networks in the French and German agricultural sectors shows that interest mediation is in fact 
more institutionalized in Germany than in France. The committees that French farm groups take 
part in are purely consultative or advisory rather than having decision-making powers, and the 
main French agricultural interest group, the Fédération Nationale des Syndicats d'Expioitants 
Agricoles (FNSEA) lacks a representational monopoly (Wilson 1982, 188; 1983, 900 and 909). 
In effect, Wilson concludes that although 'corporatist-type structures' seemed to be present in 
French agriculture, at least until the Left came to power in 1981, this does not 'mean the 
prevalence of corporatist patterns of interest group politics when governments fail to give any 
power to these bodies' (Wilson 1983, 907).36 Unlike the FNSEA, the German Deutsche 
Bauernverband (DBV) enjoys a representative monopoly and has various institutionalized paths 
of influence at its disposal (Sontowski 1990, 105-106 and 203; Führer 1996, 25 and 52). In 
1955, the German Ministry of Agriculture had already been labelled ' Verbandsinsel' (Breitling 
1955, 243 cited in Sontowski 1990, 104) or ' Verbandsherzogtuni (Eschenburt 1955, 64 cited in 
Sontowski 1990, 107), and Sontowski argues that this has remained the case. Unsurprisingly, 
relations between farmers and government in Germany are usually classified as corporatist 
(Ackermann 1970; Heinze 1981; Sontowski 1990; Führer 1997).
Table 3.5 summarizes the French and German scores on the three indicators of domestic 
polarity during the period of the Uruguay Round. The French score on the domestic polarity 
index is six between 1982 and 1986 and five between 1986 and 1993. The German score is 
one from 1982 up to and including 1989, and zero from 1990 until 1993. Domestic polarity is 
therefore classified as high in France, and low in Germany.
Table 3.5: Domestic polarity in France and Germany
Country and Period Centralization of 
executive power 
(a)
Executive­
legislative 
relations (b)
Institutionali­
sation of interest 
mediation (c)
Total (d)
France 1982-1986 2 2 2 6
France 1986-1987 1 2 2 5
France 1988-1992 2 1 2 5
France 1993+ 1 2 2 5
Germany 1982-1989 0 1 0 1
Germany 1990-1993 0 0 0 0
(a) 0 = federal state; 1= unitary state with President and government leader of different party; 2. unitary state
(b) 0 = legislative dominance; 1 = executive-legislative balance; 2 = executive dominance
(c) 0 = corporatist interest mediation; 2 = pluralist interest mediation
(d) 0 and 1 = low domestic polarity; 2, 3 and 4 = intermediate domestic polarity; 5 and 6 = high domestic 
polarity
36 It is som etim es argued that it w as not only the com ing to power of the socialist governm ent in 1981 that 
eroded the corporatist-type structures, but that this w as more im portantly the effect o f Europeanization 
(Roederer-Ryning 2002, 120).
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3.3.2  Process variables
The theoretical framework includes two process variables (Section 2.6): the degree of societal 
mobilization or pressure and the degree of governmental sensitivity. The measurement of each 
will be now discussed in turn.
The degree of overall societal pressure will be classified as high, intermediate or 
low/absent. The degree of pressure will be judged to be high if a number of important groups 
mobilize together either in favour of or against a certain policy option. Societal groups providing 
grassroots support for the governing coalition are considered to be particularly relevant here. 
Furthermore, the importance of different political parties depends on whether they form part of 
the governing coalition or are part of the opposition (Van der Vleuten 2005, 467). For the 
German case this implies that the farm lobby's support was important for the German governing 
coalition consisting of the Christiich Democratische U non (CDU), Christiich Soziaie Union (CSU), 
and the Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP), for it is commonly argued that the German farm 
organizations have special connections with the CDU and CSU, and to a lesser degree also with 
the FDP (Keeler, 1996). German farmers as a group are considered to have a relatively 
homogeneous political preference, are inclined to be member of a political party and their 
turnout in elections is relatively high (Führer 1996, 244). According to Keeler, 80%  of the 
German farmers generally voted CDU/CSU, and particularly the Bavarian sister-party of the CDU, 
the CSU, was highly dependent on the agricultural vote (Keeler 1996, 141; see also Weiss
1989, 80-81 and Sontowski 1990, 100). Jochen Führer (1996, 68) argues that the farmers' 
affinity with the CDU is based on ideological convergence and on party political interconnections 
between the DBV leadership and the CDU. Moreover, Rudolf Wildenmann even claims that the 
farmers are able to influence 40%  of the 'iandiichen Wahier (in Führer 1996, 68). Their 
electoral potential is therefore considered to be the farm group's most important means of 
political pressure (Sontowski, 1990, 99).
With respect to the electoral potential of French farmers, Peter Philips (1990, 105) argues 
that the farm population is too small to exert significant electoral influence. Keeler (1996, 130­
131), however, argues that one should not only take account of the farm population itself, but 
also of the industries connected with it -  6%  of the French population is employed in the 
agricultural supply industries or food processing sector (Naylor 1994, 265) -  and of retired 
farmers and spouses of farmers. Hélène Delorme (1994, 46-47) follows a similar line of 
reasoning and concludes that the electoral weight of the farm population due to its 'impact on 
rural voters, tendency not to abstain and presence throughout the country' should be assessed 
at approximately 17%  of the electorate (see also Keeler 1996, 130-131). Although the farm 
vote 'has covered the political spectrum much more than has been the case in Germany' (Averytt 
1977, 23-24), Delorme argues that while the agricultural vote has little effect on the division 
between left and right, it does affect the rivalry between different centre-right parties, because 7 
out of 10 farmers vote for one of these parties (1994, 46-47). Although the interest of particular 
French parties in the farm vote is thus less clear-cut than in Germany, it appears that centre- 
right governments are more sensitive to such considerations than socialist governments.
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The degree of pressure is regarded intermediate when a number of groups are able to 
mobilize their supporters, but some of these groups favour and some of them oppose a certain 
policy option, meaning that either the proponents or the opponents are only narrowly in the 
majority.
The degree of pressure is considered to be low, either when very few groups or no groups 
at all mobilize, or when mobilization is so diverse and contradictory that it does not provide a 
clear incentive for the government to take one specific sort of action.
Governmental sensitivity to domestic pressure particularly increases when elections are 
near, and when the position of the government in parliament is weak (Van der Vleuten 2001, 
53). The institutional aspects of a weak position of the government in parliament have already 
been discussed in the section relating to executive-legislative relations, one of the indicators of 
domestic polarity. Process aspects of a weak position are the number of motions of censure with 
which the government is confronted (especially when such motions only narrowly fail), and the 
difficulties encountered in having parliament adopt important legislation (or the citizens by 
means of a referendum). Furthermore, decreases in overall societal satisfaction with the 
government and increases in disagreements and controversies within the governing coalition are 
indicators of increasing governmental sensitivity.
3.3.3  Political, economic and ideological costs and benefits
Was it in the French interest to include agricultural negotiations in the GATT-negotiations or 
not? Would German interests be better served by liberalizing agricultural trade or taking a 
protectionist stance? The answers to these questions depend on the expected domestic and 
international political, economic and ideological costs and benefits that are attached to these 
policy options. In order to analyse the case studies thoroughly, measurements need to be given 
in advance on the basis of which the costs and benefits can be established. Table 3.6 provides 
an overview of the different cost and benefits and how they will be measured in this research 
project.37
3.3.3.1 Political costs and benefits
With respect to the international political interest, the costs and benefits of a particular option 
will be based on the degree to which other states exert pressure in favour of or against this 
option. If the United States, for example, strongly supports the launch of a new round of GATT 
negotiations, a German preference in favour of such negotiations would be beneficial to
37 W hen reading this section it is im portant to keep in mind that, notw ithstanding the pluses and minuses 
that I attach to different indicators, this research is eventually qualitative in nature and not quantitative. I 
am not interested in quantifying the exact effects of a single proposal on a state's G DP or em ploym ent for 
exam ple, but I am interested in m apping constants and changes in these costs and benefits through time. In 
order to be able to do this in a consistent m anner that allows for com parisons between the different cases, 
it is necessary to apply a single assessm ent method through the entire research period.
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Table 3.6: Measurement of the expected costs and benefits of behavioural option X
CO STS BENEFITS
DOMESTIC
POLITICAL
Political material
Societal pressure against X
Political immaterial
X is contradictory to pledges the 
government has made concerning the 
position it would defend in the 
international arena
Political material
Societal support for X
Political immaterial
X is in line with pledges the 
government has made concerning 
the position it would defend in the 
international arena.
DOMESTIC
ECONOMIC
X is expected to lead to decreases in 
GDP and employment
X is expected to lead to increases in 
GDP and employment
DOMESTIC
IDEOLOGICAL
X is contradictory to the government's 
policy paradigm
X is compatible with the 
government's policy paradigm
INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL
Political material
Expected negative effect of X on 
German-French relations and vice 
versa, German-EC relations, French-EC 
relations, German-US relations and 
French-US relations
Political material
Expected positive effect of X on 
German-French relations and vice 
versa, German-EC relations, French- 
EC relations, German-US relations 
and French-US relations
Political immaterial
X is contradictory to pledges or threats 
the government has made in the 
international arena during the 
negotiations
Political immaterial
X is in line with pledges or threats 
the government has made in the 
international arena during the 
negotiations
INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC
X implies liberalization in the state's 
(and the EC's) non-competitive 
sectors;
X implies protectionism in the state's 
(and the EC's) competitive sectors;
X undermines the multilateral trading 
system
X implies protectionism in the 
state's (and the EC's) non­
competitive sectors;
X implies liberalization in the state's 
(and the EC's) competitive sectors;
X accords with GATt  rules and 
principles and enhances the 
multilateral trading system
INTERNATIONAL
IDEOLOGICAL
X contradicts state identity and the 
role prescriptions for the state in the 
international system associated with it
X is consistent with state identity 
and the role prescriptions for the 
state in the international system 
associated with it
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Germany-United States relations. I will analyse the extent and direction of (1) pressure from 
outside the EC, (2) pressure from inside the EC, and (3) French pressure (in the German case 
studies) or German pressure (in the French case-studies). With respect to the first and third 
indicator, pressure against the proposal in question will be labelled with a minus ( '- ')  while 
extensive pressure against the proposal will be labelled with a double minus ( '-  - ') .  Pressure in 
favour of the proposal will be labelled with a plus (' + ') and extensive pressure with a double 
plus ('+ +'). With respect to pressure from inside the EC, ('+ +') indicates unified acceptance of 
the proposal in question, ('— ') indicates unified resistance, (' + ') indicates lack of agreement 
within the EC but predominantly acceptance, and, finally, ( '- ')  indicates lack of agreement but 
predominantly rejection. Taking together the scores on (1), (2) and (3) will result in a balance 
indicating the international political material costs or benefits of the proposal in question. Notice 
that by adding up and subtracting the pluses and minuses, the overall pressure from within the 
EC (indicators 2 and 3) carries more weight than the extra-EC pressure (indicator 1). An 
important underlying assumption justifying this decision is that France and Germany, due to the 
higher interaction capacity within the EC than with states outside the EC and due to the greater 
dependence on intra-community trade than on extra-community trade, will attach relatively 
more importance to the position of other EC member states than to the position of states 
outside the EC. The overall balance of international material costs and benefits is either '+ ' 
(benefits exceed costs), '+  + ' (benefits considerably exceed costs) ' - '  (costs exceed benefits), ' -  
- '  (costs considerably exceed benefits) or '+ / - ' (benefits equal costs). Given that the range of 
the potential outcomes based on a simple adding up and subtracting of the pluses and minuses 
of the three indicators lies between 6 plusses and 6 minuses, an outcome of 1 to 3 pluses 
results in a score of ' + ' (benefits exceed costs) on the balance of international political interests, 
and an outcome of 4 to 6 pluses results in a score of '+  + ' (benefits considerably exceed costs). 
In the same manner an outcome of 1 to 3 minuses results in a score of ' - '  (costs exceed 
benefits), and 4 to 6 minuses to a score of '— ' (costs considerably exceed benefits). An 
example is provided in Table 3.7.
Table 3.7: Example of depiction of International political costs and benefits as applied in the 
empirical chapters
Policy option A Policy option B Policy option C
Extra-EC pressure + + + + +
Intra-EC pressure + + + +
French pressure — — +
BALANCE + /- + + +
The domestic political costs and benefits of a particular behavioural option are related to the 
societal support for or resistance against that alternative. Considering that the domain of this 
research is agricultural trade policy, the positions of three types of societal actors are particularly
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relevant here: (1) the farm lobby;38 (2) the industrial and trade lobby; and (3) the political 
parties. In the empirical part of this research, I will establish for each of the decision moments 
whether these French and German societal actors supported or rejected the policy proposal in 
question and whether they exerted relatively limited or high degrees of pressure. Pressure in 
favour of a proposal will be indicated with a plus (' + ') and extensive pressure in favour of a 
proposal with a double plus ('+ +'). Pressure against a proposal will be indicated with a minus 
('-')  and extensive pressure against a proposal with a double minus ' -  - '  . Taking together the 
scores on (1), (2) and (3) will result in a balance indicating the domestic political material costs 
or benefits of the proposal in question. This balance is either '+ ' (benefits exceed costs), '+  +' 
(benefits considerably exceed costs) ' - '  (costs exceed benefits, ' - ' ,  '—  ', or '+ / - ' (benefits 
equal costs). Given that the range of possible outcomes based on a simple adding up and 
subtracting of the pluses and minuses of the three indicators is similar to that in the case of 
international political interests, similar rules will be applied in the classification of the balance.
3.3.3.2 Economic costs and benefits
With respect to the international economic interest, each of the relevant proposals and policy 
options at the decision moments in the case studies will be assessed regarding its effect on the 
state's trade balance, its effect on the chances of a successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round 
and its effect on the credibility of the multilateral trading system. The effects on the overall trade 
balance are related to the question whether the proposed liberalization involves sectors in which 
the state has a competitive advantage or a disadvantage. As indicated in Table 3.6, a state will 
benefit from liberalization in its competitive sectors and from protectionist policies in its non­
competitive sectors. When a specific proposal only involves the agricultural sector and the state 
does not have a competitive position in this sector, then accepting the liberalization proposal 
will be internationally economically costly. However, when a proposal does not only involve the 
agricultural sector but also offers a package-deal including for example the industrial and 
services sectors, and the state has a competitive position in these latter sectors, then accepting 
the package would be in the state's overall international economic interest.39 A successful 
conclusion of multilateral trade negotiations is usually regarded as economically beneficial for all 
the states involved, since potential disadvantages of liberalization in one sector are likely to be 
offset by advantages in other sectors. During the Uruguay Round, agriculture was one of the 
sectors in which it was most difficult to reach an agreement. At times it was claimed that the 
agricultural negotiations interfered with negotiations concerning other sectors. In order to 
establish a good picture of the international economic benefits, it is important to assess whether 
agriculture was indeed the main obstacle for a successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round at
38 In Sections 5.3.1 and 6.3.1 I will discuss the most im portant actors w ithin the French and Germ an farm 
lobbies.
39 Provided that the industrial and services sectors offer a greater contribution to the trade balance than the 
agricultural sector, w hich  w as the case in France and Germ any at the time.
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the various decision moments. If this was the case, I will assess whether the proposals or 
agreements under study at these decision moments would aggravate that situation (economic 
costs) or, contrarily, contribute to the lifting of this obstacle (economic benefits). Moreover, it 
should be taken into account here whether the agreements that had already been reached in 
other sectors in the Uruguay Round were favourable to France and Germany. If these 
agreements, that would only become final if the Uruguay Round was concluded in its entirety, 
concerned liberalization in competitive French or German sectors, this would mean that 
removing the agricultural obstacle would be in the states' international economic interests. If, 
however, these agreements hardly concerned liberalization in the state's competitive sectors but 
rather in its uncompetitive sectors, then acceptance of a proposal that could remove the 
agricultural obstacle in the negotiations would not be in the state's international economic 
interests. Finally, trading nations benefit from a well-functioning multilateral trading system. It is 
therefore in their economic interest to safeguard the functioning and credibility of the GATT 
system. The stability of this system would for example be at stake when major GATT partners 
show a tendency to prioritize bilateral and regional agreements over GATT negotiations and 
when GATT negotiations drag on, missing one deadline after the other notwithstanding the 
states' previous commitment to these deadlines. Specific proposals or agreements in the GATT 
negotiations are economically beneficial to the extent that they alleviate these tendencies and 
economically costly to the extent that they exacerbate the situation. In the empirical chapters, 
each of the three indicators of a state's international economic interest will be assessed as either 
costly ( '- ')  or beneficial (' + '). Taken together, these scores result in a balance of ' + ' (benefits 
exceed costs), '+  + ' (benefits considerably exceed costs), ' - '  (costs exceed benefits), ' -  - '  (costs 
considerable exceed benefits), or '+ / - ' (benefits equal costs). Given that the range of the 
potential outcomes based on a simple adding up and subtracting of the pluses and minuses of 
the three indicators lies between 3 plusses and 3 minuses, an outcome of 1 or 2 pluses results in 
a score of ' + ' (benefits exceed costs) on the balance of international economic interests, and an 
outcome of 3 pluses results in a score of '+ + ' (benefits considerably exceed costs). A  similar 
reasoning applies in the case of minuses.
As was already indicated in Table 3.6, domestic economic interests concern the effects of 
different behavioural alternatives on GDP and employment. In assessing the domestic economic 
costs and benefits of different proposals and agreements in the empirical chapters, I will 
distinguish between the income and employment effects in the agricultural sector and the 
effects on overall GDP and employment. Specific agricultural proposals and agreements only 
affect agricultural income and employment, while package-deals involving other sectors, affect 
overall GDP and employment. With respect to both of these indicators, the effects will be 
labelled '+ ' (limited benefits), '+  + ' (extensive benefits), ' - '  (limited costs), or ' -  - '  (extensive 
costs). Given that the range of the potential outcomes based on a simple adding up and 
subtracting of the pluses and minuses of the two indicators lies between 4 plusses and 4 
minuses, an outcome of 1 or 2 pluses results in a score of ' + ' (benefits exceed costs) on the 
balance of domestic economic interests, and an outcome of 3 or 4 pluses results in a score of ' +
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+ ' (benefits considerably exceed costs). Again, a similar reasoning applies in the case of 
minuses. When taking together the scores to arrive at the domestic economic balance, more 
weight is attached to overall GDP and employment than to agricultural income and employment, 
because the agricultural sector is only a relatively small part of the overall economy in both 
Germany and France. This implies that the combination of a ' -  - '  score on agricultural income 
and employment and a ' + ' score on overall GDP and employment will result in a balance of '+ / -  
', and the combination of a ' - '  score on agricultural income and employment and a ' + ' score on 
overall GDP and employment will result in a balance of '+ '.
3.3.3.3 ideological interests
Van der Vleuten provides a conceptualization of domestic ideological costs as 'related to the 
match between, on the one hand, the political programme of the government and the principles 
upon which domestic policy has been built, and on the other hand, the principles which have 
inspired [the policy proposals discussed at the European level or within the GATT]' (2005, 466). 
An analysis of coalition agreements, speeches of government officials and agricultural policy 
papers will allow us to uncover the principles underlying domestic agricultural policy.
France is known for its high degree of state intervention in the market. Regarding France, 
Jack Hayward (1986, xiii) speaks of 'state force rather than market force' and Marie-Christine 
Kessler (1999, 284-285) uses the terms 'dlspos/tlf dintervention and 'ideologie 
interventionniste.40 This state intervention is particularly direct and comprehensive in the 
agricultural sector (Coulomb et a1 1990, 24-25). Agriculture is considered an affaire dEtat for 
reasons of food storage and supply (necessary for territorial defence) and because it was 
regarded as the responsibility of the state to decide who had the right to farm the land and 
what these farmers should provide for the state in return (Coulomb et al 1990, 19). State 
intervention in the agricultural market is therefore generally regarded as legitimate in France 
and governments have sought to create price stability in agricultural markets (Delorme 1990, 
33-35; Tubiana 1990, 128-129; Fouilleux 1996, 42). The principle of market organization 
through price policy is central in the French interventionist agricultural policy paradigm. France 
even tried to extend its own system of market organization internationally when it put forward 
proposals for market organization and even market sharing in GATT (cartels des exportateurs)
40 Femke van Esch em phasizes that w ith respect to French econom ic policy, the goals of im proving the 
French com petitive position and protecting French producers against international com petition, attained by 
the policy instrum ents of m odernization, nationalization and trade restrictions, indicate a Keynesian 
econom ic view  (2007, 143). Delorme on the other hand, argues that since the 1980s, France has gradually 
abandoned 'its traditional Keynesian policies based on direct state regulation of w ealth creation' and has 
started to introduce a more neo-liberal approach, limiting the role of the state in the econom y (1994, 4 3 ­
47). It remains an open question w hether a neo-liberal econom ic perspective gained a firm footing in 
France, but to the extent that this has been the case, it is usually considered to be a neo-liberalism  à la 
française (C lift 2003), as French state intervention in the econom y remains extensive, particularly in the 
agricultural sector.
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(Tubiana 1990, 135). Finally, a principle that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s was the idea 
that agriculture should also serve social purposes related to the preservation of the countryside. 
This did not only include nature conservation, but also preserving agriculture as a traditional 
way of life and preventing an exodus from the countryside (Gyomarch et al. 1998, 156). This 
multifunctionality of the agricultural sector was not only a justification for state intervention in 
agriculture, but it was also a goal in itself. The French views on agriculture will be elaborated 
more extensively in Chapter 5.
Although the German state can generally be characterized as less interventionist than the 
French, and more disposed towards the liberalization of trade rather than the establishment of 
protectionist policies, the German agricultural sector is an exception (Weiss 1989, 79). The 
German government has a comprehensive mix of instruments at its disposal to intervene in the 
agricultural market. These instruments range from subsidies to tax benefits and direct payments. 
An important principle in German agricultural policy is the Einkommensorientierten 
Produktpreispolitik (Führer 1996, 22). Price policy and income policy are closely connected and a 
combination of high guarantee prices and guaranteed sales quantities are meant to safeguard 
farm income. Germany also advocates similar policies within the CAP at the European level. A 
second important principle or Leitbild in German agriculture is that of the bäuerliche 
Landwirtschaft, small-scale family farming based on environmentally friendly and animal friendly 
production methods (Bulletin 25.3.1987, Agrarbericht 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1992, 
Koalitionsvereinbarungen 1991). Finally, the importance of multifunctionality, safeguarded by 
this type of farming, is emphasized in Germany as it assures Umweltschutz, Naturschutz and 
Kulturpflege (Bulletin 19.3.1987, 12.6.1987, 11.2.1988, Agrarbericht 1987, 1988, 1993, 
Koalitionsvereinbarungen 1991). The German views on agriculture will be discussed more 
extensively in Chapter 6.
While national policy paradigms are the basis of domestic ideological costs and benefits, 
state identity is the basis of international ideological costs and benefits. Policy options not in 
accordance with aspects of state identity entail international ideological costs. Three aspects of 
French state identity are particularly relevant with respect to the case in question here: its 
vocation exportatrice in the agricultural sector, the French idea of France as the leading state 
within a strong EC, on an equal footing with or even as a counterweight against the United 
States, and the Franco-German friendship. Firstly, France considers the export of agricultural 
products a 'vocation (Fouilleux 1996, 52). This vocation is seen as legitimized by the 
importance of agricultural exports for economic growth (agricultural exports contributed 
between 15%  and 20%  to the overall trade balance) (Bourdon 1990, 54). Agricultural trade is 
also referred to as France's petroie vert (Bourdon 1990, 54, Coulomb et al 1990, 25, 
Guyomarch et al 1998, 156-158). This term was first introduced by President Giscard d'Estaing 
who, by the end of the 1970s, developed plans to turn agriculture into French oil (Coleman and 
Chiasson 2002, 177).41 The term 'vocation exportatrice emerged more and more in documents
41 Section 5.2.2 provides more inform ation on the developm ent of the French vocation exportatrice.
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from the Ministry of Agriculture from the middle of the 1980s onwards.42 Kessler (1999, 276) 
emphasizes that economic prosperity is not the only concern when it comes to the French wish 
for export expansion, but French presence i n the export market is considered a goal in itself. The 
vocation exportatrice has an economic as well as an ideological component. It is not only 
necessary to export agricultural products in order to balance French trade, but also from an 
ideological perspective, in which the farmer is regarded to be an entrepreneur who has the right 
to export his products abroad (interview Guy Legras 12.11.2007). Secondly, the idea of 'la 
Grande nation, as a reference to France's prestigious past (Cogan 2003, 12-14), seems still to 
be very much alive, and French Presidents have consistently striven to maintain France's rank in 
the world. Charles de Gaulle proclaimed a 'politique de grandeur and consecutive Presidents 
have emphasized French power and prestige and tried to show that France is a powerful state 
whose interests other states ought to take into account (Kessler 1999, 153-154). This French 
vision of its powerful and independent place in the world has often been and still is combined 
with fierce resistance to American hegemony in the world, if not forthright anti-Americanism 
(Kessler 1999, 153; see also Cogan 2003, x). Cogan (2003, 7) even uses the term 'mutual 
cordial distrust' to characterize the relations between France and the United States. Clearly, 
France alone is by no means powerful enough to compete with the United States on equal 
terms, and French Presidents and Prime Ministers have shown themselves aware of this fact. 
Since the 1960s, France has sought to gain leverage through multilateral organizations, 
especially the EC (Cogan 2003, 80; Kessler 1999, 154-155; Lieshout 2004, 204). At the end of 
the 1960s and during the early 1970s, French President Georges Pompidou regarded European 
integration as an instrument that would not only reinforce the economic and political grandeur 
of France, but would also strengthen Europe as a whole, enabling it to provide the necessary 
counterweight to the two superpowers (Van Esch 2007, 185-186). In the 1990s, French Prime 
Minister Edouard similarly saw European integration as a means of preventing French foreign 
policy from being subjected to American leadership and he emphasized that a powerful France 
was necessary to achieve this goal (Balladur 1995, 123). President François Mitterrand 
emphasized French leadership when arguing that 'a United European power led by the French 
had potential to develop into a third superpower, foster peace and prosperity, and safeguard 
French independence' (Van Esch 2007, 279; emphasis added). In effect, France considers itself 
a powerful state within a powerful European Union, which as a whole can consider itself to be 
on an equal footing with and to serve as a counterbalance against United States hegemony. 
Finally, the Franco-German friendship (l'amitié privilégiée is central to France's European policy 
(Delorme 1994, 42). The Franco-German friendship has been and still is an important engine of 
European integration and France places high value on this friendship (Cogan 2003, 89). 
Nevertheless, as mentioned, France is keen to take a leadership role within the EC and the 
process of integration (Markovits and Reich 1991, 56). The Franco-German relationship is
42 See for exam ple C A C  19860691. 2 0 .9 .1 98 5 . Ministère de l'agriculture et de la forêt. La Politique Agricole 
Com m une; and, 1 .10.1985. Ministère de l'agriculture et de la forêt, cabinet du ministre, C laude Chéreau. 
Untitled docum ent.
Research Strategy and Methodology |63
characterized by the closeness of personal ties between French Presidents and German 
Chancellors and 'has become deeply embedded institutionally in the years since de Gaulle and 
Adenauer signed the Elysée Treaty in 1963' (Cogan 2003, 99). Haywood argues that the 
Franco-German friendship has varied in intensity over the years -  depending among other things 
on the relations between French and German governments and French uneasiness with the idea 
of French dependence on one neighbour in particular -  but in the end France regarded it 
imperative 'to tie Germany into European integration by any means possible, and not to allow it 
to become an independent power' (Haywood 1993, 278-279). Therefore, from the French 
perspective, the Franco-German friendship also served geo-political goals. With respect to the 
effects of the Franco-German friendship, Webber (1999, 48) emphasizes that the Franco­
German relation is particularly important with respect to issues that one or the other or both 
regard as politically salient and that 'the deference shown by the one government to the other 
may lead it occasionally to adopt positions on [EC] issues contrary to those dictated by domestic 
political considerations'.43
Two aspects of the identity of the German state are particularly relevant to this study: 
Germany as 'neue Handelsstaat, and the Franco-German friendship. The 'neue Handelsstaat', is 
a state that 'seine Internationale Rolle nicht als 'Polizist (Sherrif), sondern als 'Kaufmann ' oder 
'Makler ' spielt und seine besondere Stärke nicht im militärischer Potenzsteigerung, sondern in 
ökonomischer Leistungs- und Wettbewerbsfähigkeit findet (Rittberger 1992, 223). This is an 
important aspect of German foreign policy identity and has even enhanced Germany's 
reputation according to Rittberger (1992, 224). Associated with Germany's identity as a 
'Handelsstaat are Germany's prioritization of the international extension of free trade principles 
(Markovits and Reich 1991, 59). Like France, Germany highly values the Franco-German 
friendship. Unlike France, the Germans however have not striven for a leading political role in 
the formation of Europe (Lieshout 2004, 161-162 and 185-187; Markovits and Reich 1991, 56) 
and have generally been prepared to 'defer [...] to their French counterparts the political 
leadership of Europe' (Cogan 2003, 99). This appears to be related to the German conviction 
that Selbsteinbindung (in Europe in this case) was necessary in order to 'prevent Germany from 
reverting to its old ways and to guarantee peace and security for Germany and its neighbours' 
(Van Esch 2007, 274). In the view of Germany, European integration was not only a means of 
Franco-German reconciliation, but also a prerequisite for European integration (Clough 1998, 
62; Van Esch 2007, 276). While for France, European cooperation based on the Franco-German 
axis was aimed at creating a European counterweight against United States hegemony,
43 Johannes Ludew ig, w ho w orked at the Bundeskanzleramt for a part of the period under study, observed 
during an interview the follow ing about the Franco-Germ an friendship: 'They knew  that they could expect 
from  the other partner -  in very specific situations, you can not do it every day you know  -  that one w ould 
be ready to accept som ething that norm ally people w ould not accept in a negotiation, but know ing of 
course that if the other one w ould be in a similar situation, there w ould be a sim ilar reaction from the 
other' (interview Ludew ig 5.4.2007).
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Germany rather performed a Vermittiersfunktion between the EC and the United States (Luttiken
2001, 117).
In the empirical chapters, the different proposals and agreements at the decision moments 
will also be assessed on the basis of their ideological costs and benefits. For each of the 
indicators (aspects of the governmental paradigm and aspects of state identity) it will be 
assessed whether the proposal in question is in accordance with (= benefits, depicted by a '+') 
or at odds with the indicator (= costs, depicted by a '- ') . In order to arrive at the overall balance 
of domestic and international ideological costs and benefits, the scores of the different 
indicators will be taken together. In principle, each of the indicators will carry similar weight, 
unless a specific aspect of the governmental paradigm or state identity has diminished in 
importance in the period between the decision moment in question and the previous decision 
moment. Given that with respect to the French domestic and international ideological interests 
and the German domestic ideological interest the range of potential outcomes based on a 
simple adding up and subtracting of pluses and minuses of the three indicators lies between 3 
pluses and 3 minuses, an outcome of 1 or 2 pluses results in a score of '+ ' (benefits exceed 
costs) on the balance, and an outcome of 3 pluses results in a score of '+  + ' (benefits 
considerably exceed costs). In the same manner an outcome of 1 or 2 minuses results in a score 
of ' - '  (costs exceed benefits), and an outcome of 3 minuses results in a score of '— ' (costs 
considerably exceed benefits). Concerning the German international ideological interest, the 
range of potential outcomes when adding up and subtracting the pluses and minuses of the two 
indicators lies between 2 pluses and 2 minuses, and an outcome of 1 plus therefore results in a 
score of ' + ' on the balance, while an outcome of 2 pluses lead to a score of '+ +'. A  similar 
reasoning applies in the case of minuses.
3.4 Conceptualizing and Measuring Influence
3.4.1 Conceptualizing influence
In explaining state preferences it is of importance to identify the factors that have impacted on 
these preferences. This also implies that the influence of certain actors (such as societal groups 
or foreign other states) has to be assessed. A distinction needs to be made between exerting 
influence and effectively influencing state preferences. The former refers to actors which affect 
the political costs and benefits by exerting pressure in favour of or against a policy option. These 
political costs and benefits become part of the State's 'calculations' which produce a state 
preference (see Sections 2.2.1. and 2.2.3.), but do not necessarily mean that the State will 
adopt the position advocated by these actors. Whether the actor effectively influenced the state 
preference (i.e. the outcome of the preference-formation process) can only be established after 
the fact, taking into account all the other political, economic and ideological costs and benefits. 
Exerting influence does not, in itself, guarantee effective influence on state preferences. I use
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the following definition of effective influence, based on Lieshout and Don Westerheijden's 
definition of (relational) power (1994, 142):
A s influence on B's preferences is effective, if  A is able to bring about a change in the 
attractiveness of the various behavioural options subjectively available to B, such that B in result 
will act more in accordance with A s wishes.
Influence can be exerted both intentionally and unintentionally. Unintentional influence is the 
result of anticipation. Actor B influences the preference of actor A by anticipation if A anticipates 
the preference of B a n d  adjusts its own preference accordingly although B did not make any 
attempt to influence A. In such cases, the simple presence of B and its expected preference 
leads A to change its preference. Both national and international actors may influence the 
preference of the government through anticipation. Anticipation is difficult to measure in 
empirical research due to the fact that an actual action in the form of an influence attempt on 
the basis of which the reaction of the targeted actor can be analysed is lacking. In this research,
I have sought to take into account anticipation by differentiating between the importance of 
different domestic groups, based on whether they are governmental parties or provide 
grassroots' support for the government, and estimating the weight attached to the (expected) 
preferences of these different groups accordingly. In other words: I assume that the government 
will anticipate the preferences of those societal groups which are important to it. These groups 
thus exert influence (in the sense that political costs or benefits are attached to behavioural 
options on the basis of these groups' expected preferences) even when the groups in question 
do not exert pressure.
3.4.2  Measuring influence
In measuring influence in the empirical analysis, I start with identifying the actors who tried to 
exert influence on the French and German governments with respect to the agricultural chapter 
of the GATT negotiations. The analysis of the political costs and benefits as described in Section
3.3.3 provides the necessary information for that first step. I subsequently assess the degree of 
congruence between the position of the actors that have attempted to influence the decision 
maker's preference and the eventual position adopted by the decision maker in the international 
arena. This provides an initial idea on which actors may have successfully exerted influence and 
which have not. The analysis of the preference-formation process by means of process tracing 
then allows me to establish whether decision makers have noticed the influence attempts of the 
various actors and whether they changed their position after these attempts. In that way, I apply 
the three central criteria of the (intensive?) process method to influence assessment: In order to 
ascribe influence to an actor, the actor must have attempted to exert influence, this influence 
attempt must have been noticed by the decision maker, and the decision maker adapted its
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position after the influence attempt, in accordance with the wishes of the actor that exerted 
influence (Bos and Geurts 1994, 63; Huberts 1994, 57-59; Peters 1999, 75-79).44
In the preference-formation process, evidence of influence may be found in the 
argumentation on which the actor exerting influence and the decision maker based their 
positions (preference). If actor A used specific arguments to support its position while making an 
attempt to influence decision maker D at t, and D subsequently adopted the same arguments to 
support its position at t+1 -  indicating a change in or addition to its original argumentation -  
this is considered as evidence to support the conclusion that A effectively influenced D in the 
preference-formation process.
Another source of evidence can be found in the deliberations taking place within the 
executive. In these discussions, evidence that the executive has considered the interests or 
attempts at influence of actor A, or discussions about what the reaction of B might be 
(anticipation), may emerge during deliberations. If this subsequently leads to the decision maker 
yielding to the (anticipated) preferences, interests and/or attempts at influence of actor A, and 
either changes its preference in accordance with A's wishes or provides substantial side- 
payments for A, then these deliberations provide an additional piece of evidence that actor A 
has influenced the decision maker.
The results of the assessment of influence will contribute to establishing the overall 
relative influence of domestic and international actors on state preferences, as they provide 
information on the actual domestic and international political costs and benefits brought about 
by domestic and international actors.
3.5 Data Sources and Analysis
In order to reconstruct and analyse systematically the preference-formation process at the various 
decision moments, and the role of the actors involved such as the government, interest groups and 
third countries, information is needed on the preferences of the relevant actors, their attempts to 
influence each other, and any changes in their positions that occurred and when these occurred. In 
the course of process tracing, the triangulation of data sources and triangulation in the methods of 
opening these sources will be applied (Verschuren and Doorewaard 1998, 128). The sources used 
are primary and secondary written sources and interviews. This triangulation of sources offers the 
opportunity to find the required information and increases the reliability of the results and 
conclusions. I will now give a more specific overview of the sources I have consulted.
44 Generally speaking, there are three main methods of influence assessm ent (Arts and Verschuren 1999, 
414): the position m ethod (Mills 1956); the reputation method (Hunter 1953); and the decision-m aking 
method (Dahl 1961). The (intensive) process methodis a variant of the latter (Braam 1973; Bos and Geurts 
1994). This m ethod is m ost appropriate here, because, unlike the position and reputation m ethod, it 
focuses on the preference-form ation process  to establish w hether the actors involved effectively exerted 
influence.
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The primary documents include documents produced by individual members of the French 
and German governments, the Ministries of Agriculture and Economics, the central government 
and societal groups. With respect to Germany, speeches and letters by Chancellor Helmut Kohl, 
Ministers Ignaz Kiechle and Jochen Borchert (Agriculture), and Ministers Helmut Haussman and 
Jürgen Möllemannn (Economics) were studied to reconstruct their preferences, and the discussions 
they had with respect to the agricultural part of the Uruguay Round. The speeches were mainly 
taken from the Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung (Bulletir), as well 
as from Kiechle's personal archive which is kept in the Bundesarchiv in Koblenz.45 The letters are 
also taken from the latter source as well. Central government documents include the 
Koalitionsvereinbarungen of the CDU/CSU/FDP coalitions from 1983, 1987 and 1991. The German 
Ministry of Economics (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft provided its bulletin BMWI 
Tagesnachrichten and documents regarding the Staatssekretärausschuss für Europafragen were 
consulted at the Bundesarchiv in Berlin. Furthermore, the annual Agrarberichte produced by the 
Ministry of Agriculture were collected through the Dokumentations- und Informationssystem für 
Parlementarisme Vorgänge (DIP). The governmental documents collected from these sources were 
used to establish the preferences of different actors in the German administration and to identify 
the government's agricultural policy paradigm. In order to establish the preferences and attempts 
at influence of political parties and farm groups, I consulted the election programmes of political 
parties, parliamentary Drucksache such as the proceedings of relevant parliamentary debates 
(through the DIP), and the Deutsche Bauern Korrespondenz, a monthly periodical published by the 
Deutcher Bauernverband. Newspaper coverage (see below) was used to identify the preferences 
and attempts at influence made by industrial groups.
For France, I have consulted a large number of dossiers from the Centre des Archives 
Contemporaines in Fontainebleau. These archives contained a wealth of records including policy 
documents from ministries, correspondence between ministries, correspondence with the French 
embassies in Germany, Brussels, Geneva and Washington, French records and minutes concerning 
meetings of the Council of Ministers, reports of meetings of the Secrétariat Général du Comité 
Interministériel pour les questions de coopération économique eureopéenne (SGCI) revealing the 
domestic governmental debate on the GATT round and the preferences and roles of various 
ministries involved in this process, and ministerial correspondence with societal groups such as the 
farm organizations. In addition, the Ministry of Agriculture provided a number of documents on the 
French position on the agricultural chapter of the Uruguay Round. With respect to the documents 
and positions of French domestic groups, the analysis is based on the relevant sources of the 
national archives, the FNSEA's monthly L 'Information Agricole, and media coverage (mainly Le 
Monde. Public documents containing governmental declarations, transcripts of speeches, press 
conferences and other public performances of the President, Prime Minister and other relevant 
ministers, were collected through the websites http://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/ and
45 In the empirical chapters, the different archives will be referred to in abbreviated form. A  guide to the 
primary sources is provided in A ppendix I, giving an overview of these abbreviations.
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http://www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr. Finally, the French parliamentary archives have provided me 
with proceedings of relevant parliamentary debates.
Primary documents on the European level include the agendas and notes from meetings of 
the Council of Ministers and the article 113 Committee, as well as a number of documents 
discussed in these meetings. These provided some information on the preferences of various 
member states, but were primarily helpful in providing an overview of the subjects discussed at 
separate Council meetings and thereby pinpointing important decision moments. These documents 
were collected from the archives of the Council of Ministers and the Dutch Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs and Economics. The Dutch archives also supplied notes from Dutch diplomats in Bonn, 
Berlin, Paris, Brussels and Washington, which proved to be very helpful in uncovering French and 
German preferences and the interaction between French and German diplomats.
The secondary sources consulted consist of press articles and scholarly sources. I collected 
media coverage on the Uruguay Round, European decision making on which positions to defend in 
the GATT negotiations and the preferences of other states and societal groups from quality print 
media. The international and national daily newspapers consulted were, among others, the 
Financial Times, Le Monde and the Handelsblatt, as well as relevant articles from other 
newspapers obtained through the Lexis-Nexis database. I also consulted the daily bulletin of the 
European Union, Agence Europe, and the specialized weekly Agra Europe. Agra Europe provided 
particularly well-informed accounts of the positions taken in the Council (Vahl 1997, 60). The 
scholarly sources I consulted were articles form academic journals and secondary literature on the 
Uruguay Round, including memoirs of a number of the decision makers involved. Taken together, 
these primary and secondary sources provided information on the identity of the relevant actors, 
their positions, their attempts at influence, and deliberation on and the formulation of the positions 
to be defended in the international arena.
In addition to written sources, interviews were used as a first cut into the research domain, 
as a second check on the information obtained from the public sources, and to fill any gaps in that 
information. Civil servants from the Dutch ministries of Foreign Affairs and Agriculture, together 
with the Dutch representative on the Article 113 Committee, a relevant Commissioner and the 
Secretary General of DG VI (Agriculture), cooperated in creating an overall picture of the 
negotiations and the specific roles of France and Germany, and they provided information on their 
French and German counterparts. Furthermore, interviews were conducted with a former French 
Minister of Agriculture, and with government officials from the German Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs and Economics, as well as from the German Bundeskanz/eramt. These civil servants were 
either involved in the negotiations or in the domestic preference-formation process. Finally, I 
interviewed a number of representatives of the DBV. With respect to the main French agricultural 
lobby group, the FNSEA, I was only able to obtain a short telephone interview with one former 
official. An advantage of using interviews is that they may provide a relatively straightforward 
route to the information required. However, since it is certainly conceivable that the interviewees 
may be subject to hindsight bias -  particularly since the negotiations were conducted fifteen to 
twenty years ago -  the information gathered through interviews was treated with caution. The
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information from these interviews was therefore not used when it constituted the sole basis for 
arguments made and conclusions drawn in the empirical chapters. It has only been referred to as 
supplementary evidence when similar information or evidence could also be obtained from either 
public or confidential written sources, or when a number of interviewees from different groups or 
ministries made similar claims.
3.6 Hypotheses Evaluation and Generalization
The hypotheses formulated in Chapter 2 focused on the degree to which certain considerations are 
expected to be prioritized in the preference-formation process under various sets of circumstances. 
Those circumstances, more specifically, concern mainly international polarity and domestic polarity 
and the combination of these two variables. Apart from the more general hypotheses focusing on 
the value of one specific variable, expectations were formulated in Table 2.2 on the relative 
importance of the politico-economic and ideological considerations given various combinations of 
domestic and international polarity. Finally, expectations were formulated on the role of process 
variables in the preference-formation process in general and in the four different combinations of 
domestic and international polarity specifically.
BOX 3.1: O PERATIONAL HYPOTHESES TO BE EVALUATED
Hypothesis A: Considering that between 1982 and 1989 international polarity and French 
domestic polarity were both high, French preference formation with respect to the agricultural 
chapter of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations should be influenced predominantly by 
ideological considerations, both domestic and international.
Hypothesis B: Considering that between 1982 and 1989 international polarity was high and 
German domestic polarity was low, German preference formation with respect to the 
agricultural chapter of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations should be influenced 
predominantly by domestic (particularly political and economic) considerations.
Hypothesis C: Considering that between 1990 and 1993 international polarity was low and 
French domestic polarity was high, French preference formation with respect to the 
agricultural chapter of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations should be influenced 
predominantly by international (particularly political and economic) considerations.
Hypothesis D: Considering that between 1990 and 1993 international polarity and German 
domestic polarity were both low, German preference formation with respect to the 
agricultural chapter of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations should be influenced 
predominantly by political and economic considerations, both domestic and international.
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Box 3.1 provides the operational hypotheses that result from applying the abstract hypotheses 
formulated in Chapter 2 to the case studies selected. These hypotheses will be evaluated on the 
basis of the findings of the case studies, which were selected in such a way that all the four 
possible combinations of domestic and international polarity are covered. The preference-formation 
process in each case study encompasses a number of points of measurement equal to the number 
of decisions on a preference. These decisions are all observations by which the hypothesis 
concerning the specific case can be tested. The observations either reinforce the validity of the 
relevant hypothesis (providing corroborating evidence) or contradict the hypothesis. If the latter is 
the case, then the hypothesis is called into question and may ultimately be rejected.
If it is found that between 1986 and 1990, the French defended preferences which were not 
in accordance with the governmental policy paradigm and the state identity, this would be an 
empirical observation that casts doubt on hypothesis A. If it is found that the Germans defended 
their farmers' preferences between 1986 and 1990, this would provide corroborating evidence for 
hypothesis B. If it is found that they backed down to international pressure against the wishes of 
its farmers, this would be a problematic empirical observation for hypothesis B. Corroborating 
evidence for hypothesis C would be provided by the finding that between 1990 and 1993 France 
prioritized its relations with Germany and/or the United States over the wishes of the French 
society and defended preferences which were in accordance with the French state identity. If, 
however, it is found that France prioritized domestic considerations, even though this harmed its 
relations with Germany and/or the United States and did not correspond with the French state 
identity, then hypothesis C is called into question. Finally, if between 1990 and 1993 societal 
pressure and the sensitivity of the German government was low, and Germany prioritized its 
relations with the United States and its share in the trade of manufactured products over the 
interests and wishes of the German farmers, this would constitute corroborating evidence for 
hypothesis D, combined with hypothesis 5 on the role of process variables. However, if it is found 
that societal pressure and governmental sensitivity were high and Germany still prioritized its 
international political and its economic interests over the interests and wishes of its farmers, these 
would be problematic empirical observations for hypothesis D, combined with hypothesis 5 on the 
role of process variables.
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter has outlined and motivated the methodological choices made in this research 
project. I have explained why using comparative case studies is the most suitable research 
design to test the hypotheses derived from the theoretical framework, as presented in Chapter 
2, which aims to explain the relative influence of domestic and international factors on state 
preferences. France and Germany were selected as cases on the basis of their variation in 
domestic polarity, which is expected to result in differences in the value of the dependent 
variable. Variation on the variable of international polarity was ascertained by selecting the 
Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations (1982-1993) as the period of analysis. Next, the
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dependent, independent and intervening variables were operationalized, resulting in 
classifications of the international system according to its polarity and classifications of France 
and Germany according to their power position in the international system and their domestic 
polarity. Measures were established on the basis of which the domestic and international 
political, economic and ideological costs and benefits and the degree of domestic pressure and 
governmental sensitivity are assessed in the empirical part of the research. The choice of the 
decision-making method as the most appropriate method for the measurement of influence has 
been motivated by the fact that it is the only method geared to analysing preference-formation 
processes -  the object of this research. Subsequently, the main sources, documents and 
interviews used in the empirical part of this study, ranging from archival documents to media 
coverage and secondary scientific literature, were presented. Finally, I formulated four 
operational hypotheses, each related to one of the four separate cases, and explained how 
these hypotheses will be evaluated. Before turning to the French and German case studies, the 
next chapter will present a concise overview of the Uruguay Round of GATT-negotiations, 
focusing principally on the agricultural chapter of these negotiations.

CHAPTER 4 
THE URUGUAY ROUND OF GATT NEGOTIATIONS
4.1 Introduction
Having set out the theoretical framework guiding this research project and the research methods 
that will be applied in Chapters 2 and 3, respectively, this chapter describes the wider 
international background against which French and German decision making concerning the 
agricultural chapter of the Uruguay Round took place. The aims of this chapter are twofold. First 
of all, it will summarize the different stages of the agricultural negotiations in the Uruguay 
Round and of the development of the positions of the key players taking part in it (the United 
States, the EEC and the Cairns Group).46 It provides a larger picture of the negotiations under 
study, while each of the case studies in the next four chapters will focus in on the preference­
formation process in one state (France or Germany) during a specific phase of these 
negotiations. This chapter therefore serves as a point of reference for the reader when studying 
the subsequent case study chapters. Secondly, this chapter sets out to analyse the attractiveness 
of the various proposals and policy options tabled during the negotiations, assessing their 
international political and (to a certain extent) economic consequences. The results of this 
analysis are an important input for the case study chapters as they indicate the international 
political and economic interests France and Germany had to consider when determining their 
negotiating positions.
In this chapter, Section 4.2 provides a short description of the degree to which agriculture 
was an issue during previous GATT rounds. The run-up to the Uruguay Round of GATT 
negotiations and the reasons why particular actors sought the inclusion of agriculture in these 
negotiations is the subject of Section 4.3. Section 4.4 describes the negotiations on agriculture 
within the Uruguay Round and analyses the attractiveness of various behavioural options for the 
EEC member states at various decision moments. For this purpose, the Uruguay Round is divided 
into a number of time periods on the basis of important decision moments within the Round. 
These are moments at which the contracting parties had to table specific offers in the run-up to 
important GATT meetings, or moments at which the Secretary General of the GATT tabled 
proposals. In Section 4.5 the attractiveness of the various behavioural options at these moments 
will be mapped out, resulting in expectations on the likely course of French and German action 
based on their international political interests.
46 The Cairns Group w as a new  player on the agricultural scene. The group of 14 agricultural-exporting 
nations aimed at liberalizing agricultural trade: A rgentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, C olom bia, Fiji, 
Indonesia, M alaysia, New Zealand, Paraguay, Philippines, Thailand and Uruguay.
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4.2 Agriculture in the GATT
Agricultural trade and manufactured trade in the GATT have been treated 'fundamentally 
different[ly]' since the outset (Swinbank and Tanner 1996, 7). In the GATT, agricultural trade 
received special treatment with respect to subsidies and quantitative restrictions. Subsidies were 
permitted as long as they were not used to achieve 'more than an equitable share of world 
trade' for the product concerned (GATT Article XVI: 3). Needless to say, it was difficult to 
establish what 'more than an equitable share of world trade' entailed, and successive GATT 
panels relating to the issue were unable to provide clarity on this question. Furthermore, 
quantitative restrictions were allowed for agricultural trade 'if they were necessary to enforce 
certain forms of domestic market management' such as the prevention of critical shortages of 
foodstuffs (Josling et al 1996, 113). The rules pertaining to agricultural trade therefore provided 
for less liberalization than the rules regarding manufactured trade. Trade practices in the two 
sectors also differed greatly. In agricultural trade, extensive use was made of non tariff barriers 
such as voluntary export restraints and orderly market arrangements were used extensively. 
These policies could not be dealt with under GATT rules unless another state filed a complaint 
(Josling et a. 1996, 113-118). Furthermore, since tariffs were only a minor part of the 
protectionism in agricultural trade, negotiations on across-the-board tariff-reductions -  the 
customary approach in the earlier GATT rounds -  had hardly any impact on agricultural trade. In 
effect, the GATT framework was not suited for managing the conduct of agricultural trade. In 
addition to this, a waiver was granted to the United States in 1955, as a result of which the 
world's largest agricultural exporter was free to introduce import quotas on almost any 
agricultural product. Waivers could be granted under Article XX V :5  of the GATT treaty, based on 
a two-thirds majority including at least half the GATT contracting parties. The waiver granted to 
the United States was very wide-ranging as it lacked a time limit and only required an annual 
report (Johnson 1984, 736). Over the years it was the subject of heavy criticism from other GATT 
contracting parties.
During different rounds of negotiations from the 1960s onwards, attempts were made to 
subject agricultural trade to stricter GATT rules. One recurring theme in all these earlier 
negotiation rounds was disagreement between the United States and the EEC on the framework 
that ought to be used to govern agricultural trade. The first round in which agriculture emerged 
as a negotiating issue was the Dillon Round (1960-1962). The formation of the EEC in 1957 
and the plans for a Common Agricultural Policy were the impetus for the agricultural section of 
the Dillon Round. The United States demanded compensation from the EEC because the 
imposition of a common external tariff was expected to reduce access for third-country exporters 
(Swinbank and Tanner 1996, 11; Ingersent et al 1994b, 56). Very little progress was made 
during these negotiations because the EEC refused tariff bindings on products that were to be 
subject to the market organization under the CAP (Josling et al. 1996; Swinbank and Tanner 
1996: 11-12). However, the EEC did agree to low or zero tariff rates for oilseeds, oilseed meals 
and manioc, products which were relatively unimportant at the time. This would become an
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important issue for the EEC in the Uruguay Round, because the imports of these 'cereal 
substitutes' in the EEC for animal feed sky-rocketed, harming the intra-EEC trade in grains 
(Swinbank and Tanner 1996, 11). In the Uruguay Round, the EEC therefore demanded a 
'rebalancing' of protection in grains and non-grain feed.
During the Kennedy Round from 1963 until 1967, agriculture again featured in the 
negotiations. The United States threatened to refuse any deal that did not introduce stricter 
management of agricultural trade by the GATT system (Josling et al 1996, 54). The United 
States was facing economic decline, and it was believed that liberalizing agricultural trade 
would redress the balance of payments. During the discussions on a suitable framework for 
agricultural trade, the ideas of the United States and the EEC were diametrically opposed. The 
United States argued 'for greater reliance on market oriented forces' (Swinbank and Tanner 
1996, 13), whereas the EEC proposed 'concerted market organization' and 'market sharing 
amongst major agricultural exporters, including a "World Commodity Agreement"' (Ingersent et 
al 1994b, 57). The EEC also proposed a plan to freeze the montants de soutien, margins of 
protection or support, which it defined as the 'difference between the price of the product on 
the international market and the actual remuneration received by the producer' (Swinbank and 
Tanner 1996, 13). The United States opposed this idea, arguing that it would lead to a 
consolidation of protection rather than the reduction of protection (Josling et al 1996, 64). 
Another reason often cited in the literature, however, is that the United States was not willing to 
accept 'external constraints on their domestic agricultural policies' (Ingersent et al 1994b, 57; 
see also Swinbank and Tanner 1996, 14). The final results of the round with respect to 
agriculture were again disappointing.
The Tokyo Round (1973-1979) took place during a period of declining economic 
conditions including the break-down of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, the oil crisis in 
1973, instability in the commodity markets and rising inflation and unemployment. Agriculture 
was again on the agenda and, for the first time in the history of the GATT, the negotiations 
were also extended to non-tariff barriers. The United States and the EEC both entered the 
negotiations with positions similar to those they had defended in the Kennedy Round. The EEC 
emphasized that the principles and mechanisms of the CAP could not be subject to negotiations 
and revived its ideas for international market management through international commodity 
agreements (Swinbank and Tanner 1996, 15; Ingersent et al 1994b, 57). The United States 
wanted to increase GATT discipline in agricultural trade, eliminate export subsidies, and 
opposed the idea of international market management (Swinbank and Tanner 1996, 15-16; 
Josling et al 1996, 81). The United States was also of the opinion that the results of the 
negotiating groups on tariff barriers and non-tariff barriers should also apply to agricultural 
trade. The EEC, on the other hand, claimed that decisions on agricultural trade should only be 
taken in a separate negotiating group on agriculture (Josling et al 1996, 83). Substantial 
amounts of negotiating time were put in these initial procedural battles, but the outcome was 
limited and stalemate ensued (Vahl 1997, 67). Tariff reductions were agreed, but these affected 
only 2 5%  of dutiable agricultural products. Limited commodity arrangements were concluded
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for dairy and beef, while an international grains agreement ended in failure. A number of the 
negotiating parties agreed on a Subsidies Code, but the implementation of this code was 
unsuccessful.
After three rounds of negotiations in which agricultural trade had been discussed, it had 
still not been brought under effective GATT discipline. Although tariffs had been reduced, the 
bulk of the protectionist policies applied in agricultural trade -  in the form of non-tariff barriers
-  had hardly been addressed and domestic farm programmes remained untouched. The Uruguay 
Round was to change this situation.
4.3 The Run-Up to the Uruguay Round
This section and the following describe the run-up to the Uruguay Round and the negotiations 
in the round itself in detail. For an overview of this period, see Table 4.1, which provides a brief 
chronology of the Round.
4.3.1 The players at the table
The main GATT decision-making body during the Uruguay round was the GATT Council, in 
which all the contracting parties or GATT members participated. The most important players for 
the agricultural chapter were the United States, the EEC and the Cairns Group. The United 
States, and each of the Cairns Group states were all individually represented in the negotiations, 
while the EEC member states were represented by the European Commission. The United States 
was formally represented by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), but the 
Foreign Agricultural Service of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) usually took 
the lead in agricultural negotiations (Moyer and Josling 2002, 50). Within the EEC, the Council 
of Ministers played an important role in setting the objectives for the negotiations and accepting 
the eventual agreement. Box 4.1 shows which rules governed the making of trade policy within 
the EEC at the time of the Uruguay Round.
4.3.2  Negotiations and Decisions
In the beginning of the 1980s, a number of states became more and more interested in starting 
new trade negotiations for several reasons. The Codes on non-tariff barriers agreed upon during 
the Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations at the end of the 1970s had not proven very successful, 
and non-tariff barriers had been proliferating. Furthermore, protectionist sentiments were 
growing, especially in the United States (Moyer and Josling 2002, 56). Solutions were sought in 
different institutional settings, such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), which installed a Trade and Agriculture Committee 'to investigate the link 
between domestic policies and agricultural trade' (Moyer and Josling 2002, 48). The first step 
taken towards a new round of negotiations within the GATT was the proposal made by 18 
contracting parties to convene a ministerial meeting in 1982 (Paemen and Bensch 1995, 31).
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BO X 4 .1 : TRADE PO LICY  M AKING IN THE EEC AT THE TIM E OF THE U RU G U A Y ROUND
The Treaty of Rome, or the EEC Treaty, describes the procedures and powers relating to the EEC's 
international trade policy. Articles 110-116 of the EEC Treaty grant the EEC exclusive competence 
for a common commercial (or international trade) policy. 47 The delegation of these powers to the 
EEC was a prerequisite in order to speak with one single voice in international trade negotiations 
(Woolcock 2000, 374). The procedure for trade negotiations consists of three phases: setting the 
objectives for the negotiations, conducting the negotiations, and adopting the results.
Setting the objectives
The Council of Ministers (of Foreign Affairs) authorizes the Commission to open negotiations and 
determines its negotiating mandate.48 This mandate is based on a Commission proposal which the 
Council must adopt by qualified majority. As well as authorizing the mandate, the Council can 
provide the Commission with supplementary directives during the negotiations (Woolcock and 
Hodges 1997, 305; Woolcock 2000, 378-380).
Conducting the negotiations
The Commission is the 'sole spokesperson and negotiator' for the EEC on issues falling within the 
EEC's exclusive competence (Woolcock and Hodges 1997, 305). The EEC has exclusive 
competence with regard to trade in goods, while services, intellectual property and investment 
(other issues of importance during the Uruguay Round) are areas of mixed national and EEC 
competence. Nevertheless, during the Uruguay Round it was decided 'that the Commission should 
be sole negotiator, without prejudice to the question of legal competence' (Woolcock 2000, 376). 
During the negotiations, the Commission is advised by the Article 113 Committee, 49 essentially a 
subcommittee of the Committee of Permanent Representatives, which is authorized to consent to 
minor modifications to the negotiating mandates (Swinbank and Tanner 1996, 55).
Adopting the agreement
Article 114 of the EEC Treaty states that the Council of Ministers has the authority to adopt 
international trade agreements by qualified majority, 50 at least if the EEC has exclusive 
competence. In areas of mixed competence, unanimity is required (Woolcock 2000, 277-278). 
Nevertheless, de facto, in decisions on GATT trade agreements the unanimity rule has always been 
applied.
47 Article 131-134  (Art. 131-134  TEC) after the am endm ents made to the Treaty establishing the European 
Com m unity by the 1997 Am sterdam  Treaty.
48 Frans Andriessen, one of the Com m issioners involved in the Uruguay Round negotiations, argues that 
w hat is termed 'm andate' in the vernacular is actually no more than a directive or guideline. A ccording to 
him, the Council of Ministers does not actually im pose a m andate on the Com m ission (interview Andriessen 
12.2.2008). Bart Kerrem ans reaches a sim ilar conclusion and argues that the negotiating m andate often 
receives far more attention than its 'equivocal role in reality' seems to justify (Kerrem enans 2004, 49). He 
further em phasizes that the TEC  does not actually 'require the Council to define a m andate or to issue 
negotiating directives [...] it only aiiowsthe Council to do so' (Kerrem ans 2004, 49, em phasis in original). 
A nd, considering Frans Engering's (Dutch member of the Article 113 Com m ittee) claim that during the 
U ruguay Round, the first formal m andate for the Com m ission w as not given until the autum n of 1990, the 
Com m ission indeed appears to be able to negotiate w ithout a mandate.
49 Now the Article 133 Com m ittee.
50 The original Article 114 w as repealed in a later version of the treaty, but the relevant content can now  be 
found in articles 133 and 300 (Art. 133 and 300 TEC).
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Table 4.1: Brief chronology of the Uruguay Round with respect to agriculture and CAP reform 
within the EEC.
Nov. 1982
July 1983
June 1984 
Nov. 1984 
Mar. 1985
Nov. 1985
Sept. 1986
June 1987
Autumn 1987
GATT
GATT ministerial meeting. During 
this meeting a Committee on Trade 
in Agricultural products was 
established to conduct studies and 
report to the GATT Ministerial 
Meeting in 1984.
GATT ministerial meeting. This 
meeting ended in failure. Committee 
studies were extended by a year. 
General Affairs Council agrees in 
principle to participate in a new 
round of GATT negotiations on the 
condition that the mechanisms of 
the CAP were not called into 
question.
The Contracting Parties to the GATT 
establish a Preparatory Committee 
with the aim of launching a new 
round of trade negotiations in 
September 1986.
The Uruguay Round is launched in 
Punta del Este. Agreement is 
achieved on an opening declaration, 
including agriculture.
The US, EEC and the Cairns Group 
table their first agricultural proposals 
in the Uruguay Round. A wide gap
CAP
The European Commission 
introduces proposals for 
agricultural reform, including most 
notably the establishment of 
production quota for milk 
The Council of Ministers reaches 
agreement on the introduction of 
milk quota.
The Commission proposes a reform 
programme with the aim of 
controlling its expenditure. These 
reforms include 'stabilizers', which 
impose a ceiling on agricultural 
expenditure.
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Feb. 1988
exists between these positions.
The Council of Ministers reaches
Dec. 1988 During the Mid-Term Review of the
agreement on the reform package 
introduced by the Commission, 
including the stabilizers.
April 1989
Uruguay Round in Montreal, 
agreement is achieved in 11 of the 
15 negotiating groups. The talks 
collapse when a number of parties 
leave the negotiations due to 
conflict over agriculture.
The Mid-Term Review is successfully
Autumn 1989
concluded in Geneva. Parties 
commit to substantial progressive 
reductions in agricultural support. 
The US, EEC and Cairns Group table
Autumn 1990
their comprehensive agricultural 
proposals. Their positions still 
diverge significantly.
The US, EEC and Cairns Group table
Dec. 1990
their 'final' proposals.
The Heysel conference, supposed to
Dec. 1990
conclude the Uruguay Round, ends 
in stalemate. Agriculture is 
commonly blamed for the debacle.
Agriculture Commissioner Ray
July 1991
MacSharry develops preliminary 
plans for CAPreform.
The European Commission reaches
Dec. 1991 GATT Secretary General introduces
agreement on CAP reform.
May 1992
the Draft Final Act. The EEC's 
Council of Ministers immediately 
denounces the agricultural part of 
this text.
The Council of Ministers reaches
Nov. 1992 The US and the EEC reach
agreement on the MacSharry 
reforms.
Dec. 1993
agreement on the agricultural part 
of the Uruguay Round in the Blair 
House Accord.
The US and EEC negotiate a number 
of modifications to the Blair House 
Accord. The Uruguay Round is 
concluded on December 15.
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President Ronald Reagan of the United States was particularly keen on launching a new round 
as the United States was struggling with a large trade deficit. United States agricultural exports 
were declining in particular in the early 1980s (Swinbank and Tanner 1996, 28). The United 
States sought to reduce their trade deficit -  which they blamed on the trade policies of other 
states -  by bringing agricultural trade under effective GATT discipline (Davis 2003, 272). Their 
main interest was in dealing with the agricultural export subsidies of the CAP. The EEC took a 
more reserved position towards the launching of a new GATT round, first of all because the 
United States placed such a strong emphasis on agricultural trade liberalization (Paemen and 
Bensch 1995, 32), and secondly due tot the economic recession and 'ambient europessimism' 
(Meunier 2005, 103; Woolcock and Hodges 1997, 305-306). France, together with Italy and 
Greece were particularly opposed to new GATT negotiations, while Germany and the United 
Kingdom were in favour. During the GATT ministerial meeting in November 1982,51 discussions 
were tense and the agricultural issues were even more divisive than expected (Josling et al. 
1996, 111). The success of the meeting was limited and no consensus emerged in favour of 
launching a new GATT round (Swinbank and Tanner 1996, 64). The EEC objected to the 
agricultural section proposed by the Preparatory Committee and even after this section was 
heavily modified, the EEC refused to commit itself to negotiations on this issue (Agra Europe 
3.12.1982; Vahl 1997, 71). Nevertheless, the negotiating partners agreed to establish a 
Committee on Trade in Agriculture which was instructed to conduct studies and report to a 
GATT ministerial meeting scheduled for 1984.
As time passed, a number of developments in the international economy combined to 
create a sense of urgency to launch a new round of multilateral negotiations among the GATT 
contracting parties. The international economy had entered a period of economic slowdown 
(Paemen and Bensch 1995, 5). The fear that the economic recession would lead to the collapse 
of the GATT system was widespread (Ingersent et al 1994a, 3), while the multilateral trading 
system was already in crisis as a result of the increasing use of non-tariff barriers and anti­
dumping measures, which were leading to the erosion of GATT rules (Swinbank and Tanner 
1996, 1; Davis 2003, 272-273). Furthermore, after a brief surge in demand for cereals and an 
accompanying increase in agricultural trade, the 1980s saw an excess of supply bringing 
international agricultural markets -  particularly the cereal market -  into disarray, causing farm 
prices to collapse (Josling et al 1996, 101-103: Moyer and Josling 2002, 48). The EEC 
continued its agricultural export restitution policies, but due to decreasing world market prices, 
this resulted in soaring budget costs and pressure for fiscal restraint. The cost of the CAP 
(incurred through the guaranteed prices and export refunds) doubled within a five-year period, 
imposing heavy constraints on EEC budgets (Josling et al 1996, 104). The situation was 
exacerbated when the United States decided to introduce its own export subsidies through the 
Export Enhancement Programme in 1983 (allegedly in a bid to force the EEC to the negotiating
51 Both the G A T T and the EEC hold meetings in w hich the ministers of their member countries convene. In 
the rem ainder of this text the term 'ministerial m eeting' refers to m eetings w ithin the G A TT, w hile the term 
Council (or Council of Ministers) refers to m eetings within the EEC.
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table (Josling et al 1996, 104)).52 Together with the increasing tendency on the part of the 
United States to favour preferential bilateral agreements over multilateral solutions, and the 
threat of protectionist trade legislation in order to mitigate the negative impact of other states' 
trade policies on the United States trade balance, the export programme led to increasingly 
bitter trade disputes between the United States and the EEC (Vahl 1997, 71; Moyer and Josling
2002, 57). Although the EEC still regarded the agricultural negotiations within the GATT as a 
threat to the CAP, it realized that its wider interests could be damaged if a new round of GATT 
negotiations were not launched and if the protectionist tendencies of the United States were to 
lead to protectionist trade legislation (Ingersent et al 1994b, 59-60; Vahl 1997, 71-72). 
Furthermore, there were growing calls from other agricultural exporting states, who were 
suffering from the export market competition between the United States and the EEC to launch 
a new round of trade negotiations.
As a result of these developments, the Commission and the majority of the EEC member 
states (with the notable exception of France) became more receptive to the idea of a new round 
of GATT negotiations. Nevertheless, during the GATT ministerial meeting of November 1984, 
during which the Committee on Trade in Agriculture reported to the contracting parties, the EEC 
was critical of the draft recommendations on agriculture, and objected to the explicit mentioning 
of export subsidies in the text (Vahl 1997, 71).53 The ministerial meeting ended in failure, 
although Commission negotiators argued that this was not due to the agricultural issue, 
specifically, but to the resistance of developing countries to including trade in services on the 
negotiating agenda (Paemen and Bensch 1995, 35). It was decided that the period of 
Committee studies would be extended by one year.
In March 1985, the General Affairs Council agreed in principle to participate in the new 
round of GATT negotiations. In a Council Declaration, the willingness to negotiate was 
communicated to the trading partners of the EEC, but like the EEC position during the Tokyo 
Round, the declaration specifically stated that the principles and mechanisms of the CAP could 
not be called into question. The launching of the agreement to participate was allegedly 'the 
result of concessions on the part of France [...] in return for references in the text to France's 
most important concerns' (Paemen and Bensch 1995, 46). A  consensus had now emerged on 
the necessity of a new round of trade negotiations and in November 1985, the contracting 
parties decided to establish a Preparatory Committee with the aim of launching a new round of 
GATT negotiations in September 1986.
4
52 The Export Enhancem ent Program me will be referred to as the '(United States) export program m e' in the 
rem ainder of the text.
53 See also: ArchEZ. IRHP 1984-48. Novem ber 1984. Het G A TT w erkprogram m a. Verdragsluitende Partijen, 
26-29 novem ber 1984.
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4.3.3  The increasingly attractive prospect of a new round of trade negotiations
Between 1982 and 1986 the most important questions for the EEC were whether to cooperate 
in initiating a new round of GATT negotiations and whether to agree to negotiate on 
agricultural trade and bring it under stricter GATT discipline. I will now assess the attractiveness 
of these different policy options in the light of the EEC's international political and economic 
interests.
When demands for a new trade round first emerged in 1982, the idea of new GATT 
negotiations was not particularly attractive to the EEC, specifically because the inclusion of 
agricultural trade was likely to push the EEC into a defensive position. The option of refusing to 
cooperate in initiating a new trade round on the other hand, seemed to have a more limited 
adverse effect on the EEC's political interest. Although a number of states, most particularly the 
United States, exerted pressure for a new trade round, many other GATT contracting parties 
were ju st as reluctant as the EEC, as illustrated by the failure of the 1982 ministerial meeting. By 
1985, the situation had changed and launching a new round of GATT negotiations was 
becoming an ever more attractive option in the light of the EEC's political and economic 
interests. First of all, increasing United States pressure on the EEC to cooperate and agree to the 
inclusion of agriculture in a new trade round, together with the emerging consensus among 
other GATT contracting parties on the necessity of such negotiations, made maintaining their 
refusal to cooperate a less politically attractive option for the EEC. Secondly, an agricultural 
subsidy war with the United States would be contrary to both the EEC's economic and political 
interests. It would not only increase budgetary difficulties, but it would also be detrimental to 
relations with the United States, an important trading partner. We may conclude that while in 
1982 a new trade round was not yet very attractive for the EEC, it had gained in attractiveness 
by 1985, as a result of both increasing political pressure from the United States and 
developments in the international economic realm. While the international political costs of 
refusing to cooperate were still limited in 1982, these costs had increased significantly by 1985.
4.4 The Uruguay Round Negotiations
4.4.1 Punta del Este 1986: Off to a rocky start
4.4.1.1 Negotiations and decisions
In the run up to the Punta del Este Ministerial Conference (September 1986), two coalitions of 
countries formulated proposals for the opening declaration, defining the scope and terms of the 
negotiations. The first group was made up of nine mid-sized industrial countries, which 
proposed a broad declaration, including new issues such as agriculture and services. The second 
group, consisting of ten developing countries led by India and Brazil, proposed a 'narrow and 
traditional agenda, excluding new issues and with tight preconditions to the launch' (Winters
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1990, 1297). Both texts were discussed at the ministerial meeting in Punta del Este. During the 
meeting, a new text was presented which was based on the text of the group of nine industrial 
countries. This text was called the Swiss-Columbian text and most GATT contracting parties 
could agree to its contents. However, a number of developing states criticized the section on 
services, while the EEC, particularly France, Italy and Greece, objected to the section on 
agriculture because 'it was felt that the text singled out export subsidies, and violated the EEC 
negotiating position as well as its agricultural policy' (Vahl 1997, 75). The EEC proposed an 
alternative text calling for discussions on 'direct and indirect' agricultural subsidies, but refused 
to accept the 'phased removal' of subsidies that the United States proposed (Agra Europe 
19.7.1986). Furthermore, the EEC insisted on the 'globality' of the round, meaning that the 
'launching, conduct and implementation of outcomes of negotiations would be treated as part 
of a single undertaking' (Paemen and Bensch 1995, 58). The EEC thus made clear that 
agriculture would not be put on a 'fast-track', although the United States favoured moving more 
swiftly in this area (Oxley 1990, 158). The United States and the Cairns Group insisted on the 
inclusion of agricultural trade in the new round of negotiations, especially export subsidies.54 
Prior to the Punta del Este meeting, Clayton Yeutter, United States Trade Representative had 
warned the EEC against 'agricultural madness' during the negotiations {Handeisbiatt 5.9.1986). 
During the negotiations, the United States stepped up its pressure on the EEC to agree to the 
agricultural section of the opening declaration. The EEC could not refuse the opening of a new 
trade round without a severe blow to its relations with the United States. Relations between the 
United States and the EEC had already been tense as a result of the argument concerning 
compensation for the United States for the expansion of the EEC with Spain and Portugal 
{Handeisbiatt 30.4.1986).
During the negotiations in Punta del Este, the EEC was isolated on the agricultural issue 
because most of the other GATT contracting parties, including the developing countries, agreed 
to the proposed text. Eventually, agreement was reached on an opening declaration, including a 
section on agriculture. The text of this section on agriculture is to be found in Box 4.2.
This declaration was more ambitious than the treatment of agriculture in previous rounds 
of negotiations. The disciplining of both direct and indirect subsidies was particularly 
revolutionary because it represented an intervention in the domestic policies of states (Winters 
1990, 1298). It is not surprising therefore that agreement could only be reached with difficulty. 
French reluctance is said to have impeded discussions within the EEC and led to its resistance 
and isolation during the GATT ministerial meeting.55 Eventually, the United States and the 
Cairns Group achieved the far-reaching inclusion of agriculture in the Uruguay Round that they 
had sought, while the EEC succeeded in averting a one-sided focus on the CAP's variable import 
levies and export refunds, as 'all direct and indirect subsidies and other measures affecting
4
54 http://w w w .cairnsgroup.org/m eetings.htm l: Cairns Group declaration after the 1st Cairns Group 
ministerial m eeting -  ministerial m eeting of fair traders in agriculture. Cairns, Australia, 27 Au gu st 1986.
55 ArchBuZa. EG/19 8 5-1989: 01544. 30 .9 .1 98 6 . M em orandum  DIE inzake Uruguay Ronde.
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directly or indirectly agricultural trade' (such as the United States deficiency payments) were to 
be discussed.
BO X 4.2  A G RICU LTU RA L PART OF THE M INISTERIAL D ECLARATIO N  OF PUNTA DEL ESTE
The Contracting Parties agree that there is an urgent need to bring more discipline and 
predictability to world agricultural trade by correcting and preventing restrictions and 
distortions including those related to structural surpluses so as to reduce the uncertainty, 
imbalances and instability in world agricultural markets.
Negotiations shall aim to achieve greater liberalization of trade in agriculture and bring all 
measures affecting import access and export competition under strengthened and more 
operationally effective GATT rules and disciplines, taking into account the general principles 
governing the negotiations, by:
(i) improving market access through, inter alia, the reduction of import barriers;
(ii) improving the competitive environment by increasing discipline on the use of all 
direct and indirect subsidies and other measures affecting directly or indirectly 
agricultural trade, including the phased reduction of their negative effects and 
dealing with their causes;
(iii) minimizing the adverse effects that sanitary and phytosanitary regulations and 
barriers can have on trade in agriculture, taking into account the relevant 
international agreements.
In order to achieve the above objectives, the negotiating group having primary responsibility 
for all aspects of agriculture will use the Recommendations adopted by the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES at their Fortieth Session, which were developed in accordance with the GATT 1982 
Ministerial Work Programme, and take account of the approaches suggested in the work of 
the Committee on Trade in Agriculture without prejudice to other alternatives that might 
achieve the objectives of the negotiations.
Source: Paemen and Bensch 1995, 276
Apart from the negotiating group on agriculture, thirteen other negotiating groups were 
installed at Punta del Este.56 Furthermore, a Mid-Term Review was planned for 1988 in 
Montreal which would take stock of the results achieved. The conclusion of the Uruguay Round 
was then expected at a Ministerial meeting in December 1990.
56 Negotiating groups on tariffs, non-tariff measures, natural resource products, textiles and clothing, 
tropical products, G A TT Articles, MTN (M ultilateral Trade Negotiations) agreem ents (codes), safeguards, 
subsidies and countervailing measures, TRIPs (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights), TRIMs 
(Trade-Related Investment M easures), dispute settlem ent and the functioning of the G A T T  system , and 
services.
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4.4.1.2 The EEC in a tight spot
During the Punta del Este meeting in 1986 the main issue for the EEC was still whether or not 
to agree to the launch of a new trade round and accept the inclusion of agriculture as proposed 
in the Punta del Este declaration. I will now assess the attractiveness for the EEC of either 
agreeing to or obstructing the launch of a new trade round. As the previous section showed, 
resistance to a new trade round had already become an increasingly unattractive option by 
1985. Two developments made this option even less attractive during the Punta del Este 
negotiations. First of all, the increasing pressure from the United States and the Cairns Group 
meant that the EEC could no longer dig its heels in without seriously damaging its relations with 
important (trading) partners and thus its political interest. Secondly, unlike during the Ministerial 
Conferences in 1982 and 1984, the EEC was now isolated in its refusal to agree to a text on 
agriculture. Virtually all other contracting parties had now rallied around the proposed 
declaration. The political pressure on the EEC to agree to the declaration and enable the start of 
a new round of GATT negotiations was thus exceptionally high in 1986. A refusal to cooperate 
on the part of the EEC was an even more unattractive option than before. The international 
political costs of refusal to cooperate had significantly increased between 1985 and 1986. 4
4.4.2  The first agricultural proposals (1987-1988)
4.4.2.1 Negotiations and decisions
The actual negotiations in the negotiating groups started in 1987. According to Hugo Paemen 
and Alexandra Bensch (1995, 105), two of the EEC's negotiators, the first year was chiefly a 
'preparatory phase' in which issues of substance were not addressed. Furthermore, the United 
States President was first required to obtain the fast track authority from Congress before the 
negotiations could make progress.57
Nevertheless, the United States was the first key player to table a proposal on agricultural 
trade. In July 1987 it proposed the complete elimination of all policies which distorted 
agricultural production and trade. These policies, which explicitly included export subsidies, were 
to be phased out within ten years (Vahl 1997, 88). This opening bid became known as the 'zero 
option' (Swinbank and Tanner 1996, 73). The United States argued that an aggregate measure 
of support (henceforth AMS or 'measure of support') should be used to measure and monitor 
this liberalization.58 The United States also proposed using the Producer Subsidy Equivalent
57 The fast-track authority enables the executive to negotiate and sign international agreem ents. Under this 
authority, Congress is only allow ed to vote either in favour of or against ratification but cannot propose 
am endm ents to the original agreem ent.
58 The aggregate measure of support w as an instrum ent to enable com parison of the degrees of support in 
different states, even though these states used different m eans of farm  support. The aggregate  measure of 
support 'is essentially the difference between the dom estic and the w orld price, m ultiplied by the volum e of
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(PSE) instrument, which had been developed within the OECD, as the measure of support 
(Moyer 1993, 96). The Cairns Group proposed the steady reduction of protection in the course 
of ten years and suggested a three stage agenda. First of all, in the short term, existing trade 
distorting policies would be 'frozen'. Next, these subsidies and other protectionist measures 
would be reduced, using the PSE as the measure of support by which progress would be 
assessed. Finally, in the long term, new GATT rules would be put in place under which 
agriculture would be placed under stricter GATT discipline (Moyer 1993, 96). The Cairns Group 
proposal was largely consistent with the United States proposal, though somewhat less radical. 
The EEC proposal was, by contrast, much more limited in scope. In essence, it aimed to extend 
the managed market concept of the CAP to world markets (Josling et ai 1996, 73). The EEC 
distinguished between short-term and long-term measures. In the short term, the instability in 
particular commodity markets and the excess supplies were to be reduced by the concerted 
management of markets through commodity agreements (Ingersent et ai. 1994b, 61; Josling et 
ai 1996, 143; Handeisbiatt8.10.1987; Agra Europe 9.10.1987). In the long term, the EEC 
argued for 'significant reduction in support and readjustment of external protection' (Josling et 
ai 1996, 143). Furthermore, the EEC agreed to reduced levels of protection in the GATT under 
two conditions. First of all, a measure of support would have to be used which gave credit to 
the supply constraints imposed by governments earlier and this measure should take account of 
exchange rate variations. Secondly, the agreement had to be sufficiently flexible to allow 
increases in protection on some individual commodities in exchange for a sharp reduction of 
protection in other commodities (Ingersent et ai 1994b, 61). This demand was labelled 
'rebalancing' and would be an important issue for the EEC in the Uruguay Round negotiations. 
Finally, the EEC repeatedly emphasized that the principles of the CAP were not negotiable and 
that the GATT negotiations should be considered as a single undertaking in which agriculture 
could not be placed on a fast track.
Clearly, the position of the United States on the one side, and that of the EEC on the other 
side, were miles apart. During the negotiations, the United States only wanted to discuss their 
long term goal of the elimination of all agricultural protection, whereas the EEC emphasized the 
short term measures to be taken and refrained from endorsing the elimination of support, 
offering only a reduction in support. Although the Cairns Group proposal seemed to provide a 
compromise between the EEC and the United States, the antagonists could not come to any 
kind of agreement in the first two years of the Uruguay Round and neither was prepared to 
make concessions (Josling et ai, 1996, 146).
production plus any direct or indirect paym ents received by the farm sector' (Sw inbank and Tanner 1996, 
72).
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Table: 4.2: US-EEC trade disputes in GATT panels during the Uruguay Round
US as claimant period EEC as claimant period
VAT treshold 1982-1987 Taxes on Petroleum 1986-1989
Government financing of 1987-1987 Customs user fee 1986-1990
Airbus
Tax reform passenger aircraft 1987-1987
Third country meat directive 1987-1988
Section 337 -  Aramid fibres 1987-1993
Animal hormones directive 1987-1987
Procurement of machine tools 1987-1989
Greek restrictions on 1988-1988
almonds 1955 Waiver 1988-1990
1988-1992
Oilseed subsidy Hormones retaliation 1988-1990
1988-1988
Licenses for dessert apples NSF sonar mapping procurement 1991-1992
1989-1989
Restraints on copper scrap Tuna import ban extension 1992
1989-1992
Government financing of Taxes on imported automobiles 1992
Airbus
4
Relations between the United States and the EEC became strained not only through the 
negotiations concerning agriculture within the GATT, but also in their bilateral trading relations 
more generally, judging from the large number of trade disputes they brought before GATT 
panels in this period. Table 4.2 gives an overview of these panels on US-EEC conflicts. In 1987, 
the Airbus and the animal hormone disputes were particularly important, although the 
hormones issue really escalated only in 1988 when it reached the top of the US-EEC bilateral 
trade agenda. This occurred when the United States introduced a retaliation scheme, which the 
EEC took to a GATT panel.
4.2.2.2. The costs of compromise
Once the negotiations on agriculture were underway, the main issue for the EEC was the degree 
to which they should compromise on agriculture and make concessions to other negotiating 
parties, particularly the United States and the Cairns Group. To what extent was either 
willingness to compromise or, in contrast, resisting all concessions attractive for the EEC in 
terms of its international political and economic interests? In 1987, there was an enormous gulf 
between the proposals of the United States and the Cairns Group on the one side and the EEC
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proposal on the other. Given the pressure that the United States zero option placed them under, 
a refusal on the part of the EEC to make any concessions whatsoever would be politically 
unattractive. Provoking a stalemate in the negotiations was likely to harm the EEC's relations 
with the United States. At the same time, however, there was disagreement about the extent to 
which the zero option should actually be taken at face value (Swinbank and Tanner 1996, 73). 
The radical nature of the offer, although undoubtedly meant to put pressure on the EEC to make 
concessions,59 had the disadvantage for the United States of appearing excessively radical and 
dogmatic. If the United States was unwilling to negotiate on its uncompromising stance, why 
should the EEC do so? Failure to make progress in the negotiations as a result of sticking to the 
extreme zero option would quickly be blamed on the United States. The adverse political 
consequences of EEC resistance to the offer should not therefore be overestimated. What is 
more, the United States zero option was likely to be rejected by many GATT contracting parties, 
so the EEC could hardly be expected to be isolated in the negotiations. We may conclude that 
the international political costs associated with resisting United States demands were limited in 
this period. Although US-EEC relations were under pressure, denouncing the zero option was 
unlikely to have any significant negative effect on these relations.
4.4.3  The Mid-Term Review in Montreal and Geneva: (December 1988 -  April 1989)
4.4.3.1 Negotiations and decisions
As mentioned earlier, it was already in Punta del Este in 1986 that the GATT partners agreed to 
a Mid-Term Review in December 1988 in Montreal. The United States and the Cairns Group 
aimed for an 'early harvest' during this meeting in order to accelerate the negotiations and 
assess to what extent partial agreements could already be made.60 The USDA even threatened 
that they might be forced to give in to pressure of Congress to take measures aimed at making 
United States farm products more competitive. This pressure would only increase if the GATT 
negotiations did not show more progress and the EEC did not make additional concession (Agra 
Europe 22.4.1988). But the EEC refused to cooperate in partial agreements in 1988 and 
regarded the meeting as a 'review' to 'take stock of the work done' and not as negotiations in 
which to make additional concessions (Paemen and Bensch 1995, 121). The proposal the EEC 
tabled in October 1988 hardly contained any new elements compared to its earlier proposals. It 
strived for the maintenance of the status quo and reduction of agricultural support over a period
59 Another argum ent used in the literature is that the United States w anted to use the G A T T negotiations to 
establish at the international level the rules that w ould require agricultural reform at the national level, 
reforms the United States governm ent w as not likely to get accepted unilaterally at the national level (see 
Paarlberg 1991).
60 http://w w w .cairnsgroup.org/m eetings.htm l: Ministerial Statem ent after the 2nd Cairns Group ministerial 
m eeting. O ttaw a, Canada, 23 May 1987; Ministerial Statem ent after the 3rd Cairns Group ministerial 
m eeting. Bariloche, A rgentina, 26 February 1988; Ministerial Statem ent after the 4 th Cairns Group 
ministerial m eeting. Budapast, Hungary, 12 Novem ber 1988.
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of five years, progress of which was to be measured on the basis of the Support Measurement 
Unit (SMU). The only genuinely new element in the proposal was a refinement of the short term 
support reductions, made to make the proposal more attractive to the GATT partners (Agra 
Europe 18.11.1988). The Cairns Groups particularly aimed at reaching agreement on support 
reductions in the short term during the Montreal meeting (Vahl 1997, 91). It was questionable 
though, politically speaking, whether reaching genuine agreements would be feasible during the 
Mid-Term Review, since President Reagan was to be succeeded by President George Herbert 
Bush in January 1989 (Swinbank and Tanner 1996, 138).
Shortly prior to the meeting in Montreal, the key players once again tabled slightly 
amended proposals. In November 1988, the United States presented a 'framework proposal' 
that was to serve as a guide for the Mid-Term review. An important new element in this 
proposal was the tariffication of non-tariff barriers in agricultural trade. Non-tariff barriers would 
first be converted into tariffs. These tariffs were subsequently to be reduced in phases, 
eventually to be eliminated altogether in the long term (Hillman 1994, 38). In the long term, 
therefore, the United States held on to the zero option, but they were willing to accept the 
Cairns Group proposal -  which the EEC regarded as 'constructive' -  as a basis for the 
negotiations (Vahl 1997, 90). The EEC, however, was only willing to freeze support measures at 
the existing levels and to negotiate on the reduction of these measures on the basis of a 
measure of support (Oxley 1990, 174). The negotiating parties were unable to reach agreement 
in Montreal. The United States refused to negotiate on short term measures if liberalization in 
the long term was not defined as the full elimination of support (Paemen and Bensch 1995, 
128). Allegedly, Yeutter had been willing to drop the zero option during the Montreal meeting, 
but American farm organizations had successfully prevented this (Hillman 1994, 38-39). During 
the negotiations, the United States increased its pressure on the EEC to make concessions on 
agriculture, particularly concerning export restitutions (Le Monde 6.12.1988). Eventually, a 
coalition of Latin-American states (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Uruguay) 
refused to negotiate any longer as long as stronger commitments on agriculture were lacking 
(Paemen and Bensch 1995, 128; Winter 1990, 1299). The Mid-Term review in Montreal ended 
in a stalemate and the negotiations were deferred until April 1989. It should be noted that it 
was not only the negotiating group on agriculture that was unable to reach agreement in 
December 1988. Although 'tentative agreements]' had been reached in eleven of the fifteen 
groups, the themes of intellectual property, textiles and apparel, as well as services proved just 
as difficult as the agricultural negotiations (Swinbank and Tanner 1996, 74).
In April 1989, the negotiating parties were finally able to reach an agreement in Geneva, 
because both the United States and the EEC were willing to make concessions (Davis 2003, 
281). Prior to this meeting, the Cairns Group had threatened to leave the negotiating table if no 
agreement was reached on agriculture (Winter 1990, 1299). In Geneva, the negotiating parties 
agreed to freeze the existing levels of support and market access for two years. They further 
committed themselves to the reduction of support by 1990, however without specifying 
reduction percentages. They simply agreed to a 'substantial progressive reduction of agricultural
4
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support over an agreed period of time' (Moyer 1993, 97). The instrument to be used for the 
measurement of support would be a measure that did not specify reduction per commodity 
(Vahl 1997, 94). The United States conceded by accepting 'substantial progressive reduction' 
instead of demanding the total elimination of support measures. The EEC obliged United States 
demands by accepting negotiations on three separate issues -  internal support, import access 
and export assistance -  although the EEC still regarded these issues to be 'inextricably linked' 
(Paemen and Bensch 1995, 140-141).61 As for the planning for the further course of the 
agricultural negotiations, it was agreed that the negotiating parties would table detailed 
proposals by December 1989, after which the negotiating group was to compile 'summary 
reports' in January 1990. Subsequently, negotiations were to take place between January and 
June 1990, which should result in an 'outline agreement'. The total package of agreements 
should finally be adopted during the GATT ministerial meeting in Heysel in December 1990 to 
conclude the GATT negotiations as planned (Paemen and Bensch 1995, 140-141).
4,4,3,2, The cost of EEC inflexibility
In the period up to and including the Mid-Term Review, the main question for the EEC remained 
whether to compromise on agriculture and to make concessions in order to reach an agreement, 
in this case during the negotiations in Montreal. The description of the negotiations given above 
shows that the pressure on the EEC, from the United States in particular, was high during the 
Mid-Term Review. In the eyes of the United States and the Cairns Group, the EEC proposals, 
and particularly the lack of specific long-term commitments therein, were far from satisfactory. 
The United States felt that they had already compromised on the short-term measures to be 
taken and argued that it was now up to the EEC to make a move.
Apart form the pressure exerted within the GATT negotiations, United States behaviour 
outside the negotiations also indirectly influenced the attractiveness of different behavioural 
options open to EEC in the GATT negotiations. As early as April 1988, the USDA announced 
that it would be forced by Congress to introduce measures enhancing the competitiveness of 
American agricultural products if progress was not made in the GATT negotiations (Agra Europe
22.4.1988). By the end of 1988, Congress did indeed pass the Omnibus Trade Bill with Super 
301 provisions allowing unilateral action on the part of the United States, placing 
multilateralism in jeopardy (Winters 1990, 1287).62 The new trade act also included 'provisions
61 According to Agra Europe( 1 4 .4 .1989) the agreem ent w as a negotiating success for the EEC, because it 
largely mirrored the EEC's original negotiating position. G uy Legras, Director General of DG VI at the time, 
argues that the Com m ission had made a great achievem ent in Geneva w ith the form ulation of 'substantial 
progressive reductions'. 'W e concluded nothing serious, but the w hole idea of the m eeting w as to keep the 
process alive. W e had to say w e made big progress' (interview Legras 12.1 1.2007).
62 Super 301 (as introduced in the 1988 Om nibus Trade and Com petitiveness Act) is an am endm ent to 
Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act. Section 301 is the 'statutory authority under w hich the United States 
may impose trade sanctions against foreign countries that maintain acts, policies and practices that [...]
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for the funds and legal means for a heightened agricultural subsidy war' (Agra Europe
11.11.1988): in other words, the export programme introduced in 1983 was now being 
extended (Josling et ai 1996, 146). Within the EEC, United States threats of actions to be taken 
if the Mid-Term Review were not to produce the desired results were considered to be part of 
the United States' aggressive preparation for the Montreal meeting.63 In the meantime, the 
conflict over the EEC hormone directive reached its peak in 1988 and the United States brought 
a new conflict on oilseed before a GATT panel. Bilateral trade relations were thus still under 
pressure.
The United States threats and actions on issues formally outside the scope of the GATT 
negotiations made the option of declining to make concessions on agriculture in the Uruguay 
Round less attractive to the EEC. We may conclude that, as a result of increasing United States 
pressure on the EEC and the fact that it would no longer be possible to blame any failure solely 
on United States intransigence (because it had shown earnest willingness to negotiate), the 
political costs of intransigence in the negotiations increased in 1988 compared to 1987. 
International pressure to make concessions increased even further in the first half of 1989 as a 
result of threats by the Cairns Group to leave the GATT negotiations if the Mid-Term Review 
was not successfully concluded in Geneva.
4
4.4.4  From Geneva to Brussels: breakdown in Heysel
4.4.4.1 Negotiations and Decisions
In accordance with the negotiating time-table agreed in Geneva, the GATT contracting parties 
introduced their comprehensive proposals in the autumn of 1989. This was the beginning of a 
period of great political turmoil, in which the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent collapse 
of the Soviet Union not only marked the end of the bipolar era, but also brought about political 
changes for Germany and the EEC. During this period, the United States was the first state to 
submit its proposal in October 1989, and the proposal was a somewhat gentler approach to 
reach the zero option. The United States wanted the contracting parties to submit specific 
commitments concerning internal support, import access and export subsidies. With respect to
restrict U.S. com m erce' (http://w w w .osec.doc.gov/ogc/occic/301.htm l). Under 'Super 301' the USTR w as 
required to 'identify U.S. trade liberalization priorities within 30 days fo llow ing the National Trade Estimates 
(foreign trade barriers) Report to Congress in 1989 and 1990 [...] to initiate (regular) section 301 
investigations on all priority practices w ithin 21 days after subm itting the report to the House W ays and 
Means and Senate Finance Com m ittees', and 'to negotiate agreem ents w hich  provided for the elim ination 
of, or com pensation for, the priority trade barriers w ithin 3 years after the initiation of the investigation' 
(http://ww w.w ebref.org/agriculture/s/super_301.htm ). The 1988 Om nibus Trade and Com petitiveness A ct is 
considered to 'shift the authority to retaliate from the president to the USTR' and to make 'retaliation 
against unjustifiable practices [...] m andatory' (Looney 1999, 
http://web.nps.navy.m il/~relooney/routledge_30.htm ).
63 ArchBuZa. EG/ 1985-1989: 01444. Open bericht. Verslag van de 1263e vergadering van de raad van de 
EG (landbouw ) gehouden te Brussel op 26 en 27 septem ber 1988.
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internal support, it proposed a 'three-tiered approach to greater discipline'. Policies were to be 
labelled as red, amber or green (depending on the degree to which they distorted trade), and 
the policies in these various categories would subsequently be subject to different reduction 
percentages (Ingersent et ai 1994b, 65). Regarding import access, the United States again 
proposed the tariffication of non-tariff barriers (such as import quotas) and the subsequent 
phasing-out of these tariffs over ten years. Finally, the United States maintained that export 
subsidies should be phased out within a shorter period (five years) than other forms of support 
(Moyer 1993, 98).
The Cairns Group proposal also envisioned the 'long-term dismantling of agricultural 
protection', but export subsidies were to be eliminated in a period of ten years rather than five 
(Moyer 1993, 98). The Cairns Group proposed substantial progressive reductions of the level of 
internal support, and with regard to import access the Cairns Group's proposal mirrored the 
United States proposal of tariffication and elimination over time, although without proposing a 
particular time-frame. Rebalancing was explicitly rejected by the Cairns Group (ibid.).64 For the 
first time in the negotiations, the Cairns Group now also began to emphasize that 'without a 
substantial outcome on agriculture the round cannot and will not be successfully concluded'.65
The EEC proposal again contrasted starkly with the other two proposals. Once again, it 
emphasized the fundamental principles of the CAP and proposed market management. The EEC 
made no separate specific commitments in the three areas demanded by the United States, but 
proposed a 'gradual and balanced reduction' (not an elimination) of support levels over five 
years without quantifying these reductions and with the stipulation that measures already 
introduced since 1986 were also to be taken into account (Ingersent et ai 1994b, 66). Thus the 
EEC departed from the one-sided emphasis on short-term action (Josling et ai 1996, 149). The 
EEC also made a concession in offering 'partial tariffication of its variable levies in return for 
outside acceptance of its demands for rebalancing levels of support between high and low 
protection products' (Moyer 1993, 98). With respect to export subsidies the EEC refused to 
make specific commitments, claiming that these would automatically be reduced once internal 
prices and tariffs were reduced (Ingersent et ai. 1994b, 66). Finally, the EEC emphasized that all 
policies affecting production decisions by farmers should be regarded as support to be reduced 
(based on the measure of support developed by the EEC), 66 including deficiency payments 
allotted to farmers in the United States (Moyer 1993, 98).
The differences between the United States and the Cairns group on one side and the EEC 
on the other seemed to be as great as ever. Unsurprisingly, negotiations on the basis of the 
comprehensive proposals led to no agreement of any kind. The EEC claimed that by restoring a 
zero option, the United States was backtracking on the concessions it had made during the Mid-
64 http://w w w .cairnsgroup.org/m eetings.htm l: Ministerial Statem ent after the 6th Cairns Group ministerial 
m eeting. Chiang Mai, Thailand, 21-23 Novem ber 1989.
656 ibid.
66 This measure w as called the Standard M easuring Unit and it took account of measures already taken and 
of exchange rate im balances (see also 4.4.2.1).
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Term Review in Geneva. The United States, meanwhile, argued that the unwillingness of the 
EEC to provide quantified commitments with respect to internal support, import access, and 
export subsidies was not in accordance with the agreements made during the Mid-Term Review. 
The first months of 1990 became a 'war of words on farm trade' (Financial Times 9.3.1990), 
with Agriculture Commissioner MacSharry accusing the United States of playing 'war games' 
[Financial Times 17.2.1990). By the end of April, the Commission and the United States 'agreed 
to meet every two weeks with the aim of producing a framework for the agricultural 
negotiations by the end of July' [Financial Times 3.5.1990). They made no progress, however, 
and they openly quarrelled on the issue of export subsidies (Vahl 1997, 114). In order to break 
the stalemate before the July meetings of the G7 and the GATT Trade Negotiating Committee, 
Aart De Zeeuw, chairman of the Negotiating Group on Agriculture, introduced a proposal 
designed to be the basis for a framework agreement for the final stages of the negotiations. 
With respect to internal support, this proposal involved significant reductions using a measure of 
support with 1988 as base year (thus giving no credit for the measures the EEC had already 
taken to reform the CAP). Import access was to be improved by the tariffication of import 
restrictions and the reduction of these tariffs over time. Finally, and most importantly, the De 
Zeeuw paper proposed that export assistance be reduced more rapidly than other forms of 
protection (Moyer 1993, 106; Ingersent et ai 1994b, 68). The United States and the Cairns 
Group accepted the paper as a framework for an agricultural agreement but the EEC opposed 
the proposal, arguing specifically that it conceded to United States demands (Paemen and 
Bensch 1995, 169).67 The Commission was only willing to take the paper as a 'means to 
intensify the negotiations' (Vahl 1997, 116). Agreement proved as elusive as ever. Despite 
threats by USTR Carla Hills that a number of delegations would walk out of the negotiations if 
the EEC was unwilling to reform its common agricultural policy, the G7 Summit in Houston did 
not bring the parties any closer (Le Monde 11.7.1990).
October 15, 1990 was set as the initial deadline for tabling final agricultural offers on 
reductions in support, including a time-frame for these reductions. By the end of September
1990, both the United States offer and the EEC offer were running late. The United States offer 
was still being passed around within the Washington bureaucracy [Agra Europe 5.10.1990), 
while there was continued disagreement in the Council of Ministers about the agricultural offer 
proposed by Agriculture Commissioner MacSharry. In September 1990, the United States argued 
that the ball was in the EEC's court and that the EEC offer would have to be far-reaching. If a 
solution could not be reached on agriculture, the United States threatened that it (together with 
40 or 50 other states) would walk out of the negotiations and no agreement would be reached 
on other important issues such as industry and services [AgenceEurope20.9.1990). The United 
States presented its final proposal on the day of the deadline. It called for a 75%  cut in the most 
trade distorting domestic subsidies and a 90%  cut in export subsidies in ten years, taking 1991
4
67 http://w w w .cairnsgroup.org/m eetings.htm l: Com m uniqué after the 7th Cairns Group ministerial m eeting. 
Santiago, Chile, 4-6  July 1990.
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as the base year (Hillman 1994, 42; Swinbank and Tanner 1996, 77). In addition, the United 
States reiterated its demand for the tariffication of barriers to import access and the introduction 
of a minimum access of 3%  of domestic consumption (Hillman 1994, 43). This proposal 
reflected two concessions to the EEC. First of all, the United states had now seriously 
abandoned its zero option, and secondly, the United States had moved 'towards endorsing' the 
measure of support for monitoring support reductions which had been introduced by the EEC, 
although it was not giving full credit to the EEC policies of supply control (Ingersent et al. 
1994b, 69-70). The EEC was unable to meet the 15 October deadline. Yeutter, now United 
States Secretary of Agriculture,68 threatened a trade war (a war of subsidies) in order to force 
the EEC to table proposals (Hillman 1994, 46). Eventually, it was only after the EEC Council of 
Ministers had met six times -  during which both Germany and France repeatedly hit the brakes
-  that the EEC agricultural offer was agreed. This offer was finally endorsed by the Council on 6 
November 1990. The EEC offered a 30%  reduction in internal support (expressed by a measure 
of support) for the main agricultural products over ten years, taking 1986 as the base year. On 
import access, the EEC continued to support partial tariffication, subject to the allowance of 
rebalancing. The offer made no specific commitments on export competition, but merely stated 
that the reductions in support would lead to concomitant adjustment of export restitutions 
(Ingersent et ai 1994b, 72-73). What was particularly new in this offer was that, for the first 
time during the negotiations, the EEC was willing to quantify certain reductions over a particular 
period of time. Within the EEC, this offer was also regarded as the negotiating mandate for the 
Commission. Due to the difficulty with which the offer had come about, this mandate was rather 
tight and the Commission was unlikely to be very flexible during the negotiations in Heysel. 
However, in October 1990, GATT negotiating partners were already criticizing the Commission 
proposal (still on the table of the Council of Ministers at the time) and labelled it as insufficient 
(Paemen and Bensch 1995, 177). As early as September, the United States expressed the 
opinion that the MacSharry proposal was a 'non-starter: too little too late'.69 The states united 
in the Cairns Group even threatened to walk out of the negotiations if the EEC did not 
compromise on agriculture.70 Unsurprisingly, the watered down version of this proposal, which
68 In 1989 Yeutter succeeded Richard Lyng as Secretary of Agriculture, while Hills succeeded Yeutter as 
USTR.
69 ArchBuZa. V N /1 9 85-1994:08640. 26 .9 .1 99 0 . w asi762/19192. Codebericht W ashington aan BuZa. 
A llegedly, Com m issioner M acSharry had already made a similar agricultural proposal at an inform al meeting 
w ith the United States in Ireland (Drom oland Castle) in July 1990. At the time, Yeutter im m ediately rejected 
that proposal. France regarded the United States conduct towards the EEC prior to the Heysel conference as 
a strategy to isolate the EEC and to blame it in advance for a potential collapse of the negotiations (C A C . 
19920056, art 7. 16.1 1.1990. Andreani. TD W ashington 2760 AG RI. Objet: participation du président Bush 
au Som m et de Paris. Positions am éricaines dans l'UR.)
70 http://w ww .sunsonline.org/trade/areas/agricult/11070090.htm  7.1 1.1990: 'Cairns Group soft-pedals on 
w alk  out threats'. However, it appeared that the states within the Cairns Group were divided on the issue.
In the form al Ministerial Statem ent after the 8th Cairns Group ministerial m eeting in Geneva, Sw itzerland, 5 
Novem ber 1990 (http://w w w .cairsgroup.org/m eetings.htm l), they did not explicitly threaten w ith a w alkout, 
but they stressed that the EEC and its member states w ould be to blame if the talks collapsed.
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was accepted in the Council of Ministers in November 1990, was received with little enthusiasm 
on the part of the other GATT negotiating parties. The prospects for the agricultural negotiations 
at Heysel seemed bleak.
Although fruitful negotiations were conducted in other areas than agriculture, the 
agricultural negotiations in Heysel soon reached a stalemate (Hillman 1994, 47). On 5 
December, the Americans sent a message to the EEC that they would walk out of the meeting if 
a new, more flexible offer on agriculture was not forthcoming (Paemen and Bensch 1995, 184). 
The Commission responded that agriculture was just one of the five negotiating groups in which 
agreement was lacking. The United States and the Cairns Group were allegedly blocking 
negotiations on other issues (Le Monde 6.12.1990). Nevertheless, the Council of Ministers 
(trade) convened on 6 December and decided to grant the Commission a 'degree of flexibility in 
keeping with the spirit of its mandate' (Paemen and Bensch 1995, 184). In the meantime, after 
consultations with the contracting parties, Mats Hellstrom, the Swedish chairman of the 
agriculture negotiating group, proposed a 30%  reduction in support (with respect to internal 
support, import access and export assistance), using 1990 rather than 1986 as a base year 
(Moyer 1993, 109). Even though the Commission made a number of last minute concessions,71 
the talks collapsed when it became clear that a compromise on agriculture could not be found, 
and the United States and the Cairns Group carried out their threat to withdraw from the other 
negotiating groups (Josling et ai. 1996, 155; Hillman 1994, 77; Agra Europe 14.12.1990). The 
inability to conclude an agreement on agriculture meant that the entire package of agreements 
negotiated in other negotiating groups also fell by the wayside. The EEC was instantly blamed 
for the Heysel debacle,72 although Commission negotiators argued that the United States had 
blocked the negotiations on issues outside agriculture, such as services, market access, subsidies 
and TRIMs (Paemen and Bensch 1995, 183). Ken Ingersent et ai. (1994b, 73) conclude that the 
key reason for the lack of agreement on agriculture was that the 'US and Cairns Group were 
unable to accept the EEC's refusal to offer specific quantitative commitments to lowering border 
protection and reducing export assistance'. Whatever the reason, in December 1990 the talks 
ended in a complete impasse. Although agriculture was not the only issue with regard to which 
agreement was lacking in Heysel (as had been the case in Montreal in 1988), the Heysel debacle 
was widely blamed on EEC intransigence on agriculture.
4
71 These concessions were a softening of the dem and of rebalancing; a w illingness to reduce export 
subsidies also by cutting export volum es on w hich  export subsidies were paid; and m inim um  im port access 
arrangem ents for up to 3 %  of consum ption (Vahl 1997, 187; Agence Europe 7 .1 2 .1 99 0 ; Agra Europe 
14.12.1990; Le Monde 10 .12.1990). W ithin the EEC, France and Ireland accused the Com m ission of 
exceeding the negotiating m andate (Josling et ai. 1996, 155).
72 See for exam ple: http://w w w .cairnsgroup.org/m eetings.htm l: Ministerial Statem ent after the 9th Cairns 
Group ministerial m eeting. Brussels, Belgium , 7 Decem ber 1990.
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4.4.4.2 The costs of intransigence
During what was scheduled to be the final year of the Uruguay Round, the EEC and its member 
states were under intense pressure from outside to agree to far-reaching liberalization in 
agricultural trade. As the description of the negotiations above shows, the United States 
gradually stepped up its pressure in 1990, culminating in extensive pressure during the 
negotiations in Heysel. The United States offer and threats (on three occasions) clearly signalled 
that the EEC would have to make substantial concessions to prevent the United States from 
walking out of the negotiations. In addition to the international pressure exerted through these 
threats during the negotiations, other United States (legislative) decisions, although not directly 
part of the GATT negotiations, also added to the pressure on the EEC and made failure to agree 
on agriculture even less attractive. The first of these legislative decisions was a Farm Bill, passed 
by Congress in the autumn of 1990. This Farm Bill provided for an increase in spending on the 
United States programme of agricultural export subsidies and it included the potential use of 
autonomous and unilateral trade restrictions outside the GATT discipline (Agence Europe
3.11.1990). With the extension of the United States export programme, USTR Hills kept the 
promise she had made in January 1990 that the United States would not decrease its export 
subsidies, as that would be tantamount to 'unilateral disarmament' (Agence Europe
22.1.1990).73 The Farm Bill also contained what was termed a GATT trigger in that it called for 
an increase in subsidies if the GATT negotiations were to fail (Hillman 1994, 48). Jimmye 
Hillman (1994, 42) argues that the 'Farm Bill might be viewed as counter attacking foreign 
agricultural export subsidies and might be interpreted as "If we can't negotiate the elimination 
of export subsidies and similar supports, then we shall match your spending!"'. The French 
Minister of Agriculture viewed the United States Farm Bill as a sign of 'trade war' (,Agra Europe
16.2.1990). The second legislative action taken by the United States concerned the 
modifications made in 1990 to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 with 
respect to clauses 301 and Super 301. The United States claimed the right to retaliate against 
any country whose trade policies it deemed unfair, independently of the GATT (Winters 1990, 
1301). These legislative developments showed a United States inclination towards unilateralism, 
and a tendency towards solving their trade deficit and settling disagreements bilaterally, thus 
endangering the multilateral international trade regime of the GATT. United States involvement 
in the negotiations on a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was both an indication 
that the United States would use regional agreements outside the GATT as an alternative to the 
multilateral trade regime, and a sign of their apparent weariness with the ongoing trade 
negotiations.
United States unilateralism and their preference for seeking alternatives to multilateralism 
put the EEC, a fervent proponent of multilateralism, under political pressure because it
73 The use of the w ar-like term of 'unilateral disarm am ent' (a term copied from  the arms race between the 
United States and the Soviet Union and negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms) seems to indicate 
that the United States considered itself to be in an alm ost w ar-like situation w ith the EEC w hen it com es to 
the trade negotiations and that they did not fear such a trade war.
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demonstrated that the United States would simply resort to unilateral and bilateral solutions to 
trade problems if it could not reach a satisfactory multilateral solution. The fact that the United 
States had a far smaller market share of total world exports than the EEC -  15%  against 44%  
respectively (Agence Europe 26.2.1990) -  indicated that the United States was relatively less 
dependent on the multilateral trading system, and this lent credence to United States threats 
that it would not make far-reaching concessions and that it was up to the EEC to compromise. 
One additional problem for the EEC was that its oilseed marketing mechanisms, against which 
the United States had filed a GATT complaint, had been condemned by a GATT panel. Since the 
1970s, the EEC had supported its oilseed farmers through direct subsidy payments to the 
crushers, who paid elevated prices to the growers. This policy had been devised because import 
levies and tariffs on oilseeds had been prohibited in the Dillon Round (Swinbank and Tanner
1996, 102-103). The United States had complained that these payments harmed the volume of 
United States soybean imports in the EEC. Although the GATT panel's condemnation of the 
EEC's oilseed policies had taken place in May 1988, the report had not actually been adopted 
until January 1990 (Paemen and Bensch 1995, 207-208). The EEC now had to amend its 
policies and clearly stood to benefit from solving the oilseed dispute in the context of a GATT 
deal.
We may conclude that the United States maintained the pressure on the EEC in 1990 in 
more than one way, ju st as it had done in 1988 before and during the Mid-Term Review. The 
explicit United States threats to walk out of the Heysel negotiations if the EEC did not make 
concessions were a new development, although the Cairns Group had threatened to do the 
same earlier. The political costs of EEC inflexibility therefore remained high, as in 1988. 
Furthermore, the GATT triggers in the Farm Bill and the United States tendency to resort to 
unilateral and bilateral trade arrangements also affected the EEC's economic interests. If the 
GATT triggers were to take effect, this would probably adversely affect the EEC's share of world 
agricultural trade unless the EEC could match the increased spending on agricultural subsidies. 
This would, however, worsen the EEC's budgetary problems. To the extent that concessions on 
agriculture could prevent the GATT triggers from taking effect and curb United States unilateral 
and bilateral tendencies, the option of making such concessions became more attractive in the 
light of the EEC's international economic interest. Finally, additional pressure, compared to 
1988, emerged from the GATT panel on oilseeds that condemned EEC policies, increasing the 
interest of the EEC in solving this dispute within a GATT deal.
4
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Table 4.3: Overview of the US and EEC offers between 1986and 1990
United States European Community
July 1987 October 1987
Zero option: the elimination of all farm support Short-term action to balance world markets,
by 2000. reductions in support.
October 1989 December 1989
Zero option retained over ten years; Unspecified reduction in support;
Tarrification; Partial tariffication;
Elimination of export subsidies (5 years). Tariffs and export subsidies reduced as a
consequence of reduced internal support.
October 1990
November 1990
75%  reduction in internal support; 30% in AMS, 1986-1995;
Tariffication and 75% tariff cuts; Tariffication with rebalancing;
90%  reduction in export subsidies. No specific commitments on exports
Source: This table is taken from Swinbank and Tanner 1996, 79.
4.4.5  Arthur Dunkel intervenes: the Draft Final Act (December 1991)
4.4.5.1 Negotiations and decisions
After the stalemate in Heysel, where disagreement between Commissioners had even been more 
pronounced than dissension between EEC member states, it was clear that agriculture was one 
of the main stumbling blocks -  if not the stumbling block -  in the Uruguay Round negotiations. 
The fact that none of the benefits involving the remaining 14 negotiating areas would 
materialize unless and until a deal had been reached with respect to agriculture loomed over the 
participants. Nevertheless, according to Legras, the GATT negotiations were no longer top- 
priority for either the EEC or the United States in 1991 (interview Legras 12.11.2007). Within 
the EEC, negotiations on CAP reform commenced, instigated both by budgetary pressure and 
the recognition that European agricultural policies had to change if the EEC wanted a successful 
conclusion to the Uruguay Round. Reform was therefore underway, although it would not be 
until May 1992 that the Council of Ministers approved the MacSharry reforms. According to a 
French official, Chancellor Kohl and President François Mitterrand had reached an informal 
understanding that the GATT talks should be put on hold and the EEC should decide on CAP 
reform first (Webber 1998b, 40-44). Although the GATT negotiations officially went on in 1991 
with meetings between USTR Hills and Commissioner Andriessen, and between the new United
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States Secretary of Agriculture Edward Madigan and Commissioner MacSharry (Paemen and 
Bensch 1995, 194), the United States clearly stated that negotiating was useless as long as CAP 
reform had not been carried out (interview Legras 12.11.2007). In addition, the world's 
attention also shifted to the conflict in the Persian Gulf and the Uruguay Round negotiations 
were 'no longer a priority issue of the Bush Administration' (Hillman 1994, 50).74
At the GATT level, Secretary General Dunkel tried to revive the negotiations on agriculture 
in February 1991 at an emergency meeting in Geneva. All parties agreed to resume the 
negotiations 'on the basis of reaching specific binding commitments to reduce farm support in 
each of three areas: internal assistance, border protection and export assistance' (Swinbank and 
Tanner 1996, 101). The EEC did not object to this wording, which, according to Ingersent et ai 
(1994b, 78), meant that 'the EEC softened its previous hard-line refusal even to consider the 
possibility of acceding to the United States demand for specific support reduction commitments 
in all three areas' (see also Davis 2003, 292). Nevertheless, the negotiations stalled and the 
United States administration also faced the problem of the expiration of its fast-track authority 
in March 1991 (Vahl 1997, 55). It had to gain an extension of its fast-track authority from 
Congress, before it could enter into further negotiations. The debate over extending this fast­
track authority soon 'turned into a referendum on the controversial US-Mexico free-trade pact' 
(Holian, Krebs and Walsh 1997, 382). Opponents of the renewal of fast-track authority argued 
that an 'extension was tantamount to supporting whatever was to come of the negotiations 
with Mexico' (ibid.). Eventually, an extension of the authority was granted, but only in the face 
of significant opposition within Congress: resolutions disapproving of the extension were voted 
down in the House of Representatives (192 votes to 231 votes) and in the Senate (36 votes 
against 59 votes) (Smith 2007, 3).
At a US-EEC summit on 9 November 1991 in The Hague, Dutch Prime Minister Ruud 
Lubbers (during the Dutch presidency of the Council of Ministers of the EEC) made an attempt to 
solve the agricultural issue. Bush, Madigan, Andriessen, MacSharry and Commission President 
Jacques Delors were all present at this meeting. During this meeting, the United States further 
relaxed its demands and was willing to make concessions on subsidies and border protection 
reductions (Ingersent et ai 1994b, 78). Bush lowered 'US demands for cuts to 35%  for export 
subsidies and 30%  in other areas to be effected in five or six years' (Moyer 1993, 115). The 
United States proposed 1986-1988 as the reference period and rejected all notions of 
rebalancing (Paemen and Bensch 1995, 198). The demand for a reduction in export subsidies 
and the reference period were problematic for the EEC because exports in some areas had
4
74 The G ulf Crisis started w ith the invasion of Kuw ait by Iraqi forces on 2 A u gu st 1990 and the subsequent 
Iraqi occupation and annexation of Kuw ait. The invasion w as im m ediately condem ned by the United 
Nations Security C ouncil, and econom ic sanctions were im plem ented. An ultimatum w as presented to Iraq, 
that it should w ithdraw  its forces from Kuw ait before 15 January 1991. Negotiations w ith Iraq were 
however unsuccessful and the ultim atum  ran out. A  coalition of 34 states (for w hich the United States 
provided 7 5 %  of the forces) subsequently started operation Desert Storm on 16 January 1991, w ith the 
purpose of expelling Iraqi forces from  Kuwait.
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increased dramatically after 1988. At the end of the day, those attending the meeting concluded 
that progress had been made on agriculture, but that the issue had not been resolved (Paemen 
and Bensch 1995, 198).
With the end of the year approaching and still no agreement between the contracting 
parties, Dunkel tabled a Draft Final Act (also referred to as the Dunkel Draft) after a round of 
shuttle diplomacy between negotiating groups and capitals, hoping 'that this package deal 
would form the basis of the elusive final agreement' (Swinbank and Tanner 1996, 101-102). 
With respect to agriculture, the Draft Final Act dealt with the three categories of internal 
support, market access and export assistance. In addition, criteria were laid down by which 
support measures would be identified that could be placed in the green box and be exempted 
from support reduction commitments. The reductions were to be implemented over six years, 
beginning in 1993. Table 4.4 provides more specific information on Dunkel's proposal.
Table 4.4: The agricultural part of Dunkel's Draft Final Act
Internal Support • 20% reduction in terms of the Aggregate Measure of Support.
• Credit allowed for actions taken since 1986, but not for supply control (in 
contrast with the EEC's SMU).
• A green box for measures with no or minimal trade-distorting effects. 
These measures were not subject to reductions.
• Reference period: 1986-1988.
Import Access • 36% reduction in customs duties and non-tariff barriers (after tariffication).
• A minimum of 15%  reduction per tariff line.
• Minimum access of 3%  in 1993, increasing to 5%  in 1999.
• Reference period: 1986-1988.
Export
Assistance
• 24% reduction in the volume of subsidized exports.
• 36% reduction in expenditure on export subsidies.
• Reference period: 1986-1990.
20 January 1992 was the deadline for the broad acceptance of the Draft Final Act (Josling 1996, 
157) and by March 1992, the contracting parties should submit detailed information on how 
they would implement the commitments from the Act (Swinbank and Tanner 1996, 101-102). 
15 April 1992 was set as the date for the end of the Uruguay Round. One final aspect of the 
Draft Final Act crucially important in the subsequent negotiations was that the provisions could 
only be changed on the basis of consent from all the negotiating partners. Negotiations would 
no longer take place in the 15 negotiating groups, but on four tracks instead: one for the 
market access for goods; one on trade in services; one on the legal review of the texts; and one 
'for amendments to the Draft Final Act, which had attracted consensus' (Paemen and Bensch 
1995, 205).
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The EEC Council of Ministers immediately rejected the Draft Final Act at their 23 December
1991 meeting, demanding changes on several issues, most notably agriculture (Swinbank and 
Tanner 1996, 102). With respect to domestic support, the proposed measure of support 'failed 
to recognize the EEC's desire to receive full credit for supply control' (Ingersent et ai 1994b, 
78). The formula proposed to convert non-tariff barriers into tariffs was expected to harm the 
margin of community preference, a fundamental principle of the CAP, and the EEC demand of 
rebalancing had not been recognized. Finally, the EEC was unwilling to make commitments 
concerning the quantity of subsidized exports, as it would be easier to control budgets than 
production and exports (Ingersent et ai 1994c, 275). The Council of Agriculture Ministers of 
January 1992 concluded that the Draft Final Act could only be used as a 'reference document' in 
the negotiations (Vahl 1997, 186; Agence Europe 13/14.1.1992). Unsurprisingly, the EEC 
refused to submit information on their base period positions and support reduction 
commitments. The United States and most of the states within the Cairns Group, who took a 
positive stance on the Draft Final Act, submitted their papers before the 1 March deadline. 
Nevertheless, when not only the EEC, but also Japan and Canada failed to meet the deadline, 
Dunkel was forced to abandon the timetable to conclude the Uruguay Round by 15 April 
(Ingersent et ai 1994b, 80). 4
4.4.5.2 The calm before the storm
In 1991, international pressure on the EEC concerning the agricultural negotiations subsided 
compared to the previous period. Neither in the EEC nor in the United States was the Uruguay 
Round at the top of the political agenda. The United States no longer threatened to leave the 
negotiating table and it even softened its demands, judging by the concessions made by 
President Bush during the EEC-US Summit in November 1991. It would seem, therefore, that 
refusing additional flexibility on the EEC agricultural offer at that moment was an attractive 
option as the potential adverse effects on the EEC's international political interests were 
relatively slight. One important point must be made in this regard, however: bilateral trade 
relations between the United States and the EEC remained under pressure due to a range of 
disputes, of which farm subsidies was only one.75 The oilseed dispute (see 4.4.4.2) had still not 
been solved. Worse still, the United States was not satisfied with the solution offered by the EEC 
following the first condemnation of its oilseed policies, and it had filed a new complaint within 
the GATT. The EEC was interested in solving this issue, and the best way to do so was within 
the scope of the GATT negotiations. Furthermore, a successful conclusion to the negotiations 
was also in the EEC's economic interest since it would strengthen the multilateral trading system 
and convince the United States to reign in its bilateral and regional tendencies in negotiating 
trade agreements. The negotiations on NAFTA could, in particular, be regarded as an indirect
75 Another im portant trade dispute involved A irbus. In this dispute, the United States criticized governm ental 
financing of Airbus in the EEC.
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threat to the EEC. Members of Congress made a political connection between NAFTA and the 
Uruguay Round, and some Congressmen used the NAFTA negotiations to win support for their 
position that the United States should make no concessions on agriculture in the GATT 
negotiations.76
We may conclude that the political costs associated with EEC intransigence on the 
agricultural chapter of the GATT negotiations had decreased in 1991 as compared to 1990. At 
the same time, a successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round became increasingly important for 
the EEC in terms of its economic interest in safeguarding the multilateral trading system as a 
whole. To the extent that additional concessions in the agricultural negotiations were likely to 
lead to the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, such an option was attractive in economic terms. 
Considering, however, the fact that other issues in the negotiations still were not solved either, 
and that both the United States and the EEC did not prioritize the Uruguay Round in 1991, it 
seems unlikely that additional concessions by the EEC would have resulted in an agreement at 
that point in time.
4 .4 .6  Bilateral U S-EEC negotiations resulting in the Blair House Accord (November 1992)
4.4.6.1 Negotiations and decisions
After the failure to reach an agreement by the 15 April 1992 deadline set by Dunkel, there was 
a lull in the negotiations during which the GATT Secretariat took little action. Bilateral 
negotiations between the United States and the EEC proved to be the only escape from the 
stalemate. Although Commission negotiators argued that the United States and EEC positions 
had actually moved quite close since the US-EEC summit in November 1991, and that the 
outstanding issues were 'the content of the "green box" of aids', the 'level of quantitative 
commitments to reduce the volume of subsidized exports, and rebalancing' (Paemen and Bensch
1995, 207-208), the negotiations made disappointing progress during the first half of 1992. It 
seemed that no flexibility could be expected from the United States concerning the agricultural 
negotiations. In February, Vice-President Dan Quale stated that 'an inevitable link [existed] 
between economic and military security' [Financial Times 10.2.1992). If the GATT talks failed, 
this would fuel protectionism and encourage those wanting to pull out of NATO. President Bush 
quickly indicated that he had no intention of withdrawing troops from Europe and that there 
was no connection with the GATT negotiations (LeMonde 13.2.1992). Nevertheless, the United 
States signalled that if the EEC tried to change the Draft Final Act, which the United States had 
already accepted, the United States would also make additional counter-demands.77
76 PersArchTdG. G A T T U ruguay Round 1990-1993. 9 .2 .1 9 91 . Codebericht van W ashington aan BZ. 
Onderw erp: Uruguay-Ronde. O nderhoud met USTR Carla Hills.
77 PersAcrhTdG. G A T T Uruguay Round 1990-1993. 22 .4 .1 99 2 . Codebericht van W ashington aan BZ, EZ. 
Lavi, PV EG, PV Geneve. Onderwerp: Gesprek DG Lavo in. g. v.d. Lely met Deputy USTR J. Katz. According 
to this m essage, the Deputy USTR even claimed that the United States adm inistration had made a deal with 
the farm lobby w hich w ould no longer be feasible if the Draft Final A ct were to be renegotiated.
The Uruguay Round of GATT Negotiations j10S
After the MacSharry CAP reforms had been agreed by in the Council of Ministers in May
1992 (see Box 4.3 for the details of these reforms), the Commission expected the EEC to be able 
to retake the initiative in the negotiations, since the reforms gave the Commission more freedom 
of manoeuvre in making concessions in the GATT negotiations on agriculture (Paemen and 
Bensch 1995, 212; Vahl 1997, 189). Indeed, the MacSharry reforms went further than the 
Commission mandate which dated back to November 1990. However, a number of EEC member 
states, notably France, made it very clear that a GATT deal which went further than the CAP 
reform the EEC had agreed to was out of the question (see Section 7.5.3). The Commission had 
thus gained some degree of flexibility, but its freedom of manoeuvre should not be overstated.
BOX 4.3: THE 1992 M ACSHARRY CAP REFORMS
• 2 9%  decrease in cereal prices in three years
• 1 5%  decrease in beef support prices
• 5 %  decrease in butter prices
• Direct income compensation for farmers. In the case of cereals per hectare 
payments, and premium payments in the case of beef cows and cattle.
• Large-scale farms to set aside 15%  of arable land from production in order to 
curtail the arable area and gain control over surpluses
• Accompanying measures: early retirement scheme; agri-environment scheme; 
scheme for forestation.
4
Meanwhile, the approaching United States presidential elections of November 1992 
began to influence the negotiations. Commissioner Andriessen argued that the Americans were 
bound to take a less compromising approach in the midst of an electoral campaign (Paemen 
and Bensch 1995, 207). And indeed, the United States increased the pressure on the EEC. In 
June 1992 they published a list of trade sanctions which they were planning to impose on the 
EEC. Although many Europeans had expected the Uruguay Round to be a low priority for the 
Bush administration during the electoral campaign, Bush in fact called for the resumption of the 
talks in September and pushed hard for a conclusion of the Uruguay Round. According to 
Paemen and Bensch, Bush believed that he would gain votes if he were able to bring the 
Uruguay Round to a successful conclusion (Paemen and Bensch 1995, 213).
The negotiations continued between the United States and the EEC, while the Cairns 
Group 'vanished from the scene' (Swinbank and Tanner 1996, 103).78 On 11 and 12 October
78 From mid-1991 onw ards, the Cairns Group had from  time to time renewed their em phasis on existing 
Cairns Group dem ands and called upon 'those participants w hose policies significantly distort agricultural 
trade [read: the EEC] to dem onstrate com m itm ent and the flexibility necessary to obtain a substantial and 
m eaningful outcom e', but they began to take on a lower profile in the negotiations w hich now  mainly 
focused on bilateral talks between the United States and the EC. See: http://w ww .cairnsgroup.org/m eetings
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1992, meetings took place between United States and EEC officials. Progress was made with 
respect to services, but the issue of agriculture remained problematic (Paemen and Bensch 
1995, 213). Another meeting between Madigan and MacSharry was planned in Chicago in the 
first week of November. The American threat to impose sanctions -  sanctions that had been in 
the air since the publishing of the list of targeted products in June -  now put increasing pressure 
on the EEC, because Assistant USTR Peter Allgeier had stated that a number of detailed 
proposals for sanctions had been put before Bush, and that the meeting between Madigan and 
MacSharry in the following week was seen as the next decision moment (Paemen and Bensch
1995, 214). When these negotiations produced no agreement, the United States blamed the 
EEC for the collapse of the bilateral talks and on 3 November, the day that Bill Clinton was 
elected President, it announced the introduction of retaliatory measures against a range of 
agricultural and food products from the EEC, effective from 5 December (Swinbank and Tanner
1996, 104). In the GATT Council of 4 November, the United States asked for authorization of 
these sanctions as retaliatory measures in relation to the EEC's oilseed policies (which had 
already been condemned by a GATT panel).79 In addition, the collapse of the bilateral 
negotiations also triggered a dispute within the European Commission between MacSharry and 
Delors on how a solution to the agricultural issue should be sought in the negotiations. 
MacSharry was offended by what he saw as Delors' interference in the negotiations through his 
constant warnings against going beyond the Council's mandate in Chicago (Meunier 2005, 
110-111). MacSharry now wished to resign as Commissioner of Agriculture (Vahl 1997, 194). 
Andriessen supported MacSharry in the conflict with Delors. Eventually, the dispute was resolved 
and MacSharry remained in charge of the negotiations on agricultural trade. His position relative 
to Delors was further strengthened by the fact that the Council of Ministers explicitly 
pronounced its confidence in MacSharry (Vahl 1997, 195).
Bilateral negotiations between the United States (Hills and Madigan) and the EEC 
(Andriessen and MacSharry) resumed on 18 and 19 November in Blair House, the United States 
President's guesthouse in Washington. Both parties were willing to make concessions and they 
eventually reached a deal -  the Blair House Accord. This Accord consisted of a number of parts: 
a settlement of the oilseed dispute, a 'bilateral agreement covering maize-gluten feed', and a 
'series of understandings on how some articles of the agricultural chapter of the Draft Final Act 
should be amended' (Swinbank and Tanner 1996, 104). Table 4.5 shows the details of the Blair 
House Accord in terms of the amendments (in ita/ic§ to be made to the Draft Final Act. 
According to Paemen, the United States and the EEC were able to reach agreement because 
Hills -  aware that her position as USTR would soon end now that Clinton had won the elections
.html: Com m uniqué after the 10th Cairns Group ministerial m eeting. M anaus, Brazil, 9 ju ly 1991; 
Com m uniqué after the 11th Cairns Group ministerial m eeting. Geneva, Sw itzerland, 9 Decem ber 1991; 
Com m uniqué after the 12th Cairns Group ministerial m eeting. Geneva, Sw itzerland, 28 June 1992.
79 PersArchTdG. G A T T Uruguay Round 1990-1993. 5 .11 .1992. Codebericht van PV Geneve aan min. van 
EZ/BEB, min. van BZ. Onderw erp: GATT-raad 4 novem ber 1992/oliezadengeschil VS-EG .
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-  wanted to end her career with a GATT deal and to that end put great pressure on Bush and 
Baker to agree. Andriessen, on the other hand, claims that it was Bush who, although he had 
lost the elections, wanted the credits of a successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round, while at 
the same time burdening Clinton with an Accord the latter probably would not approve of 
(interview Andriessen 12.2.2008).
Table 4.5: The Blair House Accord
Internal Supprt • 20% reduction in terms of the AMS.
• AMS per sector (instead of per product).
• Credit allowed for actions taken since 1986.
• Direct payments are placed in the green box.
• Reference period: 1986-1988.
Import Access • 36% reduction in customs duties and non-tariff barriers (after tariffication).
• A minimum of 15%  reduction per tariff line.
• Minimum access of 3%  in 1993, increasing to 5%  in 1999.
• Reference period: 1986-1988.
Export
Assistance
• 21% reduction in the volume of subsidized exports.
• 36% reduction in expenditure on export subsidies.
• Consultative mechanism with respect to cereal substitutes.
• Reference period: 1986-1990.
Peace Clause • A peace clause for 6 years: GATT parties acknowledged that measures 
adopted by any one partner to the accord were in conformity with the 
GATT rules, provided that the partner respected its "Uruguay Round 
commitments"' (Paemen and Bensch 1995, 217).
The Blair House Accord weakened the Draft Final Act (Josling et ai. 1996, 161), and represented 
a more favourable deal from the EEC's point of view. Direct income payments were placed in the 
green box and were thus excluded from discipline. This was important because MacSharry's CAP 
reforms had introduced direct income payments as a substantial support measure. Furthermore, 
the level of support was to be calculated over entire sectors, enabling aggregation between 
support reductions in different products (Paemen and Bensch 1995, 217). With respect to 
oilseeds, no further concessions had to be made by the EEC than had already been made in the 
MacSharry CAP reforms. Nevertheless, the EEC did have to abandon the demand of rebalancing 
(Ingersent et ai 1994b, 87). The United States was only willing to implement a consultative 
mechanism 'which would enter into operation as soon as imports into the Community of cereals 
substitutes posed a threat to its internal cereals market' (Paemen and Bensch 1995, 217).
However, the United States and the EEC were now left with the formidable task of gaining 
approval from the other GATT contracting parties for the Blair House Accord in order to 
introduce the Accord as an amendment to the Draft Final Act. The United States and EEC were 
initially optimistic that this could be achieved promptly. This optimism proved ill-founded,
4
106| Against the Grain
although it was not the other GATT contracting parties that turned out to pose the greatest 
problems, but the United States and the EEC themselves. After being officially installed as 
President, Clinton 'was in no hurry to adopt what was initially seen as a flawed agreement 
entered into by his predecessor' (Swinbank and Tanner 1996, 105), while France fiercely 
opposed the Blair House Accord, sparking a debate within the EEC on the compatibility of the 
Blair House Accord with the MacSharry CAP reforms.
4.4.6.2 The consequences of bilateral negotiations and threats
Although the United States and EEC positions had shifted towards one another during the US- 
EEC summit in the autumn of 1991, significant differences remained. In effect, the important 
choice for the EEC in 1992 was whether it would agree to a more flexible agricultural offer, or 
on the other hand stick to its previous offers. As the description of the negotiations above 
shows, United States pressure on the EEC increased in the second half of 1992: it threatened to 
impose trade sanctions and intensified bilateral negotiations.80 The sanctions were initially a 
reaction to the second condemnation of the EEC oilseed support programme by a GATT panel 
on 31 March 1992, but they were explicitly linked to the demand of progress (read: EEC 
concessions) in the agricultural chapter of the Uruguay Round (Vahl 1997, 194). Although the 
EEC succeeded in preventing the adoption of the panel report (Paemen and Bensch 1995, 211), 
they would clearly still have to resolve the oilseed issue, because it provided an easy means for 
the United States to pressurize the EEC. On the one hand, the fact that United States president 
Bush wanted to reach an accord before the presidential elections in the beginning of November 
seemed to improve the EEC negotiating position, but on the other hand it also limited the 
willingness to compromise that could be expected from the United States. Compared to 1991, 
the EEC was therefore under greater political pressure in 1992 to reach a compromise with the 
United States.
Furthermore, outside the formal GATT negotiations, the United States also stepped up its 
spending on subsidized exports by $1,5 billion, as permitted by the GATT trigger in the 1990 
Farm Bill (see 4.4.4.1.) (Financial Times 27.2.1992). The export enhancement programme was 
again extended in September 1992.81 The United States was clearly unafraid of entering into a 
subsidy war with the EEC. Furthermore, Congress paved the way for more unilateral actions by 
passing the Trade Expansion Act, section 101 of which provided a re-enactment of the Super 
301 authority for five years.82 Apart from the potential threat of a subsidy war and United States 
unilateralism, the NAFTA Treaty signed in September 1992 added to the pressure on the EEC to 
come to the negotiating table to save the Uruguay Round. As a result, striking a deal with the
80 It w as not only agricultural trade that put the relations between the United States and the EEC under 
strains, the United States also im plem ented measures against EEC steel exports (Vahl 1997, 190).
81 ArchBuZa. DDI DIE AR A : 1763. 29 .9 .1 99 2 . C O C O  (Coördinatie Com m issie). Onderw erp: G A T T Uruguay 
Ronde.
82 ArchBuZa. DDI DIE AR A : 1821. 10.7 .1992. Verslag Nederlandse delegatie naar Com ité 113 leden.
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United States on the agricultural chapter of the negotiations was not only a politically attractive 
option, it was also in the EEC's economic interests. With respect to substance, the Blair House 
Accord itself was less economically costly than the Draft Final Act as a result of the placement of 
the direct income payments in the green box, the smaller reduction in the volume of exports, as 
well as the introduction of the peace clause.
4.4.7  Renegotiating Blair House and reaching a final agreement
4.3.7.1. Negotiations and agreement
After the United States and the EEC had agreed on the Blair House Accord, GATT Secretary 
General Dunkel immediately called a Trade Negotiations Committee meeting and announced 
that the Round was to be completed by the end of 1992. After all negotiating parties had 
reassembled in Geneva, negotiations started in December 1992. Not all GATT contracting 
parties were satisfied with the Blair House Accord. The Cairns Group was of the opinion that the 
Draft Final Act tabled by Dunkel in December 1991 should remain the basis for the agricultural 
negotiations. The Cairns Group criticized the Blair House Accord because it contained 'proposals 
that would dilute the Draft Final Act'.83 The swift conclusion to the negotiations that Dunkel had 
hoped for did not materialize. All negotiating parties had witnessed the problems that had 
emerged within the EEC concerning the Blair House Accord. France vehemently opposed the 
Accord and threatened to veto any GATT deal in the Council of Ministers. The other GATT 
parties were unwilling to negotiate if it was unclear whether the EEC would be able to keep the 
promises made in the Blair House Accord (Paemen and Bensch 1995, 219). Furthermore, 
negotiations on issues beyond agriculture also proved difficult. The United States was unwilling 
to move on the issues of textile tariffs and tariff peaks (ibid.).
The Uruguay Round could neither be concluded within the term of the Delors II 
Commission nor within the term of President Bush's administration. In January, a new 
Commission was installed, with new Commissioners for trade (Leon Brittan) and Agriculture 
(René Steichen). In the United States, Clinton began his presidency with Mickey Kantor as the 
new USTR and Mike Espy as the Secretary of Agriculture. The Clinton administration was not 
entirely satisfied with the details of the Blair House Accord. It took the view that the deal on 
oilseeds had been too generous and that the Accord failed to deal with market access issues 
{Financial Times 20.1.1993). Nevertheless, in view of French demands for the renegotiation of 
the Accord, the new United States administration also took the view that negotiations could not 
be reopened (Swinbank and Tanner 1996, 109). An additional problem in the first half of 1993 
was that the United States government's fast-track authority had expired once again in March
1993. Clinton obtained a new fast track authority in June 1993, but the 'deal was that President
4
83 http://w w w .cairnsgroup.org/m eetings.htm l: Com m uniqué after the 13th Cairns Group ministerial 
m eeting. Geneva, Sw itzerland, 18 October 1993.
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Clinton had to notify Congress by 15 December 1993 on his intention to sign an agreement, 
which would then have to be submitted to Congress by 16 April 1994' (Swinbank and Tanner
1996, 108). Both the United States and the new Secretary General of the GATT, Peter 
Sutherland, emphasized that this date was the final deadline of the Uruguay Round. If an accord 
was not reached by that date, the Uruguay Round would have failed.
Table 4.6 : The final Uruguay Round package on agriculture
Internal
Supprt
• 20% reduction in terms of the AMS.
• AMS per sector (instead of per product).
• Credit allowed for actions taken since 1986.
• Direct payments are placed in the green box.
• Reference period: 1986-1988.
Import Access • 36% reduction in customs duties and non-tariff barriers (after tariffication). 
US accepts EEC calculation method.
• A minimum of 15% reduction per tariff line.
• Minimum access of 3%  in 1993, increasing to 5%  in 1999. (Possibility of 
substracting preferences).
• Reference period: 1986-1988.
Export
Assistance
• 21% reduction in the volume of subsidized exports.
• 36% reduction in expenditure on export subsidies.
• Consultative mechanism with respect to cereal substitutes.
• Reference period: 1986-1990, but 1991-1992 for certain products.
Peace Clause • A peace clause for 9 years: GATT parties acknowledged that measures 
adopted by any one partner to the accord were in conformity with the 
G A Tt rules, provided that the partner respected its "Uruguay Round 
commitments"' (Paemen and Bensch 1995, 217).
After intensive French lobbying within the EEC, the Council of Ministers decided to request 
'clarification' (instead of the 'renegotiation' demanded by France) of the Blair House Accord in 
September 1993. The United States, on its part, showed no flexibility with regard to amending 
the Blair House Accord.84 Its position remained that the Accord could not be renegotiated, and 
besides, United States priorities at that point were not with the Uruguay Round but with gaining 
ratification of the NAFTA Treaty in Congress, a hotly debated issue in the United States (Paemen 
and Bensch 1995, 241). It was not until after the ratification of the NAFTA Treaty on 17 
November, that the United States could seek an agreement in the Uruguay Round as well 
(Paemen and Bensch 1995, 241; Année politique, économique et sociale 1993, 222). US-EEC 
negotiations subsequently took place on 22-23 November and later on 1 December. However, it
84 ArchBuZa. DDI DIE A RA : 1763. 14.9 .1993. wasi 624/16270. BZ vertrouw elijk Onderw erp: U ruguay 
Ronde. Bezoek Brittan aan W ashington.
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took a 48-hour marathon meeting, beginning on 6 December, to find solutions to the remaining 
differences on agriculture. Table 4.6 shows the package agreed upon during this meeting. The 
changes compared to the original Blair House Accord are again given in italics.
After the new deal was struck, even France agreed that agriculture was 'no longer an 
obstacle to agreement' (Financial Times 9.12.1993). Two other issues, which had also been 
problematic earlier on during the Uruguay Round negotiations remained so: textiles and services 
(particularly the film and television markets). Nevertheless, the negotiating parties eventually 
succeeded in reaching an agreement on 15 December, the final deadline of the Uruguay Round.
4.4.7.2 The attraction of a final deal
In 1993, an important issue in the GATT negotiations for the EEC was whether or not to 
demand a renegotiation of the Blair House Accord in order to gain more concessions from the 
United States. Considering the EEC's political interest, demanding renegotiation was a relatively 
unattractive option for two reasons. First of all, the United States had clearly stated that it was 
unwilling to reopen the negotiations on agriculture and that if negotiations were to be reopened 
it would seek additional concessions from the EEC rather than being prepared to concede any 
ground themselves. Secondly, a demand for renegotiation would have endangered the 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round: the insistence of both the GATT Secretary General and the 
United States that 15 December 1993 was the final deadline for the conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round was credible in light of the difficulty with which Clinton had gained the new fast track 
authority. All in all, the degree of political pressure exerted on the EEC to enable the conclusion 
of the Uruguay Round (and thus to moderate its demands for additional concessions from 
trading partners on agriculture) was high in 1993.
4
4.5 Conclusion
There were essentially two types of issues on which the EEC and its member states had to form 
their preferences during the run up to and the conduct of the Uruguay Round of GATT 
negotiations. Firstly, in the period preceding the opening declaration of Punta del Este in 1986, 
the question was whether the EEC should be willing to take part and cooperate in a new round 
of GATT negotiations and agree to the inclusion of agricultural trade in these negotiations. 
Secondly, once the negotiations were underway, the question was whether or not the EEC 
should table or accept far-reaching offers or deals on agriculture and make concessions to the 
demands of important negotiating partners such as the United States. Table 4.7 shows the 
attractiveness of the various behavioural options during the Uruguay Round in the light of the 
EEC's international political interests (based on pressure from outside the EEC). The first two 
rows indicate the time-period and the issue with respect to which a decision had to be taken, 
respectively. Between 1982 and 1985, for example, a decision had to be taken on whether or
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not to participate in a new round of GATT negotiations and include agriculture as an issue in 
any such negotiations. The third row indicates the considerations on the basis of which the 
respective policy option is classified with respect to its attractiveness. This attractiveness is finally 
represented in the fourth row, in which a '+ ' indicates that international political benefits are 
associated with the political option in question, while a ' - '  indicates that the option is 
internationally politically costly. The number of pluses and minuses indicates the degree of 
pressure.
The results of this analysis will be an input in the case study chapters with respect to the 
international political costs and benefits (extra-EEC) of different behavioural options. In the case 
study chapters this analysis will be completed with an assessment of the internal political, 
economic and ideological costs and benefits and the international political (intra-EEC), economic 
and ideological costs and benefits of different behavioural options. Based on the aggregate of 
these political, economic and ideological interests, expectations will be formulated on the French 
and German preferences at different point in time. In each of the case study chapters, these 
expectations will subsequently be contrasted with the preferences actually defended by the 
French or the German government.
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Table 4.7: The international political attractiveness of taking part in the GATT negotiations and 
making a compromise with respect to agriculture
1982-1985 1986 1987 1988
Taking part in a new 
Round of GATT 
negotiations with the 
inclusion of agricul­
ture.
Endorsing the opening 
declaration during the 
GATT Ministeriai
meeting in Punta del 
Este.
Making concessions 
on agriculture and 
proposing a far- 
reaching agricultural 
offer.
Making concessions 
during the Mid-Term 
Review in order to 
reach a compromise 
on agriculture.
- Limited US 
pressure
- Lack of consensus 
within GATT
- High level of US 
pressure
- EEC risking 
isolation in GATT
- Limited US 
pressure
- US proposal too 
ambitious to be 
taken seriously
- High level of US 
pressure
- US introduces 
protectionist 
legislation
- US export 
programme 
extended
Exta-EEC political 
costs or benefits 
+
Extra-EEC political 
costs or benefits 
+ +
Extra-EEC political 
costs or benefits
+
Extra-EEC political 
costs or benefits 
+ +
4
1990 1991 1992 1993
Tabling a far- 
reaching agricultural 
offer for the 
negotiations in 
Heysel.
Making additional 
concessions on 
agriculture. / Accepting 
the Draft Final Act.
Making concessions 
to the US and 
accepting the Blair 
House Accord.
Accepting the Final 
Accord
- High level of US 
pressure
- US threats of 
walkout
- GATT triggers in 
US legislation
- EEC oilseed 
policies 
condemned in 
GATT
- Low to medium 
level of US 
pressure
- US and EEC 
prioritize other 
international 
matters over the 
GATT negotiations
- High level of US 
pressure
- US threat of trade 
sanctions
- Increasing US 
unilateralism and 
bilateralism
- High level of US 
pressure
- 15 December is 
the final deadline 
for the Uruguay 
Round
Extra-EEC political 
costs or benefits 
+ +
Extra-EEC political 
costs or benefits 
+
Extra-EEC political 
costs or benefits 
+ +
Extra-EEC political 
costs or benefits 
+ +

CHAPTER 5 
DEFENDING VITAL INTERESTS: FRANCE 1982-1989
5.1 Introduction
Following the overview of the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations given in the previous 
chapter, this chapter will focus on French preference formation concerning the agricultural 
chapter of this trade round between 1982 and 1989. In this period, France proved to be a 
fervent defender of the interests of its agricultural sector. France initially rejected EEC 
participation in a new round of GATT negotiations and resisted each and every proposal with 
the potential to damage French agricultural exports or jeopardize principles of the CAP. 
Although France eventually had to make compromises in the negotiations -  in the end France 
did agree to include agriculture in the negotiations and accepted the outcome of the Mid-Term 
Review in 1989 -  French priorities hardly appear to have changed in this period, if at all. 
Considering the changes in governments that occurred during the 1980s, this continuity is 
perhaps surprising. After a socialist administration that was determined to do things differently 
than the previous centre-right government, another centre-right coalition emerged in 1986 that, 
in turn, wished to break with the policies of its predecessor. This makes the continuity in foreign 
agricultural policy all the more striking. In this chapter I aim to explain this continuity in 
preferences and evaluate whether the theoretical framework elaborated in Chapter 2 can 
provide an adequate explanation for the preferences defended by France in the first half of the 
Uruguay Round.
Section 5.2 will explain the context of the French decision-making process. As well as 
providing a short description of the formal decision-making process, the section will also 
elaborate on French views on agricultural policy and developments within the French 
government in the 1980s. It is against this background that domestic and international 
considerations from a French perspective must be examined. Subsequently, Sections 5.3 and 5.4 
will focus on these domestic and international considerations, respectively. In each of these 
sections, the political, economic and ideological dimensions of the French national interest will 
be examined in greater depth in relation to various policy options. Important issues or specific 
proposals that were on the negotiating table at various decision moments will be assessed in 
terms of their impact on French political, economic and ideological interests. Based on this, 
Section 5.5 will provide propositions about the preference that the French should theoretically 
have defended at each decision moment, and compare these with the preferences that France 
actually defended in the negotiations. In conclusion, Section 5.6 will answer the question of the 
extent to which the theoretical model adopted in this research, is able to explain French 
preference formation during the run-up to and the first half of the Uruguay Round.
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5.2 The French Context
5.2.1 The French decision-m aking process
The position that France defended in the European arena tends to be the outcome of an 
interministerial process. As far as the agricultural chapter of the Uruguay Round is concerned, 
this meant that the Minister of Agriculture conducted the negotiations, but on the basis of a 
governmental mandate (Le Theule et al 1993, 758).85 In the Article 113 Committee that 
assisted the Commission during the GATT negotiations (see Section 4.3.1), France was 
represented by the director of the Direction des Relations Économiques Extérieurs (DREE), which 
was part of the Ministère du Finance, du Budget et du Commerce Extérieure (Lequesne in 
Menon 2000, 81).
A  specialized administrative agency, the Secrétariat Général du Comité Interministériel 
pour les questions de coopération économique eureopéenne (SGCI), is responsible for 
coordinating French inputs into community policy-making. Under the supervision of the Prime 
Minister's staff, and working closely with the President's advisers, the SGCI is also the crucial 
link between the French permanent representative and his staff in Brussels and all the domestic 
ministries concerned (Gyomarch et al 1998, 45).The common position reached during 
interministerial meetings is usually laid down in a specific document (le Bleú), which consists of 
a report of the meeting and a conclusion (Fouilleux 1996, 20). This mandate is subsequently 
sent to the French permanent representation in Brussels. If the various French ministries involved 
cannot reach a common position in the SGCI, the debate will be transferred to the staff of the 
Prime Minister's office, and the issue will be resolved in an interministerial committee of political 
appointees from ministerial cabinets or -  on rare occasions -  by the ministers themselves 
(Menon 2000, 80 and 87).86 The Ministries of Economics, Finance and Foreign Affairs in 
particular are generally seen as powerful actors within the SGCI (Fouilleux 1996, 56-58).87 
However, from the moment the agricultural negotiations became an issue in which the President
85 The Agriculture Minister w as the French representative in the Council of Agriculture and on occasion in 
the so-called Jum bo-C ouncils a w ell, in w hich  the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Trade also participated. 
The DREE, however, officially took the lead in the negotiations (Interview Otto Genee 1 5.12.2004).
86 Inter-ministerial coordination takes place at three levels: 1. the 'conseilinterm inistériel chaired by the 
President; 2. the 'com itéinterm inistériel chaired by the Prime Minister; 3. the 'réunion interm inistérielle, a 
m eeting of high cabinet officials chaired by a member of the Prime M inister's cabinet (Fouilleux 1993, 72).
87 Peters and W right (2 001,165) point out that the SC G I is not alw ays 'as powerful or as centralizing' as is 
often assum ed. Various ministries try to resist the SG C I's  'centralizing em brace' and the Prime Minister 
repeatedly has to remind such departm ents that they have to refer European matters to the SG CI 
(Gyom arch et al. 1998, 56). The Ministry of Agriculture for exam ple tried to by-pass the SG C I by setting up 
an in-house European legal departm ent (M enon 200 0 , 85). This ministry further profited from  the fact that 
the issue of agriculture w as dealt w ith by a special 'délégué pour les affaires agricoles' w ithin the French 
perm anent representation, w ho w as the sole French spokesm an in the Special Com m ittee on Agriculture 
and w ho enjoyed 'far greater autonom y than his colleagues' (Lequesne 1993, 199). On the other hand, it is 
also argued that the centralization of the French system of coordination w as strengthened by the 'constant 
resort to the arbitration of M atignon and the Élysée' (M enon 2000, 86 and 167).
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became personally involved, a higher degree of discipline was evident. At such times, the 
President issues directions and the ministers will follow (interview Genee 15.12.2004). In the 
case of the Uruguay Round, however, it was not until 1990 (see Chapter 7) that the agricultural 
chapter became a major political issue in which governmental leaders were directly involved 
(e.g. in G7 or OECD meetings).
5 .2.2  The French view  on agriculture
In France, agriculture has for many years been regarded as a state matter. As indicated in 
Section 3.3.3, state intervention in agriculture is fully accepted in France. According to 
Andriessen, agriculture is regarded as 'existential' in France: every Frenchman has a father of 
grandfather who used to be a farmer. As a people, the French still consider themselves as 
'farmers who moved to the city'. But in France it is not so much the interest in agriculture that is 
striking, but the interest in the countryside (campagne) (interview Andriessen 12.2.2008). 
Following World War II, the agricultural sector had to be adapted to a new economic system 
geared towards industrialization (Coulomb et ai 1990, 33-52). This went hand in hand with 
modernization in the agricultural sector, particularly with the aim of increasing production 
capacity. In this way, the sector took its own place within the broader governmental aims of 
state-led growth (Coleman and Chiasson 2002, 169). It is argued that these policy 
developments reflected a change in the French perception of the role of agriculture. Whereas 
farmers had previously been regarded as a social group 'harbouring and preserving the 
fundamental values of civilization in the face of urban decadence', the farmer of the 1960s was 
depicted as 'a profession that would feed the French population at the least cost, while also 
helping the country's balance of payments' (Coleman and Chiasson 2002, 172, referring to 
Gervais 1972, 6; Muller 1984, 21). After the hardships of food shortages of World War II, 
guaranteeing the food supply became a central aim of French agricultural policy. But food 
supply was not the only reason why France strove for growth in production. France had also set 
itself the goal of becoming the greatest agricultural power in Europe, able to mobilize the 
agricultural economy of its partners to negotiate on an equal footing with the United States on 
the division of world markets between them (Coulomb et ai 1990, 33-52). This leads me to 
another principle that was central to the French agricultural paradigm: the principle of market 
organization through price policy. France had a penchant for organizing and sharing markets 
and attempted to prevent market instability and price instability (Tubiana 1990, 135; Coulomb 
et ai 1990, 19-33). As part of this tendency, it was considered unjustifiable to allow free reign 
to market forces in agriculture.
The principles and goals of French agricultural policy were first laid down in the Loi 
d'orientation agricole in 1960.88 At the heart of this law was the aim of reaching parity between 
the agricultural sector and other economic activities. To this end, it was proclaimed that the
88 Published in Journal Officiel de la République Française, 7 .8 .1 9 60 , 7 3 6 0 -7365.
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contribution made by the agricultural sector to the French economy should increase and the 
difference in the income of people working in the various sectors should decrease (art 1, 
sections 1 and 2).89 Finally, a restructuring of agriculture was deemed necessary, focusing on 
family farms using modern production techniques (art 1, section 3).90 All in all, the law of 1960 
envisioned agriculture as a sector that should aim at production growth and the establishment 
of fair prices through a process of modernization.
While the law of 1960 had given limited attention to the role of agricultural exports, the 
adaptation of the Loi d'orientation agricole in 1980 brought about important changes in this 
respect.91 In the course of the 1970s, President Giscard d'Estaing had developed plans to turn 
agriculture into 'French oil' (Coleman and Chiasson 2002: 177). In the new law, this was 
reflected in the objective of improving the competitiveness of French agriculture and increasing 
its contribution to the French economy by strengthening its 'capacité exportatrice'(art 1). In 
1974, 15 to 2 0%  of France's export earnings already came from trade in agricultural products 
(primary produce and foodstuffs). This not only meant that the aspiration of 'pétrole vert'was 
being realized, it was also regarded as legitimizing the French 'vocation à exporter, because 
adapting agricultural production to meeting domestic requirements alone would impose great 
difficulties on the agricultural sector (Coulomb et al 1990, 54). In addition, the 1980 law 
allotted agriculture an important role in maintaining France's economic and demographic 
equilibria. Part of the role of the agricultural sector was to contribute to employment in the 
countryside (maintaining the population in rural areas) and the preservation of the countryside 
{territoire). Agriculture thus not only served economic objectives, but also fulfilled a social 
purpose. As already indicated in Section 3.3.3., France attached great value to this 
'multifunctionality' of the agricultural sector.
The emphasis on the vocation exportatrice of French agriculture and its role in the 
preservation of the countryside continued into the 1980s. Delorme (1994, 43-47) suggests that 
these two objectives were the result of the neo-liberal changes that took place in French 
economic policy, which, he asserts, led to a reconsideration of the position of agriculture within 
the economy. The objectives mentioned above were, according to Delorme, a result of the 
radical shift in policy made by the socialist government in 1983 (see Section 5.2.3) from a 
Keynesian economic policy to a more neo-liberal economic one (see Section 3.3.3.3). This 
conclusion does not appear to hold water however, since the export policy had already been 
introduced in the 1970s.92 Nevertheless, it is true that the vocation exportatrice and the
89 The consideration of incom e-parity between the agricultural sector and other econom ic sectors w as also 
regarded of im portance in Germ any. Franz-Josef Feiter (interview 21.5 .2 00 7 ) related this objective to art. 58 
of the Treaty of Rome (1957).
90 Previously, French agriculture had been dom inated by large-scale landow nership (Coulom b et a l 1990, 
19-33).
91 Published in Journal Officiel de la République Française, 5 .7 .1 9 80 , 1670-1685.
92 In addition, it is unlikely that neo-liberalism  influenced the French view  on agriculture to a great extent. 
Com pared to other states, neo-liberalism  made little im pact in France. Not only did it encounter resistance
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preservation of the countryside became increasingly prominent in the discourse on French 
agricultural policy during the 1980s.
The French vision of the role of agriculture and the objectives of agricultural policy, as 
outlined above, together with the principles of the French agricultural policy paradigm and the 
aspects of French state identity that have been described in Section 3.3.3, form the background 
against which France perceived the developments in the agricultural chapter of the Uruguay 
Round. It is therefore important to keep this vision in the back of one's mind when analysing the 
ideological costs and benefits that may have been attached to the various policy options from a 
French perspective.
5.2.3  The French government in the 1980s
After decades of rule by Gaullist and centre-right Presidents and governments, Mitterrand of the 
Socialist Party (PS) was elected President in 1981. The PS and the Communist Party (PC) also 
gained a majority in parliament. Pierre Mauroy (PS) was appointed as Prime Minister and formed 
a government made up of members of the PS and PC. This new government took office in a 
difficult period. France was facing an economic recession and high unemployment rates. The 
new socialist government claimed that, in contrast to previous centre-right governments, which 
had been unable to control inflation and unemployment, they would combat economic recession 
with a radical new approach.93 The government started out with a Keynesian, expansionist 
economic policy supposed to tackle unemployment by, among other things, the nationalization 
of companies. The expansion of the public sector was also meant to increase the state's control 
over the economy (L'Année politique, économique et sociale 1981, 388-389). The government 
also increased state investments and proposed the reduction of working hours. Finally, the 
government strove for decentralization and regionalization. Mitterrand labelled this package of 
new policies as 'la  politique nouvelle or 'politique du changement (L'Année politique, 
économique et sociale 1982, 59). As far as agricultural policy was concerned, the socialist 
government aimed at regaining the European market (L Année politique, économique et sociale 
1981, 409). Although these international objectives were not in fact new, Minister of 
Agriculture Edith Cresson planned a number of important changes at the domestic level. First, 
she wanted to include the left oriented agricultural organizations in the consultation process 
between government and farm lobby, alongside the FNSEA and CNJA (Centre national des 
jeunes agriculteurs who were already participating in this process.94 Second, she introduced 
commodity boards ('offices par produit).
in France in the 1980s, it w as also im plem ented in a typically French m anner ('neoliberalism à la française), 
in w hich the principle of a dirigiste state w as m aintained (C lift 2003).
93 In fact the governm ent w as labelled the 'U nion of the Left', but for the rem ainder of this chapter I will 
refer to this governm ent as the 'socialist governm ent'.
94 Until 1981, four agricultural 'organizations' had official contacts w ith the governm ent: the FNSEA and 
C N JA  (the interest organization for young farmers, closely tied to the FNSEA), the assemblée permanente
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The new policy met with fierce resistance, both from the opposition and wider society. 
There was consternation over the fact that the PC occupied ministerial positions in the new 
government (Van Esch 2007, 257; Morray 1997, 93). At a time when tensions in the Cold War 
were mounting again, many Frenchmen and foreign governments were worried about the 
communist elements in the French government.95 But it was not only the composition of the 
government that came in for criticism. Its policies also met with disapproval. Arguing that the 
new governmental policies were 'simpliste et malsaine', the right-wing Rassemblement pour la 
République (RPR) tabled a censure motion in the Assemblée (L Année politique, économique et 
sociale 1981, 425). The Sénat also resisted the nationalization planned by the government 
(idem, 470). As far as agricultural policy was concerned, Cresson came into conflict with the 
FNSEA and CNJA. They accused her of wrongfully questioning their representativeness and 
feared that the introduction of commodity boards would result in different agricultural sectors 
being played off against one another (L Information Agricole May 1986, 38). The government's 
policies were not only persistently criticized, they also failed to meet their objectives. The 
recession deepened and the French Franc ran into severe difficulties within the European 
Monetary System (EMS) (L'Année politique, économique et sociale 1981, 435; 1982, 593).
With the failure of the government's policies, disagreements within the government also 
surfaced. While the PC and the Ministers Laurent Fabius and Pierre Bérégovoy favoured 
continuing the expansionary economic policy (Van Esch 2007, 257), Delors, Minister of Finance, 
wanted to bring an end to the 'relance keynésienne in favour of a more restrictive policy with 
respect to wage development, prices and cuts in government expenditure (Morray 1997, 98). 
Although this politique de rigueur was only formally introduced in 1983 by Mauroy's third 
government, the beginnings of the shift can be traced back to 1982 when the government had 
begun a more restrictive policy out of necessity, because the expansionary policies had resulted 
in major budget deficits and higher inflation. Nevertheless, 1983 is usually considered the year 
in which the U-turn took place: the politique de rigueur marked the end of 'socialist illusions' 
( L 'Année politique, économique et sociale 1983, 486). In social terms, the politique de rigueur 
led to dissatisfaction and turmoil (idem, 390) and its short-term economic results were a further 
decrease in economic growth and an increase in unemployment. This came at the expense of 
the government's popularity (Morray 1997, 107). This failure also caused heated disputes within 
the government between proponents of the market-oriented rigueur and advocates of the idea 
of 'stimulated growth' (Morray 1997, 108-109). In 1983, Minister Chévènement (member of
des chambres d'agriculture (A P C A , national representation of the cham bers of agriculture at the 
departmental level, in w hich  representatives of FN SEA, C N JA  and other 'syndicats' were elected), and the 
Confédération nationale de la mutualité, de la coopération et du crédit agricole (C N M C C A ). These 
organizations had m onthly meetings w ith the Ministry of Agriculture and took part in an Annual Agriculture 
Conference with the governm ent (Naylor 1994, 266).
95 It is claimed that Mitterrand had stated in 1981 that he w anted to use the Com m unists in the 
governm ent in order to decimate them . In the case of a coalition between the PS and the PC, the PC w ould 
not be able to execute an attack on Mitterrand and the PS anym ore, because they w ould be made co- 
responsible for the policies conducted (M orray 1997, 78-80).
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CERES, on the left-wing of the PS) resigned out of dissatisfaction with the government's new 
direction. The PC also stepped up its criticism. Ultimately, however, it was not economic policy 
that brought down the third Mauroy government, but the issue of school reforms. As a result of 
major public protests in 1984, Mitterrand felt forced to intervene and withdraw the 
government's proposal on school reforms. In response, Alain Savary, the Minister of Education, 
resigned from the government whereupon Mauroy decided to hand in the resignation of the 
entire government (Morray 1997, 145).
Mauroy was succeeded by Fabius. Fabius focused on modernizing French industry: after 
changement and rigueur the time had now arrived for modernisation. This was regarded a policy 
shift in a more orthodox liberal direction within modern socialism that was not 'dirigiste but 
'créateur (L'Année politique, économique et sociale 1984, 29 and 457). The PC, however, 
refused to take part in a government for which the creation of employment was not the prime 
objective (Morray 1997, 147). With this, the Union of the Left between the PS and the PC came 
to an end. Although the socialist government's more restrictive economic policy had, in the 
meantime, begun to bear fruit (only unemployment continued to rise) and the policy of cost 
containment and modernization appeared to be a more realistic policy, it did little to revive the 
government's popularity (L'Année politique, économique et sociale 1984, 510). L'Année 
politique, économique et sociale states that the government was confronted with an 'état de 
disgracë: only 26%  of the French population had faith in the government's policies and only 
30%  were satisfied with President Mitterrand, while 54%  were dissatisfied with him (1984, 
415). Within the PS, the unpopular policy choices gave rise to increasing divisions, for example 
between the centre-pragmatic led by Lionel Jospin and the left-fundamental rénovateurs led by 
Michel Rocard (L Année politique, économique et sociale 1984, 368 and 454).
Following increasing speculation during 1985 that a period of cohabitation may be 
imminent, this period actually arrived after the parliamentary elections of March 1986. Midway 
through 1985, opinion polls were already indicating that 58%  of the French electorate was 
planning to vote for the right-wing opposition parties.96 After the elections, the Union pour ia 
Démocratie Française (UDF) and the RPR, together with the right-wing splinter parties, obtained 
a majority in the Assemblée (L'Année politique, économique et soii l e  1986, 31). Jaques Chirac, 
leader of the RPR, became Prime Minister. In his governmental declaration of 15 April 1986 in 
the Sénat he promised that the policies he proposed would mark a break with the policies 
implemented by the socialist government between 1981 and 1985.97 He proposed a policy of 
'recovery' (redressement which would prioritize not only employment, but also security and the 
position of France in the world (regaining French grandeuf). In the economic domain, Chirac 
wanted to break away from the socialists' policies by introducing privatization and deregulation. 
Eventually, however, the 'rupture with the socialist policies was in fact less pronounced than
96 Europe Brief Notes June 1985, In: Agence Europe 19.6.1985.
97 http://w ww .vie-publique.fr/discours: Déclaration de politique générale de M. Jacques Chirac, Premier 
Ministre, sur les grandes lignes de la politique en matière d 'économ ie, d 'enseignem ent, d'audiovisuel et de 
sécurité, au Sénat le 15 avril 1986.
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had been anticipated and Chirac's policies resembled the initiatives begun by Delors in 1983 
(L Année politique, économique et sociale 1986, 521). Chirac did however devote more 
attention to agricultural policy in his governmental declaration than his socialist predecessors. 
He attached great value to the agricultural sector because of its importance for the French trade 
balance and he wanted to preserve Europe's vocation exportatrice by guaranteeing the 
fundamental principles of the CAP. He also aimed to strengthen the ties between the 
government and agricultural interest groups.98 Although no major differences existed between 
Chirac's agricultural policy and the policies of his socialist predecessors, Chirac did present 
himself as a more fervent defender of French agriculture. Meanwhile, the cohabitation 
progressed with difficulty and Mitterrand refused to sign a number of laws (e.g. concerning 
privatization, the election system and working hours) ( L 'Année politique, économique et sociale 
1986, 63, 82 and 95). Mitterrand's popularity increased, and the government encountered 
serious problems. In 1986 it faced terrorist attacks and student riots (idem, 94). In 1987, a stock 
market debacle added to the problems and social tensions manifested itself in strikes in various 
sectors. Although Chirac was of the opinion that social dissatisfaction was inherent in a policy of 
'redressement', this policy did not improve his chances in the presidential elections of 1988.
Mitterrand was re-elected as President in the elections of 1988. He immediately called 
parliamentary elections in which the PS and PC won and gained combined an absolute majority, 
but the PC did not want to be part of a new socialist government (L'Année politique, 
économique et sociale 1988, 29). A minority government was formed under the leadership of 
Rocard.99 His intention was 'gouverner autrement', by which he meant introducing greater 
transparency, closer contacts with societal actors and more parliamentary debate (idem, 62). As 
far as agriculture was concerned, he wanted to support both farmers that experienced 
difficulties and those that were already competitive, which required diversification in financing 
and policies.100 This indicates a more technical and economically inspired vision of agriculture on 
his part, when compared to the position taken by the agricultural lobby (see Section 5.3.1). 
Rocard's policies met with great resistance. L'Année politique, économique et sociale speaks of 
an 'ambiance de contestation in 1989 (1989, 428). Criticism of the government manifested 
itself in, among other things, censure motions in parliament. During his term in office, Rocard 
was confronted with six censure motions, two of which came in the period up to and including 
1989 (Elgie and Maor 1992, 71 ; Thiébault 2004, 335).
On the basis of the information presented above, societal contentment with the 
government and the degree of stability and sensitivity of the French government in the period 
1982-1989 may be estimated. The entire period is characterized by increasing societal
98 http://w ww .vie-publique.fr/discours: Déclaration de politique générale de M. Jacques Chirac, Premier 
Ministre, au Sénat le 15 avril 1987.
99 L'Année politique, économique et sociale (1988, 14) speaks of an apparent acceptance that a stable 
majority w as not a prerequisite as long as the opposition did not unite in a majority.
100 http://ww w .vie-publique.fr/discours: Déclaration de politique générale de M. Michel Rocard, Premier 
Ministre, sur le program m e du gouvernem ent, à l'Assem blée nationale le 29 juin 1988
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discontent with the various governments. None of these governments succeeded in combating 
unemployment and the economic recession deepened. Relative peaks in societal discontent may 
be found in 1984, stemming from Mauroy's politique de rigueur, and in the autumn of 1987, 
when Chirac was confronted with large-scale protests by various domestic groups. As far as 
governmental stability is concerned, 1981 began with a stable coalition between the PS and the 
PC. The Mauroy governments (1981-1984) faced five censure motions within three years to be 
sure, but these motions did not gain a majority in parliament by a long shot. Within the Mauroy 
government, however, disagreement erupted within a year over economic policy, eventually 
culminating in the break-up of the 'Union of the Left'. This also meant that the socialist 
government lost its majority in parliament. The Chirac government taking office in 1986 enjoyed 
a stable majority in parliament and was only confronted with one motion of censure in two 
years. Rocard on the other hand, had to govern with a minority in parliament and was 
dependent on parliamentary support from the centre. On top of that, he faced two motions of 
censure within a year, one of which fell only 27 votes of being passed. Considering 
parliamentary support and the number of censure motions, the periods of 1984-1985 and 
1988-1989 may therefore be characterized as having a relatively high degree of governmental 
instability. Finally, we can assess the sensitivity of the government. This sensitivity depends on 
the stability of the government and the electoral calendar. The most important elections during 
the period of the run-up to and during the first half of the Uruguay Round were the 
parliamentary elections in 1986 and 1988 and the presidential elections in 1988. In addition to 
the periods of high governmental instability already mentioned, governmental sensitivity was 
also relatively high in 1987, prior to the presidential elections. It was therefore in 1985 and in 
the period 1987-1989 that the government was likely to attach greater importance to domestic 
political considerations than during the rest of the period 1982-1989.
5.3 The French Interest: Domestic Considerations
5.3.1 Political interests
This section focuses on the domestic political consequences of the various behavioural options 
during the run-up to and the first half of the Uruguay Round. In this respect, it is first of all 
important to map out the positions defended by the farm lobby. In addition, we will look at the 
positions of other societal actors such as the industrial and trade lobbies and political parties, to 
the extent that they intervened in the agricultural aspects of the negotiations. Before turning to 
the mobilization of these lobbies and their effect on the government's political interests, I will 
first describe the main actors in the farm lobby and outline the ideological background against 
which the farm lobby judged agricultural policy proposals.
The French farm lobby is fragmented, but the FNSEA is by far the largest organization 
within the lobby. The FNSEA is an umbrella organization whose members include departmental 
agricultural organizations (the FDSEAs) and specific product organizations (such as the
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Association Générale des Producteurs de Blé et autres céréales (AGPB) for cereals and the 
Fédération Nationale des Producteurs de Lat (FNPL) for milk). Due to significant divergence in 
the interests of the various agricultural sectors and the diversity in farm sizes, ranging between 
modern large-scale and old small-scale farms (Gyomarch et al. 1998, 145), it was difficult for 
the FNSEA to act as a unified lobby. The various product organizations did not hesitate to 
develop activities on their own, not in line with broader FNSEA policies, if they thought the 
FNSEA was not taking appropriate action. What unified the FNSEA was its focus on a sufficient 
degree of price support (Roederer-Rynning 2005, 99): in this respect the various sectors and 
farm types had a common interest and it was therefore this demand that the FNSEA 
emphasized. This policy could not, however, prevent competitors from emerging over time, 
either as a result of splits from the FNSEA or through the creation of new organizations. These 
splits were ascribed to the fact that large-scale farms dominated the FNSEAs executive 
committee (Averyt 1977, 17 and 26; Philips 1990, 11; Gyomarch et al. 1998, 146) (particularly 
cereal growers), and that most farmers did not feel properly represented by the FNSEA (Naylor
1994, 265). On the left of the political spectrum the Mouvement de Défense des Exploitants 
Familiaux (MODEF) was established in 1959 (and eventually split off from the FNSEA in 1975), 
and the Confédération Nationale des Syndicats de Travailleurs Paysanne (CNSTP) in 1981, which 
together with the Fédération Nationale des Syndicats Paysans united to form the Confédération 
Paysanne in 1987. On the right of the political spectrum the Fédération Française de 
'Agriculture (FFA) was established in 1969 and Coordination Rurale in 1991. Despite the 
increased fragmentation in the political organization of the farm groups, the FNSEA nevertheless 
remained the largest agricultural interest group in France (Naylor 1994, 266). In addition, the 
various farm organizations generally remained united in their strong resistance to the far- 
reaching liberalization of agricultural trade in the GATT negotiations. The differences were 
particularly to be found in the extremity of the measures they used to get their positions across. 
In this chapter, as well as in Chapter 7 on the second French case, I will specify the positions of 
the various agricultural organizations to the extent that this is relevant to the assessment of the 
French domestic political interests. In the presentation of the underlying ideas of the farm lobby 
concerning agricultural policy, below, I will rely mainly on FNSEA sources on the matter.
The French farm lobby had specific ideas on what form French agriculture should take as 
well as on its mission and objectives. The FNSEA defended a syndicalist doctrine with a farm 
structure dominated by one-man farms and family farms. In 1988, the term 'civilisation rura/e 
was used and underpinned by two concepts. The first concept is 'territorial et familial'. This 
referred to the specific rural estate of one farmer or farm family, in which the farmer was only a 
link within a chain of ancestors who had passed the estate on from father to son. Every 
generation tried to preserve and improve the estate and hand it on to the next generation. The 
second concept is 'territorialetcollectif’and places the single farm within a larger entity, as part 
of the countryside. Together the farmers took care of 'l'occupation harmonieuse du territoire 
(L'information Agricole December 1988). Apart from this civilisation rurale, the farm lobby also 
emphasized agriculture as a truly economic activity (L'information Agricole January 1987).
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Farmers were above all considered to be responsible for the management of their own farms. 
Farm income should be gained from rewards for production and not from income support that 
was not matched by genuine labour on the part of the farmers. As for the mission of French 
agriculture and French farmers, the FNSEA stressed the objective of providing food for the 
people: 'nourrir /es hommes (L’information Agricole May 1983; December 1988). The FNSEA 
linked its mission of providing food for the people with that of providing security of food supply 
and food independence (L information Agricole March 1989).
From 1983 onwards, the vocation exportatrice (see Section 3.3.3) also emerged in the 
ideas of the farm lobby as a distinctive role for French agriculture (L information Agricole May 
1983). In the second half of the 1980s this vocation was increasingly stressed by the farm lobby, 
which referred to the great contribution of agro-aiimentaire exports to the French economy in 
the form of a trade surplus that partially offset France's overall trade deficit (L information 
Agricole May 1989; October 1989). A  final role for French agriculture, which emerged in the 
discourse of the agricultural lobby, particularly after 1988, was the idea that farmers should 
populate the rural territory ('occuper l'espace', manage the countryside and protect the 
environment (L information Agricole, December 1988; May 1989).
When we compare these principles with the vision of the French government on 
agriculture (see Section 5.2.2), there is a striking level of similarity between the two.101 The 
emphasis shifted from domestic food supply to the vocation exportatrice of French agriculture 
and its role in managing and preserving the countryside. While from the government's 
perspective, this vocation appeared to be particularly motivated by economic arguments, the 
farm lobby took its inspiration from the idea of a 'divine right to export their surplus production', 
regardless of the costs [Agra Europe 9.10.1987). Moreover, the farm lobby also placed a greater 
emphasis on agriculture as an economic activity in which farm income should, for the greater 
part, be generated from the marketing of agricultural produce.
Their ideas on the structure and mission of French agriculture guided the way in which the 
farm lobby evaluated the desirability and attractiveness of various policy instruments. When the 
idea of production control began to gain popularity in the EEC in the 1980s, the French farmers 
vehemently resisted such a policy. Production controls would be an impediment to the mission 
of feeding the people and were therefore invariably viewed as a 'politique malthusienne 
{L’information Agricole May 1983). Moreover, production control would also be incompatible 
with the self-proclaimed vocation exportatrice of French agriculture. Controls would limit the 
exportable volume, while great quantities of produce were needed to secure France's position 
on the agricultural world market [L’information Agricole, April 1985). Instead of production
101 An interesting question is w hether the farmers predom inantly influenced the vision of the governm ent 
on agriculture or vice versa. A lthough  I did not conduct extensive research on this question, it is noteworthy 
that the FN SEA's m o nth ly- L'Information Agricole -  invariably covered only issues such as the vocation 
exportatrice and the role of French agriculture in the preservation of the countryside after the governm ent 
had already started developing such policies (as expounded in the Loi d'orientation agricole for exam ple). It 
therefore appears that the farmers rather follow ed the governm ent than vice versa.
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control, the farm lobby preferred a 'prudent price policy' as a part of market organization. The 
price policy should guarantee farmers a fair reward for their labour. Not surprisingly, the French 
farm lobby therefore rejected direct income supports that were decoupled from production. After 
all, agriculture was an economic activity.
The farm lobby thus had a clear vision on the position and objectives of agriculture in 
France. But to what extent did the farm lobby mobilize between 1982 and 1989? In this period 
farmers' dissatisfaction was significant for a number of reasons and demonstrations and protests 
were organized regularly. The immediate cause of this mobilization was however not principally 
related to the GATT negotiations, but rather to the proposals on CAP reform and French 
domestic agricultural policy. In 1984, milk quota were introduced within the context of the CAP 
and in 1989, the Delors III reform package included so-called stabilizers, which were aimed at 
limiting EEC agricultural expenditure. Furthermore, French farmers faced a drop in their income 
due to falling prices on agricultural markets, as well as droughts. They felt that they were 
insufficiently compensated by the French government and this led to repeated demonstrations 
[L'information Agricole May 1989; October 1989). In addition, the FNSEA became enraged at 
the attempts of the socialist governments to grant the left-oriented farm organizations access to 
the formal consultation process between government and farm lobby. In 1981, when Cresson 
headed the Ministry of Agriculture, this lead to large-scale protests (L 'information Agricole May 
1983). Although there was a relaxation in relations between the FNSEA and the government 
after Rocard succeeded Cresson, the FNSEA was still of the opinion that the government was 
wasting its time and energy on discussing the representativeness of the FNSEA, when it should 
have been addressing the problem of deteriorating farm incomes instead (L’information Agricole 
March 1985). Farmers complained that the socialist government did not involve them sufficiently 
in the policy-making process (Financial Times, 18.5.1983) and that the government took little 
notice of their protests (L 'information Agricole, March 1985). When the centre-right government 
headed by Chirac took office in 1986 and François Guillaume, former-president of the FNSEA, 
was appointed Minister of Agriculture, this was a clear attempt by the new government to 
improve relations between the government and agricultural groups. The farm lobby nevertheless 
continued to scrutinize the policies of their former president.
Although the reason for actual demonstrations between 1982 and 1988 were mainly to 
be found in policy issues at the national and European levels, the farm lobby also expressed its 
opinions and concerns with respect to the GATT negotiations. Considering the apparently large 
degree of consensus between the French government and the farm organizations on the issue of 
GATT, the FNSEA expressed its preferences less through demonstrations, and more through 
reacting to outcomes of meetings such as the GATT Ministerial Conferences in 1982 and 1986. 
While the outcome of the Ministerial Conference in 1982 was generally considered to be a 
success for the EEC because no agreement had been reached on launching a new GATT round, 
the FNSEA was less enthusiastic about the outcome. It was not satisfied with the agricultural 
committee that had been established and concerned about the general declaration 
[L’information Agricole December 1982). By accepting this declaration, the EEC had accepted
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the idea that the market for agricultural products needed to be more fully integrated into GATT. 
The FNSEA feared -  and rightly so -  that the Ministerial Conference would prove a first step for 
the United States to dismantle the CAP through the GATT negotiations. In the years that 
elapsed until the launch of the new GATT round, the FNSEA regularly pointed out the danger 
inherent in such negotiations.
The gist of these warnings was invariably the danger of the offensive the United States 
had launched against EEC agricultural policy, while the United States in turn had its own system 
of agricultural support which it refused to put up for discussion (L'Information Agricole 
December 1985). According to the FNSEA, the United States attempted to damage the CAP in 
three ways: by instituting GATT procedures against the EEC's agricultural policy; by increasing 
the tension on world markets through expanding its export programmes (see Section 4.3.2); 
and by exerting extensive pressure for the renegotiation of the rules concerning agriculture in 
GATT (L 'Information Agricole February 1986). The FNSEA argued that in the new trade round 
the United States was deliberately focusing on agriculture, services and technology, because 
France was negotiating from a position of weakness in these sectors (L 'Information Agricole 
February 1986; May 1986). An added danger was that the United States would want to achieve 
results in the short term for domestic political reasons. It was the FNSEA's expectation that to do 
this, the United States would aim particularly at quickly obtaining concessions on agriculture, 
specifically on export restitutions, because not enough preparation had yet been done on the 
issues of services and technology to allow for short-term-deals (L 'Information Aricole February 
1986). This would not be in France's interests as an agricultural exporter. In this context, the 
FNSEA stressed that the French agricultural exports were not only of exceptional interest for the 
agricultural sector itself, but also for the French economy as a whole (L 'Information Agricole 
May 1986). The FNSEA therefore called on the government and the EEC to be vigilant in their 
negotiations on a new GATT round. The EEC should refuse to accept a one-sided emphasis on 
agriculture in the negotiations and should resist the pressure being exerted by the United States 
and others to make concessions in the area of agriculture (L 'Information Agricole February 
1986). Although they took the view that the GATT negotiations represented a greater risk to 
European agriculture than was generally appreciated, the FNSEA agreed that negotiations were 
necessary because a trade war would not be in their interests either. But these negotiations 
should only take place on the basis of mutual and balanced concessions. The FNSEA also 
regarded it essential that the EEC, led by the French, should propose a serious basis for the 
negotiations: 'mutual agricultural disarmament at world level' (L'Information Agricole May 
1986). The organization was, in the end, fairly satisfied with the outcome of the Ministerial 
Conference in Punta del Este where the Uruguay Round was launched. The negotiations had 
opened on a balanced basis and many of the French demands had been met. The agricultural 
negotiations had not been placed on a fast-track, for example, and it was not only export 
restitutions that had been put on the negotiation table, but all direct and indirect agricultural 
support that influenced trade. The farm lobby nevertheless continued to counsel caution 
because the inclusion of agricultural support in the negotiations could have grave consequences.
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According to the FNSEA, the meeting in Punta del Este had been the first Ministerial Conference 
at which the specificity of agriculture had not been explicitly recognized: until that point, 
agriculture had always been given a 'statut particuiier (LInformation Agricole November 1986). 
The political parties in the Assemble, which had not interfered with the negotiations on the 
opening of a new GATT round until then, were satisfied with the efforts of the French 
government in the negotiations for the same reasons as the farm lobby. The governing parties, 
the RPR and UDF, claimed that it was thanks to the intervention of the French government that 
a more balanced opening declaration had been accepted in Punta del Este than the declaration 
that had been originally proposed.102 The role of political parties at that moment was therefore 
reactive in nature and in fact supported the position the government had defended.
The agricultural proposal made by United States in the autumn of 1987 (the zero option) 
was regarded as far too extreme by the FNSEA. The organization was therefore pleased that the 
EEC fiercely criticized these proposals (L'Information Agricole October 1987) and also called 
upon the EEC to stick to its guns in the GATT negotiations (L Information Agricole March 1988). 
The FNSEA showed itself fairly satisfied with the proposals tabled by the EEC in this period, and 
the demand for rebalancing in particular could count on farm lobby support. None of the 
fundamental mechanisms of the CAP (such as the double pricing system and export restitutions) 
could be put up for discussion. Nevertheless, the farm lobby was concerned about the 
distinction that was made in the Commission proposals between short-term and long-term 
objectives, for it was thought that the United States could seize upon this distinction in its 
attempt to obtain rapid success in the agricultural negotiations. Furthermore, by excluding 
'direct support without an effect on production' from reduction commitments, an essential 
element of the Punta del Este declaration would be jeopardized: the agreement that all direct 
and indirect measures of support would be up for negotiation. It was precisely this formulation 
that had been one of the great successes of the French delegation (L Information Agricole 
November 1987). In this way, the proposal was also viewed as prejudicing EEC-level decision 
making on the use of direct income support. As indicated earlier in this section, the FNSEA had 
reservations with respect to the instrument of direct income support, de-coupled from 
production.
When the Mid-Term Review ended in a stalemate during the negotiations in Montreal, the 
FNSEA blamed this on the intransigence of the United States, just as the Commission had done. 
The farm lobby had sent a delegation to Montreal to take part in a worldwide demonstration of 
'solidaritepaysanne’by farmers (L'Information Agricole December 1988). They believed that it 
was in consequence of their pressure that the EEC remained unified and tenacious during the 
negotiations. Nevertheless, prudence was in order and the farm lobby had to ensure that the 
negotiators stick to their mandate and defend the principles and mechanisms of the CAP (ibid.). 
The agricultural lobby appeared very satisfied with the position and efforts of the French
102 Journal O fficiel de la République Française (1986), Assem blée nationale, 1re séance du 8 octobre 1986, 
4454 -4 4 5 5 .
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government during this period. The FNSEA singled out France as EEC member state that had 
insisted most strongly on standing up to the United States pressure during the GATT 
negotiations and stressed the need to remain unified (L'Information Agricole September 1988). 
The strong terms in which Henri Nallet had demanded that the agricultural reforms the EEC had 
already implemented should be taken into account, were favourably received by the farm lobby 
[L'information Agricole February 1989). Once again, the political parties in the Assemblée also 
displayed satisfaction with the government's approach to the GATT negotiations.103 The RPR, 
UDF and L 'Union Démocratique du Centre (UDC) also insisted that the rights of French and 
European agriculture should be energetically defended at the international level and that France 
should strive to maintain unity within the EEC.104 When the Mid-Term negotiations were 
resumed in Geneva in April 1989, Raymond Lacombe and Luc Guyau, president and secretary of 
the FNSEA, went to Geneva to support the French officials and lobby Commission negotiators. 
While the negotiations were still underway in Geneva, the PS, in a debate in the Assemblée, 
warned against the 'réductions substantielles progressives' and against freezing support 
measures (with a base year that was disadvantageous for the EEC) that had been proposed by 
Dunkel in his compromise text. Although the EEC member states were mainly positively disposed 
towards this proposal, because the elimination of all agricultural support was now officially off 
the table, the PS argued that Dunkel's proposal was extremely dangerous. On this issue, the 
party called on the government to listen to the French agricultural organizations, who had 
already criticized Dunkel's proposals. Eventually, the FNSEA assessed the compromise reached 
in Geneva as 'la moins mauvaise que la CEE pouvait espérer (L Information Agricole May 
1989). The EEC's reform efforts had been acknowledged, but the system of variable levies was 
still named as an issue to be dealt with in the longer term. A positive point, according to the 
FNSEA, was that agriculture could now no longer be blamed for blocking the negotiations. 
Thanks to the persistent attitude of the French government and the support of the farmers, the 
EEC had been able to avoid the role of 'accusée and had issued its own set of demands to the 
United States and the Cairns Group (L Information Agricole May 1989).
Although the farm lobby was fairly content with the French government's efforts on GATT, 
they still believed that the government was not taking their interests sufficiently into account. 
The farm organizations wanted Nallet to install a working group in which the government, 
together with the agricultural organizations, would lay down the French strategy concerning the
103 W hat is striking in these debates is that members of the Assemblée devoted more effort to criticizing the 
United States' conduct in the negotiations ('the United States is inflexible', 'the United States w ants to 
dismantle the C A P ', 'the United States spends more on farm support than the EEC', 'while the EEC 
im plem ents production controls and seeks multilateral solution, the United States uses unilateral (Trade Act) 
and regional (N AFTA) policies') than to m aking dem ands to the French governm ent. Apparently, argum ents 
that were specifically aim ed against the United States were favourably received, w hich seems to reflect the 
anti-Am erican sentim ents in France already mentioned in Section 3.3.3).
104 Journal O fficiel de la République Française (1988), Assem blée nationale, 1re séance du 7 décem bre 1988, 
3260-3261 et séance du 14 décem bre 1988, 3 6 4 8 -3649.
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Uruguay Round.105 According to the FNSEA, the GATT negotiations were the cause of most of 
the economic problems. They argued that in its proposals the Commission took far too much 
account of the anticipated reaction of the United States. The French government should make 
more effort to convince the Commission to modify its approach (L'Information Agricole January
1990, 4-7).
As far as the mobilization of other French domestic groups during the first half of the 
Uruguay Round is concerned, I can be brief: they hardly mobilized at all. The CNPF (ConœH 
National de Patronat Français, the French employers organization, did not interfere in the 
agricultural chapter of the GATT negotiations. According to Naylor (1994, 271), this 
organization did not want to give the impression that it supported the American position. It is 
also claimed that the CNPF had little influence on the government during the Uruguay Round, 
because relations between the CNPF and the French government were dominated by the latter 
(Green Cowles 2001, 167-168).106
As far as the support for national interest groups through the pressure exerted by 
transnational lobbies is concerned, it is striking that only Eurochambers (the European Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry) exerted pressure from the start of the Uruguay Round in favour of 
the gradual dismantlement of agricultural subsidies and other measures that influenced 
agricultural trade (Agence Europe 11.10.1986). UNICE (the Union of Industrial and Employer's 
Confederations of Europe) called only for increased controls on agricultural spending (Agence 
Europe 5.11.1987) and appealed to the United States and EEC negotiators to act responsibly 
and reach a compromise in the agricultural negotiations (Agence Europe 5/6.12.1988); they 
demanded no explicit concessions on agriculture in order to reach more favourable agreements 
in the industrial sector. It was not until the failure of the Mid-Term Review in 1988 that UNICE 
made any such demands, at which point it urged 'that a solution be found quickly to persistent 
disagreements in the farm sector, so that the benefits that industrial companies and services 
expect from the Uruguay Round, are not endangered' (Agence Europe 18.3.1989). According to 
Christina Davis (2003, 285-286), before the Mid-Term Review in Montreal the transnational 
industrial lobby only intervened in agriculture to prevent agricultural disputes that could damage 
industrial negotiations and trade. After Montreal, the transnational industrial lobby stressed the 
linkage between the negotiations on agriculture and industry and explicitly demanded a more 
flexible position on agriculture, in order to allow for success to be reached in other sectors in the 
negotiations. Nevertheless, even this increase in pressure exerted by the transnational industrial 
lobby, was unlikely to have been effective in the French case because it was not accompanied by
105 C A C . 19910751, art 1. 18.7 .1989. A  letter from the FNSEA, C N M C C A , C N JA  and A P C A  to Minister 
Nallet.
106 A lthough  the CNPF had m onthly m eeting w ith the DREE, it w as disappointed by the lack of initiative on 
the part of the governm ent. A ccording to the CNPF, the governm ent w as particularly busy with the issue of 
agriculture and audiovisual services. The CNPF therefore preferred to direct its efforts at the European level, 
exerting pressure through UNICE, the European industrial lobby (Green Cow les 200 1 , 167-168). During the 
first half of the Uruguay Round, however, UNICE hardly intervened in the agricultural part of the G A TT 
negotiations, at least not before the failure of the M id-Term Review in Montreal.
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similar pressure from the French industrial lobby itself. In addition, the pressure of the 
transnational industrial lobby was continuously counterbalanced by the pressure that the 
European farm lobby -  united in COPA (Comté des Organisations Professionnelles Agricoles 
and COGECA (Comté Généra! de la Coopération Agricole de ' Union Européenne -  exerted in 
support of the national farm lobbies and against making concessions in the agricultural 
negotiations (see for example Agence Europe 10.10.1987; 26.10.1988; 24.11.1988;
3.4.1989).
It may be concluded that before and during the first half of the Uruguay Round, there was 
fairly limited domestic pressure directly related to the GATT negotiations. The GATT negotiations 
had not yet become an important political issue in France at this time. This may be explained by 
the fact that in the first half of the Uruguay Round, the EEC had not yet made specific proposals 
such as reduction percentages, and the negotiations on agriculture were rather focusing on the 
broader aims and the structure of an eventual accord. As a result it was difficult for domestic 
groups to assess the precise consequences of any future GATT deal. The agricultural chapter in 
GATT was therefore less urgent than the farm issues at the national or the European level. In 
addition, the position adopted by the French government in the agricultural negotiations, and to 
a lesser extent that of the Commission, were already rather cautious, meaning that French and 
European agricultural interests appeared to be defended quite well. It therefore comes as no 
surprise that both the political parties in the Assemblée and the farm lobby were content with 
the approach of the French government to the agricultural negotiations in GATT during this 
period.107 As we have seen, the mobilization of the political parties and the farm lobbies thus 
took the form of reactions to the conduct of the French government and the Commission rather 
than proactive efforts to encourage the government or Commission to defend specific proposals 
or make specific demands in the negotiations. At first, the farm lobby urged mainly for caution 
in the negotiations and for reciprocal and balanced compromises. The only more specific 
preference voiced by the FNSEA was the demand that the principles of the CAP be 
guaranteed.108 It was only from the autumn of 1988 onwards, shortly prior to the Mid-Term 
Review, that the FNSEA began to keep a closer track of the French negotiators, not only to 
support them, but also to check that they were remaining alert to the interests of the French 
farmers. From this moment, the mobilization of the farm lobby also explicitly targeted the GATT 
negotiations, and their methods moved on from only (written) reactions to include 
demonstrations. During the entire period of the run-up to and the first half of the Uruguay 
Round, no other domestic groups explicitly intervened in the agricultural negotiations to serve as 
a counter-balance to farm lobby pressure. Expressed in relative terms, the mobilization of the
107 It is notable that in the relevant debates in the Assemblée only representatives of the coalition parties 
took the floor. Apparently the opposition parties did not have substantial criticism on the governm ent's 
approach (for otherwise they w ould  undoubtedly have taken every opportunity to voice such criticism in the 
Assemblée), but did not wish to pay com plim ents to a governm ent that they were not a part of either.
108 The latter dem and had already been made by the governm ent at an earlier point in time. The source 
materials give no indication that this dem and can be traced to farm lobby dem ands.
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farm lobby in the first half of the Uruguay Round increased from a limited degree of mobilization 
in the period prior to 1988 to a fairly high degree of mobilization from the autumn of 1988 
onwards.
5.3.2  Economic interests
Insofar as a new round of GATT negotiations and the inclusion of the agricultural sector could 
be expected to lead to an increase in France's GDP and general employment, agreeing to new 
GATT negotiations may be seen as a domestically economically attractive position. Considering 
the economic recession that France faced in the early 1980s, a new GATT round could have 
been a means of creating an economic boost.109 Whether trade liberalization benefited the 
French economy in terms of GDP and employment ultimately depended on the degree to which 
the market for the various sectors was expected to expand as a consequence of liberalization 
and the degree to which France was likely to share in the market growth through increased 
exports after price changes caused by liberalization were taken into account. Income from trade 
only increased if price reductions after liberalization were compensated by a greater increase in 
the volume of exports. This would, in turn, depend on France's competitive position in various 
economic sectors (industry, agriculture, services), for the Uruguay Round was not going to focus 
on industrial trade alone, but also on trade in agriculture and services.
Within the French farm sector, two distinctions need to be made. The first distinction is 
between import-competing sectors (such as the livestock sector) and export-oriented sectors (the 
cereal sector for example). The second is between efficiently producing farms (such as the large 
farms in the Paris Basin) and small, relatively less productive farms (such as those in 
mountainous areas) (cf. Gyomarch et ai 1998, 145-146; Delorme 1994, 47-50; Vahl 1997, 
76). The export-oriented and more productive sector within French agriculture was fairly 
competitive internationally. Its competitive position was particularly strong within the European 
internal market, which was insulated from the world market by its double pricing system and 
variable levies. Of all French agricultural exports, approximately 60%  of French agricultural 
exports were traded within the EEC, and this percentage further increased during the 1980s 
(70%  in 1987) (Delorme 1994, 40-41). Thanks to high European guarantee prices, French 
agriculture on the one hand generated a substantial income from national production and 
European trade (Gyomarch et ai 1998, 156), but on the other hand the high guarantee prices 
(which had been introduced under German pressure) also prevented the export-oriented part of 
French agriculture from reaping the full benefits of its strong competitive position within the
109 In the early 1980s, France w as in a bad econom ic position: it w as confronted with high unem ploym ent 
rates and a deficit on the overall trade balance. 6 %  of the labour force w as em ployed in the agricultural 
sector, a sector that contributed 3 ,5 %  to the GDP and w as good for 1 6 %  of the French exports (Le Monde
19.1 1.1992; Statistical Yearbook. 1989/1999, 2 3 6 -2 4 1 ; OECD econom ic survey of France 1989/1990, 
1995). The share of agriculture in overall GDP and em ploym ent gradually decreased, while the contribution 
of the services sector to the econom y increased.
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European internal market (Delorme 1994, 47). For this part of the agricultural sector, decreases 
in guarantee prices offered new opportunities to increase the French market share of the 
European market and gain increased income from exports. For the import-competing sectors, 
however, reductions in guarantee prices would have immediate repercussions on farm incomes 
if these reductions were not compensated. Thanks to European export restitutions, the 
competitive position of French agriculture within the world market was also sufficiently strong to 
have gained substantial market shares and income through trade. Although France would be 
able to cope with international competition without European export restitutions for a number 
of agricultural products, it was dependent on European export support in most of its agricultural 
markets.110 Trade liberalization in these markets and a reduction in export assistance would 
have therefore been likely to result in a reduction in the French market share and income from 
agricultural trade. It was thus in the French economic interest, both domestic and international 
(see Section 5.4.2) that the European export restitutions, which were part of the CAP, 
continued.
France's competitive position in the industrial sector, meanwhile, was relatively weak. In 
the 1980s, the French governments made frantic efforts to reduce the deficit on the industrial 
trade balance by large investments that were supposed to improve industrial competitiveness. 
The French service sector, finally, was regarded as internationally competitive (interview 
Andriessen 12.2.2008). France was the largest provider of services within the EEC and the 
second largest exporter of services in the world.111 Liberalization initiatives in this sector could 
therefore result in increases in income and employment in the French service sector.
On the basis of the factors described above, the proposals tabled in the run-up to and 
during the first half of the Uruguay Round can now be assessed with respect to their domestic 
economic attractiveness. In the early 1980s it was not clear a priori whether new GATT 
negotiations were, on balance, likely to be economically beneficial or disadvantageous to 
France. Although liberalization in the service sector was likely to increase French income and 
employment, liberalization in its relatively uncompetitive industrial sector could have led to a 
loss of markets and income. Notwithstanding the fact that a part of the French agricultural 
sector was able to compete on the world market, the inclusion of agriculture in the GATT 
negotiations was nevertheless likely to be domestically economically costly for France. This was 
because its GATT trading partners were particularly eager to discuss the European export 
restitution scheme to which France owed its relatively competitive position in world agricultural
110 Delorme m entions quality w ine, cognac, cham pagne and cheese as products that could be exported 
w ithout or w ith only small export restitutions. For the export of the rem ainder of the agricultural products 
export restitutions were indispensible, particularly for cereals (1994, 41). A ccording to Andriessen, France 
w as unable to com pete in w orld agricultural markets w ithout export substitutions (interview Andriessen 
12.2.2008). Export restitutions were necessary, because the European guarantee prices were above the 
w orld-m arket prices. In order to be able to export products to third countries on the w orld market, they had 
to be offered at a price at (or below) w orld-m arket level. The difference between the European guarantee 
price and the w orld-m arket price w as restituted by the EEC to the trader.
111 Journal O fficiel de la République Française (1987), Assem blée nationale, 2e séance du 9 décem bre, 7004.
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markets. Because it was agreed in Punta del Este in 1986 that all measures that influenced 
agricultural trade would be up for discussion, the Punta del Este opening declaration was less 
economically costly than the earlier proposals that had stressed export restitutions in particular. 
Nevertheless, because the declaration still assumed substantial decreases in agricultural support, 
the declaration was not attractive from the perspective of French domestic economic farm 
interests.
The proposals tabled by the EEC in 1987 and 1988 were not sufficiently specific to allow 
for an accurate assessment of the economic costs and benefits involved. A point of particular 
interest within the EEC position was that the CAP was to remain 'untouched' by the GATT 
negotiations under all circumstances. This position corresponded with French domestic economic 
interests. The zero option proposed by the United States and the far-reaching liberalization 
proposals of the Cairns Group, however, were economically unattractive to France. This was 
because the French agricultural sector profited substantially from the CAP policies (cf. Gyomarch 
et ai 1998, 156), and limiting European support mechanisms was likely to result in income 
losses both for French farmers and for the agricultural industry. Far-reaching concessions to the 
United States and Cairns Groups during the Mid-Term Review were therefore not in France's 
economic interests. The 'substantial progressive reductions' in the three areas of internal 
support, market access and export assistance to which the GATT parties committed themselves 
in the outcome of the Mid-Term Review in 1989, were not sufficiently specific (no percentages 
had been agreed yet) to allow for a precise assessment of its domestic economic consequences; 
yet, at the same time, the term 'substantial' appeared to imply significant reductions in 
agricultural support. More precise agreements based on this understanding were almost bound 
to be economically costly for the French farm sector.
5.3.3  Ideological interests
As indicated in Sections 3.3.3, 5.2.2 and in Table 3.11, France has traditionally known a high 
degree of state intervention in the economy, particularly in the agricultural sector. Central to the 
interventionist French policy paradigm is the principle of market organization through price 
policy, which is incompatible with the idea of a completely free market. One principle that 
gained increasing prominence from the 1980s onwards was the idea that French agriculture 
should also serve a social purpose (the multifunctionality of agriculture), controlling and 
preserving the rural countryside. This not only involved environmental conservation, but also the 
preservation of agriculture as a traditional way of life and prevention of a rural depopulation 
(Gyomarch et a! 1998, 156). If the underlying ideas of the proposals for a new GATT round or 
the specific demands and proposals tabled during the GATT negotiations on agriculture were 
incompatible with any of the three principles mentioned above, accepting these proposals would 
run counter to France's domestic ideological interest.
Taking part in a new round of GATT negotiations including agriculture was not by 
definition incompatible with the French policy paradigm, because the legitimacy of state
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intervention (of the method of price intervention for example) was not necessarily denied by the 
GATT proposals. Nevertheless, during the economic recession in the early 1980s, the French 
governments of Mauroy and Fabius (see Section 5.2.3) sought the solution to economic 
problems particularly in interventionist and expansionist policies that aimed to strengthen the 
competitiveness of French industry, and more especially to protect the domestic market. The 
idea that such interventionist policies were appropriate in times of economic crisis contradicts 
the idea that underlay the call for new GATT negotiations, namely that trade liberalization was 
the appropriate solution to the economic crisis. The proposals tabled by the Commission during 
the first half of the Uruguay Round, were all based on the idea of the legitimacy of state 
intervention and even sought to extend the European instruments of price intervention and 
market ordering to the world level. These proposals were therefore attractive from the domestic 
French ideological perspective. Under the proposals of the United States and the Cairns Group, 
by contrast, aspects of the French policy paradigm were essentially denied or put up for 
discussion. Their proposals aimed to strengthen market forces in the agricultural sector and 
limiting the interventionist measures that would be allowed. Income support through price 
policy should, from the United States perspective, be replaced by direct income supports. This, 
however, would be incompatible with the central role that both France and the EEC gave to 
price policy in their agricultural policies. Making concessions to the United States on this issue 
during the Mid-Term Review in Montreal would therefore be an unattractive option to France, 
incompatible with its ideological interests. The outcome of the Mid-Term Review in Geneva was 
on the one hand based on the idea that the degree of intervention in agriculture should be 
rolled back, but the agreement in itself neither denied the legitimacy of state intervention in 
itself, nor the legitimacy of specific forms of state intervention.
5 .3 .4  Domestic costs and benefits
On the basis of the information presented above concerning France's domestic political, 
economic and ideological interests, we are now able to assess the domestic costs and benefits 
of various policy options open to France (Table 5.1).112 This concerns the degree to which taking 
part in new GATT negotiations, accepting agriculture as one of the negotiating themes and 
making far-reaching concessions during the first half of Uruguay Round may be considered 
either attractive or unattractive, based on the French domestic interests. Here we see that the 
costs of the various proposals exceed the benefits at almost all the decision moments, with the 
exception of the EEC proposals in 1987 and 1988. Based on domestic considerations alone, it 
may therefore be expected that France would not agree to the launching of a new GATT round 
including agriculture, and that it would reject the proposals of the United States and the Cairns
112 See Section 3.3.3. for an explanation of how  the political, econom ic and ideological 'balances' in Table
5.1 are calculated.
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Group as well as the outcome of the Mid-Term Review. In Section 5.4, I will go into further 
detail about how the same policy options related to France's international interests.
Table 5.1: French domestic costs and benefits with respect to the proposals during the first half of the Uruguay Round.
New GATT 
round
Agriculture in 
GATT round
Opening de­
claration PdE
EEC proposals 
1987 and 1988
US and CG 
proposals
Concessions 
during MTR
Outcome MTR 
Geneva
POLITICAL(a)
Farm lobby - - - + -  - -  - -
Industry and trade lobbies 0 0 0 0 0 + 0
Political parties 0 0 - 0 - 0 -
BALANCE POLITICAL - - - + - - -
ECONOM IC(b)
Income and employ-ment 
farm sector
0
+ - / -  -
GDP and employ-ment total 
economy 0 0 0 0 0
BALANCE ECONOMIC - - - + - - -
IDEO LO GICAL(c)
Legitimacy of state 
intervention
- 0 0 + 0 0 0
Market organization 
through price policy
0 0 0 + - - 0
Multifunctionality 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BALANCE IDEOLOGICAL - 0 0 + - - 0
SUM  DOM ESTIC (d)
1 - - - + - - -  1
Legend: (a) -  =  pressure against the proposal, -  -  =  extensive pressure against the proposal, + =  pressure in favour of the proposal, and + +  =  extensive pressure in favour of the 
proposal. (b) -  =  econom ic costs, -  -  =  high econom ic costs, + =  econom ic benefits, + +  =  high econom ic benefits. (c) + =  the underlying ideas of the proposal considered in the 
policy option are in accordance w ith the French policy paradigm , -  =  the underlying ideas of the proposal considered in the policy option are at odds w ith the French policy 
paradigm . The balances are accorded a value of + =  benefits exceed costs; + + =  benefits considerably exceed costs; -  =  costs exceed benefits; -  -  =  costs considerably exceed 
benefits; + / -  =  costs equal benefits. In assessing the balance of econom ic costs/benefits, the consequences for the econom y as a whole are attributed more w eight than the 
consequences for agriculture. (d) The sum dom estic is either + =  benefits exceed costs; -  =  costs exceed benefits; or + / -  =  costs equal benefits. 0  =  no clear costs or benefits w ith 
respect to the criterion involve
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5.4 The French Interest: International Considerations
5.4.1 Political interests
From the moment in 1982 that 18 GATT partners proposed preparing for a new round of GATT 
negotiations, the United States exerted pressure on the EEC to take part in these negotiations 
and to accept the inclusion of agriculture as a negotiating theme (see Section 4.3.2). The 
Commission and most of the member states still had reservations concerning a new GATT round 
at that point. There were also extensive divisions among the GATT members as a whole. The 
EEC was therefore not isolated in its opposition to a new round of GATT negotiations in 1982.
This situation changed in 1984. Although there was still considerable dissent at the GATT 
level, a consensus had slowly started to take shape within the EEC, with the Commission and 
most of the member states cautiously adopting a positive stance on the idea of a new GATT 
round including agriculture. Only France and Greece persisted in their opposition to a new GATT 
round.113 When Dunkel proposed a GATT working programme in September 1984, most EEC 
member states still shared the French analysis that the working programme was not sufficiently 
balanced. But when Dunkel proposed a new programme only two months later, France was 
practically isolated in its criticisms.114 Meanwhile, Germany also began to pressurize France. This 
pressure was aimed on the one hand at gaining French approval for the accelerated 
implementation of the Tokyo Round agreements, and on the other hand at overcoming French 
reservations concerning a new GATT round. On 9 April 1984, negotiations took place between 
the German Minister of Economics, Otto Graf Lambsdorff and Cresson, who was then Minister 
of Trade. They met again during the Franco-German consultations in Rambouillet in May 1984. 
During both of these meetings, Lambsdorff tried to convince his negotiating partner of the 
necessity of a new round of GATT negotiations.115 In October 1984, Martin Bangemann, who 
had succeeded Lambsdorff as Minister of Economics, travelled to Paris for negotiations with 
Cresson. He obtained a commitment from her to take part in an informal meeting of European 
Trade Ministers on the GATT negotiations.116 In his talks with Cresson and Bérégovoy, the 
French Minister of Economics, he also urged France to accept the working programme for the
113 BArch. B102: 271990. 17.1 .1984. Art 113 M itglieder am 17.1.1984.
114 C U E A C . 10597/84, G A TT 147. 1 5 .11.1984. Som m aire de conclusions de la réunion du Com ité spécial 
article 113 en date du 15 novembre 1984 à Genève.
115 BArch. B102: 2 7 1992. 15.5 .1984. Unterabteilungsleiter V A  an Herrn Minister auf dem Dienstw ege 
vorgelegt. Betr.: EG-Rat am 14. Mai 1984. Hier: Handelspolitische Erklärung; 1 .6.1984. Protokollnotizen der 
Botschaft Paris. Betr.: 43. deutsch-französische Konsultation auf der Ebene der Staats- und 
Regierungsschefs am 2 8./29.05.1984 in Ram bouillet bei Paris; hier: Ergebnisaufzeichnung.
116 BArch. B102: 271994. 3 .10 .1 98 4 . Fernschreiben aus Bonn A A  an BM WI. Betr.: Besuch BM dr. 
Bangem ann in Paris 01. bis 0 2 .1 0 .19 8 4 . A  salient detail is that the United States had already asked 
Germ any to organize such a m eeting between Trade Ministers in 1984. A t that point, Germ any had not yet 
met this request however, because it did not w an t to offend the French, w ho held the presidency of the 
EEC at that time (BArch. B102: 2719 9 1 . 7 .3 .1984. Der Leiterin der Abteilung V  an Herrn Minister auf dem 
Dienstw ege vorgelegt. Betr.: Informelle M inisterrunde zur Vorbereitung einer neuen "Reagan-Runde").
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preparations for a new GATT round.117 According to the Germans, it was not so much that 
France believed it to be too early to start new GATT negotiations, but that France simply tried to 
slow down the process because the sectors that were on the negotiating table were sectors in 
which France did not wish to liberalize trade.118
In March 1985, the European Ministers of Foreign Trade reached an agreement on the 
EEC's participation in the new GATT round. The Council declaration in which this decision was 
made public however, stipulated that the principles and mechanisms of the CAP were non- 
negotiable. Paemen and Bensch (1995, 46) regard this declaration to be 'the result of 
concessions on the part of France [...] in return for references in the text to France's most 
important concerns'. A  Dutch negotiator subscribes to the viewpoint that because of French 
influence, one-third of the declaration now focused on agriculture, while the original proposal 
had only included one sentence on the matter (interview Frans Engering 20.2.2004; see also 
Vahl 1997, 72). Although French resistance to a new GATT round appeared to have subsided, 
Germany was still concerned that France would impose new barriers and Germany therefore 
maintained its pressure on France. In 1985, further meetings were arranged between 
Bangemann and Cresson in July and October.119 The primary goal of the Germans at these 
meetings was to overcome the -  as the Germans saw it -  reserved French attitude concerning 
the new GATT negotiations.120
During the GATT Ministerial Conference in Punta del Este in September 1986, the EEC 
became increasingly isolated because most of the GATT parties were willing to accept the 
declarations that had been proposed,121 while the EEC, under pressure from the French, was 
forced to withhold its support from these texts (Journal of Commerce 18.9.1986; interview 
Legras 12.11.2007).122 At the same time, France became isolated within the EEC. Germany and 
the British presidency of the EEC tried to find formulations with the aim 'den Franzosen Brucken 
zu baueri [Handelsblatt 19.9.1986) and exerted pressure on France to soften its position (The 
Associated Press 18.9.1986).123 Next to France, only Ireland and Denmark still had problems
117 BArch. B102: 292881. 3 .10 .1 98 4 . Betr: Besuch von BM Bangem ann in Paris am 1./2. Okt. 1984.
118 BArch. B102: 271992. 3 .4 .1984. W eltw eite Handelsfragen. Hier: Gespräch mit Frau Cresson am 9. April 
1984.
119 A ccording to Legras, Germ any perform ed the role of a 'go-betw een' between the Com m ission and the 
French. 'W ithout the Germ ans, we probably w ould never have achieved anything' (interview Legras
12.1 1.2007).
120 BArch. B102: 292882. 1 .7 .1985. Verhältnis EG/USA; 1.7 .1985. Gespräch von BM Dr. Bangem ann mit 
Frau Minister Cresson am 8. Juli 1985 in Paris. EG-Handelspolitik; 27 .9 .1 98 5 . Gespräch BM Dr. Bangem ann 
mit der französischen Industrie- und Handelsm inisterin Cresson am 1.10.1985. Neue GATT-Runde.
121 ArchBuZa. EG /1985-1989: 01544. 30 .9 .1 98 6 . M em orandum  DIE inzake UR.
122 ArchEZ. IRHP 1986-39 DEF. 21 .8 .1 98 6 . Onderwerp: G A T T Nieuwe Ronde, Ministers Conferentie te Punta 
del Este, 15-20 septem ber 1986.
123 It is claim ed that the pressure exerted by Yeutter and Bangem ann eventually resulted in the French 
acceptance of the declaration. There w as a tacit agreem ent between France and Germ any, supported by 
Kohl, that the fundam ental principles of the C A P  were not to be put up for discussion (interview Schom erus 
29.3 .2007). Ultimately, the French were sim ply being realistic according to Andriessen. They realized that 
there w as no other option. Andriessen does not exclude the possibility that there were voices within the
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with the proposed text. Apart from intra-EC pressure, France also faced extra-EC pressure from 
American negotiators, particularly USTR Yeutter during the negotiations in Punta del Este 
(interview Lorenz Schomerus 29.3.2007).
Once the Uruguay Round had been launched, the United States and the Cairns Group 
exerted pressure on the EEC by submitting far-reaching agricultural proposals which contrasted 
sharply with the reticence of the EEC (see Section 4.3.2). Given that it was not only the EEC but 
also many other GATT partners that regarded the American zero option as far too extreme, the 
EEC was not isolated on this issue. Rejecting the proposals of the United States in 1987 would 
therefore not jeopardize the GATT negotiations as a whole, but it would negatively affect trade 
relations with the United States, which were already strained due to the six GATT panels 
adjudicating between the EEC and the United States.
As indicated in Section 4.3.3, United States pressure on the EEC member states increased 
in 1988 as a result of the implementation of a new Trade Act and threats of additional export 
assistance in the Farm Bill of 1989, if the outcome of the Mid-Term Review in 1988 was not 
satisfactory.124 This pressure was also brought to bear on France specifically when Nallet visited 
Washington in September 1988. During the meetings he had in Washington he became 
convinced of the determination of President Reagan to extend the export markets of American 
agriculture. Members of Congress warned him that if tangible results were not evident during 
the Mid-Term Review, there would be repercussions in the content of the Farm Bill of 1989.125 
In addition, Yeutter emphasized that the United States would maintain its zero option during the 
Mid-Term Review. Nallet denounced what he saw as the aggressive way in which the United 
States made preparations for the Mid-Term Review and the French Ministry of Agriculture held 
out little hope that the negotiations in Montreal would succeed.126
While the Council of Ministers of October 1988 had still emphasized that the Commission 
should not make additional concessions unless the other negotiating partners also did so,127 
differences emerged in the European Article 113 Committee of November on the question of 
whether the EEC needed to adopt a more flexible position in the negotiations on agriculture.128 
During a Council meeting on 14 November, Commissioner Andriessen himself emphasized that 
the EEC should not become isolated and that it was therefore important for the EEC to adopt a 
more flexible position on agriculture and move in the direction of the Cairns Group proposal.
French delegation that w anted to take the em phasis off agriculture and pointed at the potentially positive 
effects of liberalization in other sectors. This w as not evident in the negotiations, however (interview 
Andriessen 12.2.2008).
124 ArchBuZa. EG /1985-1989: 01444. Open bericht. Verslag van de 1263e vergadering van de 
Landbouw raad van de EG gehouden te Brussel op 26 en 27 septem ber 1988.
125 C A C . 19940616, art 5. 1 6 .9 .1988. TD  W ashington 1848. M argerie. Objet: visite Nallet aux États-Unis.
126 C A C  19940616, art 5. 16.9 .1988. Note cabinet du ministre de l'agriculture et de la forêt. Objet: Etats- 
Unis Europe: perspectives agricoles.
127 C U E A C . 8527/88, G A T T 108. 5 .10.1988. Résultat des travaux de la réunion ad hoc du Com ité spécial de 
l'article 113 en date du 5 octobre 1988. Objet: G A T T U ruguay Round: Agriculture.
128 ArchBuZa. EG /1985-1989: 01546. Raad 9397/88, G A T T 129. 1 .11.1988. Uittreksel uit het overzicht van 
conclusies van Speciaal comité art. 113 leden.
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Andriessen suggested that the EEC should show its willingness to reduce agricultural support in 
1989 and 1990 by 10%  per year. Although this proposal was favourably received by a number 
of member states, both Nallet and Kiechle (the German Minister of Agriculture) refused to 
commit his country to specific percentages for short-term reductions in support.129 On 22 
November 1988, the General Affairs Council accepted the recommendation of the Agriculture 
Council which meant leaving the EEC proposal on agriculture unaltered, and that the 
Commission was only allowed very limited freedom of manoeuvre during the negotiations in 
Montreal.130 Shortly prior to the Mid-Term Review, the EEC was therefore in agreement that the 
Commission should not make additional concessions on agriculture in the negotiations. Here, 
France was not isolated in its resistance, but still enjoyed the support of and acted in unison 
with its most important European partner Germany.131 It was only when the negotiations in 
Montreal reached a stalemate that both within Germany (see Section 5.5 and 6.5) and within 
the EEC, differences again emerged on the question of whether the EEC should be prepared to 
give ground on agriculture in order to prevent negative repercussions on the GATT negotiations 
in other areas.132
In 1989, relations between the United States and the EEC improved. Although France still 
viewed these relations as very 'contentieux due to the various GATT panels on which the two 
were crossing swords (on issues including agriculture and Airbus),133 the DREE nevertheless 
concluded that US-EEC relations had entered calmer waters, particularly since Bush had taken 
office as President and initiated a more moderate trade policy.134 Prior to the resumption of the 
Mid-Term Review negotiations in Geneva in April 1989, increasing support emerged within the 
EEC for the new compromise proposal submitted by Dunkel in March.135 Germany now also 
called for willingness to compromise in Geneva (BMWI Tagesnachrichten 27.1.1989; Frankfurter 
Rundschau 4.4.1989). In the spring of 1989, France was therefore under pressure, both from 
within the EEC and the wider GATT sphere, not to put obstacles in the way of a successful 
conclusion of the Mid-Term Review in Geneva.
129 ArchiBuZa. EG /1985-1989: 01444. Open bericht PV Brussel aan min. BuZa. Onderwerp: deelverslag 
1273e vergadering van de Landbouw raad gehouden in Brussel op 14-1 5 Novem ber 1988.
130 ArchBuZa. EG /1985-1989: 01546. Raad 9628/88. Conclusies door de Raad aangenom en op 22 
novem ber 1988.
131 A lthough  French and Germ an agricultural interests did not coincide entirely, the two countries 
nevertheless cooperated in defense of the CA P. The French focus on agricultural exports and the Germ an 
preference for high guarantee prices w as com bined in the Franco-Germ an com m itm ent to the C A P  (Vahl 
1997, 96).
132 C U E A C . 5200/89, G A T T 30. 2 4 .2 .1 98 9 . Résultats des travaux du Com ité special de l'article 113 
(m em bres suppléants) en date du 24 février 1989; 5518/89, G A T T 37. 17.3 .1989. Résultats des travaux du 
Com ité special de l'article 113 (m em bres titulaires) en date du 10 mars 1989.
133 C A C  19940616, art 5. SG C I Premier Ministre. Objet: présidence française; politique com m erciale. 
19 .9 .1988
134 C A C . 19940616, art 5. 7 .9 .1 9 89 . DREE. Note pour le SG CI. Objet: Visite en France de Mme Carla Hills le 
11 septembre 1989. See also: C A C . 19910751, art 1. 3 .9 .1 9 89 . Ministère de l'agriculture et de la fôret. 
Situation des négociations d 'U ruguay.
135 Journal O fficiel de la République Française (1989), Assem blée nationale, séance du 5 avril 1989, 41.
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5.4.2  Economic interests
In order to estimate the extent to which participation in a new round of GATT negotiations and 
accepting the proposals that were tabled during the first half of the Uruguay Round served the 
international economical interests of France, this section will look at the consequences of these 
proposals for the French trade balance, the chances of a successful conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round and the consequences for the proper functioning of the multilateral trade regime. Just as 
the effects of liberalization on income and employment depended on whether the proposals 
entailed liberalization in competitive or non-competitive sectors (see Section 5.3.2), the 
consequences of liberalization on the trade balance also depend on the relative competitiveness 
of France in the economic sectors involved. In Section 5.3.2, I already elaborated on the French 
competitive position in the agricultural, industrial and service sectors. What is also of particular 
importance is that French agricultural trade made an important contribution to balancing the 
overall French balance of trade. While the trade balance of the industrial sector often showed a 
large deficit (42 billion FF in 1988 for example), the agricultural trade balance had been in 
surplus since 1965 (with the sole exception of 1977) (Agra Europe 10.2.1989). As Table 5.2 
clearly shows, this surplus in agricultural trade increased in the 1980s.
Tabei 5.2: French agricultural trade
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Trade surplus 
agriculture
25,4 17,4 25,4 29,8 31,1 28,2 31,7 39,4
Sources: Agra Europe, 23.4.1982; 2.12.1983; 3.8.1984; 6.9.1985; 21.2.1986; 20.2.1987; 11.3.1988; 
10.2.1989. Trade surplus agriculture is presented in billions of French Francs.
Trade in cereais provided a significant contribution to this surplus (between 60 and 80% ). The 
agriculture and food sector (agro-alimentairè) was considered an important sector within the 
French economy due to its contribution to GDP (7,8% ) and employment (10% ).136 Considering 
that, as was already indicated in Section 5.3.2, France was dependent on the EEC's export 
restitutions for its competitive position in agriculture, and thereby for its overall trade balance 
[Agra Europe 13.8.1982) reducing export subsidies would have been very unattractive for 
France, let alone dismantling them entirely. Finally, it should be noted that the French service 
sector also made a large contribution to the overall French trade balance: in 1987 this sector 
had a trade surplus of 34 billion FF that helped to reduce France's overall trade deficit.137
In order to establish whether specific proposals in the negotiations on agriculture could 
contribute to the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round, we need to determine whether 
the agricultural negotiations impeded progress in the other negotiating domains (such as
136 C A C . 19930186, art 13. Agriculture, monde rural et environnem ent: Les propositions du Parti Socialiste.
137 Journal O fficiel de la République Française (1987), Assem blée nationale, 2e séance du 9 décem bre, 7004
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negotiations on services). If this were the case, the overall French economy would benefit from 
the acceptance of the proposals on agricultural liberalization in order to bring an end to the 
negotiating stalemate and reap the benefits from trade liberalization in other competitive 
sectors. Up to and including 1988, this was not yet the case. It was only after the break-down 
of negotiations in Montreal that some actors identified agriculture as the cause of the 
negotiating stalemate. In general, however, agriculture was not yet considered to be the 
obstacle to making progress, for the negotiations on services, textiles and intellectual property 
were equally problematic (Davis 2003, 279).
Given its relatively strong dependence on trade with other states, France was also 
interested in a stable and well-functioning international trading system. Table 5.3 shows that 
France was far more dependent on international trade than the United States, and slightly less 
dependent than Germany. France was therefore interested in a well-functioning GATT regime.
Table 5.3: French, German and United States dependence on international trade
France Germany United States
1986 1990 1993 1986 1990 1993 1986 1990 1993
Exports of 
goods and 
services (% of 
GDP)
20 21 21 23 25 22 7 10 10
Imports of 
goods and 
services (% of 
GDP)
21 23 20 23 25 22 10 11 11
Trade (% of 
GDP)
41 44 41 46 50 44 17 21 21
5
Source: World Development Indicators.
Against this background, the United States threats to make a shift towards bilateral and 
regional trade accords if the multilateral trade negotiations within GATT did not produce the 
desired outcomes represented a problem from the French international economic perspective. 
The United States unilateral policies in the form of trade and agricultural legislation were also 
undermining the international trading system. In addition, the export programmes provided for 
by United States legislation were likely to have immediate repercussions on the agricultural 
trade balance in France. It was possible that policy options which involved concessions to the 
United States could effectively limit the economic costs of such legislation, but France needed to 
be reasonably sure that making such concessions would persuade the United States to refrain 
from carrying out their threats.
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Taking the considerations presented above into account, we are now able to assess the 
various proposals tabled during the first half of the Uruguay Round with respect to their 
international economic consequences. When it became clear that agriculture was to be part of 
the new GATT round and that the United States and other food exporting countries meant to 
target the European export restitutions in particular, the idea of new GATT negotiations turned 
into an unattractive option from the French international economic perspective. Nevertheless, 
the fact that the service sector was also proposed as a negotiating theme should have made the 
French rather more positively disposed to the negotiations, although it was clear from the outset 
that developing countries were very reserved with respect to this issue (see Section 4.3). 
Furthermore, the worldwide economic recession and the tendency of various states to introduce 
protectionist measures which undermined the credibility of the GATT regime provided an 
additional incentive for France to perceive the new GATT round as having potential benefits in 
terms of its international economic interests.
The EEC Ministerial Declaration of March 1985, in which the EEC agreed to participate in 
a new round of GATT negotiations, served French economic interests. Given that European 
participation in new trade negotiations had become inevitable, a declaration was made which 
outlined the condition that the EEC would only take part if all forms of agricultural support (in 
other words, not only export restitutions) were discussed and if the CAP was not to be put up 
for discussion. This took account of the French economic interests in the CAP. The proposals 
that were tabled for an opening declaration in Punta del Este in 1986, however, stressed that 
export assistance in particular, rather than all forms of agricultural support, would be discussed. 
Without amendments to the text, such an opening declaration would have been internationally 
economically unattractive for France, since negotiations that specifically targeted export 
assistance, such as that provided by the CAP's export restitutions, would have had a clearly 
negative economic impact on French agriculture.
The proposals the Commission submitted in 1987 and 1988 were consistent with French 
economic interests insofar as they proposed the management of international markets and 
rebalancing, and because they stressed the global nature of the negotiations and the non­
negotiability of the principles and procedures of the CAP. Management of international 
agricultural markets would safeguard France's position and market shares in various agricultural 
products. Rebalancing would allow France to regain a dominant position in the internal 
European market for animal feed at the expense of third states which were exporting large 
amounts of cereal substitutes and soy to the EEC in consequence of extremely low import tariffs. 
The principle of the global nature of the GATT negotiation ensured that the EEC negotiated 
simultaneously on issues such as agriculture, in which it took a defensive position, and on issues 
in which it took an offensive position such as the service sector. Finally, the EEC's demand that 
the principles of the CAP remained non-negotiable was in the French international economic 
interests, particularly to the extent that it involved the maintenance of European export 
restitutions. The EEC proposals of 1987 and 1988 had no direct consequences for the stability of 
the multilateral trading system.
Defending Vital interests: France 1982-1989 | 143
The United States zero option and the far-reaching reduction proposals of the Cairns 
Group were not in France's international economic interests, because they aimed particularly at 
the elimination of export subsidies and would thereby undermine one of the main principles of 
the CAP. Given the Trade Act approved by the United States Congress in 1988 (with the Super 
301 clause) and United States threats concerning the Farm Bill that was on the agenda of 
Congress in 1989, one can argue that conceding to the American demands would have a 
favourable effect on the stability of the multilateral trading system to the extent that such 
concessions could have prevented further unilateral action on the part of the United States. 
Nevertheless, the United States zero option and the EEC agricultural proposals remained worlds 
apart, so it was highly unlikely that the EEC could make concessions that were far-reaching 
enough to prevent the United States from executing its threats. In addition, the far-reaching 
nature of the necessary concessions may have had such negative consequences for France's 
agricultural trade balance, that the potential international economic benefits of these 
concessions were unlikely to offset their international economic costs. It was therefore not an 
economically attractive option for France to make far-reaching concessions on agriculture during 
the Mid-Term Review in Montreal. The eventual outcome of the Mid-Term Review that was 
reached in Geneva in April 1989 was economically costly on the one hand, because it implied 
agreement with 'substantial progressive reductions' of agricultural support measures. On the 
other hand, no commitments had been given on concrete reduction percentages and the United 
States zero option was now officially off the negotiating table. Finally, the agreement reached in 
Geneva prevented the reputation of the GATT system from being damaged any further by a 
second failure to conclude the Mid-Term Review.
5.4.3  Ideological interests
Policy options of which the underlying ideas are incompatible with the French state identity are 
internationally ideologically unattractive. Three aspects of the French state identity are of 
particular relevance here (see also Section 3.3.3). These involve the French notion of vocation 
exportatrice in the agricultural sector, the leading role of France within Europe that should 
negotiate as a unified entity on an equal footing with the United States (or should be able to 
function as a counterweight to the United States), and the Franco-German partnership.
The agricultural proposals of the United States and the Cairns Group were incompatible 
with the French vocation exportatrice, because these proposals were based on the idea that the 
extent of a state's exports should depend on its competitive position and not on its history or 
any self-ascribed mission in the world. In the vision underlying the United States and Cairns 
Group proposals there was no place for the idea of a 'right' to export agricultural products for 
those who could not compete internationally: France clearly did not share this view. By contrast, 
the Commission proposals of 1987 and 1988, which stressed the non-negotiability of the 
principles and procedures of the CAP (which enabled agricultural exports), were in accordance 
with the vocation exportatrice that France not only ascribed to itself, but also to the EEC as a
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whole.138 As a result, accepting the United States or Cairns Group proposals or making far- 
reaching concessions during the Mid-Term Review were unattractive options from an 
internationally ideologically French perspective.
The idea of a strong Europe under French leadership as a counter-weight against the 
United States does not appear to be undermined by participating in a new round of GATT 
negotiations or by the proposals that were tabled during the first half of the Uruguay Round. 
The GATT negotiations did not damage the economic power of the EEC and there was nothing 
to suggest a priori that the eventual outcome of the negotiations would, on balance, 
disadvantage the EEC. Probable losses in the agricultural sector could be compensated with 
gains in other sectors such as services or industry. Nevertheless, in the argumentation of French 
ministers during this period (see Section 5.5) it is striking that some proposals were regarded as 
bad, or at least suspect, because they had been initiated by the United States. This argument 
was used with respect to the question of whether or not to include the service sector in the 
negotiations, for example, even though France could reasonably expect to benefit economically 
from any liberalization of trade in services.139
The Franco-German friendship, finally, became a particularly important consideration 
when French and German preferences threatened to diverge and concessions were needed by 
one of the partners in order to reach a common position. This was the case when the EEC was 
faced with the question of whether to take part in a new round of GATT negotiations including 
agriculture. Germany greeted these initiatives enthusiastically from the start, attaching great 
value to them because of the potential gains for the German industrial sector (as will be 
elaborated in Chapter 6). The French refusal to accept the launch of a new GATT Round and its 
stubborn persistence in maintaining this position at the moment supreme in Punta del Este, put 
the Franco-German partnership under great strain. In the spring of 1989 the French and German 
positions again threatened to diverge. While France was not prepared to make additional 
concessions on agriculture so that the Mid-Term Review might be concluded successfully, 
Germany was in favour of a more flexible European position and attached great importance to 
making progress in the Uruguay Round. It was thus in France's international ideological interest 
to cooperate and soften its position in order to enable the conclusion of the Mid-Term Review in 
Geneva for the sake of preserving the Franco-German partnership.
5 .4 .4  International costs and benefits
On the basis of the information presented above on France's international political, economic 
and ideological interests, we are now able to make an estimate of the international costs and
138 Denying the 'right to export' and proposing to reduce or elim inate export restitutions w as thus not only 
econom ically costly for France, but it w as also unattractive from  an ideological perspective.
139 Audiovisual services such as the film industry were an exception. From a cultural and ideological 
perspective, France attached great value to the 'exception cuitureiie and did not w ish to liberalize trade in 
such services.
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benefits of various policy options (Table 5.4).140 This regards the degree to which taking part in 
new GATT negotiations, accepting agriculture as one of the negotiating themes and making far- 
reaching concessions during the first half of Uruguay Round may have been considered either 
attractive or unattractive, based on the French international interests. Here we see that it is only 
with respect to the accepting the agricultural proposals of the United States and the Cairns 
Group or making far-reaching concessions during the Mid-Term Review that the international 
costs outweigh the international benefits. On the basis of France's international interest, it is 
therefore to be expected that France would not accept the American or Cairns Group proposals 
or be willing to make far-reaching concessions on agriculture during the Mid-Term Review. 
Given that concerning the other decision moments, international benefits exceed international 
costs, it is to be expected that France would accept a new GATT round including agriculture, 
that France would take a positive position on the EEC proposals of 1987 and 1988 and that it 
would accept the eventual outcome of the Mid-Term Review in 1989. In the next section, 
expectations will be formulated for each of the decision moments on the preferences that France 
was likely to defend. These expectations are based on both the domestic and international 
considerations and weighing up the various dimensions of the French interests, based on the 
theory set out in Chapter 2. These expectations will then be contrasted with the preferences 
France actually defended in the negotiations.
5
140 See Section 3.3.3. for an explanation of how  the political, econom ic and ideological 'balances' in Table 
5.4 are calculated.
Table 5.4: French international costs and benefits with respect to the proposals during the first half of the Uruguay Round
New GATT 
round
Agriculture in 
GATT round
Opening de­
claration PdE
EEC proposals 
1987 and 1988
US and CG 
proposals
Concessions 
during MTR
Outcome MTR 
Geneva
POLITICAL(a)
Extra-EEC pressure + + + + + -  - + + + +
Intra-EEC pressure - + + + + -  - -  - +
German pressure + + + + + -  - -  - +
BALANCE POLITICAL + + + + + + - - +
ECONOM IC(b)
Trade balance - - - + - - -
Agriculture as the 
obstacle in the UR
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Multilateral trading 
system
+ 0 + 0 0 0 +
BALANCE ECONOMIC + /- - + /- + - - + /-
IDEOLOG CAL(c)
Vocation exportatrice 0 0 0 + - - 0
FR/EEC ~  US balance 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Franco-German
friendship
+ + + 0 - - +
BALANCE IDEOLOGICAL + + + + - - +
SUM  INTERNATIONAL(d)
+ III + III + III + III -  III -  III +
Legend: (a) In the case of extra-EEC  and Germ any: -  =  pressure against the proposal, -  -  =  extensive pressure against the proposal, + =  pressure in favour of the proposal, + +  = 
extensive pressure in favour of the proposal. W ith respect to Intra-EEC: —  = united rejection or resistance; + +  =  united acceptance; -  =  disunity w ithin the EEC, but predom inant 
resistance; and + =  disunity w ithin the EEC, but predom inant acceptance. (b) -  =  econom ic costs, + =  econom ic benefits (c) + =  the policy option corresponds well w ith the aspect 
of the French identity involved; -  =  the policy option is at odds w ith the aspect of the French identity involved. The 'balances' may take values of either + =  benefits exceed costs; + 
+ =  benefits considerably exceed costs; -  =  costs exceed benefits; -  -  =  costs considerably exceed benefits; or + / -  =  costs equal benefits. (d) The 'sum ' may take values of either + 
=  benefits exceed costs; -  =  costs exceed benefits; or + / -  =  costs equal benefits. 0  =  no clear costs or benefits w ith respect to the criterion involved.
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5.5 Theoretical Expectations and French Preferences
The assumption that underlies this research is that States decide on their preference on the basis 
of their domestic and international political, economic and ideological interests. As the previous 
Sections have shown, it is not only domestic considerations that can clash with international 
considerations, but political, economic and ideological considerations can also give rise to 
contradictory priorities in terms of policy options. In Chapter 2, I have argued that the relative 
influence of domestic considerations as compared to international considerations depends on 
the level of domestic and international polarity. Between 1982 and 1989, international polarity 
was high, and domestic polarity in France was high from a comparative perspective. The high 
level of domestic polarity in France indicates that the French government was in a strong 
position relative to domestic actors and would be able to take account of its international 
interests. The high international polarity means that the international system and the position of 
states within that system was relatively stable, as a result of which France also had greater 
scope to take its domestic interests into account. In short, the combination of high domestic and 
high international polarity is the combination in which a State has a maximum freedom to 
implement its preferred policies. My prediction in this case is that ideological considerations in 
particular, both domestic and international, will be relatively important in the preference­
formation process. What must also be taken into account in this period, however, is the fact that 
French domestic polarity was high in relative terms from an international perspective, but the 
variable was not a constant. Between 1986 and 1988, domestic polarity was slightly lower than 
during the first half of the 1980s due to the cohabitation of a socialist President and a centre- 
right government. From 1988 onwards French domestic polarity remained at this somewhat 
lower level because the new socialist government led by Rocard had no majority in parliament. 
Executive-legislative relations were consequently balanced rather less favourably for the socialist 
government in 1988 than for the preceding centre-right government (see Section 3.2.1). 
Additionally, governmental sensitivity was relatively high in 1985 and between 1987 and 1989 
(Section 5.2.3). In light of this reduced domestic polarity combined with the increased sensitivity 
of the French government, I predict that domestic political considerations will take on a more 
important role in French preference formation from the year 1986.
In Sections 5.5.1 to 5.5.5 I will now discuss the various decision moments separately. First 
a prediction will be formulated on the expected French preference at each of the decision 
moments. These predictions are based on the French domestic and international ideological 
interests and from 1986 onwards on domestic political interests as well. In the cost and benefit 
tables for each decision moment below, only the balances concerning these interests are 
therefore reproduced from Tables 5.1 and 5.4. The other balances are indicated with an X as 
considerations that are regarded to be non-decisive on the basis of the theoretical framework. 
After having formulated the prediction, the preferences that France actually defended in the 
negotiations will be analysed in order to establish whether these preferences are in accordance 
with the predictions based on the theoretical framework.
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5.5.1 New GATT negotiations including agriculture
5.5.1.1 Predictions
On the basis of the ideological costs and benefits attached to participating in a new GATT round 
(see Table 5.5a), it is predicted that France will initially resist European participation. It is only 
from 1984 onwards, when Germany began to increase its pressure on France to give up its 
resistance against a new GATT round including agriculture, that due to the importance of the 
Franco-German friendship it became too costly in ideological terms for France to persist in its 
objections. From 1984 onwards, it is therefore predicted that France would reluctantly abandon 
its resistance to new GATT negotiations. This does not mean, of course, that during those 
negotiations France would not do everything in its power to prevent agriculture, particularly the 
issue of export assistance, from becoming a central issue on the GATT agenda.
Table 5.5a Issue: Taking part in a new round of GATT negotiations
INTERNATIONAL DOMESTIC
Political x x
Economic x x
Ideological + —
BALANCE + —
Prediction: France will reluctantly accept EEC participation in a new GATT round, but not before 
1984.
Key to symbols: + = benefits exceed costs, -  = costs exceed benefits, x = non-decisive consideration.
Table 5.5b Issue: Including agriculture in the GATT negotiations
INTERNATIONAL DOMESTIC
Political x x
Economic x x
Ideological + 0
BALANCE + 0
Prediction: France will eventually agree to the inclusion of agriculture in the GATT negotiations
Key to symbols: + = benefits exceed costs, 0 = no significant costs or benefits, x = non-decisive considerations.
5.51.2 Preferences
In 1982, France harboured serious reservations on the issue of participating in a new GATT 
round. The government doubted whether new trade negotiations were opportune and France 
persistently tried to slow down the preparatory process for negotiations on agriculture (interview 
Schomerus 29.3.2007), because these had already been concluded in the Tokyo Round, so
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France argued (Agra Europe 5.11.1982). France feared that the EEC would be forced in a 
defensive position in any GATT negotiations on agriculture. It therefore proposed a study to 
demonstrate that the EEC was more open to agricultural imports than its trading partners. 
France also argued that it would be strategically advantageous to propose a number of more 
attractive negotiating issues for the new GATT round (e.g. intellectual property and trade-related 
aspects of exchange rates) to obtain a better balance between the various areas of discussion.141 
As far as potential negotiations on services were concerned, France had doubts about whether 
the EEC should take too positive a stance on an issue that had been proposed by the United 
States.142 This line of argument is striking. Within the EEC, France was the largest service 
provider, and as such may have been expected to display a positive attitude towards the idea of 
negotiations on services. The fact that France made it clear that the inclusion of services in the 
negotiations was problematic because it had been proposed by the United States appears to 
indicate that the idea of Europe as a counter-weight to the United States and a certain form of 
anti-Americanism played a role here. When Dunkel presented a text on potential agricultural 
negotiations in October 1982, France remained adamantly opposed because they viewed the 
text as targeting export subsidies exclusively -  in other words, the EEC export restitutions -  
while other instruments of agricultural policy would be left unaffected. A separate Preparatory 
Committee on agriculture would only be acceptable if the specific character of agriculture was 
recognized, if the Committee was limited to conducting studies, and if all forms of agricultural 
support were discussed.143 Prior to the GATT Ministerial Conference in November 1982, France 
remained dissatisfied with the political declaration as it had been drafted by the Preparatory 
Committee. According to France, the declaration excessively concentrated on protectionism as 
the cause of the worldwide economic recession, while ignoring monetary factors.144
Following the failure of the conference in 1982, France maintained its reservations on the 
working programme for a new GATT round and the inclusion of agriculture in these 
negotiations, although by 1984 its reaction was perceptibly less negative.145 While the French 
negotiator in the Article 113 Committee continued to take a position against a new GATT 
round,146 Roland Dumas, Minister of European Affairs, began to adopt a more positive stance in 
the General Affairs Council on 23 January. He nevertheless emphasized that a new GATT round 
should also focus on the financial and monetary causes of trade problems.147 In this period,
141 ArchEZ. Raad 4571/8, G A TT 22. 29. Verslag van de vergadering van art. 113 (plv) van 2 9 .6 .1982.
142 ArchEZ. W A -B EB-55. Verslag van de vergadering van art. 113 (plv) van 16.7.1982.
143 ArchEZ. W A -B EB-55. Verslag Com ité artikel 113 (leden) van 15.10.1982.
144 ArchEZ. IRHP 1982-52. 8 .1 1 .1 98 2 . G A TT Ministeriële Zitting 22-27 novem ber 1982.
145 C U E A C . 5385/83, G A T T 50, A G RI 18. 4 .3 .1 9 83 . Note d 'inform ation; 5477/83, G A T T 54. 8 .3 .1983. 
Som m aire de conclusions du Com ité spécial de l'article 113 (m em bres titulaires) en date du 4 mars 1983.
146 ArchEZ. 823g E Z A C L  313 4833. EZ/BEB. Verslag van de vergadering van art. 113 van 17.1 .1984; BArch. 
B102: 271990. 17 .1 .1 98 4  Art. 113 M itglieder.
147 BArch. B102: 271990. 24 .1 .1 98 4 . Fernschreiben aus Brüssel an Bonn A A . Betr.: Tagu ng des Rates der EG 
(allg.rat) am 2 3 .1 .1 98 4 . Top: Neue Runde von Handelsverhandlungen im GATT. See also: 26 .1 .1 98 4 . Von 
Dewitz an das Ausw ärtiges Am t. Betr.: GATT: Neue Runde von Handelsverhandlungen. Hier:
Sprachregelung für die deutschen Auslandvertretungen. Bezug: Mein Schreiben vom  11.1.1984.
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France also repeated its demands for a balanced approach to the agricultural negotiations in 
which all trade affecting agricultural measures should be put on the table.148 The working 
programme that the GATT secretariat submitted in 1984 failed to meet this criterion for more 
balance, according to France, because the text still stressed export subsidies, effectively putting 
the EEC in the dock.149 The recommendations could also have adversely affected the CAP.150 A 
new proposal that the GATT secretariat tabled two months later was still unacceptable to France 
because it would have favoured the main competitors of the EEC.151 All in all, France remained 
reserved with respect to the GATT working programme in 1984, but it did seem to have 
recognized that a new GATT round was inevitable.152
In 1985, an official at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs signalled that the French 
position on the GATT negotiations had softened, but that the time was not yet right for the start 
of the new trade round.153 Instead, France favoured a 'standstill' agreement for two years, 
rather than starting actual GATT negotiations. Moreover, financial and monetary issues should 
also be discussed first.154 France was nevertheless satisfied with the Council Declaration of 20 
March 1985, in which the EEC supported the launch of a new GATT round with the proviso that 
the fundamental principles of the CAP remained non-negotiable.155 Although France, by 
accepting this declaration had also accepted EEC participation in a new GATT round, Mitterrand 
continued to hold up the process in May 1985 because he would not agree to a date for the 
launch of new GATT negotiations (Paemen en Bensch 1995, 34). Mitterrand was concerned that 
agriculture, and therefore the CAP, would become the central issue in the negotiations. Before a 
new trade round could start, he wanted to be sure that other negotiating domains such as steel 
and services would also play a prominent role in the negotiations (,Agra Europe 10.5.1985). 
Before the AGPB, Agriculture Minister Nallet stressed that France would not allow itself to be 
forced to accept a certain GATT agenda, let alone to accept any modifications to the
148 ArchEZ. 823g E Z A C L  313 4833. EZ/BEB. Verslag van de vergadering van art. 113 (leden) van 4 .6 .1984.
149 ArchEZ. 823g E Z A C L  313 4833. EZ/BEB. Verslag van de vergadering van art 113 (leden) van 11.9.1984.
150 C U E A C . 9113/84, G A T T 120. Som m aire des conclusions du Com ité spécial de l'article 113 (membres 
suppléants) en date du 11 septembre 1984.
151 C U E A C . 10597/84, G A TT 168. 1 9 .11.1984. Som m aire des conclusions du Com ité spécial de l'article 113 
en date du 15 novem bre 1984 à Genève.
152 ArchEZ. 823g E Z A C L  313 4833. EZ/BEB. Verslag van de vergadering van art. 113 (plv) van 2 6 .10.1984; 
7013/84, G A T T 86. Resultaat besprekingen art. 113 gehouden op 4 .5 .1 9 85 . Voorbereiding op minister 
vergadering O ESO  van 17/18 mei; 9113/84, G A T T 128. Som m aire des conclusions du Com ité speécial de 
l'article 113 en date du 11 septembre 1984; 9990/83, G A TT 147. Som m aire des conclusions du Com ité 
spécial de l'article 113 en date du 19 octobre 1984; 10597/84, G A TT 168. Som m aire des conclusions du 
Com ité spécial de l'article 113 en date du 15 novem bre 1984; IRHP 1984-48. Novem ber 1984. Het G A TT 
w erkprogram m a, Verdragsluitende partijen 26-29 novem ber 1984.
153 Arch BuZa. EG 1985-1989: 01543. 18 .3.1985. Codebericht van am b. Parijs aan BuZa. Onderwerp: 
Frankrijk. G A T T nieuwe ronde.
154 ArchEZ. IRHP 1985-1 1. 7 .3 .1 9 85 . Nieuwe G A T T ronde.
155 ArchBuZa. EG 1985-1989: 01543. 20 .3 .1 98 5 . Codebericht van am b. Parijs aan BEB. Onderw erp: EG 
verklaring voor nieuwe G A TT ronde; BArch. B102: 292882. 5660/85, G A T T 45. 2 1 .3 .1 98 5 . Erklärung vom 
Rat am 19. März 1985 genehm igt. Betrifft: Neue Runde von Handelsverhandlungen.
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mechanisms and principles of the CAP.156 France was still considered to be the most obstinate 
state within the EEC in this area. Germany spoke of 'verdeckt aber nog immer spürbar French 
reservations about a new GATT round, which were detectable in the French interpretation of the 
Council Declaration of March 1985.157 Considering the fact that in September France was still 
objecting to the launch of the GATT round in 1986, this German perception appears to have 
been correct.158
5.51.3 Analysis
On the basis of the theory, it was predicted that France would initially reject EEC participation in 
a new GATT round, but would soften its position on the issue from 1984 onwards and 
reluctantly accept new GATT negotiations including agriculture. The empirical analysis has 
shown that France did indeed defend a reserved position on the launch of a new GATT round 
and rejected the inclusion of agriculture in such negotiations. Although French reservations 
continued for some time, it is striking that by 1984 France was no longer objecting to a new 
GATT round including agriculture. It appears to have accepted that a new GATT round including 
agriculture was inevitable. The empirical analysis therefore provides corroborating evidence for 
the predictions I have formulated.
5.5.2  The start of the Uruguay Round in Punta del Este
5.5.2.1 Predictions
Regarding the eventual opening declaration of the Punta del Este conference, it is predicted that 
France will accept it. Although domestic political considerations are expected to increase in 
relative importance at this time due to the lower domestic polarity (cohabitation, the political 
costs attached to accepting the declaration are relatively limited, while the Franco-German 
friendship would have been seriously damaged if France had continued to obstruct barriers for 
the new GATT round after frantic German attempts to convince the French of the need for these 
negotiations. Once again, France can be expected to do everything in its power to defend the 
French agricultural interests, as long as this would not result in a complete failure at the 
opening conference.
156 C A C . 19860691, art 1. Discours de m onsieur Henri Nallet, ministre de l'agriculture au 61 e congrès de 
l'association générale des producteurs de blé et autres céréales, le 20 juin 1985 à Vichy.
157 BArch. B102: 292882. 1 .7 .1985. Gespräch von BM Dr. Bangem ann mit Frau Minister Cresson am 8. Juli 
1985 in Paris. EG-Handelspolitik.
158 BArch. B102: 292882. 1 .10 .1985. Fernschreiben aus Genf an Bonn A A . Betr.: Sondersitzung G A T T­
Vertragsparteien zur Vorbereitung einer neuer GATT-Runde.
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Table 5.5c Issue: Acceptance of the 1986opening declaration
INTERNATIONAL DOMESTIC
Political x -
Economic x x
Ideological + 0
BALANCE + -
Prediction: France will accept the opening declaration in Punta del Este
Key to symbols: + = benefits exceed costs, -  = costs exceed benefits, 0 = no significant costs or benefits, x = 
non-decisive considerations.
5.5.2.2 Preferences
In 1986, the year in which the GATT negotiations were scheduled to begin, the French attitude 
was characterized by its confrontational stance vis-a-vis the United States, its obstructive 
position within EEC decision making relating to GATT, and its persistence during the 
negotiations in Punta del Este. In June, France called for the EEC to take a confrontational 
approach in the trade conflict that had erupted between the United States and the EEC over 
compensation for the accession of Spain and Portugal. According to France, United States 
criticism was a direct attack on the fundamental principles of the CAP.159 The EEC would need 
to adopt an assertive attitude if it was to defend its agricultural export policies successfully, 
which was essential in view of the vocation exportatrice of the agricultural sector (Agence 
Europe 11.6.1986). European agriculture had to be dynamic, competitive and effective in 
international markets, Agriculture Minister Guillaume stated.
France repeatedly tried to slow down the decision-making process within the EEC on the 
new GATT round. At an EEC coordination meeting on 3 June 1986, it was still an open question 
for France whether the EEC would even be present at all in Punta del Este the following 
September, and, if it was, whether a new GATT round would then be launched.160 France also 
objected to the Draft Overall Approach, a list of negotiating directives concerning GATT 
negotiations that the Commission had submitted to the Council of Ministers. The main problem 
was that the demand of guaranteeing the principles of the CAP was no longer included in the 
directives, whereas it had been an important part of the Council Declaration in 1985 (Vahl 
1997, 73). France also wanted the directives to state that the EEC could only accept 
negotiations on agriculture after agreement was reached on a number of fundamental 
objectives. The negotiations should aim at improving the existing prescriptions and rules within 
GATT concerning all aspects of trade in agricultural products, both import-related and export-
159 BArch. B102: 295996. 11.6 .1986. Leiter der A bteilung V  an Herrn Minister auf dem Dienstw eg. Betr.: Ihr 
Gespräch am 15. Juni 1986 in Saltw ood Castle zum  Handelskonflikt EG/USA über die Folgen der EG- 
Erweiterung.
160 ArchBuZa. EG /1985-1989: 01544. Open bericht van PS O ESO  Parijs aan Ministerie BuZa. Onderwerp: 
O ESO  handelscom m issie/ G A TT nieuwe ronde/ Frankrijk/ Seoul-overleg.
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related, taking into account the specific character and problems of the agricultural sector. It also 
insisted on an explicit statement that the EEC was adamant that the fundamental mechanisms 
and principles of the CAP should remain intact (cf. Meunier 2005, 105).161 It is striking that a 
number of these demands were included in the new Commission proposal in full. This gives 
reason to assume that France played an influential role in EEC decision making on this issue.162 
Clearly the CAP, in the words of a Dutch official, was 'sacrosanct' for the French, and France 
feared that GATT negotiations would undermine the CAP.163
Concerning the agricultural element of the 'Declaration on the launching of the new GATT 
round', France had repeatedly displayed its opposition to the reference to export subsidies (Vahl
1997, 74). During the Ministerial Conference in Punta del Este, Michel Noir, the French Minister 
of Trade and leader of the French delegation, continued this opposition. He stressed that export 
subsidies (an important pillar of the CAP) could not be discussed separately and that agricultural 
support in states other than the EEC member states should be discussed as well [Agra Europe 
19.9.1986). The latter demand was certainly justified. OECD research had shown that virtually 
all developed states protected their agricultural sector in one way or another. Within the 
European agricultural policy, variable levies and export restitutions were the main policy 
instruments, while the United States used deficiency payments, which meant that support was 
officially decoupled from production, but which nevertheless affected world agricultural markets 
[Agra Europe 26.9.1986). Not only France, but also the Commission and even Germany 
repeatedly pointed this out during the 1980s. At the Punta del Este conference, Noir rejected 
every text which explicitly mentioned export subsidies. One of these texts was the Swiss- 
Columbian proposal that had gained the support of most of the EEC member states. It is even 
claimed that Guillaume threatened to appeal to the Declaration of Luxembourg (Swinbank and 
Tanner 1996, 65-66). The fact that the report of a Dutch official stated that 'France's "vital 
interest" placed the EEC in an isolated position in the Preparatory Committee' seems to provide 
further evidence for this claim.164 For member states could only appeal to the Declaration of 
Luxembourg if this concerned a matter of very important interests for the state in question. 
France thus succeeded in securing the acceptance of the proposed amendments by the Article 
113 Committee, which was meeting regularly during the GATT Ministerial Conference. Noir also 
threatened that France would leave the negotiating table if its agricultural interests were not 
taken sufficiently seriously (UnitedPress International 18.9.1986). Eventually, France felt able to
161ArchBuZa. EG/19 8 5-1989: 01544. Raad 6788/68, G A TT 77, herziene versie. Inleidende nota van comité 
pv 6 mei 1986 over G A T T ronde, algem ene visie.
162 Vahl (1997, 72) makes a similar claim  on the basis o f docum ents of the Dutch Ministry of Econom ics: 
IRHP 1985-1 1 and IRHP 1986-39.
163 ArchBuZa, EG/19 8 5-1989: 01028. 31 .7 .1 98 6 . A m b. Parijs aan BuZa. Onderwerp: Franse export. 
Ontleend aan gesprek met ministre délégué voor de buitenlandse handel, Michel Noir.
164 ArchBuZa. EG /1985-1989: 01544. 30 .9 .1986. M em orandum  DIE inzake UR. See also: ArchEZ. IRHP 
1986-39 DEF. 21 .8 .1 98 6 . G A T T nieuwe Ronde. This m em orandum  also claim ed that France's position had 
meant that the EEC w as unable to support the Sw iss-Colum bian com prom ise text in the Preparatory 
Com m ittee.
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accept a compromise text in which export subsidies were no longer explicitly mentioned and 
which included the following objective: 'Improving the competitive environment by increasing 
discipline on the use of all direct and indirect subsidies and other indirect measures affecting 
directly or indirectly agricultural trade, including the phased reduction of their negative effects 
and dealing with their causes' [Agra Europe 26. 9.1986).
5.52.3 Analysis
On the basis of the theory, it was predicted that France would eventually accept the opening 
declaration at the GATT Ministerial Conference in 1986, enabling a new trade round to be 
launched. Turning to the position that France actually defended in the negotiations, it becomes 
clear that France was the most reserved of the EEC member states when it came to accepting 
the initial proposals for an opening declaration. The French rejection was largely based on the 
fact that its GATT partners wanted to give the issue of agriculture, and particularly export 
subsidies, a prominent place on the agenda. In Punta del Este, French persistence in not 
wanting to jeopardize the interests of its agricultural sector, particularly its export potential, was 
evident. It was only at the last minute, when it could obtain no more concessions, that France 
finally accepted an amended opening declaration, which included the French demand that all 
forms of agricultural support should be part of the negotiations. As in 1984, the assertive 
negotiating strategies of the French and their eventual acceptance of the opening declaration, 
accord with the predictions formulated. A question that remains, with respect to the French 
positions in both 1984 and 1986, is whether the decision to accept the proposal at the last 
minute was indeed the result of international ideological considerations, the Franco-German 
friendship in this case. The theoretical prediction was that the importance of ideological 
considerations relative to political and economic considerations would increase in the case of 
France 1982-89. The sources analysed do not prove conclusively that it was the matter of the 
Franco-German friendship that moved the French to accept the declaration, rather than general 
international political pressure (exerted not only by Germany but also by the United States). No 
references are made in the French documents to its relations with Germany as a special issue of 
concern Nevertheless, it is striking that it was from 1984 onwards, precisely the time at which 
Germany increased its pressure on the French to accept that a new GATT round was necessary, 
that France began to adopt a more flexible position. Similarly, during the negotiations in Punta 
del Este in 1986, French acceptance only came about after it had come under fierce pressure 
from its EEC partners, particularly Germany. In the analysis of secondary literature on the issue, 
a large degree of influence is ascribed to France's relationship with Germany, its most important 
trading partner within the EEC, which considered a new trade round 'vital' to its trade interests. 
It is claimed that France eventually agreed to include agriculture in the Uruguay Round to 
prevent a 'major break with Germany' (Webber 1998b, 37, referring to Odell 1993, 247; 
Paemen and Bensch 1994, 46). It is absolutely clear that international considerations were 
decisive with respect to French acceptance of a new GATT round, for such acceptance was not 
to be expected on the basis of France's domestic interest. It appears plausible that international
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ideological considerations played a decisive role within France's international interests, but it 
cannot be determined with certitude on the basis of the empirical analysis.
5 .5.3  The first proposals
5.5.3.1 Predictions
Both the domestic and international costs and benefits that the French would have attached to 
acceptance of the Commission proposals on agriculture in 1987 and 1988 lead to the 
expectation that France will accept these proposals (Table 5.5d). The opposite is the case with 
respect to the proposals submitted by the United States and the Cairns Group (Table 5.5e). It 
was only political pressure from outside the EEC that would have led to acceptance of these 
proposals (see Section 5.3.1), while ideological considerations, both domestic and international, 
ran counter to these proposals which were incompatible with the French idea of the legitimacy 
of state intervention and its vocation exportatrice. Given that ideological considerations are 
predicted to play the most important role in French preference formation in this period, I 
formulate the proposition that France will not accept the proposals submitted by the United 
States and the Cairns group.
Table 5.5dIssue: Acceptance of the EEC proposals in 1987and 1988
INTERNATIONAL DOMESTIC
Political x +
Economic x x
Ideoloqlcal + +
BALANCE + +
Prediction: France will accept the EEC proposals on agricu ture in 1987 and 1988.
Key to symbols: + = benefits exceed costs, x = non-decisive consideration.
Table 5.5e Issue: Acceptance of the proposals of the United States and the Cairns Group
INTERNATIONAL DOMESTIC
Political x -
Economic x x
Ideological - -
BALANCE - -
Prediction: France will reject the proposals submitted by the United States and the Cairns Group.
Key to symbols: -  = costs exceed benefits, x = non-decisive considerations.
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5.5.3.2 Preferences
The substantive negotiations started in 1987. France urged caution in the agricultural 
negotiations, insisting that the EEC should not commit itself to any proposal concerning this 
issue.165 A German negotiator labelled the French manoeuvring as 'Bremserei (interview 
Schomerus 29.3.2007). When Reagan, at the G7 meeting in Berlin, proposed putting the 
agricultural negotiations on a fast track, Mitterrand immediately protested and stressed the 
'global nature' of the negotiations: the negotiations should continue at a similar pace in all the 
negotiating groups and a final deal could only be achieved when negotiations had been 
completed in all the negotiating areas.166 In this way, France tried to prevent concessions being 
made in the agricultural negotiations without counter-concessions by the trading partners on 
other issues in exchange.
In 1987, France rejected the United States zero option immediately after it was submitted. 
The main problem was that the proposal placed the CAP in the line of fire, while de-coupled 
support, including the deficiency payments used in the United States, were not included in the 
support to be eliminated. In addition, the United States proposal to convert non-tariff barriers 
into tariffs and subsequently reduce these tariffs, was an attack on the CAP according to 
France.167 The agricultural proposal that the Commission tabled in GATT on behalf of the EEC in 
October 1987 was considered a last-minute compromise that would at least enable the EEC to 
negotiate (Die Welt22.10.1987). It is claimed that France had exerted considerable influence on 
this proposal. Agra Europe even argued that the 'proposals were largely written in Paris rather 
than in Brussels' (9.10.1987). The demand for rebalancing came mainly from the French and the 
proposals for market management through commodity agreements closely resembled the plans 
that Guillaume had developed for the cereal market.168 These ideas of market management 
formed the 'ideological underpinnings' of the position defended by the EEC in 1987 (Agra 
Europe 22.4.1988; Vahl, 1997). The EEC agricultural proposal tabled in 1988 contained no 
substantial changes compared to its 1987 proposal, but the proposal now made an explicit 
distinction between those measures to be taken in the short term and those to be taken in the 
long term. Although France feared that this distinction might be an occasion for other GATT 
partners to try and put agricultural negotiations on a fast-track again under the pretext of the 
'short-term measures' for agriculture, France eventually declared itself 'satisfait' with the 
proposal, but it stressed that it would have preferred a more resolute attitude on the part of the 
EEC.169
165 ArchBuZa. V N /1985-1994: 03963. 2 .2 .1 9 87 . Open bericht NLBUZ 713, G EV  961.
166 http://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/: 22 .5 .1 98 7 . Conférence de presse conjointe Mitterrand et Kohl, 
som m et franco-allem and, Paris. See also: A rchBuZa. EG /1985-1989: 01544. 19 .2.1987. M em orandum  van 
DIE aan DGES over UR onderhandelingen.
167 ArchBuZa. V N /1985-1994: 03963. 2 .2 .1 9 87 . Open bericht NLBUZ 713, G EV  961.
168 ArchBuZa. EG /1985-1989: 01545. 1 3 .10.1987. DIE/AE Coördinatie Com m issie.
169 C U E A C . 6938/88, G A T T 82. 1 0 .6 .1988. Résultats des travaux du Com ité spécial de l'article 113 
(m em bres titulaires) en date du 7 juin 1988.
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5.5.3.3 Analysis
The empirical analysis has provided corroborating evidence for the predictions that France will 
accept the EEC agricultural proposals in 1987 and 1988, but reject the proposals submitted by 
the United States and the Cairns Group. It is noteworthy that the French government, in its 
arguments against the proposals of the United States and the Cairns Group, particularly stressed 
that these proposals were inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the CAP. This accords 
with the prediction that ideological considerations will play a decisive role in French preference 
formation, for the principles of the CAP were closely related to the French agricultural paradigm.
5.5.4  The Mid-Term Review
5.5.4.1 Predictions
Given the high domestic and international costs attached to making far-reaching concessions to 
the United States and the Cairns Group during the Mid-Term Review in Montreal, I predict that 
France will reject such concessions (Table 5.5f). Far-reaching concessions that would meet the 
essential demands of the United States would be incompatible with the French vocation 
exportatrice and the aspect of its agricultural paradigm that concerned the idea of market 
organization through price policy. What is notable regarding the outcome of the Mid-Term 
Review in 1989, is that domestic considerations point towards its rejection. It was in France's 
international ideological interest, however, to accept the outcome (Table 5.5g). It is of particular 
importance here that the eventual agreement did not appear to be at odds with the principle of 
state intervention and the French vocation exportatrice, while it was in the interest of the 
Franco-German friendship to accept the outcome. It is therefore predicted that France will agree 
to the outcome of the Mid-Term Review in 1989.
Table 5.5f: Issue: Making concessions during the Mid-Tern Review in Montreal
INTERNATIONAL DOMESTIC
Political x -
Economic x x
Ideological - -
BALANCE - -
Prediction: France will resist additional EEC concessions during the Mid-Term Review in 
Montreal.
Key to symbols: -  = costs exceed benefits, x = non-decisive consideration.
158| Against the Grain
Table 5.5g: Issue: Acceptance of the outcome of the Mid-Term Review in Geneva
INTERNATIONAL DOMESTIC
Political x -
Economic x x
Ideoloqical + 0
BALANCE + -
Prediction: France will accept the outcome of the Mid-Term Review in Geneva.
Key to symbols: + = benefits exceed costs, -  = costs exceed benefits, 0 = no significant costs or benefits, x = 
non-decisive consideration.
5.5.4.2 Preferences
Prior to the Montreal negotiations, France had argued that the Mid-Term Review was not an 
occasion to make partial agreements, but simply an opportunity to evaluate the 'progress so far' 
(Agra Europe 18.11.1988; Agence Europe 19.11.1988). The French considered that the 
perspectives for the Mid-Term Review were bleak. According to a French government document, 
the United States put the idea of a 'communauté exportatrice to the test as well as the CAP, 
particularly the double pricing system. In the Montreal negotiations it was necessary to prevent 
new demands being imposed on the French farmers, without taking account of the CAP-reforms 
that had already been implemented. According to the document, the EEC member states were 
still united in their position on agriculture, although a few member states were on the verge of 
departing from the common position, particularly the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.170 
France urged for caution on the Montreal negotiations and once more emphasized the global 
nature of the negotiations.171 It insisted that the Commission should defend a 'tough position' 
and not commit the EEC to any method of measuring agricultural support (,Agra Europe 
18.11.1988). In the Agricultural Council meeting of 14 and 15 November 1988, Nallet 
succeeded in gaining acceptance for a recommendation to be issued to the General Affairs 
Council. This recommendation stated that the principle of the global nature of the negotiations 
should be maintained and that no deviations from the opening declaration in Punta del Este 
should be made.172 Once the negotiations in Montreal had reached deadlock, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Denmark called for additional concessions in order to meet the demands of
170 C A C . 19940616, art 5. Les négociations com m erciales multilatérales et la réunion à m i-parcours de 
Montréal.
171 C U E A C . 6938/88, G A T T 82. 1 0 .6 .1988. Résultats des travaux du Com ité spécial de l'article 113 
(m em bres titulaires) en date du 7 juin 1988.
172 C A C . 19930195, art. 2. 1 6 .11.1988. Com m uniqué de presse.
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the most important trading partners, but France continued to resist such moves (interview 
Schomerus 29.3.2007).173
Nallet, meanwhile, attempted to convince the United States of the advantages of market 
regulation. In a speech during a visit in Washington he argued that it was quite reasonable to 
expect a system of market management to develop in the agricultural sector through controlled 
support rather than a fully fledged free market system. In the end, all developed states 
supported their farmers in one way or another. The EEC support system was simply different to 
the support system used in the United States and the EEC was not willing to give up its CAP in 
exchange for a system of de-coupled support measures resembling the American system. 
According to Nallet, the EEC had already displayed a willingness to face the problems in the 
agricultural market by introducing CAP reforms, while the United States had implemented 
protectionist measures through the Trade Act, measures which were at odds with its demands 
to apply free-market conditions to agriculture.174
Following the failure of the Mid-Term Review in Montreal, bilateral negotiations continued 
between the United States and the EEC. In March 1989, the United States showed its 
willingness to move away from the zero option and accept the EEC position of a 'réduction 
concertée, progressive et équilibrée of agricultural support. France, however doubted that these 
concessions on the part of the United States were more than window dressing and took issue 
with the Commission's idea that the EEC should make concessions in return.175 A report that 
Nallet sent to the Prime Minister, in advance of a meeting between Rocard and President of the 
Commission Delors, shows that the Ministry of Agriculture disagreed with a number of the 
proposals that the United States and the Commission were discussing in the ongoing bilateral 
negotiations. The report emphasized that the CAP reforms already undertaken should be taken 
into account, that the dismantlement of export subsidies was out of the question and that only a 
global 'concertée et progressive reduction of allform s of agricultural support was acceptable.176 
When it became clear that the Mid-Term Review would be continued in April 1989, France 
judged this to be counter to its interests. It suspected that the United States was under the 
impression that the EEC was willing to make substantial concessions. France had to maintain its 
firm position, because agricultural exports, supported by the EEC export restitutions, were a 
'nécessité vitale pour l'équilibre de notre commerce extérieur)11
173 W ithin the EEC, France w as considered to be an extremely recalcitrant m em ber state at this time (ArchEZ. 
Soc 1 -199. Infodossier GATT/UR MTR 5-8 decem ber 1988. Telex van PV Genève aan BuZa. Onderwerp: art.
113 leden en algem ene raad van 21/22.11.1988).
174 C A C . 19940616, art 5. Texte intégral, corrigé. (Speech of the French Minister of Agriculture in the United 
States).
175 C A C . 19930195, art 2. 8 .3 .1 9 89 . Note pour le directeur du cabinet. Objet: redém arrage de la 
négociation agricole au GATT.
176 C A C . 19930195, art 2. Nallet. Note pour le Premier Ministre. Objet: votre rencontre avec J. Delors. 
Questions agricoles. See also the discours of Nallet in the Assem blée. Journal O fficiel de la République 
Française, Assem blée nationale. séance du 14 décem bre 1988, 364 8 -3 6 4 9 ; séance du 5 avril 1989, 41.
177 C A C . 19930195, art 2. 22 .3 .1 98 9 . Ministère d l'agriculture et de la fôret. Nallet. Note. Objet: Entretien 
entre le président de la République et M. Delors. Négociations agricoles du GATT.
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What is conspicuous in this period is that there appeared to be little consensus between 
the various French ministers involved. According to a Ministry of Agriculture memorandum, the 
EEC was at risk of finding itself in an untenable situation before long. It was argued that the 
Commission was negotiating without taking account of French demands, while the DREE only 
seemed interested in positioning itself as the staunchest defender of the CAP in Paris, Brussels 
and Geneva. This would, at best, result in deadlock in the negotiations, as had been the case in 
Montreal, or in French isolation in the negotiations. According to the Ministry of Agriculture, the 
DREE's approach of doing nothing but organizing a united front of refusal, would actually lead 
to France's capitulation in Geneva. It would be better if France decided on how far it was willing 
to go in the negotiations. This could take the following form. The EEC should emphasize the 
demand of a reciprocal engagement to reduce all forms of agricultural support. As a gesture of 
compromise, the Commission could simultaneously offer a freeze on support in the short term, 
provided that the other GATT partners would also make concessions.178 At a meeting of trade 
advisers during the Mid-Term Review in Geneva, France repeated its well-rehearsed demands 
for recognition of the CAP reforms already undertaken, the non-negotiability of the CAP and the 
balanced reduction of all types of agricultural support.179
Although France only accepted the outcome of the Mid-Term Review at the last minute 
(interview Schomerus 29.3.2007), Nallet was satisfied with the outcome, claiming that the 
perseverance of France and the Commission had produced a satisfactory outcome. The EEC had 
escaped from a one-sided emphasis on export subsidies, and the elimination of agricultural 
support had been replaced by a 'réduction globale progressive equilibrée de tous les soutiens 
agricoles .180 According to the Ministry of Agriculture, the agreement reached in Geneva was an 
'acquis solide which clarified and expanded on the Punta del Este declaration in a way that 
benefited the interests of the EEC -  which we can interpret to mean the interests of France.181
5.5.4.3 Analysis
French resistance to making concessions in the Montreal negotiations and its eventual 
acceptance of the agreement reached in Geneva in 1989, accords with the predictions 
formulated. Looking at the arguments put forward by the French, it is clearly evident that 
ideological considerations were an important reason for rejecting concessions in Montreal. 
France explicitly stated that the United States proposals were a denial of the vocation 
exportatrice and an outright attack on the mechanisms and principles of the CAP. French 
acceptance of the outcome of the Mid-Term Review only came about after agreement had been
178 C A C . 19930195, art 2. 4 .4 .1 9 89 . Note pour le ministre. G A TT réunion chez le Premier Ministre. Éléments 
de langage.
179 C A C . 19930195, art 2. 5 .4 .1989. Fiche pour le ministre. Objet: Dîner des conseillers du com m erce 
extérieur. Éléments d'intervention.
180 C A C . 19930195, art 2. Résultat de la négociation agricole à Genève. Canevas de l'intervention de M. 
Henri Nallet, Conférence de Presse du 10 avril 1989.
181 C A C . 19940616, art 5. 1 .9 .1989. Situation des négociations d 'U ruguay.
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reached on balanced reductions in all forms of agricultural support -  one of the main French 
demands. At the same time, however, France was forced to accept, despite previous resistance, 
that separate proposals and agreements had to be made in three areas: import competition, 
market access and export assistance. This had been an important United States demand. That 
France, six months later, defended the accord as a victory for France and the EEC therefore 
appears to have been mainly for domestic consumption and an attempt to convince the French 
people of the tenacity and negotiating success of its government.
5.6 Conclusion
We may conclude from this case study that the attitude and preferences defended by France 
during the run-up to and the first half of the Uruguay Round largely accord with the 
expectations formulated on the basis of the theoretical framework. The predictions concerning 
preference outcomes, formulated under the assumption that domestic and international 
ideological considerations would prevail, proved accurate. This said, there was not sufficient 
evidence in all the decision moments that it was domestic and international ideological 
considerations that predominated in the French preference-formation process. Nevertheless, the 
process analysis does provide reasonable evidence that the consideration of the Franco-German 
friendship played an important role in the French acceptance of new GATT negotiations and the 
opening declaration of Punta del Este. Likewise, the process analysis showed that the vocation 
exportatrice played an important role in French rejection of the proposals of the United States 
and the Cairns Group and in French resistance to concessions in Montreal. Concerning the 
acceptance of the EEC proposals of 1987 and 1988 and the acceptance of the outcome of the 
Mid-Term Review, however, it is not entirely clear whether ideological considerations played a 
larger role than international economic or political considerations in the French preference­
formation process. All in all, the empirical analysis provides no grounds to reject the hypothesis 
that in cases with high domestic and international polarity, ideological considerations will 
prevail over political and economic considerations.
As far as the widely held assumption that the French farm lobby is highly influential is 
concerned, it must be concluded that the empirical analysis provides no evidence for this. In fact, 
farm lobby pressure was fairly limited until 1988. Farming organizations recognized the problem 
of production surpluses and agreed that something had to be done to stabilize the global 
agricultural market. On this issue, they subscribed to the ideas proposed by the French 
government concerning market organization and the preservation of the mechanisms and 
principles of the CAP. The sources show that the farm lobby followed the position of the 
government on this, rather than vice versa. The farm lobby did not appear to influence 
governmental preferences in the sense that they demanded changes in the government's 
position which were reflected by a change in the government's position. Although influence 
through anticipation cannot be excluded, given the overlap in the positions of the farm lobby 
and the government, and that no sources were found in which the government explicitly
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recognized the need to take account of the position of the farm lobby, this seems unlikely. 
Rather, domestic considerations and arguments concerned the French agricultural interests. 
With respect to French acceptance of the outcome of the Mid-Term Review, it should be noted 
that this preference was unexpected on the basis of domestic political considerations. Clearly, 
the French government did not hesitate in taking decisions they knew were bound to arouse 
criticism from the farm lobby. The fact that they tried to frame such decisions as a victory for 
France and French agriculture appeared to indicate that they were aware that domestic groups 
still needed to be convinced that this really was the case.
CHAPTER 6
FOR THE SAKE OF OUR ECONOMY: GERMANY 1982-1989
6.1 Introduction
This chapter will focus on the preference-formation process of Germany with respect to the 
Uruguay Round between 1982 and 1989. It is striking that in this period initially Germany went 
to great lengths to ensure the launch of new GATT negotiations, but once the negotiations had 
started the Germans turned out to be one of the staunchest defenders of agricultural interests. 
Germany appeared to be drawn between its wider economic interests and reputation as a 
Handelsstaat, on the one hand, and the specific interests of its agricultural sector and its wish to 
preserve the Franco-German friendship, on the other hand. Which interests prevailed at the 
various decision moments in this period, and why? That is the question this chapter sets out to 
answer. To this end, it will be investigated whether the theoretical model set out in Chapter 3 
provides an adequate explanation for the positions Germany defended in the run-up to and 
during the first half of the Uruguay Round.
Section 6.2 will describe the German context, focusing particularly on developments 
within the German government in the 1980s and German views on agricultural policy. This is 
the background against which we will view Germany's domestic and international 
considerations, which are the subject of Sections 6.3 and 6.4 respectively. Both sections discuss 
the political and economic as well as the ideological aspects of the German national interest. 
The specific proposals that ware tabled at various points during the Uruguay Round 
negotiations, will be judged in terms of their political, economic and ideological consequences. 
On the basis of the analysis conducted in Sections 6.3 and 6.4, Section 6.5 will provide 
predictions for each decision moment regarding the preference that will be defended by 
Germany, and compare and contrast these predictions with the preferences that Germany in fact 
defended in the negotiations. The conclusion in Section 6.6 will answer the question of how far 
the theoretical model developed in this research is able to explain German preference formation.
6.2 The German Context
6.2.1 Decision m aking in Germany
Germany is characterized by its relatively weak mechanisms for the coordination of foreign 
policy at the national level. In the 1980s and 1990s German ministers on occasion defended 
entirely different positions in the international arena, both claiming to be defending the national
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preference. This is usually explained in terms of the high degrees of sectorization and 
fragmentation within the German government as a result of the Ressortprinzip (see Section 
3.3.1) (Thuner and Stoiber 2002, 564; Knill 2001,89). Knill (2001, 72) even argues that 
'negative coordination' would be a more applicable term 'implying that coordination efforts are 
restricted to avoiding potential interference with the activities of other units, rather than 
developing integrated policy solutions'. Despite these institutional barriers, Germany does have 
formal rules for the coordination of foreign policy. Bilateral coordination between the ministries 
involved in a particular issue is mandatory. In such cases, one ministry takes the lead and is 
obliged to consult the other ministries involved. If the ministries are unable to reach a 
compromise, the dispute may be settled at cabinet level (Derlien 2000, 57; Thuner and Stoiber 
2002, 571).182 The Ministry of Economics is the leading department in all matters that are 
predominantly economic in nature, including the GATT negotiations (Derlien 2000, 57; Weiss 
1989). The other ministries which were consulted on agricultural matters relating to the 
Uruguay Round were the Ministries of Agriculture, Foreign Affairs, Development Aid and 
Environment (interview Schomerus 29.3.2007). When one of the ministries wished to table a 
proposal at cabinet level, the other ministries involved also had to sign the proposal before it 
could be tabled. This system is known as Mitzeichnung(co-signature). Within the Chancellors's 
Office, each ministry had a Spiegeireferat, and a similar rule of Mitzeichnung applied to the 
Referate involved. As a result, within the Chancellor's Office, similar battles were fought as 
those between the ministries. Frans-Josef Feiter was the leader of the Referat for agriculture and 
rural areas during much of the Uruguay Round, while Johannes Ludewig was responsible for 
trade and finance. When neither the leaders of the Referate nor the Chef des Kanzieramtscould 
reach a compromise, the case was put before Chancellor Kohl. This happened on a number of 
occasions during the Uruguay Round (interview Feiter 21.5.2007; interview Ludewig 5.4.2007). 
However, in spite of these formal coordination mechanisms, the German system remains 
fragmented and sensitive to 'persistent and deeply entrenched department rivalries' that hamper 
coordination efforts (Peters and Wright 1996, 167).
6.2.2  The German view  on Agriculture
Although Germany is a country in which state intervention in the economy is relatively limited 
(certainly in comparison to France), the agricultural sector represents an exception to this 
general rule. As early as the end of the nineteenth century, tariffs were introduced to limit
182 W ithin the system of interministerial consultation, unsolved problem s can be referred to the 
Staatssekretarausschuss fü rEuropafragen, in w hich the Chancellor's Office and the Ministries of Econom ics, 
Agriculture and Finance take part (Derlien 2000, 60; Peters and W right 1996, 166). The agenda's and 
minutes of the Staatssekretarausschuss show , however, that the agricultural Chapter of the Uruguay Round 
w as hardly ever discussed in this Ausschuss.
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agricultural imports and safeguard domestic agricultural production (Hendriks 1989, 76).183 
These tariffs were of particular importance for wheat production, because they offered 
protection against competition from wheat farmers in the Ukraine, the 'granary of Europe' at the 
time (interview Andriessen 12.2.2008).184 The German preference for high prices, both in the 
twentieth century and today, can be traced back to the policies introduced by Bismarck in the 
nineteenth century, according to Andriessen (interview 12.8.2008). Elevated German wheat 
prices were an obstacle in the negotiations on the Common Agricultural Policy. Germany 
resisted any lowering of wheat prices to the average price level in the other EEC member states. 
Only in 1964 did Germany, in the face of significant French pressure, accept a common market 
for wheat, with a wheat price that was ten to fifteen percent lower than the original German 
wheat price (Hendriks 1989, 79-80; interview Andriessen 12.2.2008).185 At the same time, 
however, Germany wished to limit the costs of the Common Agricultural Policy, to which it was 
a net contributor.
Farm-income guarantees by means of price support have remained a central element in 
the German agricultural policy ever since the late nineteenth century.186 Führer labels this policy 
the 'Einkommensorientierte Produktpreispolitik (1996, 22 and 50). This policy conflicts with the 
'Marktorientierte Produktpreispolitik'proposed by the European Commission in the early 1990s. 
Germany opposed the Commission proposals, because they would separate income policy from 
price policy (Führer 1996, 232). In the 1980s, Germany preferred the use of quotas to curb 
production surpluses and was averse to allowing a greater role for market forces in agricultural 
price policy and the use of price cuts in order to balance production and demand (Hendriks
1991, 70-75). Compensation for these price-cuts in the form of direct income support was not 
an attractive option for Germany, because the government believed that farm incomes should, 
for the most part, be generated through the price of farm products. In the annual agricultural 
reports, an increase in the share of subsidies and support payments within farm incomes was 
considered a cause for concern (Agrarbericht 1989, 2; Agrarbericht 1990, 3).187 Furthermore, 
the German government shared the conviction of the French government (see Section 5.2.2)
183 Apart from the argum ent of 'self-sufficiency in food ', the high tariffs introduced by Bism arck were also 
necessary, according to Gisela Hendriks, to maintain the support of the 'conservative ruling classes' and to 
safeguard and reinforce the position of the federal governm ent against the states (Lander) (Hendriks 1991, 
26-30). The close cooperation between the governm ent and the farm lobby also dates back to this period 
(idem, 30).
184 W heat production had an im portant place within the agricultural sector, not only because it w as a main 
ingredient for basic food products, but also because w heat conversion in the cattle farm s influenced the 
price of meat, e ggs and milk (Hendriks 1989, 78).
185 The com m on market price may still be considered to be relatively high though w hen com pared to the 
original w heat prices in the other member states.
186 The idea w as still reflected in policy docum ents, election program m es and speeches of governm ent 
officials during the period of the U ruguay Round (Hande/sb/att31.12.1986; Wahlprogramm CDU 1987; 
Bulletin 16.2.1987)
187 Starting in the Agrarbericht 1989(evaluating the econom ic year 1987-1988) the governm ent reflected 
on these shares under the heading ' Einkommensubertragungen'.
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that those employed in the agricultural sector should be able to receive an equal income, and 
equal increases in income, to those employed in other sectors. Leveling up incomes in the farm 
sector to incomes in other economic sectors of the economy was a stated aim of the German 
government on which it reported annually in the Agrarbericht.
In addition to the close linkage between income and price policy, the notion of the 
bäuerliche Landwirtschaftwas a LeitbHdin German agricultural policy. The German ideal was an 
agricultural mix of a multitude of medium-large and small farms which would contribute to the 
infrastructure in rural areas and to maintaining the Kulturlandschaft (Agrarbericht 1987). This 
idea of the bäuerliche Landwirtschaft was a constant element within the German policy 
paradigm during the Uruguay Round and was also evident in election programmes, coalition 
accords, agricultural reports and the speeches of government officials.188 After German 
reunification, however, the government began to interpret the idea of the bäuerliche 
Landwirtschaft more flexibly, because the large agricultural cooperatives in former East-Germany 
had also become part of German agriculture (see Chapter 8). According to the German 
government, a bäuerliche agricultural sector would best be placed to fulfill not only economic, 
but also social needs. Apart from the maintenance of the infrastructure in rural areas and the 
Kulturlandschaft already mentioned, agriculture's other social roles include environmental 
protection and social stability (Handelsblatt 31.12.1986, 23; Bulletin 30.6.1982; 30.11.1983; 
7.10.1986; 30.4.1987; 14.9.1988; 24.4.1989; Agrarbericht 1989). In the German policy 
paradigm, agricultural policy was thus at the same time social and environmental policy (Bulletin
30.6.1982). The fact that agricultural policy played not only an economic role, but also had 
social functions, was used as an argument to justify the treatment of agriculture as a special 
sector that could not be fully exposed to free market forces. This corresponds with the idea of 
the 'Soziale Marktwirtschaft according to which a market economy is not a goal in itself, but 
should be in the service of the people (Bulletin 7.10.1986).
The idea of using price policy as a means of income policy emerged very clearly within the 
German policy paradigm during the Uruguay Round. This was partly a result of the composition 
of the governing coalition (CDU/CSU/FDP). As discussed in Section 3.3.2, particularly the 
CDU/CSU had strong ties with the agricultural sector and the FDP also had electoral motives for 
taking the interest of the sector into account (Hendriks 1991, 126; Petit et al 1987). The 
Socialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) was less focused on specifically agricultural 
interests since special attention to one particular sector would be incompatible with the SPD's 
doctrine of solidarity and justice (Hendriks 1991, 109-110). Moreover, the SPD was a proponent 
of structural reform in agriculture including larger farming units and it resisted price policies that 
provided farm incomes at the expense of consumers and taxpayers (Hendriks 1991, 114).
188 CDU/CSU Wahlprogramm 1983; Hardelsbiatt31.12.1986; Agrarbericht 1987, 1988, 1989, 
Wahlprogramm C D U 1 9 8 7 ; Koaiitiorsvereinbarunger 12.3 .1987; Bulletin 2 4 .2 .1987.
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6.2.3  The German government in the 1980s
After 1982, Germany was governed by a CDU/CSU/FDP coalition throughout the entire period 
under study in this chapter (1982-1989). Contrary to the situation in France (see Section 5.2.3), 
in Germany there was no rapid succession of different governments in the 1980s. The German 
government was, nevertheless, confronted with internal problems and criticism from German 
society, but this did not result in a collapse of the Kohl government. This section will give an 
overview of political developments with respect to the German government in the 1980s, and 
will assess the degree of governmental stability and sensitivity in this period.
In 1982, the SPD/FDP coalition under the leadership of Helmut Schmidt found itself in a 
political crisis. Germany had to deal with an economic recession and the coalition partners were 
unable to reach agreement on employment and security policies. Within the SPD, a battle of 
ideas was taking place between party leader Willy Brandt and Chancellor Schmidt. The 
employment policy eventually proposed by the government was heavily criticized and the SPD 
delegation in the Bundestag even rejected the policy proposed by the government.189 In 
addition, trade unions and other societal groups criticized the budget, particularly the cuts in 
expenditure that it contained. The German population lost confidence in the government and 
the SPD and the FDP suffered poor election results in state elections in Hamburg and 
Niedersachsen.190 The government received a further blow when two ministers, Lambsdorff and 
Hans Matthofer, were accused of accepting money from the Flick company (Der Spiegel
1.3.1989). Eventually, the relations within the cabinet reached crisis point with Schmidt and 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP) accusing one another of damaging the reputation of the 
government.191 In September 1982, the coalition collapsed and the four FDP cabinet ministers 
offered their resignations. The CDU/CSU, with the support of the FDP, then brought down the 
SPD minority government by means of a constructive vote of no confidence (konstruktives 
Misstrauensvotum.192 A new coalition of the CDU/CSU and the FDP under the leadership of 
Kohl took power in Germany.
The new government went off to a quick start. Kohl aimed to take immediate steps to 
tackle the economic crisis and regain the confidence of the German population. A  modified 
budget was introduced and accepted by parliament.193 Nevertheless, the Kohl government took
189 Europe Brief Notes May 1982, in: Agence Europe 16.6.1982.
190 ibid.
191 Europe Brief Notes Septem ber 1982, In: Agence Europe 6 .10 .1982.
192 In Germ any, individual ministers cannot be dismissed by the Bundestag but only the governm ent as a 
w hole. This can only be achieved through a konstruktives Misstrauensvotum  (a 'constructive vote of no­
confidence') on the basis of Article 67 of the Basic Law. Parliamentary parties or 25 percent of all Members 
of the Bundestag can initiate a constructive vote of no-confidence. This proposal must not only gain an 
absolute majority (50 percent plus one) in the Bundestag, but the Bundestag m ust also at the same time 
elect an alternative candidate as Chancellor (Saalfeld 2004, 356). In Germ an parliam entary history, the 
constructive vote of no-confidence has only been used twice: once in 1972, in order to remove the Brandt I 
cabinet (but this vote did not gain a majority in parliam ent), and in 1982 to remove the Schm idt IV cabinet 
and install Kohl as the new  Chancellor.
193 Europe Brief Notes Mid Novem ber 1982, In: Agence Europe 8 .1 2 .1 98 2 .
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office at a time of unprecedentedly poor economic prospects and the highest rate of 
unemployment since the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany (Der Spiegel
11.10.1982; 6.12.1982). Der Spiegel argued that it was unlikely that the new government's 
coalition programme of 'economic recipes from the 1950s' would be able to pull Germany out 
of economic recession (15.11.1982). At the same time, although the new government 
outwardly appeared united, animosities and differences of opinion were beginning to emerge. 
FDP members in the cabinet argued that the CSU should be left outside the cabinet after the 
elections scheduled for 1983, while the CSU in turn criticized FDP ministers and were confident 
of an absolute majority for the CDU/CSU after the elections. If no absolute majority was to be 
obtained, the CSU leader Franz Josef Strauss envisaged a Grosse Koaiition with the SPD (Der 
Spiegel6.12.1982). Strauss's expectation was realistic insofar as the FDP was experiencing a 
crisis at that point and was losing many members due to the political line taken by Genscher in 
precipitating the fall of the Schmidt government (Der Spiegel 15.11.1982; 6.12.1982). The 
CDU's electoral defeat and the SPD's gains in state elections in Hamburg moreover raised 
doubts about the CDU/CSU's hopes for an absolute majority, and raised the prospects of a 
revival for the SPD (Der Spiegel 27.12.1982). By mid-January 1983, the mood within the 
CDU/CSU had changed entirely from expectations of a secure Wah/siegto fears of a majority for 
the SPD and the Greens in the upcoming March elections (DerSpiegel 17.1.1983). The coalition 
parties could not agree on the German position with respect to the negotiations between the 
United States and the Soviet Union on limiting medium-range missiles and on whether or not to 
allow the placement of United States Pershing II missiles on German soil (Der Spiegel 
17.1.1983; 31.1.1983). This aspect of the German security policy would remain a major 
dividing line in the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition, although it continued to govern after the March 
1983 elections.
The CDU/CSU won the federal elections of March 1983 (from 44.5 %  of the votes in 1980 
to 48.8%  of the votes in 1983), while both the SPD (from 42.9%  to 38.2% ) and the FDP (from 
10.6%  to 7.0% ) lost electoral support. The CDU/CSU victory was attributed to fear of 
unemployment and economic insecurity among the German people, as well as the hope that a 
centre-right coalition would produce better results than the centre-left government had 
previously done (DerSpiegel7.3.1983). The CDU/CSU needed FDP support and participation as 
a coalition partner to obtain a majority in parliament. The coalition negotiations proved difficult 
for various reasons. Strauss entered the coalition negotiations in a strong position in view of the 
fact that, unlike the FDP, the CSU had slightly increased its share of the vote in the elections 
(from 10.3%  to 10.6% ) and had become a relatively more important coalition partner to the 
CDU than the FDP. Strauss claimed an important cabinet post (Der Spiegel 14.3.1983).194 His 
demands were not met, and the stage was set for further quarrels between the CSU and the 
FDP in the cabinet.
194 Europe Brief Notes M id-M arch 1983, In: Agence Europe 7 .4 .1983.
For the Sake of our Economy: Germany 1982-1989 |169
Before long, divisions emerged between the coalition parties on economic and social 
policies (Der Spiegel29.8.1983). The most politically significant bone of contention in the short 
term however was the question of whether or not to allow the stationing of United States 
Pershing II missiles in Germany. The CDU/CSU was, for the most part, in favour and it has even 
been claimed that in November 1982 Kohl had already promised the United States that the 
Pershing missiles could be placed in Germany by the end of 1983 (Der Spiegel 17.1.1983). The 
FDP took a more cautious stance and its position was supported in protests by the German 
peace movement and other domestic groups in June, August and October 1983 (Der Spiegel 
13.6.1983; 29.8.1983; 24.10.1983).195 Eventually the Bundestag agreed to the stationing of 
the missiles. Meanwhile, criticism of the government's policy programme as a whole increased 
and the coalition parties lost ground in the state elections in Hesse (a 6%  loss for the CDU), 
while the SPD increased its existing majority in Bremen (Der Spiegel3.10.1983). Despite these 
electoral set-backs, Chancellor Kohl remained popular.196 Apart from the fact that the FDP had 
lost ground in state elections too, its position was further weakened by developments in the 
Lambsdorff case when he was taken to court in relation to the Flick affair (Der Spiegel
5.12.1983).
Some economic respite came in 1984 thanks to increasing exports and cost management, 
but the unemployment rate remained higher than ever. 197 The year was characterized by 
government crises between the coalition parties and within the parties themselves. Following 
the legal proceedings against Lambsdorff in 1983, his CDU-colleague Manfred Wormer, the 
Minister of Defence, also became entangled in an affair, and cabinet leaders were heavily 
criticized after they had voiced their support for an amnesty for those involved in the Flick affair 
(Der Spiegel 16.1.2984; 14.5.1984). This particularly weakened the position of Genscher within 
the FDP, and the Kanziersamt even considered the option of governing without the FDP (Der 
Spiegel 21.5.1984). A debate emerged within the FDP on the cause of the party's electoral 
losses and the FDP leadership was criticized for having caused the party's lack of political profile 
(Der Spiegel 25.6.1984). Meanwhile, a debate on tax reforms had flared up between the 
coalition parties. While the CDU and CSU wanted the proposals to benefit families and the CDU 
wished to avoid the impression that cabinet policies only favoured the rich, the FDP wanted to 
ensure that the middle classes benefited (Der Spiegel 27.2.1984; 3.12.1984). Apart from these 
skirmishes within the coalition, the government was also confronted with strikes in several 
industrial sectors as a result of opposition to the reduction in working hours (Der Spiegel
21.5.1984). Former SPD minister Georg Leber had to intervene in order to bring the strikes to an 
end.198 As a result, the idea that the government's policy programme was in crisis increasingly 
began to take hold. CSU leader Strauss had criticized Kohl for his lack of leadership as early as 
January 1984 (Der Spiegel 16.1.1984), but after the CDU was confronted with electoral losses
195 Europe Brief Notes M id-Septem ber 1983, In: Agence Europe 19.10.1983.
196 Europe Brief Notes, O ctober 1983, In: Agence Europe 25 .1 1 .19 8 3 .
197 Europe Brief Notes Early July 1984, In: Agence Europe 2 1 .7 .1984.
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throughout the year, doubt also set in within the CDU itself about whether Kohl was the right 
candidate for the Kanzleramt and the name of Gerhard Stoltenberg, the Minister of Finance, 
was mentioned as a potential candidate for the next elections (DerSpiegel8.10.1984). Kohl did 
not view the losses in state elections as signs of dissatisfaction with government policy, since 
the CDU, was still able to command a majority in many state parliaments (in Baden­
Württemberg for example) as well as in the Bundesrat}9
In 1985, the government faced not only increasing societal criticism, but also increasing 
friction within the coalition.200 The CDU/CSU and the FDP were divided on the issue of the 
United States Strategic Defense Initiative, and on a FDP proposal which would damage the 
position of the trade unions (Der Spiegel 13.5.1985; 28.10.1985). While Kohl was particularly 
interested in maintaining a good relationship with the United States, and had therefore declared 
that Germany would participate in the Strategic Defense Initiative (Der Spiegel 13.5.1985), the 
FDP opposed the initiative because it wanted to slow down the arms race between East and 
West '(DerSpiegel30.9.1985). Eventually the FDP won the day and the CDU/CSU agreed that 
Germany would only negotiate with the United States, without committing itself to participation 
in the Strategic Defense Initiative (DerSpiegel23.12.1985). On the electoral front, the CDU was 
confronted with a defeat in the state elections in Saarland (from 44%  in 1981 to 37%  in 1985), 
while the SPD's share of the vote rose (from 45%  to 49% ). These election results influenced the 
composition of the Bundesrat, where the CDU was now dependent on the CSU to obtain a 
majority (DerSp/egel 10.6.1985). This strengthened the position of the CSU in the cabinet even 
more than the parliamentary election results in 1983 had already done. Meanwhile, the CSU 
attempted to create a distinct profile for itself in preparation for the Bavarian state elections of
1986, distancing itself both from the FDP and the CDU. According to the CSU, governmental 
success was being obstructed by the FDP, which was continually vetoing proposals. Strauss 
claimed that Kohl gave in to the wishes of the FDP too easily, while for example he ought to 
have been prioritizing issues such as the introduction of more restrictive legislation on the rights 
of foreigners residing in Germany.201 The CSU even let it be known that they considered leaving 
the coalition, before the continuing electoral unpopularity of the CDU began to harm the CSU 
(Der Spiegel 8.7.1985). The question of whether Kohl was the right choice of candidate for 
Chancellor for the 1987 parliamentary elections was now being seriously discussed, not only by 
the CSU but also within the CDU itself (Der Spiegel 10.6.1985). The SPD meanwhile selected 
Johannes Rau as its candidate for the chancellorship, but in the polls Rau was still far behind 
Kohl [Der Spiegel 23.12.1985).
Security issues once again divided the coalition in 1986. This time the Soviet proposal on 
nuclear disarmament put Kohl in a difficult position, because he had always declared himself in 
favour of disarmament and Entspannung between East and West, but at the same time wished 
to remain a close ally of the United States and include German industry in the research for the
199 Europe Brief Notes May 1984, In: Agence Europe 9 .6 .1984.
200 Europe Brief Notes Early January 1985, In: Agence Europe 23 .1 .1985.
201 Europe Brief Notes M id-July 1985, In: Agence Europe 5 .9 .1985. See also Der Spiegel 10.6.1985.
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Strategic Defense Initiative (Der Spiegel 17.2.1986). In addition, the accident at the nuclear 
reactor in Chernobyl sparked a broad discussion on the safety and desirability of nuclear energy, 
a debate which favoured the SPD, which opposed nuclear energy, vis-a-vis the CDU, which 
favoured the use of nuclear energy (Der Spiegel 5.5.1985; 19.5.1986). While the CSU 
succeeded in maintaining an absolute majority in the state Bavarian state elections, the CDU 
began to lose support among important electoral groups which had supported the CDU in the 
1983 elections, such as the farmers, the unemployed and the pensioners (Der Spiegel
10.3.1986). The party was particularly worried about losing the electoral support of farmers (Der 
Spiegel 5.5.1986). In June, the CDU lost 6%  in the state elections in Niedersachsen (from 
50.7%  to 44.3% ), while the SPD's vote rose from 36.5%  to 41.2%  and the FDP held on to its 
6%  (Der Spiegel 16.6.1986). It was claimed that even Kohl himself was in doubt about his 
candidacy for the Kanzieramt, while Stoltenberg made clear his willingness to replace him (Der 
Spiegel 19.5.1986). Despite these setbacks for the CDU, they did profit from the fact that the 
SPD was also in crisis. The SPD had become entangled in a Spenden Affare of its own, and the 
party lost its absolute majority in Hamburg, because it lost 10%  of its votes in the state elections 
(Der Spiegei 17.11.1986). CDU/CSU officials again dared to hope for an absolute majority in the 
Bundestag after the 1987 parliamentary elections, and in January 1987, Der Spiegel stated that 
the CDU/CSU were certain to win the forthcoming elections (5.1.1987). FDP prospects were 
considered more dim because Bangemann, who had succeeded Genscher, did not enjoy full 
support as leader of the party and it was claimed that the party still lacked a clear profile (Der 
Spiegel 5.1.1987; 12.1.1987).
The issue of asylum prioritized by the CSU in the Bavarian state elections had also become 
one of the most important themes of the federal elections of 1987, in addition to unemployment 
and the discussion on nuclear power.202 The CDU/CSU/FDP coalition won the 1987 elections, 
even though the electoral support of the CDU/CSU fell to its lowest level (44.3%) since 1949. 
The FDP gained 9%  of the votes (compared to 7%  in 1983), thereby strengthening its position 
in relation to the CDU and the CSU (Der Spiegel 26.1.1987). The governing coalition had 
benefited from internal divisions within the SPD and the fact that Rau did not enjoy the full 
support of his own party (DerSpiegel26.1.1987). Moreover, the SPD had become involved in a 
number of scandals prior to the elections.203 The CDU and CSU blamed each other for the 
decline in their share of the vote compared to the 1983 elections. According to Der Spiegel the 
poor election results were caused not only by Kohl (who had not even enjoyed full support 
within his own party), but also by the large number of crises and affairs in the CDU/CSU/FPD 
coalition and the move to the right that the CDU had appeared to make under pressure from the 
CSU (Der Spiegel 26.1.1987). When the CDU lost even more votes in state elections (a 6.8%  
decrease in Rhineland-Palatinate), a conflict erupted within the party on the direction it should 
take. CDU party secretary, Heiner Geissler, favoured an appeal to a broader electorate, including
202 Europe Brief Notes Septem ber 1986, In: Agence Europe 3 .10 .1986.
203 Europe Brief Notes January 1987, In: Agence Europe 4 .3 .1987.
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traditional SPD voters, while others wanted to move further to the right in the direction of the 
CSU (Der Spiegei 25.5.1987). Kohl and his party were very keen to win back voters and, 
according to the FDP, the party deliberately pushed through additional agricultural support 
before the state elections in Schleswig-Holstein in fear of losing the agricultural vote there (Der 
Spiegel 22.6.1987).
The issue of tax reform again exposed divisions within the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition. The 
CDU had changed its position on the reductions in the tax rates for the highest incomes, 
because they would only benefit a small part of the population rather than the average citizen 
(DerSpiegei2.2.1987). Nevertheless, it is claimed that Kohl put his own party under pressure to 
give in to the demands of the CSU and FDP (Der Spiegei 2.3.1987). Later in 1987, the tax 
reforms would meet with criticism, not the least because the reforms were eventually financed 
by cutting tax deductions from which the less wealthy profited (Der Spiegei 12.10.1987;
19.10.1987). Apart from tax reforms, the issue of nuclear disarmament by the superpowers also 
was a bone of contention again, with the FDP in favour of more drastic disarmament than the 
CDU and CSU.204 The CSU opposed disarmament the most vehemently, and the issue resulted in 
a quarrel with the CDU. CSU leader Strauss was furious about the disarmament initiatives put 
forward by CDU party secretary Geissler.205 At the same time, criticism from opposition parties 
and societal groups increased. The most significant point they raised was that the government 
still had not succeeded in reducing unemployment. Other controversial issues were the tax 
reforms, state pensions and health care. Societal discontent manifested itself in electoral defeats 
for the CDU in Bremen (a 10%  loss compared to the previous state elections) and Schleswig­
Holstein in 1987 (an 8 %  loss). The SPD benefited from discontent with the government coalition 
and made electoral gains in the regional elections in 1988.206
Both 1988 and 1989 were characterized by deteriorating relations within CDU/CSU/FDP 
coalition. The CSU and the FDP heavily criticized Kohl and his party. Just as it prior to the 
collapse of the Schmidt cabinet in 1982 had doubts about further cooperation with the SPD, the 
FDP now began to harbour doubts about the wisdom of continuing to work with the CDU (Der 
Spiegei 18.7.1988). During another coalition crisis on nuclear disarmament in 1989, the FDP 
threatened to leave the coalition (Der Spiegei 29.5.1989). Meanwhile, Kohl also came in for 
heavy criticism within his own party, particularly after fresh electoral losses for the CDU in state 
elections in Berlin and Hesse. There were open discussions in the party about whether Kohl 
should be replaced with another candidate for the chancellorship (Der Spiegei 20.3.1989). 
Nevertheless, in 1989 Kohl was re-elected as head of the party, partially because there were no 
attractive alternatives (DerSpiegei 18.9.1989). Eventually, discontent with the government was 
not only apparent among large sections of society, but within the CDU/CSU delegation in 
parliament itself. The CDU/CSU delegation heavily criticized the government's tax reforms,
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which it considered socially unjustifiable. The political parties and the German population had 
lost faith in Chancellor Kohl and his popularity hit an all-time low (Der Spiegei28.8.1989).207
Considering the political conflicts within the coalition, partly due to the stronger position 
of the FDP in the cabinet, and increasing social discontent with the efficacy of government 
policies, the fall of the Berlin Wall on the night of 9 November 1989 may almost have been 
considered a godsend. Although the fall of the Berlin Wall marked the start of a period of 
uncertainty and transition, it also enabled Kohl to act as the Chancellor of unity. The euphoria of 
die Wende meant that the issues that had previously been considered of enormous political 
significance faded into the background. The political consequences were particularly noticeable 
from 1990 onwards, the period of the second German case study (see Chapter 8).
On the basis of the information presented above, we can assess societal contentment with 
the government and the degree of stability and sensitivity of the German government. Societal 
discontent began to develop from 1984 onwards and increased particularly after the coalition 
was re-elected in 1987. Although the government enjoyed a majority in both the Bundestag and 
the Bundesrat between 1983 and 1989 (see Section 3.3.1), its stability was negatively affected 
by increasing internal divisions and tensions as early as 1985, and particularly from 1987 
onwards. Combining these assessments with the electoral calendar, we may assess the 
sensitivity of the German government. Although federal elections -  increasing governmental 
sensitivity -  only took place in 1983 and 1987, the state elections and their implications for the 
composition of the Bundesrat resulted in an increasing governmental sensitivity, particularly as 
the coalition parties began to lose larger numbers of seats in the Bundesrat and the 
governmental majority was at stake. We may conclude that governmental sensitivity was 
relatively limited between 1982 and 1985, and increased from 1986 onwards. I therefore 
predict that the German government will attach greater importance to its domestic political 
interests in the second half of the 1980s than between 1982 and 1985.
6.3 The German Interest: Domestic Considerations
6.3.1 Political interests
This section focuses on the domestic political consequences of the various behavioural options 
open to the German government during the run-up to and the first half of the Uruguay Round. 
In this respect, it is first important to outline the positions defended by the German farm lobby. 
Subsequently, the position of other societal groups will be examined, such as the industrial and 
trade lobbies, to the extent that they intervened in the agricultural part of the negotiations. 
Before turning to the mobilization of these lobbies and the associated effects on the 
government's political interests, I will first explain the ideological background against which the 
farm lobby assessed agricultural policy proposals.
207 Europe Brief Notes Middle of May, In: Agence Europe 16.6 .1989.
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Although German farms were relatively small in international terms, their size also differed 
within Germany. In the 1980s larger farms were particularly located in the northern states, while 
in the southern states smaller farms dominated (Führer 1996, 58). The interests of the German 
agricultural sector where thus far from unified. However, they were represented in a single farm 
organization, the Deutscher Bauernverband(DBV), rivals to which were never really able to gain 
a foothold (Andrlik 1981).208 Just as the FNSEA in France was an umbrella organization for the 
FDSEAs and product organizations, the DBV was an umbrella organization in which various farm 
organizations at the level of the Länder were represented. The lack of a univocal collective 
interest within the DBV was resolved and unity maintained by concerted pressure for an income- 
oriented product and price policy (Führer 1996, 64). This was in the interest of both smaller and 
larger farm companies and excluded any policy that differentiated on the basis of farm size. 
Associated with the support for an income-oriented price policy was the so-called 
Leistungsprinzip. Remuneration of labour by means of controlling the price of farm products was 
considered legitimate by the farm lobby, and farmers refused to be 'staatlich alimentierte 
Almosenempfänger (Sontowski 1990, 146). The Leitbild of the bäuerliche Familienbetrieb was 
also an important source of unity within the farm lobby (Führer 1996, 64). It was only through 
such a farm structure that the rural population would be able to fulfill its role in promoting 
social stability and guarantee the maintenance of the countryside and the environment 
(Sontowski 1990, 110-111). According to the farm lobby, the social functions of the agricultural 
sector legitimized a Sonderstellung for the agricultural sector, meaning that the agricultural 
sector should be subject to different policies than other economic sectors (Sontowski 1990, 
112). The ideas of the farm lobby on German agriculture also had implications for how the lobby 
assessed various instruments of farm policy. The Leistungsprinzip and the preference for an 
Einkommensorientierte Produktpreispoiitiekmeant that the European Commission's proposals of 
the late 1980s to cut farm prices and compensate farmers with direct income payments were 
unacceptable to the German farm lobby.209
When in November 1982 a GATT Ministerial Conference was proposed in which the 
United States wanted to focus particularly on agricultural trade, the DBV urged the EEC to be 
uncompromising. It should prevent the CAP from ending up on the negotiation table (Deutsche 
Bauern Korrespondenz, November 1982). At the same time, however, the Bund Deutscher 
Industrie (BDI) attached considerable importance to the Ministerial Conference as a means of
208 In 1972 the DeutscherBauernverbandim  Nebenberufwas established, but this organization w as no 
threat to the DBV (Andrlik 1981). The organization w as not a mass m ovem ent and lacked organizational 
resources (Averyt 1977, 14).
209 This position is strikingly sim ilar to the position defended by the French farm lobby, w hich viewed 
agriculture as an 'econom ic' activity and thus rejected direct incom e transfers (see Section 5.3.1). 
Ultimately, however, the farm lobbies of the two countries w ould disagree on the best solution to 
production surpluses. The preference of the DBV for production lim itations did not find favour w ith the 
French farm lobby, because such lim itations were incom patible w ith the French vocation exportatrice. The 
FNSEA w as, therefore, more favourably disposed tow ards an increased free-m arket-based price policy. The 
price reductions that w ould result from  such a policy, however, led to resistance from the DBV.
For the Sake of our Economy: Germany 1982-1989 |175
stimulating agreements on further trade liberalization. It believed that the EEC should be willing 
to put the adverse economic consequences of its agricultural policy up for discussion in order to 
prevent trade conflicts in other areas, since these could damage German industrial exports.210 In 
the run-up to the opening of the new GATT negotiations between 1982 and 1984, the BDI 
continued its lobbying effort. It emphasized the need for new GATT negotiations in order to 
control protectionist tendencies. The BDI also encouraged trade negotiations on agriculture, so 
that a 'faire Interessenausgleich’could be achieved in this sector.211 The Bundesverband des 
Gross- undAussenhandels (BGA) also argued for a new round of GATT negotiations, including 
sectors that had hitherto remained exempt from strict trade discipline, such as agriculture and 
textile [Handelsblatt5.11.1986). The farm lobby therefore feared that the German agricultural 
interests would be sacrificed for German industrial interests if both became part of new GATT 
negotiations (interview Schomerus 29.3.2007). Furthermore, the DBV considered the assertive 
reaction of the United States to the accession of Portugal and Spain to the EEC, as a 
forewarning of the hard line the United States could be expected to take in the GATT 
negotiations.212 This only increased its anxiety about the inclusion of agriculture as a subject for 
negotiation. After a meeting was held between Chancellor Kohl and the leadership of the DBV 
shortly before the GATT conference in Punta del Este in 1986, the government nevertheless 
concluded that they agreed that a solution for the crisis in international agricultural markets 
could only be found through concerted political action at the GATT and EEC levels (Bulletin
19.9.1986). It appears that the German government was under the impression that the farm 
lobby was not opposed to opening a new round of GATT negotiations in Punta del Este. Even 
though farmers were concerned that such negotiations would compromise their interests, they 
did not mobilize against it (Deutsche Bauern Korrespondenz November 1986).
The German agricultural and industrial lobbies thus lobbied the German government from 
opposing directions, even before the start of the Uruguay Round. General public opinion in 
Germany was favourably disposed towards taking part in a new round of GATT negotiations, 
because this would enable Germany to introduce the policy changes needed to meet long­
standing international demands (interview Feiter 21.5.2007). By 1984, the CDU/CSU, FDP and 
SPD all agreed in the Bundestag that it was important to launch a new round of GATT 
negotiations and supported the government's efforts to this end.213 However, the SPD did warn 
that the EEC ought to reform its agricultural policies and put an end to the 'massive 
Agrarprotektionismus .214 The overall support of the political parties for a new trade round 
continued in 1985,215 although the CDU/CSU stressed that the GATT was also the forum in
210 BArch. B102: 2 7 1993. 7 .9 .1 9 82 . BDI. Stellungnahm e der Industrie zur GATT-M inisterkonferenz im 
Novem ber 1982.
211 BArch. B102: 2 7 1994. 1 .10.1984. BDI. Stellungnahm e zu einer neuen Verhandlungsrunde zur 
liberalisierung des W elthandels.
212 BArch. B102: 2 9 5996. G ATT. 4 .6 .1 9 86 . DBV. Brief an Minister Bangem ann.
213 Deutscher Bundestag. Plenarprotokoll 10/94. 2 5 .1 0 .19 8 4 , 6862, 6873 and 6860.
214 Deutscher Bundestag. Plenarprotokoll 10/94. 2 5 .1 0 .19 8 4 , 6860.
215 Deutscher Bundestag. Plenarprotokoll 10/153. 2 4 .4 .1 98 5 , 1 0 031-10053.
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which the EEC should table the issue of cereal substitutes, on which the EEC should be allowed 
to implement higher import levies.216 Prior to the ministerial meeting of 1986, in a debate on the 
government's Wirtschaftsbericht 1986, the CDU/CSU, FDP and SPD once again reiterated their 
support for a new GATT round and agreed with the position the government had defended in 
the Wirtschaftsbericht in this area.217 This implied that the parties also agreed on the need to 
include agriculture in the negotiations, but that the government would strive to ensure that the 
trade effects of the policies of all GATT partners would be put on the negotiating table.218 All 
the parties of the governing coalition were satisfied with the government's conduct during the 
Punta del Este negotiations and argued that the outcome of the negotiations was a success for 
Germany. The CDU/CSU explicitly stated that agricultural support should be reduced, preferably 
by curbing production surpluses, and conditions favourable to bäuerliche Familienbetriebe 
should be maintained. The SPD, however, expressed doubts about whether the Punta del Este 
declaration actually meant anything at all and argued that the government should have striven 
for a better result for the agriculture sector. Without agricultural reforms in the EEC, the new 
GATT round was bound to fail, the SPD claimed. They believed that on this issue, the German 
government had taken shelter behind the French.219 Considering the positive attitude of 
industrial and trade groups and the main political parties, the farm lobby appeared to be 
relatively isolated in its resistance to the inclusion of agriculture in new GATT negotiations, and 
its concerns were overshadowed by the benefits which other sectors expected to gain from such 
negotiations.
Once the negotiations were underway, it was primarily the farm lobby that exerted 
pressure with respect to the agricultural negotiations. Pressure from the farm lobby was more 
active, more fierce and more public than the lobbying of any other group, according to 
Schomerus (interview 29.3.2007). Schomerus even asked the BDI and other industrial interest 
groups to oppose the farm lobby and the Ministry of Agriculture more publicly, in order to shore 
up support for the position of the Ministry of Economics in the intra-governmental debate. The 
industrial groups, however, initially took no such action, considering it inappropriate to 
intervene in matters outside their own sector. In addition, the BDI also had to bear in mind that 
a number of industrial sectors actually profited from protectionism in agriculture (interview 
Schomerus 29.3.2007). Thus, during the first half of the Uruguay Round, the industrial and 
trade lobbies intervened only hesitantly in the agricultural negotiations and it was not until the 
Mid-Term Review talks collapsed in 1988 that the industrial lobby began to intervene more and 
more in the agricultural negotiations.
In 1987, the discontent of German farmers increased and farmers demonstrated in Bonn. 
Farm Minister Kiechle was even 'ausgeladeh ('uninvited') for the Bauerntag in 1987 (Bulletin 
4.7.1987; 7.7.1987). This discontent, however, seems to have been related more to wider EEC
2 1 6  Deutscher Bundestag. Drucksache 10/4406; Plenarprotokoll 10/182. 6 .1 2 .1 9 8 5 , 13912-13913.
2 1 7  Deutscher Bundestag. Plenarprotokoll 10/562. 14.3.1986.
2 1 8  Wirtschaftsbericht 1986(Deutscher Bundestag. Drucksache 70/68), 3 0 .1 .1 98 6 , 19.
2 1 9  Deutscher Bundestag. Plenarprotokoll 10/323. 2 5 .9 .1 98 6 , 1 7 996-18002.
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policies than German policies, as Kiechle observed (Bulletin 18.8.1987). During its 
demonstrations, the farm lobby not only referred to the deteriorating incomes within the 
agricultural sector, but more particularly demanded governmental resistance to European 
Commission proposals for farm prices and CAP reforms (Bulletin 3.4.1987; Deutsche Bauern 
Korrespondenz February 1987; Handelsblatt 3.4.1987). If the EEC were to lower its agricultural 
prices and reform the CAP, its negotiating position in GATT would be damaged, according to 
the DBV, and the EEC should take a less compromising stance instead (Deutsche Bauern 
Korrespondenz August 1987). Although the discontent among farmers appears to have been 
primarily related to EEC policies, the farm lobby linked these EEC policies directly to the 
prospects for the GATT negotiations. The farm lobby understood that, on the one hand, trade 
regulation was necessary to prevent a further decline in international agricultural prices, but, on 
the other hand, they feared that the government would be excessively accommodating on 
agriculture due to the export-dependence of German industry. The DBV further rejected the 
separate treatment of agricultural import and export mechanisms and emphasized that all 
policies that affected internal price levels should be up for negotiation in GATT (Deutsche 
Bauern Korrespondenz November 1986). The main goals of the DBV with respect to the 
Uruguay Round was that the EEC market and price policy -  supporting farm income through 
agricultural prices and not through direct payments -  was maintained, that the EEC was able to 
continue its double pricing system, and that a solution be found for the problem of the unlimited 
imports of cereal substitutes (interview Klaus-Martin Lotz 18.5.2005).
At the same time, the industrial lobby published positions and memoranda in which it 
made the case for further trade liberalization and CAP reform. The BDI argued that the CAP 
could no longer be financed and the organization was anxious about the trade conflicts the CAP 
could cause, to the detriment of European industry. Agricultural policy had to become more 
market-oriented by separating price policy from income policy, and farmers should therefore be 
supported through social policies (Handelsblatt 30.1.1987). By the end of 1987, the DIHT 
(Deutsche Industrie- und Handeistag, even favoured German acceptance of the CAP-reform 
proposals and accepting an agreement on the dismantling of agricultural support in the GATT 
negotiations (Handelsblatt 4.12.1987). German economic scientific institutes also rejected 
protectionism in agriculture and wanted the issue to be dealt with in the GATT negotiations by 
bringing agricultural trade under strict GATT discipline [Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
9.5.1987). In the international arena, such positions resonated well with the positions of 
organizations such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the Association of 
European Chambers of Commerce and Industry Associations (Agence Europe 11.10.1986; 
Süddeutsche Zeitung 8.7.1987), as well as with the demands of UNICE (Agence Europe 
5.11.1987; 5/6.12.1988).
Differences in opinion between the various lobbies persisted in the run-up to the Mid-Term 
Review in 1988. The DBV warned that the GATT negotiations should not be used to undermine 
the bäuerliche Landwirtschaft and argued for a less compromising stance on the part of the EEC 
to defend its rights in the GATT negotiations. The policy instruments of the CAP should not be
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discussed and the CAP reforms the EEC had already implemented (a unilateral sacrifice 
according to the DBV) should be recognized as Vorleistungen in GATT (Deutsche Bauern 
Korrespondenz January 1988). Shortly prior to the negotiations in Montreal, the DBV warned 
the Commission not to use the GATT negotiations as a pretext for undermining the European 
agricultural arrangements any further (Deutsche Bauern Korrespondenz December1988). The 
BDI, by contrast, argued that agreements should be made in GATT on the reduction of 
production-stimulating support, since the EEC agricultural policy increasingly represented an 
obstacle to international trade (Handelsblatt 29.11.1988). In addition, the scientific councils of 
both the Ministry of Economics and the Ministry of Agriculture declared themselves in favour of 
halving farm support and to secure a successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round (Handelsblatt
1.12.1988; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 14.12.1988). The Ministry of Agriculture, however, 
ignored such advice (interview Hermann Schlöder and Peter Witt 4.8.2008). The CDU/CSU and 
FDP supported the government's policy with respect to the GATT negotiations in 1987 and
1988. These parties stressed the importance of the multilateral trading system and were 
concerned about the protectionist legislative measures that the United States was initiating.220 
They did not touch explicitly on the question of whether the EEC should make concessions to the 
United States in Montreal, but the CDU/CSU did repeatedly express its concern about the issue 
of cereal substitutes.221 It was therefore unlikely that they would support far-reaching 
compromises with the United States and the Cairns Group during the Mid-Term Review. The 
SPD, however, again emphasized that the government should seize the initiative on agricultural 
reform, without which the GATT negotiations were bound to collapse.222 This seems to imply 
that the SPD would have approved of some concessions to the United States on agriculture, 
although the party did not state this explicitly.
When the Montreal negotiations ended in a stalemate, the Ministry of Economics and the 
BDI considered this a curative shock (Süddeutsche Zeitung 10.12.1988). They hoped that it 
would make it clear to everyone that trade barriers in the agricultural sector must be reduced. 
Simultaneously, their fears of a trade war increased. The BDI and BGA sought to avoid 
escalating any crisis, so that international trade relations would not deteriorate any further 
[Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 30.12.1988). The conflict between the United States and the 
EEC on hormone beef, in which the United States was to implement punitive tariffs in January
1989, played a part in the reinforcement of these fears. Prior to the conclusion of the Mid-Term 
Review in Geneva, the BDI explicitly urged the Commission to take a more flexible position in 
the agricultural negotiations now that the United States had moved away from the zero option 
[Handelsblatt23.3.1989; 28.3.1989; 4.4.1989). The German industrial lobby was assisted in 
this by international organizations such as the ICC, Eurochambers and UNICE (Agence Europe
220 Deutscher Bundestag. Plenarprotokoll 11/77. 5 .5 .1988.
221 Deutscher Bundestag. Drucksache 11/1465. 4 .1 2 .1 9 8 7 ; Drucksache 11/1842. 24 .2 .1 98 8 ; Drucksache 
11/2159. 19.4.1988.
222 Deutscher Bundestag. Drucksache 11/521. 24 .6 .1 98 7 ; Drucksache 11/1 128. 10.1 1.1987; Plenarprotokoll 
11/77. 5 .5 .1988, 5152, 5175.
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18.3.1989). While France could afford to put the positions of the European industrial and trade 
lobbies aside, since the French industrial lobby took a far more reserved position (see Section 
5.3.1), the pressure of the European lobby groups only strengthened the pressure of the German 
industrial and trade lobbies on the German government, because they both advocated similar 
positions.
In contrast to the demands of the German and transnational trade and industry lobbies, 
the DBV advocated a harder line for the EEC in the negotiations, as did COPA and COGECA at 
the European level (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung30.12.1988). It was therefore not surprising 
that the farm lobby was anxious about any EEC endorsement of the progressive dismantling of 
agricultural support in Geneva. According to the DBV, the agreement undermined the bäuerliche 
Landwirtschaft and had secured insufficient compromises on the problem of cereal substitutes 
(Deutsche Bauern Korrespondenz May 1989; June 1989). The CDU/CSU shared the concerns 
about to the issue of cereal substitutes, but did not reject the outcome of the Mid-Term Review 
in Geneva.223 For the remainder of 1989, the DBV repeatedly called on the Commission to take 
a less compromising stance against the demands of the United States and the Cairns Group, 
particularly when the United States introduced new agricultural proposals in 1989 in which it, 
according to the DBV, was backtracking on the agreements reached in Geneva. The DBV 
rejected the demands of the United States and urged the German government, the Council of 
Ministers and the European Commission to do the same. The EEC should not yield to the United 
States 'Diktat of full liberalization in agricultural trade (Deutsche Bauern Korrespondenz 
December 1989).224
Given the information presented above, it is striking that in comparison to the French case 
study, the German industrial lobby intervened far more in the agricultural part of the GATT 
negotiations from the start. The direct intervention of the German industrial lobby remained 
limited until the Mid-Term Review in Montreal. Between 1982 and 1988, the lobby repeatedly 
drew attention to the importance of new GATT negotiations and a successful conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round. At this point, the industrial lobby only argued that the agricultural sector should 
be included in the negotiations in order to avoid agricultural trade conflicts from harming 
industrial trade. After Montreal, the industrial lobby began to intervene more directly in the 
agricultural negotiations, insisting explicitly that the EEC should take a more flexible stance 
(read: make concessions) on agriculture.
In estimating the mobilization and pressure of various societal groups, the following 
pattern can be discerned. In relative terms, domestic pressure was relatively limited between 
1982 and 1986, but increased between 1986 and 1989. Until 1986, while the negotiations still
223 Deutscher Bundestag. Drucksache 11/4315. 14.4 .1989.
224 It m ight seem strange that the DBV appealed to an agreem ent here (the M id-Term Review) that it had 
rejected earlier. A ccording to DBV official Lotz, this w as a purely pragm atic choice. 'A t first, w e argued 
against changes of the status quo. W hen such changes nevertheless occured, we rejected these changes. 
But w hen the negotiations moved forw ard, we defended this new status quo. W e had to be realistic.' 
(interview Lotz 18.5.2005)
180| Against the Grain
focused on the whether or not and how to open a new round of GATT negotiations, the 
industrial lobby exerted slightly more pressure in favour of new negotiations than the 
agricultural lobby exerted pressure against such negotiations. Moreover, the main political 
parties also emphasized the necessity of a new GATT round, including agriculture. On balance, 
then, participating in new GATT negotiations was compatible with Germany's domestic political 
interests. After the launch of the GATT round in 1986, the negotiations shifted to the specific 
sector of agriculture. A complicating factor in the analysis from 1986 onwards was the fact that 
the German government was confronted with increasingly contradictory pressures from the 
industrial lobby and the agricultural lobby, making the political consequences of this 
mobilization (political costs and benefits) less equivocal from the viewpoint of the German 
government. While industrial mobilization had exceeded agricultural mobilization prior to 1986, 
in 1987 and 1988 agricultural mobilization against the proposals of the United States and the 
Cairns Group and against making concessions on agriculture during the negotiations in 
Montreal exceeded the industrial pressure in favour of making such concessions. On balance, it 
was therefore in Germany's domestic political interest to reject the proposals of the United 
States and the Cairns Group and resist concessions during the Mid-Tern Review. Turning to the 
outcome of the Mid-Term Review in Geneva in 1989, the pressure exerted by the farm lobby 
and supported by transnational agricultural groups, was about equal to the pressure exerted by 
the industrial and trade lobby, who were also supported by transnational industrial groups. It is 
therefore unclear whether it would have been in the government's political interests to accept 
the outcome of the Mid-Term Review or reject it.
6 .3.2  Economic interests
To the extent that a new round of GATT negotiations and the inclusion of the agricultural sector 
could be expected to contribute to the German GDP and general employment in Germany, 
agreeing to new GATT negotiations may be considered domestically economically attractive. A 
distinction will be made between the effects on GDP and employment in the agricultural sector 
and those on GDP and employment in the German economy as a whole. As explained in Section
5.3.2, the potential economic benefits of trade liberalization in terms of GDP and employment 
ultimately depend on the degree to which the market is expected to expand as a consequence 
of liberalization and the degree to which the state in question is likely to share in any market 
growth through increased exports. The latter, in turn, depends on the state's competitive 
position in the economic sectors concerned (industry, services, agriculture). From a comparative 
international perspective, the German agricultural sector did not have a strong competitive 
position in the 1980s and 1990s. This can be explained by the relatively high production costs of 
small-scale German farms.225 Germany may have been the fourth greatest exporting nation at
225 Germ an agricultural production prices exceeded those in France and m any other European member 
states (Statistical Yearbook 1990, T82).
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the time when it came to agricultural produce (Hendriks 1991, 66), but it still imported far more 
agricultural products than it exported as Table 6.1 shows. German agricultural products were 
traded mainly within the EEC (two thirds of Germany's total agricultural exports).
Tabel 6.1 German trade in agricultural products
1981 1884 1987 1988
Agricultural Exports 21,8 26,7 26,4 28,9
Share of exports extra-EEC 40% 33% 27% 33%
Share of exports intra-EEC 60% 67% 73% 67%
Agricultural Trade Balance -24,68 -28,6 -25,4 -24,3
Sources: Agra Europe22.1.1982; 25.3.1983; 8.7.1983; 23.12.1983; 16.11.1984; 26.4.1985; 17.1.1986; 
27.2.1987; 18.3.1988; 23.9.1988; 10.2.1989.
Agricultural Exports and Trade Balance in billion DM.
Notwithstanding its poor competitiveness in an international perspective, Germany was able to 
compete on the intra-EEC market thanks to the high guarantee prices of the CAP. Germany thus 
benefited from protectionism in agricultural trade and was unlikely to be in a position to share in 
the growth of agricultural markets that may result from trade liberalization. What is more, its 
position within the European market could be jeopardized through agricultural trade 
liberalization. Decreases in the guarantee prices or Aussenschutz (community preference) would 
lead to market losses, income losses and in the longer term an increase in unemployment. 
Unlike the agricultural sector, the German industrial sector was generally regarded as extremely 
competitive, even though this was not the case for all industrial sectors. In this respect, Steven 
Casper and Sigurt Vitols refer to 'the exceptional broadness of the competitive advantage' of 
Germany across a wide range of sectors (1997, 2-3; see also Porter 1990). Germany was 
therefore likely to be in a position to profit from the growth of industrial markets after trade 
liberalization, and would thus be able to generate additional income and employment in the 
industrial sector.
In terms of farming incomes, Germany benefited significantly from the high farm prices 
that the CAP guaranteed. By keeping these prices artificially high (relative to world-market 
prices), the German farmers were provided with a certain minimum income. When it came to the 
domestic economic consequences of agricultural negotiations within GATT (in terms of GDP and 
employment), the defence and maintenance of the CAP, and particularly its double pricing 
system, was therefore in the German interest. Merely dismantling the double pricing system, the 
corollary of which would be the disappearance of community preference, would harm Germany's 
domestic economic interests.
Taking account of these considerations, we may now estimate the economic 
consequences of the proposals that surfaced in the run-up to and during the first half of the 
Uruguay Round. As far as accepting a new round of GATT negotiations is concerned, it may be
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concluded that this would be in the overall interest of the German economy, because the 
industrial sector was likely to reap significant benefits (both in terms of income and 
employment) from further trade liberalization. Including agriculture in these negotiations, 
however, was not an attractive option, as this was likely to lead to loss of market-shares and 
income. When it became clear in Punta del Este that there would be no new GATT negotiations 
if the EEC did not agree to including agriculture, agreeing to a new trade round under those 
conditions was, on balance, still in Germany's economic interests, because the income 
generated by the industrial sector made up a far larger share of the German GDP than the 
income generated by the agricultural sector.226 The proposals tabled by the Commission in 1987 
and 1988 were not sufficiently specific with respect to the reductions of various forms of 
agricultural support in order to enable an accurate estimate of the economic costs and benefits 
associated with these proposals. A point of particular interest in the EEC position was that the 
principles and procedures of the CAP were under all circumstances to remain outside the remit 
of the GATT negotiations (see also Section 5.3.2). This position was conducive to the German 
domestic economic interests. The zero option proposed by the United States and the far- 
reaching liberalization proposed by the Cairns Group, however, were economically unattractive 
for Germany. Making concessions in the direction of these proposals was therefore not in 
Germany's economic interests. The results of the Mid-Term Review in Geneva -  where the GATT 
partners agreed on 'progressive reductions' in agricultural support -  gave rise to economic 
concerns, because the terminology used seemed to imply high reduction percentages, which 
were not in Germany's domestic economic interests.
6.3.3  Ideological interests
In order to establish whether the proposals in the GATT negotiations were in Germany's 
ideological interest, we need to determine to what extent the ideas underpinning these 
proposals corresponded with the German agricultural policy paradigm. The proposals thus need 
to be contrasted with the central elements of the German policy paradigm: the legitimacy of 
state-intervention, an income-oriented price policy, and the ideal of a multifunctional bäuerliche 
Landwirtschaft (see Sections 3.2.3. and 6.2.2.).
Taking part in the new round of GATT negotiations and accepting agriculture as one of 
the negotiating themes did not in itself run counter to the principles of German agricultural 
policy. Even though the goal of the negotiations was trade liberalization (including in the field of 
agricultural trade), this goal did not negate the legitimacy of certain forms of state intervention, 
nor did it prescribe a specific form of price policy or economic scale. It would depend on the 
content of specific proposals put forward in the negotiations whether the underlying ideas of
226 In 1982 the Germ an agricultural sector provided 2 .5 %  of the GDP, and by 1993, its share in overall GDP 
had dropped to 1 % . In 1982, 5 %  of the Germ an w orkers were em ployed in the agricultural sector, and by 
1993, this percentage had dropped to 3 % . In com parison, 4 5 %  of the Germ an population w orked in the 
industrial sector in 1980 (W orld Developm ent Indicators; O EC D  1980, 64).
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potential compromises and accords were at odds with the German ideological interests. The EEC 
proposals during the first half of the Uruguay Round were certainly in line with the German 
policy paradigm. The Commission's proposals showed that the EEC subscribed to what Carsten 
Daugbjerg has termed a 'dependent agriculture' or 'state-assisted' paradigm, which defines the 
agricultural sector as deserving of special treatment due to its contribution to national policy 
goals, and in which price mechanism are not considered the most effective means of reaching 
the goals of an efficient and productive agricultural sector (Daugbjerg 2008, 1268). 
Furthermore, a central feature of the EEC proposals was that the fundamental principles of the 
CAP were to be safeguarded. These principles were compatible with the German income- 
oriented price policy and the goal of a bäuerliche Landwirtschaft. The high farm prices within 
the CAP and the protection of the European market through the double-pricing system enabled 
a connection between price policy and income-policy, and the survival of relatively small and 
uncompetitive farm companies. The proposals of the United States and the Cairns Group, 
however, were clearly based on the principle of a free market system in the agricultural sector. 
This principle was incompatible with the idea of conducting income-policy through price policy. 
The introduction of a free market system was also likely to lead to an agricultural structure in 
which larger farms (through economies of scale) would be better able to survive than medium- 
large and small farm companies. Indirectly, the far-reaching proposals of the United States and 
the Cairns Group thus also called the bäuerliche Landwirtschaft into question. It was therefore 
not in Germany's domestic ideological interest to accept these proposals or make substantial 
concessions during the Mid-Term Review in 1988. As argued in Section 5.3.3, the outcome of 
the Mid-Term Review in Geneva was based on the principle that agricultural support measures 
had to be reduced, but the agreement reached at that time did not deny the legitimacy of state 
intervention in itself, nor any specific forms of intervention.
6.3.4. Domestic costs and benefits
On the basis of the information presented above on the political, economic and ideological 
interests of Germany, we are now able to make an assessment of the domestic costs and 
benefits of the various policy options (Table 6.2).227 This regards the degree to which 
participation in new GATT negotiations, accepting agriculture as one of the negotiating themes 
and making far-reaching concessions during the first half of Uruguay Round may be considered 
either attractive or unattractive, in terms of German domestic interests. Here we see that in term 
of its domestic interests, Germany would be interested in a new round of GATT-negotiation and 
the launch of these negotiations in Punta del Este. Accepting agriculture as one of the 
negotiating themes would, on balance, not be in Germany's domestic interests. Finally, based 
on these domestic interests alone, Germany can be expected to reject the proposals of the
227 See Section 3.3.3. for an explanation of how  the political, econom ic and ideological 'balances' in Table
6.2 are calculated.
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United States and the Cairns Group as well as the outcome of the Mid-Term Review. Section 6.4 
will elaborate on how the same policy options should be assessed on the basis of Germany's 
international interests.
Table 6.2. German domestic costs and benefits with respect to the proposals during the first half of the Uruguay Round.
New GATT 
round
Agriculture in 
GATT round
Opening de­
claration PdE
EEC proposals 
1987 and 1988
US and CG 
proposals
Concessions 
during MTR
Outcome MTR 
Geneva
POLITICAL(a)
Farm lobby -  - 0 + -  - -  -  I -  -
Industry and trade 
lobbies
+ + + 0 0 + + +
Political parties + + + + 0 -  1 0
BALANCE POLITICAL + + /- + + - - + /-
ECONOM IC(b)
Income and employment 
farm sector 0 + -  / -  -
GDP and employment 
total economy + + 0 + + 0 0 0 0
BALANCE ECONOMIC + - + + - - -
IDEOLOGI CAL(c)
Legitimacy of state 
intervention
0 0 0 + 0 0 0
Income-oriented price 
policy
0 0 0 + - - 0
Bäuerliche Landwirtschaft 0 0 0 + - - 0
BALANCE IDEOLOGICAL 0 0 0 + + - - 0
SUM  DOM ESTIC(d)
+ 1
- + 1 + - - -
Legend: (a) -  = pressure against the proposal, -  -  = extensive pressure against the proposal, + = pressure in favour of the proposal , and ++  = extensive pressure in favour of the 
proposal. (b) -  = economic costs, -  -  = high economic costs, + = economic benefits, ++  = high economic benefits. (c) + = the underlying ideas of the proposal considered in the 
policy option are in accordance with the German policy paradigm, -  = the underlying ideas of the proposal considered in the policy option are at odds with the German policy
paradigm. The balances are accorded a value of + = benefits exceed costs; + + = benefits considerably exceed costs; -  = costs exceed benefits; -  -  = costs considerably exceed 
benefits; + / -  = costs equal benefits. In assessing the balance of economic costs/benefits, the consequences for the economy as a whole are attributed more weight than the 
consequences for agriculture. (d) The sum domestic is either + = benefits exceed costs; -  = costs exceed benefits; or + / -  = costs equal benefits. 0 = no clear costs or benefits with 
respect to the criterion involved.
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6.4 The German Interest: International Considerations
6.4.1 Political interests
As already indicated in Chapter 4 and Section 5.3.1, it was the United States in particular that 
exerted considerable pressure on the EEC in 1982 to take part in a new GATT round and accept 
agriculture as one of the negotiating themes. At that time, the EEC member states were still 
united in their resistance to a new round of GATT negotiations and they refused to discuss the 
issue of agriculture during the GATT Ministerial Conference in November 1982 [Agra Europe 
16.7.1982). Although by 1984 the positions of the Commission and most of the member states 
had shifted in favour of launching a new GATT-round including agriculture, Germany continued 
to find itself under pressure from vehement French opposition to the GATT initiatives. As 
indicated in Section 5.5.1, the French not only resisted the accelerated implementation of the 
results of the Tokyo round, but also the proposed new round of GATT negotiations, and 
especially the inclusion of agriculture as a negotiating theme. Documents of the German 
Ministry of Economics show that the German government was well aware of the French 
reservations and their appeal on other EEC member states in general, and Germany in 
particular, to support their stance. One of these documents mentioned the 'übergrosse Vorsicht 
unserer französischen Freunde .228 For Germany, the diplomatic encounters between French and 
German ministries on this subject (see Section 5.4.1) were aimed at overcoming French 
resistance, while for France the goal was to press the Germans to help them to decelerate the 
negotiating process.
In the meantime, the United States continued to exert pressure in favour of a new round 
of GATT negotiations. German government officials were confronted with this pressure during 
their visits to the United States. When Schomerus was in Washington in 1984, his interlocutors 
tried to convince him that the agricultural issue was the main trade-political obstacle to good 
trade relations between the EEC and the United States. Indirect threats were also made that 
Congress was likely to insist on more aggressive export policies when it discussed the Farm 
Bill.229 At the same time, however, the USTR appeared to be sceptical on the possibility of 
reaching agreement on a new GATT round in the short term, because no agreement with the 
developing countries had been reached either.230
Prior to the GATT Ministerial Conference in Punta del Este in September 1986, the EEC 
became increasingly isolated on the issue of agriculture (see Chapter 4 and Section 5.4.1.).
228 BArch. B102: 2 7 1991. 16.2 .1984. Aussenw irtschaftsbeirat am 21.2 .1 98 4 . Hier; Liberaliseringsinitiative 
und neue GATT-Verhandlungsrunde; BArch. B102: 2719 9 2 . 1 5 .5 .1984. Unterabteilungsleiter V  A  an 
Minister. Zur Unterrichtung. Betr: EG -Rat am 1 4.5 .1984. Handelspolitische Erklärung.
229 BArch. B102: 271994. 20 .8 .1 98 4 . Fernschreiben von W ashington. Betr.: Besuch Lorenz Schom erus an 
W ash ington, 13-17 A u gu st 1984.
230 BArch. B102: 171994. 20 .8 .1 98 4 . Leiter der A bteilung V. Betr.: Besuch in W ashington vom  13.-17. 
A u gu st 1984. Brief von Schom erus.
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Germany came under increasing pressure to take action to overcome the deadlock in the 
negotiations. This implied that France in particular had to be prevailed upon to approve the 
opening declaration of the new GATT round. This was unlikely to be easy, given that only three 
months earlier France had argued that the EEC should take a harder line with respect to the 
dispute on compensatory measures in exchange for the accession of Spain and Portugal to the 
European Community.231 However, at the same time, Germany came under increasing pressure 
both from within the EEC and from other states to agree to an opening declaration. For GATT 
partners, Germany, as the EEC's major trading nation, thus became the focus for hopes of 
reaching a compromise (Agra Europe 21.11.1986). The German government was aware of these 
expectations and realized that if they remained unfulfilled, Germany's reputation and political 
standing would be damaged.232
Prior to the Mid-Term Review, Germany again faced contradictory international political 
pressure. States outside the EEC, particularly the United States, were pressuring Germany to 
instigate reform of the CAP. During visits abroad, Kohl often had to listen to arguments such as: 
'We buy your cars and your machines, but you have to change the [agricultural] policy, 
otherwise we will not have the money to buy your machines anymore' (interview Feiter
21.5.2007). The threats the United States made in the autumn of 1988 to leave the negotiating 
table if the EEC refused to make concessions on agriculture (see Section 4.4.3) were dismissed 
as simply 'part of the negotiating game' by the German delegation (Die Welt 2.12.1988). 
However, by threatening to shift its focus towards regional and bilateral free trade zones (at the 
expense of agreements in the context of GATT), the United States touched a German nerve and 
caused some anxiety within the Ministry of Economics (Die Welt 2.12.1988; SUddeutsche 
Zeitung5.12.1988). Nevertheless, most EEC member states agreed that the Commission should 
make no concessions unless its negotiating partners also showed forbearance in the GATT 
negotiations (see also Section 5.4.1). 233 It was only after the breakdown of negotiations in 
Montreal that a debate emerged, both within the German government and within the EEC, on 
the question of whether the EEC should take a more flexible position in the agricultural 
negotiations in order to avoid negative repercussions in other negotiation groups.234 France, 
however, continued to resist making concessions on agriculture and attempted to gain German 
support for that position (interview Schomerus 29.3.2007). Prior to the conclusion of the Mid-
231 BArch. B102: 195996. 11.6 .1986. Leiter der A bteilung V  an Herrn Minister auf dem Dienstw eg. Betr.: Ihr 
Gespräch am 15. Juni 1986 in Saltw ood Castle zum  Handelskonflikt EG/USA über die Folgen der EG- 
Erweiterung.
232 BArch. B102: 2 9 2882. 4 .6 .1 9 85 . Handelsm inisterkonferenz Stockholm , 8-10 juni 1985. Agrarfragen.
233 C U E A C . 8527/88, G A T T 108. 7 .10 .1 98 8 . Résultat des travaux de: la réunion ad hoc du Com ité spécial de 
l'article 113 en date du: 5 octobre 1988. Objet: G A TT -  Uruguay Round: Agriculture; A rchBuZa. EG /1985­
1989: 01546. Raad 9628/88. Conclusies door de Raad aangenom en op 22 novem ber 1988.
234 C U E A C . 5200/98, G A T T 30. 1 .3.1989. Résultats des travaux du Com ité spécial de l'article 113 (membres 
suppléants) en date du 24 février 1989; 5519/89, G A T T 37. 17.3 .1989. Résultats des travaux du Com ité 
spécial de l'article 113 (m em bres titulaires) en date du 10 mars 1989.
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Term Review in Geneva, a majority of the EEC member states favoured a compromise (see 
Section 5.4.1), but the French remained recalcitrant (see Section 5.5.4).
6 .4.2  Economic interests
In order to assess the extent to which taking part in new GATT negotiations and accepting the 
proposals that were tabled during the first half of the Uruguay Round served German 
international economical interests, this section will examine the likely consequences of these 
proposals for the German trade balance, the chances of a successful conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round and the consequences for the proper functioning of the multilateral trade regime. Just as 
the effects of liberalization on income and employment depended on whether these proposals 
involved liberalizing a competitive or a non-competitive sector, the consequences of 
liberalization for the trade balance also depended on the relative competitiveness of Germany in 
the economic sectors in question (see Section 5.4.2). In contrast to the situation in France, in 
Germany it was the industrial trade surplus that served an important purpose in cancelling out 
trade deficits in agriculture. The overall German trade balance did not therefore benefit a great 
deal from export restitutions or other forms of support in the agricultural sector, while it did 
stand to benefit from liberalization in the industrial sector.
In order to establish whether specific proposals with respect to the agricultural 
negotiations may contribute to the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round, we need to 
determine whether the agricultural negotiations impeded progress in other negotiating domains 
(such as the industrial negotiations). If this were the case, the overall German economy would 
benefit from accepting the proposals on the liberalization of agricultural trade in order to resolve 
the negotiating stalemate and reap the benefits of trade liberalization in Germany's competitive 
sectors. As I have established in Section 5.4.2, this was not the case during the first half of the 
Uruguay Round.
As a trading nation par excellence, Germany was highly dependent on a properly 
functioning system of multilateral trade. The German economy was highly interlinked with the 
international trading system. Foreign trade -  imports plus exports -  accounted for approximately 
47%  of its GDP (see Table 5.2). As a consequence, disturbances in international trade and 
international trade relations were damaging for German trade. Germany therefore had a 
considerable economic interest in multilateral trade negotiations within GATT and ensuring that 
the multilateral trading system was strengthened and maintained. In effect, United States 
threats to move towards bilateral and regional trade accords if multilateral trade negotiations 
within GATT did not produce the desired outcomes, posed a serious problem from the German 
point of view. The threats with respect to the contents of the 1988 Trade Act and the 1989 
Farm Bill also affected German economic interests. Although the economic consequences of 
United States export programmes and the tightening of their trade policies in the agricultural 
sector would be relatively limited for Germany as compared to France, the implementation of 
such measures in the industrial sector would be highly detrimental to the German economy. In
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addition, the potential for the trade conflict to spread beyond the agricultural sector to other 
sectors, which would imply an overall worsening of Germany's trade relations, was a risk that 
Germany surely had to guard against at all costs, given its economic interests. Proposals in the 
Uruguay Round that were likely to be detrimental to Germany's trade relations were thus 
unattractive in economic terms.
In light of the considerations presented above, we can now assess the various proposals 
tabled during the first half of the Uruguay Round in terms of their international economic 
effects. Taking part in a new round of GATT negotiations was in Germany's international 
economic interests, given both the potential effects on its trade balance and maintaining and 
strengthening the multilateral trading system. Including the agricultural sector in these 
negotiations was less attractive given Germany's relatively weak international competitiveness in 
this sector. Overall, however, the German trade balance would benefit from negotiations on 
trade liberalization, because competitive sectors such as the industrial sector accounted for a far 
greater proportion of Germany's income from exports than the agricultural sector. If new GATT 
negotiations were only feasible if agriculture was included as a negotiating issue, which was the 
case during the negotiations in Punta del Este in 1986, then it would be in the German 
economic interests to accept the inclusion of agriculture in the negotiations. Furthermore, the 
world-wide economic recession, and the tendency of some states towards introducing 
protectionist measures which undermined the credibility of the multilateral trading system, 
provided additional economic incentives for Germany to take a positive stance on the new round 
of GATT negotiations.
The declaration of the European Ministers of Foreign Trade in 1985 -  in which they 
expressed their commitment to EEC participation in the new GATT negotiations on the condition 
that not only export subsidies, but also other forms of agricultural support were included in the 
negotiations and that the principles of the CAP would not be compromised -  was economically 
attractive for Germany, because it implied that the EEC was not willing to negotiate on the 
double pricing system. This could safeguard the German share in the European internal 
agricultural market through an agricultural accord in GATT. The opening declaration proposed at 
the GATT Ministerial Conference in Punta del Este was on balance in Germany's international 
economic interest because it entailed not only negotiations on trade liberalization in agriculture 
but also in other, more competitive sectors for Germany such as industry and services. In 
addition, the launch of a new round of trade negotiations would help to strengthen the 
multilateral GATT system as a whole.
The agricultural proposals that the EEC defended in 1987 and 1988 were economically 
attractive for Germany for the same reasons as the 1985 declaration of the European ministers. 
In addition, the ideas the EEC propagated on the management of the international agricultural 
market corresponded closely with the way in which Germany, by restoring the balance between 
supply and demand, wished to restore the balance on the world market for agricultural 
products. The EEC proposals from 1987 and 1988 had no direct consequences for the 
maintenance of the multilateral trading system.
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Conceding to the zero option of the United States or the far-reaching support reduction 
proposals of the Cairns Groups (and thus conceding to these demands during the Mid-Term 
Review as well) was not in Germany's economic interests, because the complete dismantling of 
agricultural protection would damage the CAP and ultimately, Germany's agricultural trade 
balance. From an economic perspective, the outcome of the 1989 Mid-Term Review was 
potentially costly on the one hand, because it implied agreeing to 'substantial progressive 
reductions' of agricultural support, but on the other hand, no specific reduction percentages 
were yet on the table and the United States had abandoned its zero option. Finally, the 
agreement in Geneva prevented further damage to the reputation of the GATT system by a 
second negotiating stalemate in the Mid-Term Review. The continuation of negotiations was far 
more in Germany's international economic interest than the agreement on agriculture arrived at 
in Geneva was counter to these interests.
6.4.3  Ideological Interests
Policy options that do not fit well with the prescriptions of German state identity are 
ideologically unattractive. Two aspects of the German state identity are relevant here (see also 
Section 3.3.3): the idea of Germany as a neue Handeisstaat (trading nation) and the Franco­
German friendship.
Taking part in new negotiations on trade liberalization corresponded with the idea of 
Germany as a Handeisstaat, whereas withholding agreement in order to safeguard the 
agricultural sector from support-cuts ran counter to this aspect of the German identity. At the 
same time, however, agreeing to GATT negotiations on agricultural trade liberalization 
(particularly when it came to the crunch in 1986) conflicted with maintaining the Franco­
German friendship, since France was fighting the launch of these negotiations tooth and nail, 
and demanded support of its German ally. Although the Franco-German friendship did not 
directly seem to be at stake with respect to the issue of the United States zero option, because 
the French and German position did not appear to diverge on this issue, it was clear that any 
consideration on the part of either France or Germany in favour of giving in to the United States 
proposal was unattractive in terms of the Franco-German friendship. As indicated in Section
5.4.3, the French and German positions threatened to diverge again after the collapse of the 
negotiations in Montreal, at which point France displayed its indifference to a successful 
conclusion of the Mid-Term Review, while Germany favoured a compromise within GATT as 
soon as possible. At this point, so far as the Franco-German friendship was concerned, it was in 
Germany's interest to meet some of the French demands and thus not to show willingness to 
compromise. As far as its identity as a Handeisstaat was concerned, on the other hand, 
adopting a more flexible position on agriculture in order to further the negotiations and 
accepting the outcome of the Mid-Term Review in Geneva after the collapse of the negotiations 
in Montreal, represented the more appropriate behavioural alternatives. In terms of its 
international ideological interests Germany, therefore, appeared continually to be caught
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between two stools, with Germany's self-image as a Handeisstaat repeatedly conflicting with 
considerations of the Franco-German friendship.
6 .4 .4  International costs and benefits
Based on the information presented above on Germany's political, economic and ideological 
interests, we are now able to assess the international costs and benefits of various policy 
options (Table 6.3).235 This implies the degree to which taking part in new GATT negotiations, 
accepting agriculture as one of the negotiating themes and making far-reaching concessions 
during the first half of Uruguay Round may be considered either attractive or unattractive, based 
on the German international interests. Here we see that with respect to participating in a new 
GATT round and the inclusion of agriculture in these negotiations, the overall international 
benefits equal the costs. On the basis of international considerations alone, no prediction can 
therefore be formulated on the German preference at these two decision moments. As for the 
other decision moments, a similar situation emerges as with the French case: the international 
benefits outweighed the costs concerning the acceptance of the Punta del Este declaration and 
the outcome of the Mid-Term Review in 1989, while the costs exceeded the benefits for the 
options of accepting the proposals of the United States and the Cairns Groups and making 
concessions during the Mid-Term Review. Considering international considerations only, 
therefore, Germany could be expected to agree to the launch of the Uruguay Round in 1986, 
and accept the outcome of the Mid-Term Review in Geneva in 1989. Accepting the proposals of 
the United States and the Cairns Group, and making any additional concessions in Montreal will 
be rejected on the basis of these considerations. In the next section, predictions will be 
formulated on the preferences that Germany was likely to defend at each of these decision 
moments in order to contrast these predictions with the preferences Germany actually defended 
in the negotiations. These predictions are based on both domestic and international 
considerations and the assessment of the various dimensions of the German interests is based 
on the theory set out in Chapter 2.
235 See Section 3.3.3. for an explanation of how  the political, econom ic and ideological 'balances' in Table
6.3 are calculated.
Table 6.3: German international costs and benefits with respect to the proposals during the first half of the Uruguay Round
New GATT 
round
Agriculture in 
GATT round
Opening de­
claration PdE
EEC proposals 
1987 and 1988
US and CG 
proposals
Concessions 
during MTR
Outcome MTR 
Geneva
POLITICAL(a)
Extra-EEC pressure + + + + + -  - + ++ + +
Intra-EEC pressure - + + + + -  - -  - +
French pressure -  - -  - - + -  - -  - -
BALANCE POLITICAL - + + + - - +
ECONOM IC(b)
Trade balance + - + + - - 0
Agriculture as the 
obstacle in the UR
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Multilateral trading 
system
+ 0 + 0 0 0 +
BALANCE ECONOMIC + - + + - - +
IDEO LO GICAL(c)
Germany as Handelsstaat + + + 0 0 0 +
Franco-German
friendship
- - - 0 - - 0
BALANCE IDEOLOGICAL + /- + /- + /- 0 - - +
S UM INTERNATIONAL(d)
+/- +/- + 1 + - - +
Legend: (a) In the case of extra-EEC and France: -  = pressure against the proposal, -  -  = extensive pressure against the proposal, + = pressure in favour of the proposal, + +  =
extensive pressure in favour of the proposal. With respect to intra-EEC: —  = united rejection or resistance; ++  = united acceptance; -  = disunity within the EEC, but predominant 
resistance; and + = disunity within the EEC, but predominant acceptance. (b) -  = economic costs, + = economic benefits (c) + = the policy option corresponds well with the aspect 
of the German identity involved; -  = the policy option is at odds with the aspect of the German identity involved. The 'balances' may take values of either + = benefits exceed costs; 
+ + = benefits considerably exceed costs; -  = costs exceed benefits; -  -  = costs considerably exceed benefits; or + / -  = costs equal benefits. (d) The 'sum' may take values of either 
+ = benefits exceed costs; -  = costs exceed benefits; or + / -  = costs equal benefits. 0 = no clear costs or benefits with respect to the criterion involved.
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6.5 Theoretical Expectations and German Preferences
Between 1982 and 1989, international polarity was high, and the domestic polarity in Germany 
was low, in internationally comparative terms. Germany scored 1 on a scale of 6 for its domestic 
polarity (see Section 3.3.1). From 1990 onwards, this score would even be zero because the 
government lost its majority in the Bundesrat. The low domestic polarity indicates that Germany 
in particular had to take account of its domestic interests. Due to the high international polarity, 
it is predicted that Germany will be able to do so, given the relatively limited structural 
international constraints (see Section 2.5). I therefore predict that domestic considerations, 
particularly the government's political and economic interests, will be decisive in the German 
preference-formation process.
In Sections 6.5.1 to 6.5.5 I will now discuss the various decision moments separately. As 
in the first French case, I will first formulate a prediction on the expected German preference at 
each of the decision moments. These predictions are based on the German domestic political 
and economic interests. In the cost and benefit tables for each decision moment below, only the 
balances concerning these interests are therefore reproduced from Tables 6.2 and 6.3. The other 
balances are indicated with an X as considerations that are regarded to be non-decisive on the 
basis of the theoretical framework. After having formulated the prediction, the preferences that 
Germany actually defended in the negotiations will be analysed in order to establish whether 
these preferences are in accordance with the predictions based on the theoretical framework.
6.5.1 New GATT negotiations including agriculture
6.5.1.1 Predictions
On the basis of the domestic political and domestic economic costs and benefits associated with 
a new GATT round (see table 6.4a) it can be predicted that Germany will push for EEC 
participation in a new round of GATT negotiations. Germany's domestic economic interests in 
particular required the launch of a new trade round and, on balance, supporting such a round 
would be in Germany's domestic political interest as well, because the great support from the 
industrial and trade lobbies and from political parties outweighed the cautious resistance of the 
farm lobby to the idea of new GATT negotiations. As for accepting the inclusion of agriculture in 
these negotiations, domestic political and economic considerations, taken together, argue 
against acceptance of this condition (see table 6.4b). Although the domestic political picture is 
mixed, because the mobilization of political parties and the industrial and trade lobbies in 
support of the inclusion of agriculture began to meet with greater farm lobby resistance, it was 
clearly not in Germany's domestic economic interest to include agriculture, unless it proved 
absolutely impossible to launch new GATT negotiations without doing so. I therefore predict 
that Germany will try to prevent the inclusion of agriculture as a negotiating theme in the new
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GATT negotiations and that it will only accept this if it is absolutely necessary in order to secure 
the launch of a new GATT round.
Table 6.4a: Issue: Taking part in new round of GATT negotiations
INTERNATIONAL DOMESTIC
Political x +
Economic x +
Ideoloqical x x
BALANCE +
Prediction: Germany will strive for the launch of new GATT negotiations
Key to symbols: + = benefits exceed costs, x = non-decisive consideration.
Table 6.4b Issue: Including agriculture In the GATT negotiations
INTERNATIONAL DOMESTIC
Political x + /-
Economic x -
Ideoloqical x x
BALANCE -
Prediction: Germany will try to prevent the inclusion of agriculture in the new GATT round and 
will only accept inclusion if that is necessary to secure the launch of the new GATT
negotiations.
Key to symbols: -  =  costs exceed benefits, + / -  =  benefits equal costs, x = non-decisive consideration
6.51.2 Preferences
Germany was positively disposed towards a new round of GATT negotiations in the early 1980s, 
even though broader support for such negotiations was still lacking in the EEC as a whole. In 
October 1982, the newly installed Chancellor Kohl emphasized in a government declaration that 
Germany wished to contribute to an international system of free trade and strengthen the GATT, 
as it had always done in the past. He therefore attached great importance to the approaching 
GATT Ministerial Conference, particularly in the context of the economic crisis of that period 
( u / t n  14.10.1982).236 In the run-up to this Ministerial Conference, Germany tried to influence 
EEC decision making in such a way that the EEC would dedicate itself to new liberalization 
initiatives at this conference.237 In line with this strategy, Germany argued in favour of having 
the issue dealt with by the Trade Ministers in the EEC rather than the General Affairs Council, 
for example, because the latter would provide inadequate scope to discuss the GATT
236 Regierungserklärung des Bundeskanzlers vor dem Bundestag, 13.10.1982.
237 ArchEZ. W A -B EB-55. Raad 4571/82, G A T T 22. Verslag van de vergadering van art. 113 (plv) op 
29 .6 .1982.
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negotiations. Such an arrangement would also give Germany more opportunity to pressurize the 
French Minister of Trade, Michel Jobert, in order to convince him of the importance of a 
successful GATT ministerial meeting.238 At this point in the negotiations, Germany, in spite of its 
own desire for a new GATT round, already began to take account of French resistance to 
participation in new GATT negotiations. This became clear in a meeting of the Article 113 
Committee shortly before the GATT ministerial meeting in November 1982. At this meeting, 
France voiced its disapproval of a number of passages in the political declaration on the table. 
Germany was far more interested in the operational paragraphs (the working programme) than 
in the political paragraphs and wanted to prevent the EEC from focusing on the latter under 
French pressure. At the same time, however, Germany also indicated that it wished to avert a 
clash between Jobert and Lambsdorff.239
After the disappointing results of the 1982 GATT Ministerial Conference, Germany 
continued to channel its efforts into manoeuvring the Commission and the member states into 
taking a positive stance towards a new round of GATT negotiations. The German Ministry of 
Economics was also in favour of a 'starkere BeteiHgung des Agrarbereichs in these new 
negotiations.240 The Ministry of Agriculture on the other hand wanted agriculture to remain 
outside the GATT negotiations (interview Schomerus 29.3.2007; interview Schloder and Witt
4.8.2008). Nevertheless, by 1984, this Ministry of Agriculture appeared to have reconciled itself 
to the fact that agriculture could not be excluded from the negotiations. During the debate on a 
'Spracheregelung für Deutschen Auslandvertretungeri the ministry no longer resisted the 
naming of agricultural themes for the GATT negotiations. It did try to limit the weight attached 
to agriculture by arguing for changes in the proposed order of points for discussion,241 but these 
changes were not implemented in the final version of the 'Spracheregelung .242 Furthermore, in 
parliamentary documents, the German government now explicitly stated that it emphatically 
supported a new trade round, including agriculture.243 Nevertheless, in line with CDU/CSU 
preferences, Kiechle stated in a speech to the American Chamber of Commerce in München that 
the German government also wished to find a solution to the problem of cereal substitutes, of 
which EEC imports must be limited. The United States should not assume that the EEC would 
abolish all its export restitutions completely. These restitutions were compatible with GATT rules 
and formed a logical element within the EEC's agricultural market system and in any case, the
238BArch. B102: 255718. 21 .6 .1 98 2 . G A TT M inistertagung.
239 ArchEZ. W A -B EB-55. Verslag van de vergadering van art. 113 (leden) op 12.11.1982.
240 BArch. B102: 2 7 1988. 1 0 .10.1983. Brief von Von Dew itz an den Minister. Betr: Liberalisierungsinitiativen 
des O ECD -G eneralsekretärs und des GATT-Generaldirektors.
241 BArch. B102: 271988. 12.1 .1984. Schnellbrief von BM L an BMWI, nachrichtlich, A A , BMF, BWZ. Betr.: 
Neue G A TT-Verhandlungsrunde. Hier: Spracheregelung.
242 BArch. B102: 2 7 1988. Band 3: 1983-1983. Grundsatzfragen der Handelspolitik.
Liberalisierungsinitiativen des O ECD -G eneralsekretärs, neue G ATT-Runde. 26 .1 .1 98 4 . Von Dew itz an das 
A usw ärtiges Am t. Betr.: GATT: Neue Runde von Handelsverhandlungen. Hier: Spracheregelung für die 
deutschen A uslandvertretungen. Bezug: Mein Schreiben vom 11.1 .1984.
243 Deutscher Bundestag. Drucksache 10/1700. 2 .7 .1984.
196| Against the Grain
United States also provided export support to its farmers through export credits and food aid 
and it maintained import contingents on the basis of its GATT waiver granted in 1955. Such 
issues should also be up for discussion in the GATT negotiations, according to Kiechle (Bulletin
31.10.1984).244
When, by 1984, the Commission and an increasing number of member states started to 
develop a more positive attitude towards a new GATT round, Germany attempted to convince 
the French of the benefits and necessity of new GATT negotiations. As far as Germany was 
concerned, the negotiations could be launched as early as the autumn of 1985 (Handelsblatt 
6.2.1984; Rheinische Post 16.2.1984). The German Ministry of Economics stressed that the 
GATT was vital for the world trading system and that no alternative forum existed for 
multilateral trade agreements. Due to its dependence on exports and because it considered itself 
a fundamental advocate of free trade, Germany had supported GATT from the start. Given 
increasing protectionist tendencies around the world and the prospect of a world trade crisis, a 
new round of negotiations was particularly relevant and important at this stage. Agriculture 
should be integrated into the GATT system, because agricultural trade had become one of the 
main sources of conflict between the EEC and its trading partners.245 Within the Ministry of 
Economics, international economic considerations and the idea of Germany as a Handeisstaat, 
appear to have played an important role in the German insistence on a new GATT round. The 
outcome of a German cabinet meeting in January 1985 showed that the position of the Ministry 
of Economics was widely shared within the government. During this meeting it was decided that 
curbing international protectionist tendencies and strengthening the international trading system 
would be the priorities of German international economic policy. Agricultural trade should be 
brought under GATT discipline in order to prevent conflicts between the EEC and the United 
States which could result in a trade war.246
Countries outside the EEC particularly counted on Germany to induce the EEC to taking a 
more positive stance with respect to the GATT negotiations. As discussed in Section 5.4.1, the 
USTR tried to channel United States pressure for a new trade round through Germany, but 
Germany initially did not cooperate because it wanted to avoid offending the French.247 By the 
end of 1984, Germany did start to exert pressure on the French in bilateral talks, however. It 
tried to convince the French that their industry would also benefit from open markets and 
consequently from a new round of GATT negotiations. France should, moreover, regard the 
negotiations as a means of curbing United States moves towards bilateral and regional solutions
244 Neuorientierung für EG -Agrarpolitiek. Speech by Minister Kiechle for the Amerikanische Handelskammer 
in M unich, 29 .1 0 .19 8 4 .
245 BArch. B102: 2 7 1991. 3 .2 .1 9 84 . Abteilung 4 an Staatssekretär. Betr. Rolle und Bedeutung des G A T T  in 
der gegenw ärtigen  Krise des W elthandelssystem s; BArch. B102: 2969 8 4 . 21.1 1.1984. Nur für den 
Dienstgebrauch. Betr: K lausur zur Aussenw irtschafts- und A grarpo litik  am M ittwoch; see also Deutscher 
Bundestag. Drucksache 10/1700. 2 .7 .1 9 84 , 10 and Plenarprotokoll 10/94. 2 5 .1 0 .19 8 4 , 6 856-6859.
246 BArch. B102: 296985. 18.1 .1985. Der Leiter der Abteilung V. Betr.: Schw erpunktarbeit der 
Bundesregierung. Bezug: Kabinettsbeschluss vom  9.1 .1985.
247 ibid.
For the Sake of our Economy: Germany 1982-1989 |197
outside GATT.248 Nevertheless, Germany did not press the French excessively. During the Council 
meeting of 1985 which resulted in a declaration of the EEC's willingness to take part in a new 
GATT round, Germany conceded to French demands. It is claimed that during this meeting, the 
initially liberally inclined German position moved closer and closer towards the protectionist 
French position after telephone calls between Paris and Bonn (interview Engering 20.2.2004). 
This resulted in a declaration of which one-third was devoted to agriculture -  whereas the 
presidency had originally only included one sentence on agriculture -  and which included 
numerous conditions and reservations on this issue. Nevertheless, the German government 
supported this declaration emphatically.249 After this meeting, the Germans continued their 
efforts to move the French to relax their position. Ministry of Economics documents concerning 
this diplomacy show that Germany was struggling with conflicting interests. Due to its economic 
interests, Germany wanted new GATT negotiations, including agriculture, to begin swiftly The 
international economic considerations that surfaced repeatedly in government documents were 
the following: GATT negotiations were necessary to ensure the multilateral trading system; a 
new GATT round was the best way to restrain protectionist tendencies -  particularly on the part 
of the United States; if the trade-political problems of the agricultural sector were to spill over 
into the industrial sector, this could lead to major political and economic confrontations that 
Germany, due to its dependence on exports, could not afford.250 German acceptance of a new 
GATT round was also important to its credibility because, according to the Ministry of 
Agriculture, it was increasingly being accused by the United States of being insincere -  paying 
lip service to trade liberalization but at the same time maintaining its protectionist policies.251 
This impression of German insincerity and lack of credibility on issues relating to trade had to be 
dealt with.252 However, notwithstanding these economic interests, Germany was reluctant to 
move too radically on agriculture, because it did not wish to upset its French friends.253 After the 
G7 conference in Bonn, where Mitterrand refused to commit himself to a specific date for the 
launch of a new trade round, Kohl emphasized that Germany's relationship with the French was 
particularly amicable (explicitly referring to the 'deutsch-französischen Freundschaft) and that 
Germany wanted to operate in tandem with France.254 German diplomacy therefore focused on
248 BArch. B102: 2 7 1994. 24 .9 .1 98 4 . Informelles Handelsm inistertreffen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
vom 1.3-3.3 1985. Gesprächsziel: Französische Zusage, an inform ellen Treffen teilzunehm en.
249 Deutscher Bundestag. Drucksache 10/3229. 2 2 .4 .1 9 8 5 , 8.
250 BArch. B102 292882. 4 .6 .1 9 85 . Handelsm inisterkonferenz Stockholm , 8-10 Juni 1985. A grarfragen; 
1 .7.1985. Gespräch von BM Dr. Bangem ann mit Frau Minister Cresson am 8. Juli 1985 in Paris. EG- 
Handelspolitik; 1 .7 .1985. Verhältnis EG/USA. Gesprächsziel: Frankreich bewusst m achen, dass seinen 
Interessen langfristig am besten durch eine w eltoffene Handelspolitik gedient ist; 2 7 .9 .1 98 5 . Gespräch BM 
Dr. Bangem ann mit der französischen Industrie- und Handelsm inisterin Cresson am 1.10.1985. Neue G A T T­
Runde. See also: ArchBuZa. EG 1985-1989: 1 543. Verslag van de vergadering van art. 113 Com ité leden 
van 8 .3 .1985.
251 BArch. B102: 2 9 2882. 4 .6 .1 9 85 . Handelsm inisterkonferenz Stockholm , 8-10 Juni 1985. Agrarfragen.
252 ibid.
253 ibid.
254 Deutscher Bundestag. Plenarprotokoll 10/137. 1 4 .5 .1985, 10163.
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convincing the French that they too, in the longer term, stood to benefit the most from a more 
open world trading system.255 The German preparatory documents for Council meetings 
provided various outlines for speeches for the German representatives, each geared towards 
responding to a different French position.256 German declarations were therefore highly 
dependent on the position taken by the French in the negotiations.
6.5.1.3 Analysis
Corroborating evidence was found in the empirical analysis for the prediction that Germany 
would favour launching a new GATT round. It is striking, however, that this preference, 
considering the documents analysed, appears to have been based mainly on international 
economic considerations, while domestic political considerations -  considerations that in the 
theoretical framework were expected to be of decisive importance -  were not found in the 
empirical research. Although a similar preference was expected on the basis of domestic political 
considerations, the empirical analysis does not provide evidence for the conclusion that the 
German government was influenced by pressure from domestic groups, most of which were 
arguing for new GATT negotiations. The strong preference for a new GATT round which Kohl 
and the Ministry of Economics defended as early as 1982 was, in their view, a natural position 
for them to take given German economic interests and the role that Germany had long played 
as an advocate of trade liberalization. The adoption of this position was not dependent on the 
mobilization of interest groups, and the German government would certainly not have been 
moved to depart from it as a result of domestic pressure. Within the German government, it was 
only the Ministry of Agriculture that raised objections until 1984, but when it came to the issue 
of GATT negotiations as a whole this ministry did not hold sufficient sway within the 
government. To the extent that the German government moderated its strong preference for 
new GATT negotiations at all, this was mainly the result of international ideological 
considerations regarding the Franco-German friendship. What can be seen repeatedly in the 
deliberations of the German government is that they tried to steer a middle course between 
arguing hard for a new GATT round and cultivating the Franco-German friendship.
On the question of the inclusion of agriculture in the GATT negotiations, it must be 
concluded that Germany was less reserved in its support for this than was expected on the basis 
of the theoretical model. Although the Ministry of Economics and the Ministry of Agriculture 
disagreed on this issue, Germany pressed increasingly for the inclusion of agriculture in the 
negotiations from 1985 onwards. The argument repeatedly used to justify this position was that 
agricultural negotiations were necessary to prevent conflicts with trading partners, particularly 
the United States. Again, both international political and international economic considerations 
appear to have played a greater role in the German preference-formation process than was
255 BArch. B102: 2 9 2882. 1 .7 .1985. Verhältnis EG/USA. Gesprächsziel: Frankreich bew usst m achen, dass 
seinen Interessen langfristig am besten durch eine w eltoffene Handelspolitik gedient ist.
256 See for exam ple: BArch. B102: 292883. 1 .7.1985. Gespräch von BM Dr. Bangem ann mit Frau Minister 
Cresson am 8. Juli 1985 in Paris. EG-Handelspolitik.
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expected on the basis of the theoretical model. The German government eventually prioritized 
the launch of a new round of GATT negotiations and, if it was necessary to that end, was willing 
to include agriculture in these negotiations.
Although on the one hand it is surprising that international considerations played an 
important role in the German preference-formation process, in view of the theoretical 
predictions, it is also consistent with the fact that there were no domestic political or economic 
obstacles to pushing for a successful opening conference, on the other hand. Due to the limited 
societal mobilization against a new trade round and the limited governmental sensitivity (see 
Section 6.3.1 and 6.2.3), the German government was able to take account of its international 
interests. Combining Germany's predicted priorities on the basis of international and domestic 
polarity with the process variables of societal mobilization and governmental sensitivity, can 
therefore explain why international economic considerations and international political 
considerations led Germany to favour a new trade round.
6.5.2  The start of the Uruguay Round in Punta del Este
6.5.2.1 Predictions
With respect to the opening declaration of Punta del Este it is predicted that Germany will 
accept this declaration. Both domestic political and domestic economic considerations favour 
acceptance of this declaration. Industrial interest groups were lobbying for a new round of GATT 
negotiations and the farm lobby, although they were concerned, did not actively resist such 
negotiations. Furthermore, although trade liberalization could be detrimental to farm income 
and employment, it was likely to result in increased incomes and employment in the German 
economy as a whole. The only factor which may have stood in the way of a positive German 
attitude to the launch of a new GATT round was the international ideological consideration of 
the Franco-German friendship, but on the basis of the theory it is predicted that the domestic 
political and economic considerations will prevail here.
Table 6.4c Issue: Acceptance of the 1986opening declaration
INTERNATIONAL DOMESTIC
Political x +
Economic x +
Ideoloqical x x
BALANCE +
Prediction: Germany will accept the opening declaration in Punta del Este and will make attempts 
to convince the French as well.
Key to symbols: + =  benefits exceed costs, x = non-decisive consideration.
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6.5.2.2 Preferences
In 1986, both Bangemann and Kiechle took the position that agriculture should be included in 
the GATT negotiations. Kiechle stressed that international negotiations were necessary in order 
to solve the problems in the agricultural sector (Agence Europe 24.3.1986). Production 
surpluses were the main issue, and the export restitutions that the EEC used to sell these 
surpluses on the world market were putting the EEC budget under great strain. According to 
Kiechle, this money could better be spent on other forms of farm support. From a social, 
regional and ecological perspective, it was important to the German government to maintain a 
significant agricultural sector, but not necessarily as a European export sector (Agence Europe
11.6.1986). Germany's main goal in the agricultural negotiations was to mitigate the potential 
for a trade conflict which increasing production surpluses were causing, and greater discipline in 
export supports for agriculture was necessary to reach this goal.257
Germany still considered the swift launch of a new GATT round to be vital. Prior to the 
Ministerial Conference in Punta del Este in 1986, Germany continued to use the international 
economic and international political arguments it had already advanced in 1984 and 1985 to 
support this position: the GATT negotiations would curb protectionism around the world and, as 
a corollary to this, strengthen the hand of the United States government against protectionist 
tendencies in Congress; the negotiations would prevent a weakening of the multilateral trading 
system; and the negotiations would improve the trade-political relations between the United 
States and the EEC.258 In the scope of the last mentioned argument it was to be prevented that 
conflicts in the agricultural sector would spill over into industrial sectors (Agence Europe
12.4.1986).
During the negotiations in Punta del Este in September 1986, the launch of a new GATT 
round was thus a goal in its own right for Germany; the precise formulation of the opening 
declaration was less important according to Bangemann {Handeisbiatt 19.9.1986; 22.9.1986). 
Together with USTR Yeutter, Germany exerted extensive pressure on France in Punta del Este. 
As already mentioned in Section 5.4.1, Germany also tried to find formulations, together with 
the British presidency, with the aim of 'den Franzosen Brücken zu bauen and to overcome 
French recalcitrance (Handeisbiatt 19.9.1986). According to Schomerus, it was thanks to 
German and United States pressure that France, having defended an inflexible position during 
almost the whole of the conference (see Section 5.5.3), eventually accepted the opening 
declaration (interview Schomerus 29.3.2007). It is claimed that a tacit agreement existed 
between France and Germany, with the support of Kohl, that the principles of the CAP were not
257 Deutscher Bundestag. Drucksache 10/5265. 2 5 .3 .1 98 6 . See also: Bulletin 8 .10 .1986: A bbau des 
Subventionsw ettlaufs beim Agrarexport. Rede von Staatssekretär von Geldern in Bonn am 2. O ktober 1986. 
Von Geldern argued that, w ith respect to agriculture, the EEC should limit itself to its internal market. In 
exchange, the issue of cereal substitutes should be discussed in the G A TT negotiations and the C A P  was 
not up for discussion.
258 Deutscher Bundestag. Drucksache 10/5265. 2 5 .3 .1 98 6 ; Drucksache 70/68. 2 0 .1 .1986.
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to be put up for discussion.259 After the negotiations in Punta del Este, Bangeman stated in the 
Bundestag that with respect to agriculture 'sich die deutsch-französische Kooperation voll 
bewährt [hat] and that he had kept in close contact with the French Ministers of Trade and of 
Agriculture during the negotiations in order to develop compromise formulas.260
6.5.2.3 Analysis
German preferences and behaviour with respect to the GATT negotiations in 1986 correspond 
with the predictions made on the basis of the theoretical framework: Germany spared no efforts 
in ensuring that the opening conference was a success and securing French approval for the 
opening declaration. But, just as between 1982 and 1985, the German line of reasoning was 
mainly based on international economic and political considerations rather than on domestic 
political and economic considerations. The comparative assessment of economic benefits on the 
one hand, and potential damage to the Franco-German friendship on the other hand, continued 
to remain important in 1986, although, compared to the previous period, Germany now took a 
more assertive position and did not hesitate to exert considerable pressure on the French. The 
fact that international considerations once again played an important role in the German 
preference-formation process may again be explained through the process variables of the 
degree of societal mobilization and the degree of governmental sensitivity. Although 
governmental sensitivity was greater in 1986 compared than in the period 1982-1985 (because 
of the parliamentary elections due in 1987), the degree of mobilization against the opening 
declaration was negligible. As a result, the German government was able to take account of its 
international interest in the preference-formation process.
6
6.5.3  The first proposals
6.5.3.1 Predictions
The domestic and international costs and benefits related to the Commission proposals in 1987 
and 1988 point unambiguously in one direction: German acceptance of these proposals (see 
Table 6.4d). From a domestic political perspective, the proposals were attractive, because they 
were likely to be acceptable to farmers as the principles and policies of the CAP were not to be 
discussed. The SPD was the only domestic actor that challenged the German government to 
make a greatef effort in the area of agriculture. Under the assumption that domestic political 
and economic considerations will prevail in this period, Germany may be expected to accept the
259 The Germ an and French interpretations of the 'fundam ental m echanism s of the C A P ' differed, however. 
Germ any took the position that the European agricultural market could be opened to some extent w ithout 
dam aging the m echanism s of the C A P, while France defended a more restrictive interpretation (interview 
Schom erus 29.3.2007).
260 Deutscher Bundestag. Plenarprotokoll 10/323. 2 5 .9 .1 98 6 , 1 7 996-17998.
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EEC proposals on agriculture. The proposals of the United States and the Cairns Groups for their 
part ran counter to German domestic political and domestic economic interests (see Table 6.4e), 
and conceding to these proposals would also have undermined the Franco-German friendship 
and principles of the CAP. It is therefore predicted that Germany will reject the United States 
and Cairns Groups proposals.
Table 6.4dIssue: Acceptance of the EEC proposals in 1987and 1988
INTERNATIONAL DOMESTIC
Political x +
Economic x +
Ideological x x
BALANCE +
Prediction: Germany will accept the EEC proposals of 1987 and 1988
Key to symbols: + =  benefits exceed costs, x = non-decisive consideration.
Tabei 6.4e Issue: Acceptance of the proposais of the United States and the Cairns Group
INTERNATIONAL DOMESTIC
Political x —
Economic x —
Ideological x x
BALANCE —
Prediction: Germany will reject the agricultural proposals of the United States and the Cairns 
Group
Key to symbols: -  = costs exceed benefits, x = non-decisive consideration
6.5.3.2 Preferences
In the autumn of 1987, Germany accepted the Commission's agricultural proposals for the GATT 
negotiations. The government argued that the Commission's proposals represented a step 
forwards in the negotiations to solve the crisis on world agricultural markets.261 In response to 
challenges from the SPD, it argued that the EEC did not need to make additional concessions, 
because its proposals already constituted a substantial compromise.262 The positions of various 
German ministries were not in agreement, however. While the Ministry of Economics was 
entirely satisfied with the steps that the Commission was planning to take in the negotiations, 
the Ministry of Agriculture warned that the EEC should not go too far in its proposals and
261 Deutscher Bundestag. Drucksache 11.1184. 13.11.1987.
262 Deutscher Bundestag. Drucksache 11/1780. 4 .2 .1 9 88 .
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concessions [Bulletin 25.2.1987; interview Schomerus 29.3.2007). The Ministry of Agriculture 
was facing increasing discontent among farmers. After the parliamentary elections of January
1987, in which the CDU/CSU lost 21 of their seats in the Bundestag (going from 244 to 223), 
CSU Minister Kiechle took steps to appease the farm lobby. In his speeches, he tried to convince 
them that he was personally committed to furthering their interests, emphasizing that ' Ihre 
Sorge s/nd unsere Sorge (Bulletin 25.2.1987).263 In the annual agricultural price round in the 
EEC, Kiechle fervently resisted price reductions and repeatedly conferred with Kohl, who stressed 
the importance of the elections to be held in Schleswig-Holstein in September 1987.264 At the 
same time, the Ministry of Agriculture tried to convince the farmers that safeguarding the 
international trading system was essential for Germany's export oriented economy (Bulletin 
27.1.1987; 5.10.1987) and that solutions for the crisis on world markets therefore had to be 
sought at the international level.265 Nevertheless, Kiechle's speeches were unable to quell 
discontent among the farmers completely, and this discontent was shown when they 'uninvited' 
Kiechle for the DBV Bauerntagin July 1987 (see Section 6.2.3). According to Kiechle, this only 
meant that the German farmers opposed the agricultural policy developed by the Commission at 
the European level, but it was not an indication of dissatisfaction with the German government 
[Bulletin 18.8.1987).
On the zero option proposed by the United States, the German position was clear. The 
major price reductions it included were at odds with the German agricultural policy and even the 
Ministry of Economics opposed the American proposal (Handelsblatt27.8.1987).266 Whereas, in 
the case of France, sources speak of 'intransigence' in the GATT negotiations, France's position 
was apparently 'mild' compared to 'Germany's absolute refusal to face the facts, both in terms 
of EEC agriculture and of international trade' [Agra Europe 10.10.1987). This view is supported 
by officials of the German Ministry of Agriculture, who claim that Germany represented a greater 
obstacle in the negotiations in 1987 than France. German resistance went so far that France 
could hide behind Germany's back and let Germany do the dirty work in the negotiations 
(interview Schloder and Witt 4.8.2008).
B.5.3.3 Analysis
Germany's acceptance of the Commission's proposals in 1987 and its rejection of the proposals 
of the United States and the Cairns Group both accord with the predictions formulated on the 
basis of the theoretical framework. Although even the Ministry of Agriculture employed the
263 BArch. N1436: 55. 24 .3 .1 98 7 . Rede vor der Ausserordentlichen M itgliederversam m lung des Deutschen 
Bauernverbandes in Bonn.
264 ArchBuZa. EG 19 8 5 -1 9 8 9 : 01030. 26 .5 .1 98 7 . M em orandum  verslag landbouw raad 24-26 mei 1987.
265 BArch. N1436: 55. 24 .3 .1 98 7 . Rede vor der Ausserordentlichen M itgliederversam m lung des Deutschen 
Bauernverbandes in Bonn.
266 It w as also questioned within the Germ an bureaucracy w hether the Am erican proposal could be taken 
seriously. W itt argued that the United States did not really w ant the total elim ination of support either 
(interview Schlöder and W itt, 4 .8 .2008).
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same economic arguments of Germany's interests in the GATT negotiations that the Ministry of 
Economics had been using for years, domestic political considerations now also began to play a 
specific role in the German preference-formation process. Domestic political considerations 
appear to have increased in importance in 1987 compared to the period prior to and including 
1986.
6.5.4  The Mid-Term Review
6.5.4.1 Predictions
Due to the high domestic political and domestic economic costs involved, it is predicted that 
Germany will not agree to far-reaching concessions during the Mid-Term Review in Montreal in 
December 1988. The German farm lobby mobilized against making concessions on agriculture 
and, although the industrial and trade lobby wanted an accord, they did not specifically argue 
for concessions on agriculture. However, the situation became more complex with respect to the 
outcome of the Mid-Term Review in Geneva in 1989. Compared to the situation in Montreal in
1988, there were fewer domestic political and economic costs associated with this outcome, 
because the industrial and trade lobbies had increased their pressure following the negotiating 
stalemate in Montreal, and were now making explicit demands for concessions on agriculture so 
that the Mid-Term Review could be concluded successfully. Moreover, international political 
considerations and international ideological considerations of Germany as a Handeisstaat, of 
which it was repeatedly reminded by its international partners, favoured the behavioural option 
of accepting the outcome. Nevertheless, in the theoretical framework domestic political and 
economic considerations are expected to play a decisive role, and it is therefore predicted that 
Germany will resist the outcome of the Mid-Term Review in 1989. This resistance should, 
however, be weaker than the predicted German resistance to concessions in Montreal in 1988, 
which would have been more costly in domestic political and economic terms.
Table 6.4f: Issue: Making concessions during the Mid-Term Review in Montreal
INTERNATIONAL DOMESTIC
Political x -
Economic x -
Ideological x x
BALANCE -
Prediction: Germany will not agree to make far-reaching concessions to the United States and the 
Cairns Group during the Mid-Term Review in Montreal.
Key to symbols: -  = costs exceed benefit, x = non-decisive consideration.
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Table 6.4g: Issue: Acceptance of the outcome of the Mid-Term Review in Geneva
INTERNATIONAL DOMESTIC
Political x + /-
Economic x -
Ideoloqical x x
BALANCE -
Prediction: Germany will not accept the outcome of the Mid-Term Review in Geneva in 1989.
Key to symbols: -  = costs exceed benefits, + / -  = benefits equal costs, x = non-decisive consideration.
6.5.4.2 Preferences
Before the negotiations in Montreal in 1988, Germany argued that the EEC should not yield to 
the demands of the United States and the Cairns Group. However, the Ministry of Agriculture 
took a firmer stance on this than the Ministry of Economics. Minister of Agriculture Kiechle 
insisted that the EEC should only make concessions in Montreal if its negotiating partners 
showed equal willingness to compromise (Die Welt 15.11.1988). He called for the EEC to take 
the initiative and not allow itself to be pushed into a defensive position (Handelsblatt 
15.11.1988; Bulletin 29.11.1988).267 It was sufficient to offer a freeze in agricultural support in 
the short term and reductions in the longer term, but he did not want the EEC to commit itself 
specific and quantifiable reductions in the negotiations (Die Welt 15.11.1988).268 He 
nevertheless agreed that subsidized exports could be reduced in order to prevent conflict with 
Germany's trade partners (Bulletin 29.11.1988). Although the Ministry of Economics also 
supported the Commission's position on the Mid-Term Review, it also warned that agricultural 
policy should not be allowed to become the 'Springsatz in the Uruguay Round (Handelsblatt 
9.11.1988). Overall, the Ministry of Economics was fairly optimistic about the prospect of 
agricultural negotiations. According to Schomerus, the negotiating themes of services and 
intellectual property were more likely to throw up obstacles in the negotiation process than 
agriculture (Die Welt 2.12.1988). Concerning agriculture, he expected that the United States 
and the EEC would be able to reach agreement on freezing support in the short term and a 
negotiating path for the longer-term issues (Handelsbiatt2.12.1988).269
When it became apparent that the negotiations in Montreal were in danger of ending in 
stalemate, the difference of opinion between the two German ministries surfaced with greater 
intensity. They disagreed on how far the Commission should be allowed to move beyond the
267 See also: A rchBuZa. EG 1985-1989: 01444. Open bericht. Verslag van de 1263e vergadering van de Raad 
van de EG (landbouw ) gehouden te Brussel op 26 en 27 septem ber 1988.
268 See also: A rchBuZa. EG 1985-1989: 01444. Open bericht van PV Brussel aan BuZa. Onderwerp: eerste 
deelverslag van de 1273e vergadering van de raad van de EG (landbouw ) gehouden in Brussel op 14-15 
novem ber 1988.
269 ArchEZ. Infodossier GATT/UR/M TR 5-8 decem ber 1988. Soc 1-199. 30.1 1.1988. Codebericht aan 
Buitenlandse Zaken. Onderw erp: MTR G A TT Montreal.
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original EEC proposal concerning short-term measures (Süddeutsche Zeitung 10.12.1988; 
Bulletin 29.11.1988). On the Article 113 Committee, the German representatives of the two 
ministries repeatedly attempted to interrupt each other (interview Schlöder and Witt 4.8.2008). 
The Ministry of Economics would have preferred to agree to further concessions in Montreal, but 
this turned out to be impossible according to Schomerus (interview 29.3.2007). It appears that 
the Ministry of Agriculture could still count on the support of Chancellor Kohl, for whom, it is 
claimed, it was of great importance to remain on good terms with the farm sector (interview 
Schlöder and Witt 4.8.2008). Schlöder and Witt argue that, during the negotiations in Montreal 
in 1988 it was Germany that continued to be the strongest defender of European agricultural 
interests while France was content to let Germany do the work (interview Schlöder and Witt
4.8.2008).270 Of course, this is correct from the German, particularly the Ministry of Agriculture's 
perspective, but the fact remains that other states believed that Germany was willing to make 
additional concessions, on the basis of the statements of the representative from the German 
Economics Ministry during the negotiations in Montreal (see Section 5.4.1).
After the breakdown of the negotiations in Montreal, the new German Minister of 
Economics, Haussmann, made a case for a greater willingness to negotiate on agricultural issues 
on the part of the EEC (Handelsblatt 15.12.1988; BMWI Tagesnachrichten 27.1.1989). 
Germany demanded 'höchsterKompromissbereitschaft undEinigungsfahigkeit of all negotiating 
partners in Geneva [Frankfurter Rundschau 4.4.1989). Nevertheless, in its Agrarbericht 1989, 
the government also reiterated that the principles and policies of the CAP were not up for 
discussion and that the EEC should be given credit for the agricultural reforms it had already 
undertaken (the introduction of quota and stabilizers) in the course of the Uruguay Round 
negotiations.271 Germany agreed to the conclusion of the Mid-Term Review that was reached 
during the negotiations in Geneva in April 1989. In the words of the Ministry of Agriculture 'der 
in Genf erzie/te Kompromiss im Landwirtschaftsbereich wahrt die Agrarinteressen der 
Bundesrepubiik Deutschland und der Gemeinschaft. Die Mechanismen und Elementen der 
geimeinsamen Agrarpolitik werden nicht im Frage gesteiit .272
6,5,4,3 Analysis
The hard-line position that Germany adopted at the start of the Mid-Term Review in Montreal 
accords with the predictions formulated on the basis of the theoretical model. The fact that 
Germany officially maintained this position despite ongoing skirmishes between the Ministry of 
Agriculture and the Ministry of Economics appears to indicate that Kohl took the side of the 
Ministry of Agriculture in the intra-governmental debate and in Montreal. German acceptance of
270 The Germ an Staatssekretär even rejected a com prom ise proposal issued by Andriessen w ith reference to 
a Franco-Germ an consultation, although no consultations had actually taken place (interview Schlöder and 
W itt 4 .8 .2008).
271 Deutscher Bundestag. Drucksache 85/89. 14 .2 .1 98 9 , 114.
272 Deutscher Bundestag. Plenarprotokoll 11/136. 1 9 .4 .1989, 10042.
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the outcome of the Mid-Term Review in April 1989, however, does not correspond with the 
predictions formulated. It is true that the domestic political picture was mixed, because farm 
pressure against acceptance was balanced by pressure from the industrial and trade lobby in 
favour of acceptance, and the domestic economic costs were more limited than the costs that 
had been associated with making concessions a few months earlier. But then it still could not be 
argued that Germany's domestic political and economic interests alone led it to accept the 
outcome of the Mid-Term Review. It appears that only international considerations are really 
able to explain the German acceptance of the outcome of the Mid-Term Review -  namely 
international political factors, including the appeals made by third states made to Germany's 
identity as an advocate of free trade, and the international economic consideration that 
concluding the Mid-Term review after the failure in Montreal had now become essential in order 
to maintain the credibility and effectiveness of the multilateral trading system.
6.6 Conclusion
On the basis of the empirical analysis, it may be concluded that German preferences in the run­
up to and during the first half of the Uruguay Round correspond with the predictions based on 
the theoretical framework at all but one of the decision moments. Only German acceptance of 
the outcome of the Mid-Term Review in 1989 does not accord with the theoretical predictions. 
In addition, it is striking that both between 1982 and 1984 and in 1986 international economic 
considerations (as well as international ideological considerations to some extent) played a far 
greater role in the German preference-formation process than was to be expected on the basis 
of the combination of domestic and international polarity. The combination of low domestic 
polarity and high international polarity meant that domestic political and economic 
considerations should have been decisive. However, given the limited degree of societal 
mobilization and governmental sensitivity, the primacy of international considerations between 
1982 and 1986 is compatible with the theoretical model. According to the model, states with a 
low domestic polarity, such as Germany, are expected to be able to take account of 
international considerations when there is limited societal mobilization and governmental 
sensitivity, and the policy option based on international considerations is thus not associated 
with significant domestic costs.
It is remarkable in this German case study that the period of 1986-1987 seems to have 
marked a turning-point. Until 1986, Germany spared no effort in ensuring that the new round of 
GATT negotiations went ahead; once these negotiations had actually started in 1987, Germany 
heavily contributed to agriculture becoming one of the main obstacles in the trade round. 
Although this may appear inconsistent, it can actually be explained perfectly well by the fact 
that prior to 1987 the negotiations had only involved the launching of a new GATT round -  
which was in Germany's interest -  whereas the substantive negotiations that began in 1987 
took place in separate negotiating groups for various areas of trade. In the negotiating group 
that was dealing with agriculture, Germany simply defended its interest in preventing what it
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saw as excessive liberalization. Moreover, the difference in the content of the negotiations 
before 1986 and from 1987 onwards (the GATT negotiations as a whole compared to the 
specific agricultural negotiations) also affected the specific ministries that were involved in the 
intra-governmental debate. Prior to 1987, during the negotiations on whether or not to 
participate in a new GATT round, the Ministry of Economics was the principal actor within the 
German government, while after the start of the actual negotiations, the Ministry of Agriculture 
held de facto primacy in the negotiations on agriculture. The empirical analysis has already 
shown that this led to intra-governmental disagreements between the Ministries of Agriculture 
and Economics, which at times resulted in the defence of contradictory positions by the 
representatives of the two ministries in European negotiations. As indicated earlier, such 
contradictions occurred repeatedly due to the inadequate internal coordination of negotiating 
positions in Germany. In the second German case study in Chapter 8 we will see that an 
increasingly fierce struggle between these ministries ultimately forced Chancellor Kohl to 
intervene and settle the dispute.
CHAPTER 7
WE ARE NOT ALONE: FRANCE 1990-1993
7.1 Introduction
French preferences on the agricultural chapter of the Uruguay Round hardly shifted at all 
between 1990 and 1993. During this entire period, France resisted any far-reaching 
liberalization of agricultural trade. This resistance manifested itself in France's wish to water 
down the Commission proposal on agriculture in the autumn of 1990. In 1991 and 1992, 
French resistance was reflected in its rejection of the Draft Final Act and the Blair House Accord 
respectively. Finally, in 1993, France sought to limit the extent of liberalization in agricultural 
trade by demanding a renegotiation of the Blair House Accord.
The question central to this chapter is how the consistently stubborn position of the 
French in the agricultural negotiations can be explained. I will argue, in contrast to the 
prevailing claim that agricultural pressure was at the root of this position, that it was in fact 
international considerations that caused the French government ceaselessly to resist 
liberalization in the agricultural sector.
This chapter will first paint a picture of the context in which French decision making took 
place, by describing the most important developments in the French government between 1990 
and 1993 (Section 7.2). Sections 7.3 and 7.4 will focus on domestic and international 
considerations respectively. These sections will shed light on the political, economic and 
ideological costs and benefits attached to various proposals that were tabled in relation to the 
GATT negotiations between 1990 and 1993. Based on this analysis, in Section 7.5 propositions 
are formulated relating to the preferences that France was likely to defend with regard to the 
proposals on the table at various decision moments, and these hypotheses are subsequently 
contrasted with the preferences that France actually defended in the negotiations. In the 
conclusion, I will evaluate the extent to which the theoretical framework is able to explain 
French preference formation in this period.
7.2 The French Government Between 1990 and 1993
The second Rocard government had already been sailing through heavy political waters in 1989 
as a result of popular demonstrations (see Section 5.1.2), but its position deteriorated even 
further during 1990 and 1991. Economic recovery failed to materialize and discontent within 
French society increased (L Année politique, économique et sociale 1990, 74, 524 and 538). The 
opposition parties repeatedly tabled censure motions, one of which failed by ju st five votes
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[L'Année politique, économique et sociale 1990, 81). At the same time, Rocard was facing 
increasing challenges from within his own socialist party, in which various movements 
(Mitterandists, Rocardians and CERES) were vying for primacy ( L 'Année politique, économique 
et sociale 1990, 25 and 89). At the party convention in March 1990, Rocard managed to come 
out on top and remained government leader. Eventually, however, his position became 
untenable due to the increasing difficulty of having government legislation adopted by 
parliament and because government policies were provoking fierce hostility across society 
[L'Année politique, économique et sociale 1991, 40-41; Der Spiegel 3.12.1990).
Mitterrand then appointed Cresson as his new Prime Minister. She sought to create new 
élan, but did not succeed because her room for manoeuvre was tightly constrained by the 
adverse economic situation and the need to maintain balance and harmony within the socialist 
party (L'Année politique, économique et sociale 1991, 45, 48 and 61). In addition, the 
government soon became entangled in various affairs and within three months of taking office, 
Cresson was less popular than Rocard had ever been during his time as Prime Minister ( L 'Année 
politique, économique et sociale 1991, 18 and 60-61). Societal discontent took the form of 
mass demonstrations and riots (L'Année politique, économique et sociale 1991, 71 and 488) 
and Cresson had to resign within a year.
She was succeeded by Bérégovoy. His policies were hardly revolutionary and his 
government stuck to the priorities develeped by that of Cresson -  namely, stimulating 
employment and production capacity ( L 'Année politique, économique et sociale 1992, 516 and 
519). Bérégovoy's government took office in a difficult period, however. Negotiations on CAP 
reform had reached their final phase and the reform eventually led to a censure motion that 
failed by just three votes ( L 'Année politique, économique et sociale 1992, 61). Further debates 
on Europe and the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty followed, and the 'non camp opposing 
ratification gained support by the week ( L 'Annéepolitique, économique etsoclaie1992, 17-18). 
Mitterrand attached his personal prestige to winning the referendum on the ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty (Gyomarch et al. 1998, 80), and the fact that the treaty was ratified so 
narrowly represented a significant blow to Mitterrand's standing, demonstrating the 
dissatisfaction that was present among various groups in society. The socialist party continued 
to lose societal support and speculation began to emerge of a new period of cohabitation 
( L 'Annéepolitique, économique et soclaie1992, 428).273
This new period of cohabitation arrived after the parliamentary elections of March 1993. 
The UDF and RPR together with the right-wing splinter parties obtained 80%  of the seats in the 
Assemblée and formed a coalition government ( L 'Année politique, économique et sociale 1993, 
47). In contrast with the strife of the first period of cohabitation between Mitterrand and Chirac 
(1986-1988), the cohabitation between Mitterrand and Edouard Balladur was a relatively 
peaceful affair [L'Année politique, économique et sociale 1993, 16-17; Gyomarch et al. 1998, 
29 and 49). Balladur, like several of his predecessors, strove for new elan and recovery in order
273 http://ww w .vie-publique.fr/discours: 2 7 .1 1 .19 9 2 . Interview accordée par Laurent Fabius à RTL
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to restore France's position as an example to the rest of the world and lead France out of its 
'crise morale (L'Année politique, économique et sociale 1993, 59).274 He asserted that his 
policies differed from the policies of his predecessors in both their ambitions and their methods. 
In reality, though, these differences were marginal and the Balladur government's socio­
economic policies actually resembled those of Rocard to a great extent ( L 'Année politique, 
économique et sociale 1993, 17). Although the economic situation remained worrying, with 
high unemployment and a monetary crisis, the French population was satisfied with the new 
government ( L 'Annéepolitique, économique et sociaie1993, 22, 97 and 387).
Although Prime Ministers came and went between 1990 and 1993, the socialist Louis 
Mermaz remained in his position as Minister of Agriculture during the greater part of this period. 
When he took office in the autumn of 1990, he viewed French agriculture as serving two 
important roles. In the first place, the agricultural sector had to be export-oriented and 
contribute to the French trade balance. In relation to this, he spoke of France as a 'grand pays 
agricole and of the agricultural sector as a 'force de frappe économique de la France. The 
second mission of French agriculture was occupying and preserving the countryside.275 These 
priorities were not in contradiction with the French agricultural policy of the preceding period, 
but it was the first time that the sector's export capacity was emphasized so explicitly and 
strongly.
The relationship between Mermaz and the farm lobby was not an amicable one. Among 
the members of the farm lobby, Mermaz was viewed with suspicion as a minister who liked to 
operate in secrecy and viewed everything in terms of power relations (rapports de forcé) 
(Fouilleux 1996, 56-58). Although formal contacts between the Ministry of Agriculture and farm 
organizations continued in the usual way, it was claimed the influence of the farm lobby in these 
encounters decreased. The claim that Mermaz ultimately made his decisions unilaterally 
appeared to be substantiated when he accepted the proposals for CAP reform in October 1991, 
a decision that came as a complete surprise to the French farm lobby, as we will see in Section
7.3.1 (Fouilleux 1996, 68-71). When Jean-Pierre Soisson took office as Minister of Agriculture in
1992, attention shifted from export policies to rural policies and the preservation of the 
countryside. In his view, farmers occupied an essential place in rural society, but other economic 
activities (industry, services, and tourism) also had increasing roles to play in rural 
development.276 Although this policy shift would lead to a decrease in farmers' influence on 
rural policies, Soisson claimed to have close contacts with agricultural organizations. When Jean 
Puech took office as Minister of Agriculture in the centre-right government in 1993, contacts
274 Déclaration de politique générale de M. Édouard Balladur, Premier Ministre, à l'Assem blée nationale le 8 
avril 1993. In: Journal O fficiel de la République Française (1993), Assem blée nationale, séance du 8 avril 
1993.
275 Déclaration du gouvernem ent sur les difficultés actuelles et les perspectives de l'agriculture française, par 
M. Louis M erm az, ministre de l'agriculture et de la forêt. In: Journal O fficiel de la République Française 
(1993), Assem blée nationale, 1re séance du 11 octobre 1999.
276 C A C . 19930188, art 2. 8 .1 .1 9 93 . Contribution à la réflexion sur les orientations d 'une nouvelle politique 
rurale.
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with the four main agricultural organizations were intensified ( L 'Annéepolitique, économique et 
sociale 1993, 353). Puech maintained French agricultural policy on the basis of the existing 
priorities -  namely the export potential of the agricultural sector and the preservation of the 
countryside.
On the basis of the information presented above, it is now possible to assess the degrees 
of societal satisfaction, the degree of governmental stability and governmental sensitivity during 
this period. The degree of societal satisfaction with the government was exceptionally low until
1993. Its economic policies failed to bring about the revival hoped for and societal discontent 
found expression in mass demonstrations. The dissatisfaction already present at the end of the 
period of the previous case increased further during 1990 and 1991 and culminated in 1992, 
after CAP reform and during the debate on the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. The position 
of the socialist government was also far from stable. The government not only lacked a majority 
in parliament, but it also came in for increasing criticism from within the socialist party itself and 
was subject to censure motions tabled by the opposition parties in the Assemblée,277 The centre- 
right government that took office in March 1993, by contrast, enjoyed of a large majority in 
parliament.278 Finally, we can turn to governmental sensitivity. The degree of sensitivity depends 
on the stability of the government and on the electoral calendar. The most important elections 
in France in this period were the parliamentary elections of 1993. Taking together the 
information on governmental stability and electoral calendar, we may conclude that 
governmental sensitivity increased steadily from the end of 1990 and reached a peak prior to 
the 1993 elections. It may therefore be expected that the French government will attach more 
importance to domestic political considerations between 1990 and March 1993, particularly in
1992, than in the period after March 1993.
7.3 The French Interest: Domestic Considerations
7.3.1 Political interests
During the second half of the Uruguay Round, various French domestic groups repeatedly made 
their opinions on the GATT negotiations known to the government. With respect to agricultural 
policy, this involved farm organizations in particular, but as the end of the negotiations drew 
near, industrial and employer organizations also started to exert pressure on the government. In 
addition, the farm lobby did not always act as a unified movement, either because the various 
agricultural organizations were attempting to outbid each other, or because the interests of
277 W ith respect to the num ber of censure m otions in this period: four were tabled under Rocard, two under 
Cresson, two under Bérégovoy and none under Balladur (Elgie and Maor 1992, 71 ; Thiébault 2004, 335).
278 As indicated in Section 3 .3.1, the majority in parliam ent did not im m ediately result in an increase in 
dom estic polarity. On balance, dom estic polarity did not change, because Balladur had to cooperate w ith a 
socialist President (cohabitation).
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specialist product organizations differed from those of the general farm organizations. 
Moreover, the relation between the farm organizations and the French government ebbed and 
flowed with successive governments (see Section 7.2), and with it the effectiveness of farm 
lobby mobilization. Nevertheless, govermnent sensitivity increased in the period up to March
1993. The remainder of this section will analyse the preferences and mobilization of the various 
domestic groups concerning the proposals at the various decision moments in order to assess 
the domestic political consequences of accepting or rejecting a certain compromise.
1990: The run-up to the conference in Heysel
In terms of farmers' protests, 1990 was a turbulent year in France. In the spring, the usual 
agitation over the annual EEC agricultural price round erupted. The FNSEA regarded the price 
package proposed by the Commission to be a precursor to EEC concessions in the GATT 
negotiations (L'Information Agricole January 1990). According to the FNSEA, the United States, 
in contrast to the EEC, was using all possible means -  including the Farm Bill -  to protect its 
agricultural sector and force the EEC to make concessions (L 'Information Agricole March 1990; 
April 1990). In the summer, there were protests due to the protracted drought and low meat 
prices. Farmers were dissatisfied with the measures the government was taking to alleviate 
these problems and demanded additional compensation from both the French government and 
the EEC [Financial Times 18.9.1990; Année politique économique et sociale 1990, 375).279 In 
the autumn the farm lobby continued its mobilization efforts, and this time the Commission 
proposal for agriculture in the GATT negotiations became an increasingly important target of 
their criticism. The Commission proposal (see Section 4.4.4) provided for a 30%  reduction in 
agricultural support and met with fierce criticism from the farm lobby. The farm lobby repeatedly 
argued that the proposal would undermine the mechanisms and principles of the CAP, and was 
incompatible with French ideas on independence of food supplies and income from production 
as the main element of farm income (see also Section 5.3.1).280 In the same vein, the APCA 
argued that the proposal represented 'distmantling of the CAP', 'giving away the French export 
potential' and the 'disappearance of community preference'.281 The important contribution of 
agriculture to the French trade balance and the preservation of the countryside were also 
mentioned by the farm lobby, although infrequently.282 What was remarkable in the reaction of
279 See also: C A C . 1 9 9 20056, art 7. 14.9 .1990. FN SEA m essage à la presse.
280 For the position of the FNSEA see: L'Information Agricole, Septem ber 1990; O ctober 1990; Le Monde,
2 5 .1 0 .19 9 0 . For the position of A P C A  see: C A C . 19920056, art 6. 5 .9 .1990. Assem blée Permanente des 
Cham bres d 'Agricu lture. Conférence de Presse du 5 septembre 1990; C A C . 19920056, art 6. 2 0 .9 .1990. 
A P C A . For the opinion of Confédération Paysanne see: C A C . 19920 0 5 6 , art 7. 2 0 .9 .1 99 0 . Confédération 
Paysanne. Syndicats pour une agriculture paysanne et la défense de ses travailleurs. For the opinion of 
M ODEF see: C A C . 19920056, art 7. 4 .1 0 .1 99 0 . M ODEF. Com m uniqué: C ou p  de Grace!
281 C A C . 19920056, art 7. A P C A . 5 .9 .1990. Com m uniqué de Presse du 5 septembre 1990.
282 Of the sources I consulted, only the FN SEA explicitly presented both points. The A P C A  only referred to 
the im portance of the French export capacity, while Confédération Paysanne em phasized the danger of 
desertification of entire regions.
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nearly all the farm organizations is their rhetoric against United States dominance. Accepting the 
Commission proposal was invariably presented as a form of capitulation to the United States. 
The FNSEA argued against 'kneeling before the power of the United States', and argued that 
European agricultural policy should not be defined by states other than the EEC member states 
themselves.283 The Confédération Paysanne compared the proposal with bowing to the demands 
of the United States and denounced the EEC's inability to resist ideological pressure from the 
United States.284 The CNJA and MODEF also rejected giving in to United States demands, which, 
according to them, was exactly what the Commission was doing in its agricultural proposal 
(Année politique, économique et sociale 1990, 389). The farm organizations were thus in 
agreement that the Commission proposal should be rejected. Obviously, the farm lobby also 
rejected the proposals issued by the United States and the Cairns Group (see Section 4.4.4), 
these being even more far-reaching than the Commission proposal.
Rather than accepting the Commission proposal, the FNSEA and APCA demanded that 
France insist on the globality of the negotiations and that agricultural support should only be 
reduced under the condition that this was done in an even-handed manner -  that the American 
deficiency payments should also be regarded as export assistance, for example. They finally 
repeated that the mechanisms and principles of the CAP should not be put at risk.285 In addition, 
the FNSEA wanted the proposal to be discussed in the European Council and demanded that 
the French delegation should be cautious in pushing for accompanying measures,286 since the 
FNSEA feared that this could lead to the double pricing system being replaced by direct income 
support. The APCA, on the other hand, did emphasize the need for accompanying measures, 
either in the form of income support or transition support.287 Finally, the FNSEA called for the 
worldwide coordination of stocks and production: market management at a global level.288 A 
Ministry of Agriculture document describing the position of several agricultural organizations 
shows that the ministry was aware of the stance of the farm organizations.289 After meetings 
with four agricultural organizations, the ministry concluded that the farm lobby had three 
concerns: (1) the mechanisms and principles of the CAP and the effects of accompanying 
measures; (2) the section of the Commission proposal that concerned tarification and 
rebalancing; and (3) the worldwide coordination of stocks and production.290
283 C A C . 19920056, art 7. 9 .1 0 .1 99 0 . FNSEA. Com m uniqué de Presse.
284 C A C . 19920056, art 7. 20 .9 .1 99 0 . Confédération Paysanne. Syndicats pour une agriculture paysanne et 
la défense de ses travailleurs; C A C .1 9 9 2 0 0 5 6 . 2.1 1.1990 AFP-O L10.
285 C A C . 19920056, art 6. 5 .9 .1990. Assem blée Permanente des Cham bres d'Agricu lture. Conférence de 
Presse du 5 septembre 1990.
286 C A C . 19920056, art 7. 1 5 .10 .1990. FNSEA. Letter of Lacom be to M erm az; C A C . 1 9 9 20056, art 7
17.10.1990. FNSEA. Com m uniqué de Presse. G ATT: les m asques sont tom bés.
287 C A C . 19920056, art 7. 3 .1 0 .1 99 0 . Note interne bureau A P C A  sur le GATT.
288 C A C . 19920056, art 7. 9 .1 0 .1 99 0 . FNSEA. Com m uniqué de Presse.
289 C A C . 19920056, art 6. 1 2 .10 .1990. Chauvin. Objet et résumé: Uruguay Round agriculture position des 
OPA.
290 It is striking that the issues raised by the FNSEA figured prom inently in this docum ent. The governm ent 
w as clearly well aware of the preferences of this farm organization.
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The farm lobby was the only domestic lobby to engage extensively in the debate on the 
Commission proposal. To the extent that the industrial lobby was involved, it was only the agri- 
allmentalre industry, which supported farm lobby demands.291 The transnational industrial and 
trade lobby (the ICC, the OECD Business and Advisory Committee, and UNICE), on the other 
hand, emphasized that failure in the Uruguay Round would seriously damage the multilateral 
trading system and jeopardize employment and investment (Agence Europe 26.3.1990; 
1.6.1990; 19.10.1990). They claimed that a solution to the agricultural issue was essential for 
success of the Uruguay Round and that agriculture should not be allowed to endanger the 
overall outcome of the negotiations (Agence Europe 29.6.1990). They thus implied that 
concessions on agriculture were inevitable and necessary and that narrow agricultural interests 
would have to give way to broader economic interests if failure in the Uruguay Round was to be 
averted. As in the first French case study, the French government was not forced to take much 
account of the pressure of the transnational industrial and trade lobby, however, because the 
domestic industrial and trade lobby was not making any similar demands. Moreover, the 
European farm organizations (COPA and COGECA) were raising similar demands at the 
European level as their national member organizations, including the FNSEA, at the domestic 
level. COPA rejected the Commission proposal on the agricultural offer in the Uruguay Round on 
the grounds that it would lead to the destruction of the CAP and European agriculture because 
it failed to ensure community preference and rebalancing (Agence Europe 15.11.1990). Farming 
oganizations from all over the world together drafted a resolution emphasizing that they could 
not accept that the agriculture negotiations were based exclusively on commercial 
considerations, since this would lead to price instability on world markets and prevent states 
from providing sufficient income assistance to their farmers (Deutsche Bauern Korrespondenz 
December 1990).
French political parties also engaged in the debate. The socialist party stressed that 
community preference should be maintained and demanded compensatory measures and 
rebalancing.292 The party was satisfied with the government's approach to the GATT agricultural 
negotiations and particularly urged the government to maintain its firm position.293 The PC, 
however, labelled the Commission proposal as 'scandaleuse and wanted the French 
government to use its veto to prevent its adoption. 294 The centre-right parties also rejected the 
Commission proposal and equated it with the dismantling of the CAP and argued it would lead 
to the collapse of competitive agricultural production in France. Under no circumstances was this 
proposal to be accepted and the government should not even be willing to negotiate on it. In
2 9 1  C A C . 19920056, art 6. 19.9 .1990. Association Nationale des Industries Agro-Alim entaires; C A C . 
19920056, art 8. 24 .1 0 .19 9 0 . Syndicat National des Fabricants de Sucre de France (Letter to M ermaz).
2 9 2  C A C . 19920056, art 7. La Lettre de la CNA. Feuille mensuelle d 'inform atin de la Com m ission Nationale 
Agrico le du Parti Socialiste. Octobre 1990, no 59.
2 9 3  Journal O fficiel de la République Française (1990), Assem blée nationale, 1re séance du 11 octobre 1990, 
3 607, 3636.
2 9 4 Journal O fficiel de la République Française (1990), Assem blée nationale, 2e séance du 30 octobre 1990, 
4571.
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the view of the centre-right parties, France should be prepared to use its veto in the worst-case 
scenario.295 These parties also suspected that by reserving money in the 1991 budget for a 
programme of transitional support, the government was anticipating a decision to reduce 
European agricultural support as a first step in accepting reductions in support within the GATT 
negotiations.296
Once the EEC member states had reached an agreement on the agricultural prosposal to 
be submitted in the GATT negotiations, the farm lobby reacted indignantly. MODEF spoke of a 
'capitulation sans condition and a 'acquiescement a la logique américaine; in its view, the 
French government had sacrificed its agricultural sector on the altar of American interests. The 
EEC was regarded as behaving like the 51st state of the United States.297 The FNSEA 
acknowledged that the Commission proposal had been moderated in several aspects, but 
argued that, under pressure from the United States, the EEC had moved in the wrong direction 
-  namely the direction of dismantling the protection of agricultural trade at the borders of the 
EEC. Community preference was now at stake. The EEC proposal was a betrayal of Europe in 
favour of the United States and its allies in the Uruguay Round (L Information Agricole 
November 1990). Only the CNM CCA was less negative. According to this organization, the 
French agricultural minister had succeeded in preserving community preference.298 Opposition 
parties, meanwhile, were vocal in their criticisms in parliament. The UDF labelled the 
government's acceptance of the proposal as 'treason', while the RPR spoke of 'the deathblow to 
the CAP'. According to the centre-right parties, the government should have used its veto 
instead of sacrificing an essential economic sector.299 The socialist party supported the 
government and expressed satisfaction with the negotiation results.300 Mermaz sought to 
convince the farmers of the advantages of the proposal, but he did not succeed (La Dépêche
14.11.1990). He did, however, appear to have convinced FNSEA president Raymond Lacombe 
that the French government was not the source of the problem, and that the farm lobby should 
target their protests at the real culprits (The Guardian 8.11.1990). In the December issue of 
L Information Agricole, the FNSEA explicitly stated that the proposal had come about despite 
French and German resistance, and that the Commission was operating without genuine 
political control. The farm lobby staged massive demonstrations in Brussels in December 1990 at 
the time of the Heysel conference, which was supposed to conclude the Uruguay Round. After
2 9 5  Journal O fficiel de la République Française (1990), Assem blée nationale, 1re séance du 11 octobre 1990, 
3 615, 3622, 3628, 3635, 3638, 3645.
2 9 6 Journal O fficiel de la République Française (1990), Assem blée nationale, 2e séance du 30 octobre 1990, 
4571.
2 9 7  C A C . 19920056. A FP-O O 91. A gri-int-eco. 7.1 1.1990. G ATT: réactions du M ODEF, du RPR et de l'Union 
pour la France; L'Année politique, économique et sociale 1990, 388.
2 9 8  C A C . 19920056, art 7. 8 .1 1 .1 99 0 . Confédération nationale de la M utualité, de la Coopération et du 
Crédit Agricoles. Com m uniqué de Presse.
2 9 9  C A C . 19920056. A FP-O O 91. A gri-int-eco. 7.1 1.1990. G ATT: réactions du M ODEF, du RPR et de l'Union 
pour la France.
3 0 0  Journal O fficiel de la République Française (1990), Assem blée Nationale, 2e séance du 7 novem bre 1990, 
4875 -4 8 7 6 .
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the conference, the FNSEA argued that these demonstrations had been very effective and had 
prevented a GATT agreement (LIInformation Agricole January 1990). Mermaz, meanwhile, 
claimed that it was at his instigation that the farmers had come to Brussels in such large 
numbers, but that this had hardly influenced the actual negotiations (interview Mermaz
27.11.2007).301
1991: From Heysel to the Draft Final Act
After the collapse of the negotiations in Heysel, the political agenda in 1991 included not only 
the resumption of the GATT negotiations, but also the plans for CAP reform proposed by 
Commissioner MacSharry. The farm lobby suspected that there was a relationship between 
these two issues and this was one of the reasons why the organizations rejected the proposals 
on CAP reform. According to the FNSEA, negotiations on the reforms should only take place 
after the GATT negotiations, because otherwise they would represent a form of unilateral 
concessions on the part of the EEC.302 The FNSEA even went as far as to equate CAP reform 
with giving in to United States demands and pretensions to dominate the world trade agenda 
(L 'Information Agricole December 1991).303 In their arguments against the merging of the issues 
of the GATT and CAP reform, rhetoric against American domination once again played an 
important role. The FNSEA also deployed the argument that the agricultural sector made a 
significant contribution to the French trade balance and that the vocation exportatrice should 
not be squandered (L'Information Agricole May 1991). Instead, the EEC should seek a global 
approach to the regulation of global markets and reductions in support in the GATT negotiations 
(L 'Information Agricole September 1991).304 In doing so, the EEC should hold on to the mandate 
provided in November 1990.305
Apart from objecting to the link between progress in the GATT and the reform of the CAP, 
the farm lobby also resisted the actual substance of the CAP reform proposals. According to the 
FNSEA the reductions in guarantee prices were far too large and they also objected to 
compulsory set aside and the decoupling of production and support through the introduction of 
direct income support (Fouilleux 1996, 62-65; L'Information Agricole November 1991;
301 See alo: http://ww w .vle-publlque.fr/dlscours: 2 9 .9 .1 99 1 . L'heure de vérité de Louis Mermaz. In a 
telephone interview, a form er FN SEA official indeed endorsed M erm az's claim that he had asked the FNSEA 
to com e to Brussels. A ccording to the FN SEA official this w as an illustration of their influence on the French 
governm ent.
302 C A C . 19930196, art 1. FNSEA. Rapport moral congrès d 'A ngers, avril 1991.
303 C A C . 19930195, art 2. Novembre 1991. AFP: 'La FN SEA dem ande de ne pas m élanger le dossier du 
G A T T et la reforme de la PA C '.
304 C A C . 19930196, art 1. FNSEA. Rapport moral congrès d 'A ngers, avril 1991.
305 C A C . 19940617, art 8. 21 .1 .1 99 1 . FNSEA à Berthom eau, directeur du cabinet du ministre de 
l'agriculture; AFP 28.3 .1 99 1 . As indicated earlier, in the autum n of 1990 the farmers had continued to 
oppose this mandate. The dem and that the EEC should stick to the m andate provided in Novem ber 1990 
does not so much indicate agreem ent w ith this m andate, but should rather be perceived as a w arning 
against even more far-reaching concessions.
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December 1991).306 The latter policy measures were at odds with their ideas on the right of 
production and the idea of agriculture as an economic activity (see Section 5.3.1). In addition, 
the proposed CAP reforms undermined the capacity of French farmers to fulfill the role assigned 
to them (food production, preserving and occupying the countryside, preserving the 
environment, and contributing to a social balance in society), and was inconsistent with French 
culture, of which the espace rural and the exploitation agricole familiale were an important part 
(L 'Information Agricole November 1991).
A  mass demonstration by 200,000 farmers was organized in Paris on 29 September 1991. 
The FNSEA presented this demonstration as a distress call to the entire French population that 
the monde rural of a large part of the country was in danger. They argued that the position of 
the farmers was not being taken sufficiently seriously at the domestic level, while the EEC was 
overlooking the farmers entirely because they did not want to be embarrassed in the GATT 
negotiations (L’Information Agricole September 1991). Mermaz did not regard the 
demonstration as a popular vote against the government but as a cry for help from the farmers 
who wanted to survive. According to Mermaz, the demonstration even provided support for the 
position of the French government in the international negotiations.307 The demonstration at 
least led to a plan d’urgence which Mermaz put before the Assemblée, providing for several 
measures to help the agricultural sector. The FNSEA and CNJA, however, viewed these plans as 
inadequate and announced new demonstrations (Année politique, économique et sociaie1991, 
348). When Mermaz then gave up his resistance to the principle of CAP reform in October
1991, the farmers were outraged.308 As mentioned in Section 7.2, for the farmers, this decision 
came as a complete surprise. The farm lobby had not been consulted on the issue (L 'Information 
Agricole November 1991; December 1991). According to Fouilleux this situation was typical of 
the relationship between Mermaz and the farm lobby (1996, 56-59). Mermaz clearly used farm 
pressure when he saw fit, but ultimately made his own decisions. The farm lobby now believed 
that it was necessary to establish closer contacts with other ministries besides the Agricultural 
Ministry, particularly with the Ministry of Finance.309
306 Concerning these substantive issues, the farm lobby w as not entirely unified. Confédération Paysanne for 
exam ple did prefer direct incom e paym ents in exchange for production support (Agence France Presse
13.1 .1991. 'Le ministre de l'agriculture très critiqué lors du 3eme congrès de la Confédération Paysanne'). 
The AG PB perceived cuts in European guarantee prices to be in its interests, because it w ould enable France 
to increase its market share in the internal European market (Fouilleux 1996, 62-65).
307 AFP 29 .9 .1 99 1 ; http://w w w.vie-publique.fr/discours: 29 .9 .1 99 1 . L'heure de vérité de Louis Mermaz. 
M erm az stated that the farmers protested in Paris and that he had not even needed to m obilize them . The 
farm protests were a potential support in the negotiations, because M erm az could now  credibly apply the 
'tied hands' strategy.
308 Until October 1991, the farmers had been relatively content w ith the w ay in w hich M erm az defended 
the French farm interests in the EEC (Le Nouvel Économiste 8 .3 .1991). M ermaz claimed that he w as in 
perm anent d ialogue w ith the farm lobby and that farmers believed he defended their interests well (France- 
Soir Actualité 28.9 .1991).
309 A lthough  the FNSEA w as dissatisfied with the concertation with M erm az, it did perceive itself to be very 
influential. In 1991 it mentioned the prevention of a G A T T deal and the delay of the C A P  reform as 
im portant achievem ents (L'Information Agricole March 1992).
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When Dunkel submitted the Draft Final Act in December 1991 in order to break the 
deadlock in the GATT negotiations, the farm lobby hardly reacted at all and appeared to be far 
more worried about the plans for CAP reform at that moment. L 'Information Agricole (January 
1991) published only a short summary of the Draft Final Act and concluded that the proposal 
was aimed at introducing a free market system into the agricultural sector. Naturally, this was 
contrary to the wishes of the farm lobby. The reactions of the farm lobby to EEC decision making 
on the position to defend in GATT with respect to the Draft Final Act, however, shows that the 
FNSEA was satisfied with the way in which the French government had acted in the relevant 
Council meetings (L 'Information Agricole January 1992).
In 1991, French industry also cautiously began to mobilize. Large companies such as La 
Lyonnaise and CGIP exerted pressure through the International Chamber of Commerce by 
supporting an appeal to the participants in the Uruguay Round to resume negotiations swiftly 
and to bring them to a positive conclusion (Le Monde 10.1.1991). This pressure was limited, 
however, and not aimed directly at the French government itself, but merely channeled through 
a transnational organization.310 Transnational organizations such as UNICE and the European 
Round Table continued to call on the EEC and individual member state governments to ensure a 
successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round as soon as possible [Agence Europe 17.19.1991). 
According to them, the progress already made in the areas of trade in industrial goods and 
services would make overall failure in the negotiations even more dangerous (Agence Europe
25.12.1991). The GATT negotiations were not debated in the Assemblée i n 1991. To the extent 
that the negotiations were mentioned, the socialist party supported the government and the 
opposition expressed no opinion.
1992: From the Draft Final Act to the Blair House Accord
Agricultural negotiations in the first half of 1992 were devoted to negotiations on CAP reform, 
an agreement on which was reached in May. Subsequently, bilateral negotiations between the 
United States and the EEC were launched. These negotiations eventually resulted in an 
agreement on agriculture: the Blair House Accord (see Section 4.4.6).
At the start of 1992, the farm lobby continued to insist that the CAP should not be 
reformed before a GATT deal had been agreed.311 When France accepted MacSharry's proposals 
on CAP reform in May 1992, major farm protests erupted and the rhetoric against American 
dominance surfaced once more. The FNSEA argued that European agricultural policy had been 
sacrificed to American interests (L 'Information Agricole May 1992). According to Lacombe, CAP 
reform meant that Europe would become an American colony [Financial Times 23.5.1992). He 
'had the impression of being under the pitchforks of the Americans' (Washington Post
310 Legras observed that the pressure exerted by French industry increased after the Heysel debacle and was 
aimed at both the French governm ent and at the European Com m ission. Industry w as less than vociferious 
in its pressure, however, and made hardly any public statem ents, because it did not w ant to com e into 
conflict w ith the farmers (interview Legras 12.1 1.2007).
311 C A C . 19930196, art 1. Avril 1992. FNSEA. Un monde en changem ent.
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23.5.1992). The RPR also chipped in on these anti-American sentiments, labelling the CAP 
reform as a unilateral concession to the United States (Le Monde 26.5.1992). They were further 
incensed by the fact that neither farm organizations nor parliament had been consulted, and 
they therefore tabled a censure motion which eventually failed by only three votes (Le Monde
3.6.1992). President Christian Jacob of the CNJA even compared CAP reform to the Munich 
Agreement of 1938 (L'Information Agricole June 1992). The FDSEAs and large numbers of 
mayors sent identical telegrams to Mermaz, in which they denounced the reforms that had come 
about without consultating the agricultural organizations, and in which they demanded 
accompanying measures to protect French agriculture and the rural world.312 Mermaz tried to 
explain the advantages of CAP reform, but he did not succeed in convincing the farmers 
(,['Information Agricole June 1992). Farmers' discontent with European policy and their own 
government was demonstrated clearly in the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in September 
1992, in which 70%  of the farmers voted against ratification.313
CAP reform therefore led to dissatisfaction among the French farmers in 1992. At the 
same time, however, the GATT negotiations were also being heavily criticized by the farmers in
1992. The FNSEA and DBV staged demonstrations in Strasbourg on 6 April 1992, against the 
GATT negotiations, among other issues {L’Information Agricole May 1992). The negotiations 
were considered a danger to the French countryside, history and culture. The farmers demanded 
the maintenance of community preference and the placement of direct income support in the 
green box containing measures that were not subject to reductions to be agreed in GATT.314 
According to Lacombe, the GATT negotiations served no other purpose than to give the United 
States leadership over European agriculture (L'Information Agricole May 1992). When the 
bilateral negotiations reached their peak in November 1992, the FNSEA and DBV warned 
Mitterrand and Kohl not to make concessions in GATT (Deutsche Bauern Korrespondenz 
November 1992). The FNSEA was extremely anxious about the turn the negotiations were 
taking because of the prospect of export volumes being reduced without any rebalancing in 
return (L 'Information Agricole November 1992). The FNSEA took the view that the compromise 
being negotiated by the United States and the Commission in mid-November should not be 
accepted.315 The opposition in parliament also expressed its concerns -  firstly because of the 
fact that the EEC was now apparantly being made to pay twice (first CAP reform and now a
312 C A C  FTB 19930195, art 2.
313 It is striking that, according to M erm az, the leadership of the FNSEA and C N JA  had declared themselves 
in favour of a yes vote in the referendum , and that only Coordination Rurale had issued negative advice on 
how  to vote (http://w ww .vie-publique.fr/discours: 2 .9 .1992. Interview de M. Louis M erm az, ministre de 
l'agriculture et de la forêt, à RTL). The FN SEA's m onthly reported that everybody should decide according to 
their own conscience, but that one thing w as clear: the farm w orld w as unfavourably disposed to the 
M acSharry reforms (L'Information Agricole Septem ber 1992).
314 The latter did not entirely fit w ith the dem ands of the FNSEA, but it w as an issue that w as very im portant 
for the DBV.
315 http://ww w .vie-publique.fr/discours: 14.11.1992. Interview accordée par Guyau. La Croix, 'GATT: 
L'avertissem ent de la FNSEA'.
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GATT deal on agriculture), and secondly because they were afraid that an agreement between 
the United States and the EEC would be to the detriment of French agriculture.316 Before the 
Blair House Accord was reached, both the political parties and the farm lobby were fairly 
satisfied with the conduct of the French government concerning the GATT negotiations, 
however. According to Guyau the government of the day was showing solidarity with the 
farmers and Mermaz had confirmed that he would continue to take a firm stance on GATT.317 
Mitterrand also confirmed his involvement in the issue and his willingness to take the right 
decisions in the GATT negotiations.318
When the Commission reached the Blair House Accord with the United States on 20 
November 1992, the farm lobby was furious. They argued that the Commission had gone 
beyond its mandate (Le Monde 22/23.11.1992).319 Jacob urged Europe to resist American 
power politics and Lacombe called for a 'résistance absolu vis-à-vis des agresseurs Américains 
(L Information Agricole November 1992). Many agricultural organizations claimed that the Blair 
House Accord went further than the CAP reforms and they demanded that the French 
government use its veto against this accord.320 The main targets of criticism were the price cuts 
and volume limits for subsidized exports, and the minimum access for imports provided for in 
the Accord (L'Information Agricole, December 1992). The FNSEA argued that in 1989, a deal 
had been struck that the EEC would accept tariffication in exchange for the United States 
acceptance of rebalancing. Now the demand of tariffication had been met, but the EEC had not 
gained rebalancing in return (L’Information Agricole January 1993). Apart from the trade 
consequences of the Accord, it was also believed to undermine the ability of French agriculture 
to fulfill its multiple functions in French society (L’Information Agricole December 1992).321 
Echoing the demands of the CNJA, the FNSEA therefore demanded a 'non au Munich agricole 
(ibid.).322 On 1 December, the FNSEA and CNJA marched to Strasbourg to stage a
3 1 9
316 C A C  FTB 19930 3 7 9 , art 6. Assem blée nationale. Com pte rendu analytique officiel. Séance du mercredi 
18 novem bre 1992. Réforme de la PAC et négociations du GATT.
317 http://ww w .vie-publique.fr/discours: 14.11.1992. Interview accordée par Guyau. La Croix, 'GATT: 
L'avertissem ent de la FNSEA'.
http://w ww .vie-publique.fr/discours: 5.1 1.1992. Interview accordée par Jacob à Europe I.
C A C . 19930188, art 2. 1 7 .12 .1992. Fax FN SEA/CNJA. G ATT: La France aboie, la carevane passe.
320 C A C . 19930189, art 3. 23.1 1.1992. Cham bre départem entale d 'agriculture de Loire; C A C . 19930189, 
art 3. 1 8 .12 .1992. Cham bre d 'agriculture du M orbihan; C A C . 19930189. 2 1 .1 2 .19 9 2 . Cham bre 
d'agriculture Finistère; C A C . 19930196, art 11. 6 .1 .1 9 93 . FNSEA. Position du syndicalisme agricole français 
sur le com prom is W ashington (Letter to Soisson).
321 These functions included food supply, the conservation of nature, the preservation of the political and 
social balance and society, as well as the viability and vitality o f rural areas (C A C . 1 9 9 30189, art 3.
3.1 2 .1 99 2 . Cham bre d 'agriculture de Maine et Loire.)
322 It is conspicuous that these argum ents were repeatedly used by the farm lobby in Novem ber and 
December. Only in January w as the argum ent added that the Blair House A ccord did not meet the 
conditions of globality and fairness. These were two phrases that the governm ent repeatedly applied in its 
opposition to the Blair House Accord in December 1992 (see Section 7.5).
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demonstration once more in an attempt to influence public opinion and encourage the French 
government to reject the Blair House Accord.323
During a debate in the Assembiee on 5 November 1992, Soisson was praised for his 
resistance to American pressure, but he was also warned not to give in.324 When the Blair House 
Accord was reached, the opposition in parliament judged the Accord to be unacceptable 
because it was not a global and balanced accord, and because the EEC had made unilateral 
concessions concerning the volume limits for subsidized exports. The economic and social 
consequences of such an accord were considered to be unacceptable. The UDF, RPR and UDC 
therefore proposed a resolution in the Assembiee that stated that: (1) the Blair House Accord 
damaged French interests; (2) the agricultural deal should be compatible with the MacSharry 
CAP reforms; (3) the French government should request a special Council meeting in which to 
discuss the Accord; and (4) that the government should use all the instruments at its disposal, 
including its veto, to obtain fundamental guarantees.325 However, when the socialist 
government attempted to gain parliamentary approval for a declaration stating that France 
would use its veto on any part of an accord that damaged fundamental French interests, the 
opposition parties withheld their support from the government. The vote against this declaration 
was not so much a vote in favour of the Blair House Accord, but rather a vote against the 
socialist government (LeMonde24.11.1992; 27.11.1992). In view of the approaching elections 
of March 1993, the opposition parties did not want to give the impression of aiding the socialist 
government. In its electoral platform, the RPR even argued that the socialist government had 
failed to defend the rural world and that the RPR would prevent any loss of France's cultural 
identity and its 'campagnes .326 Only the employers' organization, the CNPF opposed this fierce 
criticism of the government by the agricultural lobby and the political parties. The organization 
was in favour of accepting the Blair House Accord and against the use of the French veto, 
because negotiations in the other sectors should not be put in jeopardy (Le Monde 28.11.1992; 
Davis 2003, 304; Vahl 1997, 253). During a meeting with Soisson, the CNPF had pointed out 
the benefits of an agreement on agriculture between the United States and the EEC and claimed 
that the agricultural sector was a burden for the French state (Soisson 1993, 91).
1993: From Blair House to the Final Accord
In 1993, the farm lobby pressurized the new centre-right government to take a firm stance in 
the GATT negotiations. During a meeting with the Prime Minister and the Ministers of 
Agriculture and Economics, the farm lobby warned that they would not accept government 
back-tracking in the negotiations (L'Information Agricole May 1993). Puech and Alain
323 http://ww w .vie-publique.fr/discours: 28 .1 1 .19 9 2 . Interview accordée par Guyau à L'Humanité.
324 Journal O fficiel de la République Française (1992), Assem blée nationale, 2e séance du 5 novem bre 1992, 
4864.
325 C A C . 19930189, art 3. UDF, RPR, U DC et apparentés: Proposition de résolution relative au volet agricole 
de la négociation de l'accord général sur les tarifs douaniers et le com m erce.
326 C A C . 19930189, art 3. 26 .1 .1 99 3 . Extrait du program m e du RPR.
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Lamassoure, the Minister of European Affairs, were urged not to sacrifice the farm interests in 
the GATT negotiations, or the farmers would take up arms against the government 
(L 'Information Agricole June 1993). The FNSEA repeated its demand for the renegotiation of the 
Blair House Accord and, if necessary, the use of the French veto.327 Unsurprisingly, the farm 
lobby was angry when the government decided to accept an agreement on oilseed. They 
regarded this to be a bad tactical move. This view was shared by the opposition parties in 
parliament.328 The FNSEA was, however, satisfied with the memorandum presented by the 
French government on 13 May that was aimed at renegotiation of the Blair House Accord.329 
Finally, the farm lobby questioned the assumption, commonly defended in the GATT 
negotiations, that an accord would lead to a recovery in world economic growth (L 'Information 
Agricole June 1993).
When France and Germany intensified their bilateral contacts in September 1993 to reach 
a common position on GATT, the farm lobby encouraged this rapprochement (Agence Europe 
2.9.1993; Le Monde 1.9.1993). Guyau eand Constantin Heereman, DBV president, met with 
Puech, Lamassoure, Alain Juppé (Minister of Foreign Affairs) and Gérard Longuet (Minister of 
Economics) to press home their arguments against the Blair House Accord and to demand 
renegotiation (L'Information Agricole September 1993). The farm lobby maintained its 
continuous pressure on the government to oppose concessions on agriculture (Devuyst 1995, 
452). In October 1993, the government consulted all political, agricultural and industrial leaders 
on the Uruguay Round (Financial Times 19.10.1993; Le Monde 7.10.1993). The government 
was supported by the RPR, UDF and UDC in a parliamentary debate on 5 October. The parties 
stressed that the government was taking a solid approach in the negotiations and that it had set 
straight the mistakes of the previous government, such as the isolation of France in the 
negotiations by the end of 1992.330 Representatives of the centre-right parties even visited the 
British, German and Italian parliaments with the object of convincing these to give their full 
support to the French government.331 However, the UDF also emphasized that France could not 
say 'no' to GATT altogether and that the interests of specific farmers should not be confused 
with overall French interests. Employers and trade unions such as the CFDT shared this view 
(Année politique, économique et sociale 1993, 101-102). The opposition parties, however, 
criticized the government's actions vehemently. According to the PS, the government had back­
3 2 7  http://ww w .vie-publique.fr/discours: 22 .4 .1 99 3 . Interview accordée par Guyau à France-lnter.
3 2 8  Journal O fficiel de la République Française (1993), Assem blée nationale, 1re séance du 16 juin 1993: 
1 657-1658, 1664.
3 2 9  Notably, the FNSEA only presented a short sum m ary of the m em orandum  in its m onthly m agazine, 
w ithout explicitly judging the proposal (with the exception of the dem and for renegotiations).
3 3 0  Journal O fficiel de la République Française (1993), Assem blée nationale, séance du 5 octobre 1993, 
3 9 0 9 -3912. See also: 1re séance du 13 octobre 1993, 4 1 2 5 -4127.
3 3 1  Journal O fficiel de la République Française (1993), Assem blée nationale, 2e séance du 20 octobre 1993, 
4565.
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tracked on earlier declarations in the negotiations and squandered French interests.332 The PC 
agreed that the government was not taking a sufficiently firm stance and claimed that the 
government should use its veto.333 French intellectuals regarded the negotiations on audiovisual 
services as a 'threat to France's glorious culture' and even French economists presented the 
Uruguay Round as an 'intolerable diktat américain (Devuyst 1995, 452). Overall, the strongest 
domestic voices still favoured holding firm in the negotiations and, therefore, the potential for 
rejecting a GATT accord (Année politique, économiqe et sociale 1993, 101-102).
During a meeting with Puech and Longuet, Guyau, on behalf of the FNSEA, APCA, CNJA 
and CNM CCA, presented a set of principles according to which the GATT negotiations be 
conducted. France and Europe could not be excluded from sharing in the growth of world 
markets; community preference should be safeguarded; European identity should be 
strengthened; and the 'weapons' that the United States used in its trade policy (such as the 
Super 301 clause) must not be permitted (L Information Agricole November 1993). With the 15 
December deadline approaching, however, employer organizations increased their pressure on 
the French government to take a more flexible position on agriculture (Vahl 1997, 253; 
Financial Times29.11.1993; 7.12.1993).
According to the FNSEA, the agreement reached on 15 December was an improvement to 
the Blair House Accord in a number of respects, but it still did not provide for rebalancing; the 
EEC had therefore made concessions on tarification without gaining anything in return 
(L Information Agricole December 1993). The farm lobby claimed it had significantly contributed 
to securing renegotiation by helping the French government out of its isolation and intensifying 
its relations with other European farm organizations, particularly the German DBV in order to 
increase the pressure on France's European partners (L’Information Agricole December 1993). 
On 15 December, right after the GATT deal had been reached, a debate took place in the 
Assemblée in which the GATT Accord was also discussed. The political parties seized the 
opportunity to score partisan points, appearing to turn the debate into a competition on which 
party had defended French interests the best. In doing so, they each in turn accused preceding 
governments of having made mistakes in the GATT negotiations. The RPR claimed once again 
that the current government had rectified the negotiating failures of the preceding socialist 
government and managed to achieve a negotiating success.334 The UDF agreed that the centre- 
right government had defended the French interests properly.335 The oppossition parties, for 
their part, argued that the government had back-tracked on many issues in the negotiations and
3 3 2  Journal O fficiel de la République Française (1993), Assem blée nationale, séance du 5 octobre 1993,
3912. See also: 1 re séance du 13 octobre 1993, 4129.
3 3 3  Journal O fficiel de la République Française (1993), Assem blée nationale, séance du 5 octobre 1993,
3913.
3 3 4  Journal O fficiel de la République Française (1993), Assem blée nationale, 2e séance du 1 5 decembre 
1993, 7655.
3 3 5  idem, 7650-7653.
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squandered the French interests in the process.336 The PC demanded that France would refuse to 
ratify the accord.337
In summary, we can conclude that in the period between 1990 and 1993, the pressure 
from the farm lobby concerning the GATT negotiations increased. Apart from making their 
position clear through papers and petitions, they also engaged in mass demonstrations. Both in 
the autumn of 1990 and at the time of the Blair House Accord in 1992, the pressure of the 
farmers was strong. After the new government took office in 1993, the farm lobby maintained 
its pressure, though somewhat less assertively than in the preceding period. In 1991 their 
pressure on the issue of the GATT negotiations also diminished, because they were preoccupied 
with the CAP negotiations at that time. The second French case also saw the increasing 
mobilization of other societal groups, such as industrial and employers' organizations. This 
pressure, however, came late and remained relatively limited. It did therefore not constitute a 
genuine counter-balance against the pressure from the farm lobby. With respect to the 
mobilization of the political parties, it is once more clear that the parties of government 
supported the government, while the opposition parties invariably criticized the governmental 
approach.
7.3.2 Economic interests
To the extent that the various proposals and potential compromises that were on the table 
during the second half of the Uruguay Round could be expected to contribute to French GDP 
and employment, these proposals were domestically economically attractive. I will now assess 
the expected effects of the 1990 Commission proposal, the Draft Final Act, the Blair House 
Accord, and the Final Act in turn on French GDP and employment.
The agricultural offer that the Commission wanted to submit in the GATT negotiations 
prior to the Heysel conference in the autumn of 1990 was domestically economically costly for 
France. The 30%  reduction in internal support and guarantee prices would affect French farm 
income negatively. Given that potential accompanying measures from the part of the EEC were 
no certainty, it was unclear whether these income losses would be fully compensated. The 
consequences of support reduction would have a different impact on large and relatively 
efficient French farms than on the inefficient smaller farms, however. The former might be able 
to benefit as long as the price decreases went hand in hand with increased exports to the 
European internal market. Price cuts would immediately affect the incomes of the latter group. 
Eventually this would exacerbate unemployment in rural areas, which was problematic given 
that the French government wanted to fight unemployment and improve the living conditions 
and vitality of the rural regions.
336 idem, 7645-7646.
337 idem, 7657.
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Because the Draft Final Act of 1991 contained an even more far-reaching compromise on 
agriculture that the Commission proposal of 1990, its effects on income and employment in the 
French agricultural sector would have been even more severe. In addition, the Draft Final Act did 
not place direct income support in the green box. It was exactly this form of support that the 
Commission was proposing in the negotiations on CAP reform as compensation for cuts in 
guarantee prices.338 An important difference between the Draft Final Act and earlier proposals 
and compromises during the GATT negotiations was, however, that the Act proposed a package 
deal that not only included agriculture, but also the other GATT negotiation themes. In order to 
assess the overall economic consequences of the proposal, other important French economic 
sectors should thus also be taken into account. Particularly the services sector, which employed 
60%  of the French work force (Statistical Yearbook 1989/1990, 317-319), is important in this 
respect. But it was precisely with respect to the services sector that the Draft Final Act 'did not 
contain the participating countries' lists of commitments for cutting import duties and opening 
their services markets'.339 It is therefore highly questionable that the economic costs with respect 
to agriculture would be offset by economic benefits in other sectors of the French economy.
The Blair House Accord was less costly in economic terms than the Draft Final Act. Not 
only had the reduction percentages been lowered, but the base period from which to calculate 
the reductions in export assistance had also been adapted to the advantage of the EEC. 
Furthermore, the status quo had changed because of the MacSharry CAP reforms under which 
the EEC member states had already agreed to price cuts of an average of 30%  over three years, 
to be compensated by direct income support. To the extent that the reductions demanded in the 
Blair House Accord could be met by the measures taken to implement the CAP reforms, no 
additional economic costs would emerge. This compatibility question became an important topic 
of debate in the EEC after the Blair House Accord had been agreed. The Commission claimed 
that the Blair House Accord was compatible with CAP reform (cf. Vahl 1997, 197), while France 
argued that the Accord would require further changes in the EEC's agricultural policies, in 
addition to the implementation of the CAP reforms (see Section 7.5). Potential problems were 
particularly expected in the export-related measures, while the reduction percentages by which 
internal support was to be reduced under the Blair House Accord would probably be met by 
implementing the CAP reforms. According to a report of the Institut National de ia Statistique et 
des Études Économiques (INSEE) the difference between the CAP reform and the Blair House 
Accord with respect to their impact on French exports would also be negligible (L 'Information 
Agricole December 1992). Notwithstanding the uncertainty of such estimates, a clear advantage
338 France did not particularly favour an extensive green box, let alone direct incom e support. The farm lobby 
believed this support instrum ent w ould make them too dependent on national budgets. In the autum n of 
1991, the French Minister of Agriculture however started to adapt his discourse on the issue and defended 
direct incom e support as an appropriate supplem ent to farm incom e from  production. Eventually he argued 
that such direct incom e transfers should not be considered paym ent for doing nothing, but a com pensation 
for the social functions that the agricultural sector perform ed in French society (Le Monde 10/1 1.3.1992).
339 http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm
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of the Blair House Accord in comparison to the Draft Final Act was that direct income payments 
were placed in the green box, and therefore not subject to the support reductions.
The Final Accord that was reached on 15 December was hard to reject from a domestic 
economic perspective. The reopening of the Blair House Accord in bilateral talks between the 
Commission and the United States had resulted in additional concessions from the United States 
on agriculture. In addition, the Final Accord concluded the negotiations in all the negotiating 
groups, as a result of which economic benefits in other sectors, such as the service sector, 
outweighed the potential costs in the agricultural sector.
7.3.3 Ideological interests
As already indicated in Sections 3.3.3 and 5.3.3, France attached great importance to extensive 
state intervention in the economy, regulating markets through price policy (as opposed to the 
idea of free market forces). In addition, the agricultural sector was expected not only to fulfil 
economic functions, but social functions too. To the extent that the ideas underlying the 
proposals and potential compromises during the second half of the Uruguay Round were 
incompatible with these elements from the French policy paradigm, accepting these proposals 
would be counter to French ideological interests.
The various potential accords under review during the second half of the Uruguay Round 
affected state intervention in economic markets. This not only involved the degree of state 
intervention, but particularly the sorts of instruments or methods of intervention that were 
allowed. Whether these effects were ideologically attractive depends on whether the methods of 
intervention proposed were compatible with French policy principles and on how important the 
methods of intervention that would have to be phased out were within French agricultural 
policy.
Although the 30%  reduction in support proposed by the Commission in 1990 was likely to 
result in a de facto decline in the effectiveness of price policy as an instrument of market 
management, the underlying idea of the proposal remained that intervention was legitimate and 
that the mechanisms and principles of the CAP would remain intact. Accepting the Commission 
proposal therefore involved no domestic ideological costs.
The Draft Final Act of December 1991, on the other hand, introduced market forces in the 
agricultural sector on a larger scale. The underlying idea was tantamount to accepting tariffs as 
the only legitimate instrument of intervention. Under the Draft Final Act, existing instruments 
such as the EEC's variable levies would be converted into tariffs, and these tariffs would 
subsequently be reduced (by 36% ). From the perspective of the French policy paradigm, this 
presented a clear departure from the notion that the use of specific intervention instruments was 
legitimate, particularly the use of price policy as a means of market management. While France 
regarded regulating agricultural markets through a broad range of policy instruments as 
essential, the Draft Final Act proposed the introduction of free market principles into the 
agricultural sector. In doing so, the proposal also relegated the status of agriculture to a purely
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economic sector ju st like any other. Such a notion could not be endorsed by the French because 
of their conviction that agriculture had an essential role to play in maintaining the fabric of 
French society.
The Blair House Accord (as well as the Final Act in 1993) was also based on a free market 
paradigm (Daugbjerg, 2008). The underlying ideas of the Accord did not correspond with the 
French idea of price policy as a legitimate instrument of market management, nor with their 
belief in far-reaching state intervention more generally. Nevertheless, the accord did legitimize 
the use of intervention instruments that would not distort trade. Such instruments were placed 
in the green box (which was by now substantially larger than the one proposed in the Draft Final 
Act). The most significant instruments to be placed in the green box were the direct income 
payments introduced by the CAP reforms in combination with price reductions and the 
compulsary set aside of land. The combination of direct income payments and set aside was, 
however, incompatible with France's production-oriented agricultural policy, under which 
agriculture was considered above all an economic activity that allowed farmers to gain the 
larger part of their income from production. The principle behind direct income transfers, by 
contrast, was the exact opposite: income would be partially decoupled from actual production 
and trade. A potential solution to this ideological contradiction was to consider the direct 
income payments as remuneration for the social functions fulfilled by the French agricultural 
sector. However, this could not disguise the fact that this would be a fundamental departure 
from the notion that agriculture was a primarily economic activity. Since the differences between 
the agricultural section of the 1993 Final Act and the Blair House Accord were minor, the 
ideological considerations were similar with respect to both agreements.
7.3.4  Domestic costs and benefits
On the basis of the preceding sections on the French political, economic and ideological 
interests, we are now able to make an estimate of the domestic costs and benefits of the 
various policy options (see Table 7.1).340 This concerns the degree to which acceptance of the 
various proposals on the table -  the 1990 Commission proposal, the Draft Final Act of 1991, 
accepting the Blair House Accord of 1992 and the Final Act in 1993 -  was attractive or 
unattractive in terms of the French domestic interests. Here we see that the cost attached to 
accepting the various proposals consistently outweighed the benefits, with the exception of the 
Final Accord in 1993. Based on domestic considerations alone it may therefore be expected that 
France will reject the Commission proposal, the Draft Final Act and the Blair House Accord and 
accept the Final Accord. Section 7.4 will elaborate on how the same policy options should be 
judged on the basis of France's international interests.
340 See Section 3.3.3. for an explanation of how  the political, econom ic and ideological 'balances' in Table 
7.1 are calculated.
Tabel 7.1 French domestic costs and benefits with respect to the proposals during the second half of the Uruguay Round
Commission Proposal 1990 Draft Final Act 1991 Blair House Accord 1992 Final Accord 1993
POLITICAL(a)
Farm lobby — - — 0
Industry and trade lobbies 0 0 + +
Political parties -  - 0 -  - +
BALANCE POLITICAL -  - - - +
ECONOM IC(b)
Income and employment 
farm sector
- — - -
GDP and employment 
total economy
0 0 0 +
BALANCE ECONOMIC - - - +
IDEO LO GICAL(c)
Legitimatcy of state 
intervention
0 - - -
Market organization 
through price policy
0 - - -
Multifunctionality 0 - 0 0
BALANCE IDEOLOGICAL 0 -  - - -
SUM DOM ESTIC(d)
- - -
Legend: (a) -  = pressure against the proposal, -  -  = extensive pressure against the proposal, + = pressure in favour of the proposal, and + +  = extensive 
pressure in favour of the proposal. (b) -  = economic costs, -  -  = high economic costs, + = economic benefits, + +  = high economic benefits. (c) + = the 
underlying ideas of the proposal considered in the policy option are in accordance with the French policy paradigm, -  = the underlying ideas of the proposal 
considered in the policy option are at odds with the French policy paradigm. The balances are accorded a value of + = benefits exceed costs; + + = benefits 
considerably exceed costs; -  = costs exceed benefits; -  -  = costs considerably exceed benefits; + / -  = costs equal benefits. In assessing the balance of economic 
costs/benefits, the consequences for the economy as a whole are attributed more weight than the consequences for agriculture. (d) The sum domestic is either + 
= benefits exceed costs; -  = costs exceed benefits; or + / -  = costs equal benefits. 0 = no clear costs or benefits with respect to the criterion involved.
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7.4 The French Interest: International Considerations
7.4.1 Political Interests
During the run-up to the Heysel conference, the United States had gradually stepped up its 
pressure. Its objective was to gain EEC concessions in the agricultural negotiations and it did not 
shy away from threatening with a walk out if the negotiations did not proceed according to plan 
or with a new Farm Bill (see Section 4.4.4). In its diplomatic contacts with France, the United 
States stressed that it would not change its position and would make no additional concessions. 
If necessary, it would intensify its bilateral and regional trade policy initiatives.341
Within the EEC a number of member states began to call for a more flexible position in the 
agricultural negotiations. As early as February 1990, the United Kingdom proposed concessions 
on export assistance in order to move the negotiations forward.342 By April, the United Kingdom 
was even willing to concede to the United States on other issues.343 Only the Netherlands 
supported this position. The other member states resisted the demands of the United States, 
though for a variety of reasons. These differences emerged during decision making on the 
Commission proposal prior to the Heysel conference.344 While the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands were willing to accept the proposal (though they believed that the Commission 
proposal should have been more ambitious), the remaining delegations opposed the proposal in 
its original form. Germany, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain and Belgium feared that the proposal 
would have an adverse affect on their farmers and demanded accompanying measures.345 
France, Germany, Ireland, Portugal and Belgium additionally argued that the tariffication 
method proposed would result in excessive reductions in support. France, finally, also displayed 
concerns with respect to quantifying reductions in export assistance.346 Although France was not 
alone in its rejection of the Commission proposal, it was the only state that had particular 
concerns about the export component of the proposal. As the negotiations in the Council 
proceeded and concessions were made in order to overcome the objections of specific member 
states, an increasing number of member states came round to supporting the proposal. 
Eventually, only the Franco-German front stood in the way of approving the proposal. Even
341 C A C . 19920056, art 6. 2 1 .9 .1 99 0 . TD  W ashington 1603 2 EC O S TRES A G RI 3INDU SG CI. DREE. Positions 
am éricaines sur le cycle d 'U ruguay.
342 C A C . 19940616, art 5. Février 1990. Entretien avec M. Gum m er; C A C . 19940616, art 5. 27 .2 .1990. 
Ministère de l'agriculture et de la forêt. Chauvin . Négociations agricoles de l'U ruguay Round -  la position 
britannique.
343 C A C . 19910751, art 2. 1 9 .4 .1990. Am bassade de France en Grande-Bretagne. L'attaché agricole. Objet: 
Conseil des ministres de l'agriculture de 25 et 26 avril 1990. Position du Royaum e-Uni.
344 That the EEC devoted seven Council m eetings to deciding on the EEC offer in the autum n of 1990 is 
rem arkable. For, from the m om ent the Com m ission had presented its proposal to the Council in 
Septem ber, it w as already clear that this offer w as absolutely inadequate in the opinion of the United States 
and the Cairns Group.
345 C A C . 19920056, art 8. 1 0 .10 .1990. TD DFRA BRUXELLES 1358 SG CI A G RI 2ECO N .
346 C A C . 19920056, art 8. 1 0 .10 .1990. TD DFRA BRUXELLES 1359 SG CI A G RI 2ECO N .
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warnings from the part of the Commission that the credibility of the EEC was at stake once the 
15 October deadline for the proposal had passed, were to no avail.347 Apparently, France could 
still count on the support of its German partner,348 and according to the press, it was the 
Franco-German axis that had enabled France to maintain its opposition to the Commission 
proposal and eventually achieve the watered-down version of this proposal that was accepted in 
the Council meeting of 7 November 1990.349
This situation gradually changed in 1991, however. The German Minister of Economics 
increasingly called for reform of the CAP, arguing that the European agricultural policy was 
putting industrial exports at risk in the GATT negotiations.350 Kiechle held the view that EEC 
agricultural policy should be aimed at production control by means of quotas and that the EEC 
did not need to be a significant agricultural exporter on the world market and export restitutions 
could be reduced.351 Germany preferred to have the accompanying measures placed in the green 
box rather than maintain the existing level of export restitutions.352 France was aware that the 
German position on quotas, decoupled support and restitution reductions was diametrically 
opposed to its own position on these matters. It therefore feared that Germany would soon 
come to favour compromises in the agricultural negotiations and even believed that the first 
signs of such a shift could already be detected.353 France was particularly interested in 
preserving unity with Germany on the demand that the EEC should stick to the November 1990 
mandate. During the Franco-German summit in May, Kiechle continued to agree to this demand, 
but his colleague Mollemannn, during a Council meeting of Trade Ministers, declared himself in
347 ArchBuZa. V N /1985-1994: 08640. O ktober 1990. Codebericht van PV Geneve aan EZ.
348 C A C . 19920056, art 7. 8 .1 1 .1 99 0 . Nanteuil. TD LONDRES 1924 AGRI 2EC O N  SG CI.
349 A ccording to Legras: 'The m andate w as an absolute farce. This m andate w as discussed in seven councils 
before Heysel. [...] This m andate w as absolutely crazy, because it w as more or less in fact approved by all 
member states, although Q M V w ould have been okay for trade measures. The presidency wanted 
unanim ous approval. To get the m andate approved by everybody, we put everything in the French w anted. 
But nobody took care of the mandate. M acSharry told me m any times: 'I never read the m andate and don't 
talk to me about the m andate'. It w as a long m andate and you can see that it w as absolutely crazy. [...] 
W hat we did w as take into account member states that could pose problems. W e made an assessm ent of 
that and talked w ith those member states. The only ones w ho w ere looking at the m andate -  I hope for 
them not seriously -  or w ho were saying that the m andate w as very im portant, were the French' (interview 
Legras 12.1 1.2007).
350 C A C . 19940617, art 9. Ministère de l'agriculture et de la forêt. Note: préparation du prochain somm et 
franco-allem and. Évolution de la coopération en matière agricole et alimentaire.
351 Ibid. France w as surprised that Germ any appeared not to pursue the developm ent of its potential as an 
im portant agricultural pow er after unification. For the agricultural sector in form er East-Germ any consisted 
of relatively large and potentially efficient farms (C A C . 19940617, art 9. 57ème consultation franco­
allem ande. Questions agricoles).
352 C A C . 19940617, art 9. Consultation franco-allem ande (Lille: 29-30 mai 1992).
353 C A C . 19940617, art 9. Les relations franco-allem andes en agriculture dans le context des négociations 
d'U ruguay. France believed that the Germ an position had started to shift in the direction of greater 
flexibility in the negotiations in Decem ber 1990. It w as claimed that this could be concluded from  a 
diplom atic telegram  of 1 February 1991 and Germ an acceptance of a proposal subm itted by Dunkel on 26 
February 1992, in w hich he proposed to reach specific agreem ents on three separate issues (m arket access, 
internal support and export assistance) in the agricultural negotiations.
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favour of making concessions in the agricultural negotiations.354 In October 1991, the internal 
struggle between Mollemannn and Kiechle was settled at a cabinet meeting in favour of the 
Minister of Economics (see Chapter 8), and Germany started to aim for a more flexibile EEC 
position in the agricultural negotiations. During an informal meeting of the European Trade 
Ministers shortly after the cabinet decision, Mollemannn issued a call for greater flexibility, 
isolating his French colleague Dominique Strauss-Kahn (Agence France Presse 11.10.1991).355 
In 1991 a gradual weakening of the Franco-German axis in the agricultural negotiations can 
thus be detected. Germany became a less reliable partner because it began to speak with two 
voices, and ultimately no longer supported France in its opposition to concessions on 
agriculture. Meanwhile, in 1991 the United Kingdom had also made consistent efforts to 
persuade its European partners that concessions on agriculture were necessary.356 Despite the 
growing consensus in the EEC that concessions should be made, the General Affairs Council 
fully rejected the agricultural section of the Draft Final Act in December 1991. It was not long, 
however, before in January 1992, both the United Kingdom and Germany began to call for a 
less negative stance and even for full acceptance of this Draft Final Act as a basis for 
negotiations.357
While pressure from the United States had remained relatively limited in 1991, despite the 
constrained trade relations, its pressure increased significantly again in 1992.358 Improved 
relations between France and the United States appeared to be a positive side-effect of the crisis 
in the Gulf in 1991 ( The Economist 16.3.1991). In 1992, important frictions on foreign policy re­
emerged, however. The United States and France disagreed on how to deal with the former 
Soviet Union, and France attached great value to developing a European defence force, while 
the United States wanted to preserve the role of NATO (Agence France Presse 8.5.1992; 
Manchester Guardian Weekly 7.6.1992). Meanwhile, tensions over trade also mounted. In 
February 1992, Hills threatened to implement unilateral sanctions in the telecommunications 
sector, and in the energy and transport sectors trade relations also deteriorated (Le Monde
27.2.1992). In the GATT negotiations, the United States stepped up its pressure by extending its 
export programme, apparently unafraid of a subsidy war with the EEC (Financial Times
27.2.1992).359 In addition, there was talk of United States sanctions in reaction to the EEC's 
oilseed policies, which had already been condemned by a GATT panel. These sanctions primarily
354 C A C . 19940617, art 9. Entretiens entre Louis M erm az, ministre de l'Agriculture et de la Forêt, et M Ignaz 
Kiechle, Bundesm inister der Ernährung, der Landw irtschaft und der Forsten. Lille, 29-39 mai 1992; C A C . 
19930195, art 3. 27 .6 .1 99 1 . Note pour le ministre.
355 C A C . 19930195, art 3. 1 1 .10 .1991. Note pour le ministre. Objet: Négociations du GATT.
356 C A C . 19930195, art 3. 28.1 1.1991. Note pour le ministre.
357 C A C . 19930195, art 3. 10.1 .1992. Ministère de l'agriculture et de la forêt. Conseiller technique: J. F. 
Collin. Note pour le ministre; C A C . 19930195, art 3. 2 1 .1 .1 99 2 . Note pour le ministre. Com pte rendu des 
entretiens avec m onsieur Packer.
358 In 1991, several trade disputes between the United States and the EEC were subject of G A TT panels, 
including disputes on agricultural subsidies and on Airbus.
359 ArchBuZa. DDI DIE A RA : 1763. 29 .9 .1 99 2 . Coco-overleg.
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concerned products in which France had significant export interests.360 Despite the fact that the 
United States had not yet obtained approval for these sanctions in GATT, it stated unilaterally 
that the sanctions would take effect in December if an agricultural accord had not been reached 
before that date.
Within the EEC, pressure on France also increased. Kohl called for a swift conclusion of 
the Uruguay Round (Financial Times 24.3.1992), and Germany exerted pressure on the French 
government to clear the way for a compromise in the GATT negotiations (Agence France Presse
3.4.1992). When negotiations between the Commission and the United States were intensified 
in the autumn of 1992, a number of member states began to step up their pressure on the 
French government (Le Monde 14.10.1992). Agriculture Ministers from the United Kingdom, 
Denmark, Germany, Italy, Spain and Ireland all made informal visits to Soisson to discuss the 
GATT negotiations (Le Monde 27.10.1992). According to Le Monde, Germany publicly remained 
supportive of France, but behind the scenes and during meetings between Kohl and Mitterrand, 
Germany called on France to soften its position time and again (7.11.1992). When Soisson 
requested a study on the compatibility between CAP reform and the compromise under 
negotiation with the United States in the Agriculture Council on 16 November 1992, he was not 
supported by any other member state (Le Monde 18.11.1992),361 although Soisson himself 
denied that France was isolated in the negotiations (Soisson 1993, 47 and 72). When the Blair 
House Accord was reached and the most significant member states, including Germany, had 
accepted the proposal, it seems impossible not to conclude that France was isolated within the 
EEC (cf. Meunier 2005, 111). 362
In 1993 direct pressure from the United States on the EEC eased off. The Blair House 
Accord had been reached and the American government was now mainly interested in steering 
the NAFTA agreement through Congress (Peamen and Bensch 1995, 241). The United States 
claimed not to be interested in reopening the Blair House Accord. Within the EEC, France 
initially remained isolated, but the new centre-right government went out of its way to find 
support for their demand for renegotiation (see Section 7.5). Like the United States, Germany 
saw no need to renegotiate the Blair House Accord but instead emphasized the need for a 
successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round because of the potential benefits for the industrial
360 C A C . 19930195, art 2. 1 1.6.1992. DREE: Desponts. Note pour le ministre. Objet: Panel soja. Publication 
de la liste de rétorsions am éricaines. Im portant French export products involved were mineral w ater, w ine, 
other alcoholic beverages, and cheese.
361 Requesting reports and evaluations were classic delaying tactics the French often applied in negotiations.
362 The Blair House Accord had certainly not been reached w ithout difficulty, ju d ging from the interview 
w ith Andriessen. Cooperation w ithin the Com m ission between Andriessen and M acSharry w as strenuous 
because M acSharry kept his position to himself and w as not able to say in the m orning w hat he w as 
planning to do in the negotiations in the afternoon. M oreover, Andriessen w as willing to go further in EEC 
concessions than M acSharry. According to Andriessen, Delors w as less chauvinistic than he is usually 
portrayed (interview Andriessen 12.2.2008). On 20 Novem ber, the European negotiators left W ashington 
w ithout an accord, but the next day, Bush called and announced that the deal that had been on the table 
w as acceptable to the United States. The Blair House Accord had now  com e into being.
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and service sectors.363 The United Kingdom also strongly urged a swift GATT deal for economic 
and political reasons.364 Maintaining their demand for rebalancing was therefore a politically 
costly option for France. However, abondoning this demand would damage the credibility of the 
French government (for the government had promised to use its veto against Blair House if 
necessary), and would be viewed by many Frenchmen as a capitulation in the face of pressure 
from the United States. Only after Kohl met France part of the way, and Germany, during a 
Jumbo Council meeting on 20 November (requested by France), offered the French a 
compromise in the form of reaching an agreement on 'clarification' (and definitely not 
'renegotiation') of the Blair House Accord, was France released from its isolation. By December 
1993, nearly all GATT partners were striving to meet the 15 December deadline brought about 
by the expiration of the United States President's fast-track mandate. As indicated in Section 
4.4.7, both the United States and GATT Director General Sutherland had warned that if this 
deadline was not met, the Uruguay Round would have failed. It was therefore in the French 
international political interest not to put up further obstacles in the last phase of the 
negotiations.
7.4.2 Economic interests
To estimate the extent to which accepting the proposals that were tabled during the second half 
of the Uruguay Round served the French international economic interests, this section will 
analyse the potential effects of these proposals on (1) the French trade balance, (2) the chances 
of a successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round, and (3) the consequences for the proper 
functioning of the multilateral trade regime. As elaborated in Section 5.4.2, French agriculture 
interests lay in maintaining export restitutions and in price reductions to a certain extent. Export 
restitutions enabled the French to preserve their share in world agricultural markets, while cuts 
in guarantee prices would improve France's export position and market share within the 
European internal market. These market shares were significant within the overall economic 
interest of France, because agricultural exports contributed significantly to the French trade 
balance, which was in deficit due to the import of energy and industrial products.
As far as the French trade balance is concerned, the agricultural offer the Commission 
proposed in 1990 was economically unattractive due to the 30%  cut in export restitutions and 
the tariffication (and subsequent reduction) of variable levies. The former damaged the export 
potential of France's agricultural sector and the latter resulted in the loss of community 
preference if the intervention price after reduction were to approach the world market price 
level. On the other hand, the Commission also demanded rebalancing in its proposal, which
363 ArchEZ: G A TT-U R  1990-1993. Soc 1-199. Aanvullende notitie ten behoeve van REZ dd 3 .9 .1993; 
Informele bilaterale BRD-N L debriefing over hoogam btelijk  Frans-Duits overleg; Vervolgnotitie t.b .v de REZ 
dd 16-9-1993 ter voorbereiding van de jum boraad dd 20-9 -1 9 93 . Betreft: G A T T UR; actuele 
ontw ikkelingen.
364 ibid.
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reduced the risk of significant incereases in imports somewhat. Furthermore, the cuts in 
guarantee prices could benefit the position of relatively efficient French farmers in the European 
internal market (see Section 5.3.2). Overall, the offer was therefore likely to produce loss in 
market share on world agricultural markets, but a potential expansion of French market shares 
on the European internal market. It is, however, questionable whether benefits at the European 
level outweighed the costs at the global level, particularly because, as a result of the reduced 
variable levies, France also had to face additional competition from third countries on the 
European market. Considering the second aspect of the French international economic interest, 
the proposal was unlikely to be in France's interests either. Although by 1990 agriculture had 
become one of the most important issues in the GATT negotiations, it was not yet considered 
the key issue that was holding up progress in other areas of negotiation. Other unresolved 
issues included the rules governing trade in services, intellectual property, textile and anti­
dumping measures (Agra Europe 2.3.1990; Frankfurter AUgemeine Zeitung 24.7.1990;
13.11.1990). Furthermore, since the United States already considered the Commission proposal 
to be insufficient, it was questionable whether agreement within the EEC on that proposal 
would actually bring a GATT deal on agriculture any closer. With respect to the third aspect of 
the international economic interest of France, the functioning of the international trading 
system, giving in on agriculture may have been an attractive option. Because the policies 
introduced by new United States trade and agricultural legislation ran counter to the notion of a 
multilateral trading system and would be implemented if the EEC did not compromise on 
agriculture (Agence Europe 3.11.1990), accepting more a more radical EEC offer on agriculture 
may have averted adverse consequences in both political and economic terms. However, overall, 
the potential economic benefits of accepting the Commission offer did not outweigh the 
inevitable costs.
For the French trade balance, the Draft Final Act of December 1991 was even less 
attractive than the 1990 Commission proposal. The Act not only prescribed reduction in 
expenditure on export restitutions, it also included reductions in the volume of subsidized 
exports. The latter was problematic for the French, because volume restrictions would limit 
France's ability to share in the growth of world agricultural export markets after liberalization. It 
could also require production limitations, whereas the French government conducted a policy 
aimed at the modernization and expansion of production capacity. In addition, the method of 
tariffication proposed in the Draft Final Act was more disadvantageous than the method 
suggested by the Commission, and the Act did not provide for rebalancing. France therefore 
feared that community preference would be undermined and additional imports from third 
countries would enter the EEC. Finally, the Draft Final Act did not categorize American deficiency 
payments as export assistance, meaning that they would be subject to lower reduction rates 
than EEC export restitutions. This would damage France's competitive position relative to the 
United States on world agricultural markets. Focusing on the second indicator for the 
international economic interest, we must conclude that agriculture was increasingly becoming 
the main stumbling block in the negotiations. The Heysel debacle in 1990 had shown that in the
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heat of the negotiations, conflicts in one of the negotiating groups could lead to a deterioration 
of the negotiating atmosphere in other groups, eventually resulting in the complete breakdown 
of negotiations. Although agriculture was not the only unresolved issue during the Heysel 
conference (services, intellectual property and textiles were other difficult issues), agriculture 
was principallyy blamed for the collapse of the negotiations. Making concessions on agriculture 
by accepting the Draft Final Act was therefore highly likely to lead to a GATT deal resembling 
this Act. Although the Act was a package deal which was not limited to agriculture alone, it did, 
however, not include a deal on the liberalization of trade in France's competitive sectors such as 
services. Giving in on agriculture in order to reach an overall GATT agreement in the form of the 
Act was therefore not economically beneficial in relation to the second indicator of the 
international economic interest either. Turning to the third indicator of the international 
economic interest, a GATT deal, such as the Draft Final Act, was very welcome from the 
perspective of strengthening the multilateral trading system. This system was under pressure 
due to increasing protectionism in the world and the unilateral and regional intitiatives 
undertaken by the United States. The United States had started to implement the GATT triggers 
from the 1990 Farm Bill, side-stepping the GATT system.365 The expansion of the export 
enhancement programme was fuelling existing tensions in US-EEC trade relations and risked an 
agricultural subsidies race. Finally, by entering into free trade negotiations with Canada and 
Mexico, the United States signalled that it would find other ways to secure its export markets, 
outside the GATT framework. Overall, however, we must conclude that the Draft Final Act 
would be unattractive from the French international economic point of view.
The Blair House Accord was economically more attractive to France than the Draft Final 
Act. The cuts in export restitutions were smaller, but the Accord still included limits for volumes 
exported with the help of restitutions, variable levies were converted into tariffs and 
subsequently subject to reductions, and the Accord provided no rebalancing. What is important 
to note, however, is that by accepting MacSharry's CAP reforms of May 1992, France had 
already committed itself to support reductions with respect to a number of significant product 
groups. The key question for France therefore was whether the section of the Blair House Accord 
that dealt with exports would require further cuts or production limits than those already 
provided for in the CAP reforms. The reduction of guarantee prices based on the CAP reforms 
would lead to a smaller disparity between European intervention prices and world market prices, 
as a result of which less money would need to be spent on export restitutions. The reduction in 
financial expenditure on export restitions required by the Draft Final Act could therefore, at least 
in part, be met simply by implementing the CAP reforms. The volume limitations would still be 
problematic, however, and could even lead to larger reductions in expenditure on export 
restitutions than required by the Accord if the maximum volume was reached before the EEC 
had reached the maximum expenditure permitted. The Blair House Accord was therefore still
365 ArchBuZa. DDI-DIE A RA : 1055. Verslag van de 1479e vergadering van de Raad van Ministers (Landbouw ) 
van 25/26.3.1991.
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potentially economically costly for the French share in world agricultural markets and for its 
overall trade balance. With respect to the role of agriculture in the GATT negotiations it must be 
noted that, although a number of trade diplomats argued that disagreements with respect to 
trade in services were now almost as damaging to the talks as the US-EEC dispute on farm 
subsidies (New York Times 24.3.1992), the agricultural negotiations were generally still 
considered to be the key to a successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round. Negotiations in the 
non-agricultural negotiating groups were more or less suspended in 1992, while agricultural 
negotiations were raised to the bilateral level between the United States and the EEC. It was 
clear that a deal was needed on agriculture before the Uruguay Round as a whole could be 
concluded. Once the Blair House Accord had been reached, accepting this agreement was likely 
to enhance the chances of an overall GATT deal. Nevertheless, the Blair House Accord did not 
benefit France in this respect, because the negotiations on services were just as deadlocked as 
the agricultural negotiations. It was therefore not in French economic interests to make 
concessions on agriculture by accepting the Blair House Accord in order to enable a wider GATT 
deal which included the results achieved in other issue areas would take effect. Finally, in view 
of increasing initiatives on the part of the United States to enter into regional and bilateral trade 
agreements outside the GATT system (e.g. NAFTA was signed in October 1992), the multilateral 
trade system would be strengthened by a successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round. Given 
these various aspects of the French international economic interests, the international economic 
benefits attached to the Blair House Accord were equal to the international economic costs.
The Final Accord struck on 15 December 1993 included a number of concessions on the 
part of the United States which were to the benefit of France. The changes to the Blair House 
Accord were limited, however. The scale of the cuts required in the volume of exports made with 
the help of export restitutions was reduced slightly, and with respect to the issue of internal 
support, the aggregation of support in various sectors would now be permitted instead of the 
application of fixed support reduction percentages per product that had previously been 
proposed.366 The EEC demand for rebalancing had still not been met, however. Given that the 
Final Accord included all negotiating groups, it would nevertheless not be economically 
attractive for France to reject the entire deal on the basis of potential cost to the agriucultural 
sector, while the deal could on balance, through the outcome on services for example, benefit 
the French economy as a whole. Furthermore, because the Uruguay Round had already missed 
numerous deadlines and would be considered to have failed if an agreement was not reached 
before 15 December 1993, the French had no other economically viable option but to accept the 
agreement. It was therefore economically unattractive for France to throw up new barriers for a 
succesful conclusion of the Uruguay Round. If it were to do so, it would certainly be blamed for 
the failure of the negotiations.
366 A ggregation  implies that a reduction percentage is agreed for a w hole sector or product group, w ith the 
possibility of variations in the support reductions per product within the product group or sector concerned, 
provided that the average reduction percentage in the sector meets the percentage agreed.
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7.4.3 Ideological interests
Policy options that are incompatible with the French state identity are unattractive from an 
international ideological perspective. Three aspects of French state identity are particularly 
relevant here (see also Section 3.3.3.): the French vocation exportatrice in the agricultural 
sector; the leading role of France within the EEC, which France believed should be on an equal 
footing with the United States (or serve as a counterweight to the power of the United States); 
and the Franco-German friendship.
The ideas underlying the Draft Final Act were at odds with the French vocation 
exportatrice, for the Act defended the principle that exports should be based on a state's 
competitive position and not on its history or a certain calling. The introduction of greater 
market forces into the agricultural sector and the assumption that competitive advantages 
should be the basis for a state's market share remained essential to the Blair House Accord and 
the Final Accord.
The role of France as a leading state in Europe and the power of Europe to counterbalance 
the United States were under pressure if the Draft Final Act and the Blair House Accord were 
accepted. According to the French, the agricultural section of the Draft Final Act had a 
distinctively American slant (see Section 7.5). The Act targeted the EEC's export restitutions, 
while the United States deficiency payments were not considered as export assistance. 
Accepting this Act was incompatible with the second aspect of the French state identity and, in 
the French perception, it would be the equivalent of going down on one's knees before the 
United States. Although the United States had certainly made concessions to the EEC in the Blair 
House Accord, this Accord was still regarded as the capitulation of the EEC (and thus France) to 
the United States. Section 7.3.1 has already shown that the farm lobby immediately labelled the 
acceptance of the Blair House Accord as kowtowing to the United States. Accepting the Accord 
was therefore believed to be at odds with the idea of a strong Europe as a counterweight to the 
United States. France also had to bear in mind, however, that its 'leading role' in the EEC 
integration process could be damaged if France were to use a veto against the Accord. France 
stood isolated in its rejection of the Accord, and a French veto could unleash a European crisis 
at the very moment that the EEC was already struggling to ratifiy the Maastricht Treaty (not in 
the least because of the referendum that the French President had called for).
In 1990, the Franco-German friendship was best served by opposing the Commission 
proposal for an agricultural offer in GATT, because Germany strongly resisted this proposal. 367 
The importance of the Franco-German friendship increased further from 1992 onwards, when 
the French and German interest and preferences threatened to diverge and concessions were 
required from one or both sides in order to reach a common position. This consideration was at 
play firstly with respect to the Blair House Accord and later with regard to the Final GATT deal.
367 Dutch negotiators endorse the conclusion that the Franco-Germ an friendship w as an im portant 
consideration for France w hen the negotiations on the agricultural offer cam e to an end in Novem ber 1990. 
A  French position against the adapted proposal w ould  not serve the Franco-Germ an friendship (ArchBuZa. 
V N /1985-1994: 08640. 1 8 .10.1990. Codebericht PV Geneve aan EZ. GEV1 1695.
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France fiercely opposed the Blair House Accord, while Germany (particularly German industry) 
was keen to conclude the Uruguay Round. When France demanded a renegotiation of the 
Accord in 1993 -  a demand in which it initially stood alone -  Germany eventually stepped into 
the breach for its French partner by finding a way to adapt the Blair House Accord without 
putting the Uruguay Round as a whole in peril. By doing so, Germany answered French calls for 
solidarity. By the end of 1993, it was France's turn to show solidarity with Germany, whose 
industrial sector was eager for a GATT deal, and to abandon its resistance to a GATT 
agreement. Continuing recalcitrance in the negotiations would have seriously damaged Franco­
German relations at that moment.
7.4.4  International costs and benefits
On the basis of the information presented above concerning France's political, economic and 
ideological interests, we are now able to make an estimate of the international costs and 
benefits of various policy options (Table 7.2).368 This regards the degree to which acceptance of 
the Commission proposal, the Draft Final Act, the Blair House Accord, and the Final GATT 
Accord may be considered attractive or unattractive, based on the French international interests. 
Table 7.2 shows that up to and including 1991, the costs of acceptance consistently outweighed 
the benefits. On the basis of France's international interests it is therefore predicted that France 
will not accept the Commission proposal or the Draft Final Act. The Blair House Accord was on 
balance more attractive than the Draft Final Act, at least considering the French international 
political interests, but the Accord still entailed significant international economic and 
international ideological costs. On balance the costs of the Blair House Accord equalled the 
benefits. No clear predictions can therefore be formulated on the French preferences with 
respect to this Accord based on international considerations alone. Acceptance of the Final 
GATT Accord was, however, in France's overall international interests.
368 See Section 3.3.3. for an explanation of how  the political, econom ic and ideological 'balances' in Table 
7.2 are calculated.
Tabel 7.2. French international costs and benefits with respect to the proposals during the second half of the Uruguay Round
Commission Proposal 1990 Draft Final Act 1991 Blair House Accord 1992 Final Accord 1993
POLITICAL(a)
Extra-EEC pressure + + + + + + +
Intra-EEC pressure + - + + +
German pressure - + + +
BALANCE POLITICAL + - + + + +
ECONOM IC(b)
Trade balance - +
Agriculture as the obstacle 
In the UR
0 0 0 +
Multilateral trading system 0 + + +
BALANCE ECONOMIC - + /- + /- + +
IDEO LO GICAL(c)
Vocation exportatrice
FR/EEC ~  US balance 0
Franco-German friendship + +
BALANCE IDEOLOGICAL - - - + /-
SUM  INTERNATIONAL(d)
1 -  I -  I + I +
Legend: (a) In the case of extra-EEC and Germany: -  = pressure against the proposal, -  -  = extensive pressure against the proposal, + = pressure in favour of 
the proposal, + +  = extensive pressure in favour of the proposal. With respect to Intra-EEC: -  -  = united rejection or resistance; + +  = united acceptance; -  = 
disunity within the EEC, but predominant resistance; and + = disunity within the EEC, but predominant acceptance. (b) -  = economic costs, + = economic 
benefits (c) + = the policy option corresponds well with the aspect of the French identity involved; -  = the policy option is at odds with the aspect of the French 
identity involved. The 'balances' may take values of either + = benefits exceed costs; + + = benefits considerably exceed costs; -  = costs exceed benefits; -  -  = 
costs considerably exceed benefits; or + / -  = costs equal benefits. (d) The 'sum ' may take values of either + = benefits exceed costs; -  = costs exceed benefits; 
or + / -  = costs equal benefits. 0 = no clear costs or benefits with respect to the criterion involved.
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7.5 Theoretical Expectations and the French Preferences
Between 1990 and 1993, international polarity was low, and domestic polarity in France was 
high from an internationally comparative perspective. In cases of low international polarity and 
high domestic polarity, the theoretical framework predicts that international considerations will 
be decisive in the preference-formation process. Within these international considerations, 
political and economic considerations are expected to play a relatively more important role than 
ideological considerations (see Section 2.5). As in the first French case study, it should be taken 
into considerations however, that while French domestic polarity was indeed high from an 
internationally comparative perspective, the scores on the various indicators of domestic polarity 
were not constant (see Section 3.2.1). Between 1990 and March 1993, domestic polarity was 
somewhat lower (a score of 5 out of 6) because the socialist government was a minority 
government. Although the centre-right government that took office in March 1993 enjoyed an 
overwhelming majority in parliament, it had to cooperate with a socialist President 
(icohabitation. Domestic polarity therefore on balance remained constant during the period of 
1990-1993 (a score of 5 out of 6).369 Combined with high scores on the process variables (e.g. 
high degrees of societal mobilization and governmental sensitivity), this somewhat lowered 
domestic polarity can lead to increased influence for domestic political considerations. 
Nevertheless, in view of the low international polarity (and the concomitant international 
constraints), this effect will be less pronounced in the period 1990-1993 than in the first French 
case study, when international polarity was still high. I expect domestic political consideration to 
play a more important role in preference-formation in the second French case study only if the 
degree of governmental sensitivity and societal mobilizations are both high. Between 1990 and 
1992, governmental sensitivity increased continuously (see Section 7.2), reaching a peak in 
1992. I therefore expect that, given high degree of societal mobilization, domestic political 
considerations will play an important role in the French preference-formation process during
1992.
In Sections 7.5.1 to 7.5.4 I will now discuss the various decision moments separately. As 
in the previous chapters, a prediction will first be formulated on the expected French preference 
at each of the decision moments. In this case these predictions are based on France's 
international interests, and in 1992 on its domestic political interests as well. In the cost and 
benefit tables for each decision moment below, only the balances concerning these interests are 
therefore reproduced from Tables 7.1 and 7.2. The other balances are indicated with an X as 
considerations that are regarded to be non-decisive on the basis of the theoretical framework. 
After having formulated the prediction, the preferences that France actually defended in the
369 For the entire period of the run-up to and the negotiations within the U ruguay Round, this means that 
dom estic polarity w as at its highest between 1982 and 1986 (a score of 6 out of 6) and at a slightly lower 
level between 1986 and 1993 (a score of 5 out of 6).
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negotiations will be analysed in order to establish whether these preferences are in accordance 
with the predictions based on the theoretical framework.
7.5.1 The Com m ission proposal of 1990
7.511 Predictions
In the light of French international interests, France is expected to reject the Commission 
proposal on agriculture. The proposal would have a negative effect on the French trade balance 
and would not be compatible with the importance France attached to the Franco-German 
friendship. Only international political considerations (on balance) favoured acceptance of the 
proposal, but if the EEC really wanted to pacify its main antagonists in the negotiations, it 
would have to go even further than the original proposal. International political benefits would 
then only be obtained at the cost of French international economic and ideological interests. 
France is therefore not expected to accept the Commission proposal unless it is adapted in such 
a way as to safeguard French export potential and its relations with Germany.
Table 7.3a: Issue: Acceptance of the Commission proposal in 1990
INTERNATIONAL DOMESTIC
Political + x
Economic - x
Ideological - x
BALANCE -
Prediction: France will not accept the 1990 Commission proposal on agriculture unless it obtains 
guarantees that safeguard its export potential.
Key to symbols: + = benefits exceed costs, -  =  costs exceed benefits, x = non-decisive consideration.
7.51.2 Preferences
France opposed the agricultural proposal presented by Commission in September 1990.370 The 
arguments the French government used to justify this position were that the proposal would 
have a negative impact on the quality of life in the countryside, and on employment and overall 
economic development.371 They argued that the Commission proposal put too much faith in the 
proper functioning of the price mechanism.372 The proposals on rebalancing and tariffication 
were particularly problematic according to the French: the degree of rebalancing was
370 A ccording to Legras, Nallet, M erm az's predecessor, had already inform ally agreed to a proposal from 
M acSharry to reduce agricultural support by 3 0 % . Nallet had indicated that he w ould criticize the proposal, 
but that it w as acceptable. On the Germ an side, Feiter had stated: 'O kay, but don't say I said okay. W e will 
cry but we agree' (interview Legras 12.11.2007).
371 ArchBuZa. DDI DIE A RA : 1012. Verslag landbouw raad 8 oktober 1990.
372 ArchBuZa. DDI DIE A RA : 1012. Verslag landbouw raad 19 oktober 1990.
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insufficient, while tariffication and minimum market access for third countries would undermine 
community preference. However, behind this apparently unified rejection lay an internal 
decision-making process in which significant differences in the priorities of the various ministries 
involved had emerged. A  number of interministerial meetings were devoted to determining the 
position that France should defend in the European negotiations to decide on the agricultural 
proposal in the GATT negotiations. In one such a meeting on 6 October 1990, the Ministry of 
Agriculture stated that the Commission proposal would have an adverse effect on French 
agriculture, particularly in certain sectors.373 It argued that France should therefore oppose the 
proposal in the Agricultural Council or demand accompanying compensatory measures. The 
representative of the President stressed that Mitterrand placed great value on securing the 
interests of French farmers and that the Commission proposal contradicted this aim and would 
be badly received in the agricultural world. Mitterrand seemed to be the only one who clearly 
anticipated the reaction of the farm lobby. The other ministries involved did not regard the 
Commission proposal as problematic. According to the Cabinet of the Prime Minister, the 
Commission had done nothing more than translate previous decisions into a concrete proposal. 
A  report by the Economics Ministry argued that, although the Commission proposal would be 
disadvantageous in terms of certain products, it would not, on balance, disrupt French 
agriculture as a whole.374 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs appeared to be particularly worried that 
the demand for accompanying measures would weaken the Commission's negotiating position 
in GATT and the SGCI emphasized that it would not be in France's interest to jeopardize the 
Commission proposal as a whole. Where all participants in the meeting agreed on was that the 
results to be obtained (i.e. the specific reductions) should not be quantified in the EEC proposal. 
The Cabinet of the Prime Minister concluded that the ministers agreed that the 'logic of the 
entirety' of the Commission proposal should not be called into question but that they would 
require the Commission to assess the consequences of their proposal and propose 
accompanying measures if necessary. This decision-making process shows that the Ministry of 
Agriculture was, predictably, the most reserved with respect to the proposal, and that the SGCI 
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were more anxious about preventing damage to the French 
prestige and European credibility. During the Agricultural Council meeting of 8 October, Mermaz 
defended the French position agreed at the interministerial meeting: he stated that France 
would not be able to accept the reductions in support proposed unless the consequences of
373 The positions of the different ministries described in this paragraph are all based on the fo llow ing source: 
C A C . 19920056, art 8. 8 .1 0 .1 99 0 . Secrétariat général du gouvernem ent. Com pte rendu de la réunion 
interministérielle, tenue le samedi 6 octobre 1990 à 10:00 sous la présidence de m onsieur Cotin , chargé de 
mission au cabinet du Premier Ministre. Objet: négociations com m erciales multilatérales: projet d'offre 
com m unautaire.
374 C A C . 19920056, art 7. 5 .10 .1990. Ministère de l'économ ie des finances et du budget. Direction de la 
prévision. Sous direction bureau de l'agriculture. L'agriculture française est-elle menacé par la proposition 
de la Com m ission pour la négociation GATT?
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such reductions were specified and the Commission committed itself to accompanying 
measures.375
On 9 October the Commission proposal was once more discussed at an interministerial 
meeting. The issue to be decided was whether the proposal for a 30%  reduction was 
acceptable. In the preparations for this meeting, the Ministry of Agriculture considered two 
options: flatly rejecting the 30%  reduction, or accepting the reduction and aiming for 
improvements on tariffication and rebalancing. It was thought that the Prime Minister, Rocard, 
would not agree to the first option because it could lead to a stalemate in the European 
negotiations and, in the worst case, to France being outvoted on the Council of Ministers by 
means of qualified majority voting. It was therefore decided to propose the second option in the 
interministerial meeting.376 The instructions formulated by Rocard after the meeting, were in line 
with this proposal. In the European negotiations, France would direct its efforts at improving the 
Commission proposal with respect to tariffication and rebalancing.377 During the interministerial 
meeting itself, it was also emphasized that unity within the EEC should be safeguarded, but that 
this unity should not come at the cost of the CAP, and the principle of community preference in 
particular. The Commission proposal should therefore be adapted.378 Mermaz defended this 
position in the Agricultural Council of 15 and 16 October 1990, in line with Rocard's 
instructions.379
Due to the reserved attitude of a number of member states, most importantly France and 
Germany, no agreement was reached during this meeting. A new Council meeting was planned 
for 19 October. Prior to this meeting, another interministerial meeting would be held in 
France.The Ministry of Agriculture laid down its strategy in preparation for this meeting. The 
ministry preferred to oppose the 30%  reductions, but, once again, anticipated a negative 
reaction from the other ministries. Mermaz was advised to trade acceptance of the Commission 
proposal in the interministerial committee against a declaration on community preference. If the 
Prime Minister, against all expectations, were to agree to oppose the 30%  reductions, then a 
'mode d e refus' should be developed that Mermaz could use in the European negotiations. An 
argument that Mermaz was advised to use on this occasion was that the price cuts were too 
extensive and would lead to disquiet among French farmers.380 After the interministerial meeting 
on 19 October, Rocard provided the following instructions: the 30%  support reductions should
375 C A C . 19920056, art 7. Octobre 1990. Ministère de l'agriculture et de la forêt. Com pte rendu du conseil 
agricole; C A C . 19920056, art. 7 9 .10 .1 99 0 . Com m uniqué du Ministère de l'agriculture et de la forêt; C A C . 
19920056, art 8. Conseil agricole du 8 octobre 1990. Intervention de M. Louis M ermaz.
376 C A C . 19920056, art 6. 9 .1 0 .1 99 0 . Note pour le ministre. Objet: com ité interministériel du 9 octobre. 
Propositions de la Com m ission sur la réduction des soutiens à l'agriculture.
377 C A C . 19920056, art 8. 1 0 .10 .1990. Secrétariat du gouvernem ent. Relevé de décisions de la réunion de 
ministres tenue le 9 octobre 1990, sous la présidence du Premier Ministre.
378 C A C . 19930192. 9 .1 0 .1 99 0 . Com m uniqué de Premier Ministre, service de presse.
379 C A C . 19920056, art 8. Conseil agricole 16 octobre 1990. Intervention de M. M ermaz.
380 C A C . 19920056, art 3. 1 8 .10 .1990. Note pour le ministre. Objet: G A T T com ité interministériel du 19 
octobre 1990.
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not be rejected, but the Commission proposal as a whole could only be accepted if the sections 
on tariffication and rebalancing were improved and accompanying measures were guaranteed. 
A  vote on the proposal during the Council meeting should be averted if possible, but if it came 
to a vote, the French delegation should vote against the Commission proposal. Finally, the 
instructions emphasized that it was important for the French negotiators to ensure that German 
support would be forthcoming.381 On 19 October, Mermaz again followed these instructions. He 
argued that the Commission proposal should be improved with respect to tariffication and that 
community preference should be guaranteed. In the negotiations in the Council (both on 19 
October and later at the 26 October meeting), Mermaz applied the 'tied hands' strategy by 
stating that the French government could not leave the French farmers in the lurch by accepting 
the Commission proposal.382 The reference to discontent among farmers clearly was in fact a 
strategic move, and not based on genuine farm lobby influence. In the preparatory report of the 
Ministry of Agriculture mentioned earlier, the minister had already been advised to use this 
argument because of the strategic advantages it could deliver in European negotiations. The 
French decision-making process was not genuinely based on anticipating the reactions of French 
farmers, apart from the concerns expressed by Mitterrand.
Meanwhile, the negotiations at the European level were entirely deadlocked and France 
realized that it was likely to become isolated on the Council of Ministers. Prior to the Council 
meeting of 26 October, the Ministry of Agriculture was concerned about whether Franco­
German solidarity would last and feared that it might falter because a number of German 
demands had been met by the Commission.383 They were concerned that Germany would now 
support the Commission proposal, isolating France and that France would be outvoted on the 
proposal by qualified majority voting. There was speculation that Germany might state that it 
did not want to support a compromise as long as another member state (read: France) 
continued to withhold its support. This would allow the Germans to pay lip service to the 
Franco-German alliance, while in reality it would mean that Germany, by abstaining from voting,
381 C A C . 19920056, art 8. 1 9 .10 .1990. Relevé de décisions de la réunion de ministres tenue le 19 octobre 
sous la présidence du Premier Ministre.
382 C A C . 19920056, art 8. 1 9 .10 .1990. Conseil agriculture. Intervention de M. le Ministre; C A C .
2 9 .1 0 .19 9 0 . Com m uniqué du ministère de l'agriculture et de la forêt.
383 C A C . 19920056, art 8. 2 4 .1 0 .19 9 0 . Bernard Vial. Ministère de l'agriculture et de la forêt. Note pour 
M onsieur le Ministre. French uncertainty about the strength of the Franco-Germ an axis w as not new  in the 
U ruguay Round. W hen Kiechle visited the United States in the autum n of 1989, the French Ministry of 
Agriculture believed that he had not defended the EEC interests w ell, because of his sym pathy for quota 
and support that w as decoupled from production. It w as therefore questionable w hether he had defended 
the vocation exportatrice sufficiently vigorously. If this were not the case, the Ministry w ould consider it an 
'affrontem entpolitique m ajeur. It w as considered necessary to have a serious conversation w ith the 
Germ ans on the 'pacte fondateur franco-allemand (C A C . 19910751, art 1. 1 2 .10.1989. Ministère de 
l'agriculture et de la forêt. Cabinet du ministre, le conseiller technique. Note pour le ministre. Objet: vos 
entretiens avec M. Kiechle, 13-14 octobre 1989.). It is clear in this docum ent that the French perception of 
the Franco-Germ an friendship w as that in case of disagreem ent, Germ any had to give in.
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would allow the presidency to pass the proposal using qualified majority voting.384 France also 
began to worry about its credibility. It realized that, considering the position it had previously 
defended on the Council of Ministers, it could not accept a compromise (without backtracking 
on earlier declarations) unless the following conditions it had already stated were met -  namely, 
no quantification of the reduction of export restitutions and a guarantee on community 
preference. The latter could be accomplished through a formulation according to which the 
reduction of export restitutions should take place at a similar pace to the reduction of internal 
support.385 Clearly, France had manoeuvred itself into an awkward position: the rejection of the 
Commission proposal, which was necessary to protect its domestic credibility, was likely to lead 
to the isolation of France within the EEC and ultimately to the acceptance of the Commission 
proposal despite French resistance.
What France had feared, eventually happened, in part. During the Council meeting of 26 
October, Germany indicated that it had no longer insurmountable objections to the Commission 
proposal, but that it did not want to see France outvoted.386 As a result, no vote took place on 
the proposal and the negotiations could still not be concluded. Only after the Commission, on 6 
November 1990, in addition to earlier concessions, guaranteed the protection of community 
preference, did France accept the proposal. Mermaz presented the outcome as a French 
negotiating success (Financial Times 8.11.1990). France had managed to ensure that no 
separate offer was made with respect to export assistance and that the principle of 
accompanying measures was accepted.387 The French government did not agree with the farm 
lobby's assessment that the Accord represented a surrender to American pressure.388 
Domestically, the French government tried to sell the accord by stressing that the reduction in 
support did not equate to reductions in income, and that half of the required 30%  reduction 
had already been met by the measures that the EEC had implemented since 1986. Moreover, as 
the world's second largest agricultural exporter, France could not simply withdraw from the 
international trading system. Preventing a subsidy war and securing balanced reductions in 
support measures by all competitors was also in the French interests.389
Once the mandate for the Commission had been established by the acceptance of the 
Commission proposal, France repeatedly explained that this offer was non-negotiable and urged 
the Commission to stick to it (Agence Europe 16.11.1990, 6; Les Echos 16.11.1990; Le Figaro
16.11.1990).390 In 1990, both before and after the Heysel conference, France repeatedly denied
384 C A C . 19920056, art 8. 2 4 .1 0 .19 9 0 . Ministère de l'agriculture et de la forêt. Direction de la production et 
des échanges. Le directeur Bernard Vial. Note pour M onsieur le Ministre. Objet: ncm /préparation du conseil 
agriculture élargi du 26/10.
385 ibid.
386 C A C . 19920056, art 8. TD  Vidal. Conseil agriculture du 26 octobre 1990 en présence des ministres du 
com m erce extérieur.
387 C A C . 19920056, art 7. 8 .1 1 .1 99 0 . Com m uniqué du ministère de l'agriculture et de la forêt.
388 C A C . 19920056. 7 .1 1 .1 99 0 . A FP-PA  14. G ATT: Michel Rocard répond aux critiques.
389 C A C . 19920056. 2 2 .1 1 .19 9 0 . BIM A. GATT: conserver la maîtrise de notre avenir.
390 ArchBuZa. DDI DIE A RA : 1012: Deelverslag Landbouw raad 27 novem ber 1990.
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claims made by other member states that agriculture was the main obstacle in the Uruguay 
Round.391 The issue of agriculture was neither the key to success in the negotiations nor the only 
issue on which France had interests to defend, it maintained.392 French interests in the service 
sector and intellectual property should not be underestimated,393 and on these issues, it was the 
United States that was blocking negotiations (Les Echos16.11.1990). During the negotiations in 
Heysel in December 1990, France finally also refused to allow the Commission to relax the EEC's 
negotiating stance (Le Monde 6.12.1990; Agence Europe 12.12.1990).
In the internal decision making within the French government and in the Agricultural 
Ministry's explicit anticipation of the wishes of the Prime Minister, it was apparent that Rocard 
played an important role in the French decision making process in 1990 and that the Minister of 
Agriculture could not simply act unilaterally at the Council meetings.394 The Ministry of 
Agriculture repeatedly favoured a more reserved attitude than the Rocard allowed it to take 
after the interministerial meetings. The fact that Rocard was a rather technocratic socialist who 
was not so much interested in the specifics of the agricultural issue or the pressure of farmers, 
but rather in finding general solutions, is probably the key to explaining the outcomes of the 
interministerial meetings on agriculture. Furthermore, this analysis has shown that the influence 
of the farm lobby on the French position in the autumn of 1990 should not be overstated. The 
government was quite prepared to use the existing discontent amongst farmers to its advantage 
when it used the 'tied hands' strategy in the negotiations on the Agricultural Council, but the 
farm lobby did not appear to have directly influenced the French position. Admittedly, the 
government opposed the Commission proposal, and that was certainly also what the farm lobby 
wanted, but from the start it aimed to obtain accompanying measures in exchange for the 30%  
reductions, which was diametrically opposed to the wishes of the farm lobby that had labelled 
the demand of accompanying measures as a very bad strategy (see Section 7.3.1).
7.51.3 Analysis
When we compare the preferences that France defended in 1990 with the expectations 
formulated earlier, we may conclude that the proposition that France would not accept the 
Commission proposal unless it obtained guarantees that protected its export potential, is indeed 
corroborated by the empirical analysis. In the French deliberations, international economic
391 C A C . 19920056, art 6. 2 7 .6 .1 99 0 . Chauvin. Com pte rendu de l'entretien de M. Nallet avec M. Dunkel, 
directeur du G A TT; C A C . 1 9 9 20056, art 6. 1 7 .11.1990. François Boittin à DREE, MAF, SG CI. Objet: 
réponses à argum entaire américain.
392 C A C . 19930196, art 8. 4 .1 0 .1 99 0 . Pelletier. Principaux enjeux des négociations agricoles de l'U ruguay 
Round. See also: ArchBuZa. DDI DIE A RA : 1012. M em orandum  Verslag Landbouw raad 21-22 januari 1991.
393 C A C . 19920056, art 6. 6 .8 .1 9 90 . Note pour le ministre d'état. Jean François Stoll, conseiller technique au 
cabinet du ministre d'état. Ministre de l'économ ie, des finances et du budget.
394 M erm az personally believed that he had been allow ed a free hand in the Agricultural Council and that he 
enjoyed the support of Mitterrand (interview M erm az 25.11.2007). Notes of officials of his Ministry 
however show  that they actually had to take other governm ental actors into account.
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considerations of the export potential for the French agricultural sector were clearly displayed. 
France realized that it was under pressure from both the United States and, increasingly, from 
other European member states, but this was not enough to make France accept the proposal. 
The empirical analysis also clearly shows that France set great store by its relationship with 
Germany and defending a unified position. When the Commission had just tabled its proposal, 
the Franco-German friendship favoured rejection, because Germany also strongly opposed it. 
Once Germany had obtained the concessions it had demanded by the end of October, however, 
French and German interests threatened to diverge and the Franco-German friendship appeared 
to be served by French acceptance of the Commission offer. Under these circumstances it was of 
major importance for France to keep Germany on its side. Ultimately, considerations of 
international credibility also seem to have contributed to the persistent French rejection of the 
Commission proposal. France would lose face if it accepted a proposal that did not meet the 
demands that it had so vigorously defended. A combination of international economic, political 
and ideological considerations therefore provides a plausible explanation of the position France 
defended regarding the Commission proposal in 1990.
7.5.2 Dunkel's Draft Final Act of December 1991
7.5.2.1 Predictions
Considering the overall French international interest, it is predicted that France will reject the 
Draft Final Act that Dunkel proposed in December 1991. The only factors in favour of 
acceptance of the Act were extra-EEC pressure and considerations of the preservation of the 
multilateral trading system; on the other hand, the Act would worsen the French trade balance 
and be inconsistent with the French vocation exportatrice as well as with its idea of negotiations 
between the EEC and the United States on an equal footing.
Table 7.3b Issue: Acceptance of the Draft Final Act
INTERNATIONAL DOMESTIC
Political - x
Economic + /- x
Ideological - x
BALANCE -
Prediction: France will not accept the Draft Final Act
Key to symbols: -  =  costs exceed benefits, + / -  =  benefits equal costs, x = non-decisive consideration
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7  5.2.2 Preferences
After the failure of the Heysel conference, France was aware that GATT partners blamed the EEC 
due to its tenacity in the negotiations on agriculture.395 France disagreed and blamed the failure 
on the unwillingness of the United States to compromise (La Tribune de rExpansion3.12.1990). 
In addition, France repeatedly stressed that progress was failing on many other issues as well. 
One of these issues was services, an area in which the French interests should not be 
underestimated.396 In 1991, however, France realized that the Commission and an increasing 
number of member states also wished to adopt a more flexible position in the agricultural 
negotiations. Not only the United Kingdom and the Netherlands were in favour of a softer 
stance on agriculture, according to the DREE, but also Mollemannn, the German Minister of 
Economics.397 From this moment onwards, France had to make sure that it did not end up in the 
minority within the EEC, and the Germany attitude was a constant cause for particular concern 
in this respect.398 That French concerns regarding the German position were not unwarranted 
became clear when Strauss-Kahn, in the Council of Trade Ministers on 26 and 27 June 1991, 
was supported only by Ireland in his opposition to a negotiating text proposed by Dunkel, which 
France regarded to be highly beneficial to the United States.399 The French rejection of the 
proposals on the grounds that they were 'pro-American' was to become a recurrent theme from 
that point on. The German representatives at the June Council meeting, by contrast, made a 
passionate plea for more concessions and flexibility in order to reach an agreement in the GATT 
negotiations.
In the run-up to Dunkel's presentation of the Draft Final Act, France was particularly 
concerned about too much willingness of the Commission and other member states to make 
concessions, and the fear of being outvoted in European decision making on the issue of 
agriculture only increased (interview Mermaz, 25.11.2007). In November 1991, a precursor to 
Dunkel's Draft Final Act was immediately labelled by the French Ministry of Agriculture as a 
totally unbalanced compromise which would favour the United States.400 However, the potential 
reactions of other member states and the accompanying fear of a collapse of the European front 
induced the Ministry of Agriculture to determine within the French government how far France 
was willing to go before it would resort to using the Declaration of Luxembourg.401 France was
395 C A C . 19940617, art 8. Décembre 1990. Jacques Desponts. Direction des relations économ iques 
extérieures. Note pour le ministre d'état. Objet: l'U ruguay Round après la conférence de Bruxelles.
396 Ibid.; C A C . 19930195, art 3. Note pour le ministre. Objet: Conseil agricole des 4 et 5 mars 1991;
30.7 .1 99 1 . Ministère de l'agriculture et de la forêt, Jaques Berthom eau. Note pour le ministre. Com pte 
rendu du conseil affaires générales, 29 juillet 1991.
397 C A C . 19940617, art 8. 17.6 .1991. Desponts, DREE. Note pour le ministre d'état. Objet: position 
française dans la négociation du cycle d'U ruguay.
398 ibid.
399 C A C . 19930195, art 3. 27 .6 .1 99 1 . Jean-François Collin. Note pour le ministre. Objet: GATT.
400 C A C . 19940617, art 8. 26.1 1.1991. Jean-François Collin. Note pour le ministre. Objet: négociations du 
GATT: Éléments d'actualité.
401 C A C . 19930195, art 3. 28.1 1.1991. Jean-François Collin. Note pour le ministre. Objet: G ATT. Réunion 
interministérielle du 29 novembre.
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furious, when in 1991 information leaked out that the Commission had made concessions on 
minimum access and on reductions in the volume of subsidized exports in the negotiations in 
Geneva.402 According to the French, the Commission was making 'avances in the direction of 
the United States without securing anything in return.403
In October 1991, Concerns about imminent isolation in the GATT negotiations led France 
to focus more on the CAP reform negotiations in order to delay EEC decision making on the 
GATT negotiations, thereby hoping to prevent European decisions to the disadvantage of 
France.404 In addition, CAP reform could subsequently serve as a framework indicating the 
maximum concessions that could be made in GATT (Le Monde 20.10.1991). In the first half of 
1991, Mermaz, on behalf of France, had still argued that a GATT deal should precede 
negotiations on CAP reform, to prevent the EEC from being forced to make concessions twice.405 
The Ministries of Economics and Foreign Affairs had already opposed Mermaz's position then, 
but it was only during an interministerial meeting in October 1991, after France had become 
increasingly isolated in the GATT negotiations, that the Minister of Agriculture was overruled 
and it was decided that France would first seek CAP reforms (Fouilleux 1996, 68-71).406 It was 
after this meeting that Mermaz agreed to negotiate on CAP reform on the basis of the 
Commission proposal.407 As explained in Section 7.3.1, the farmers were furious about this 
decision, and viewed it as inconsistent with assurances they had received from the Ministry of 
Agriculture. Such a reaction was understandable considering that Mermaz appeared to have
402 The Com m ission and a num ber of member states w anted the EEC to make concessions after the 
transatlantic sum m it in Novem ber 1991, during w hich Bush had made concessions. French governm ent 
docum ents, however, indicate that the French perception w as that the United States had only appeared to 
make concessions, but its position had not actually changed. The idea that the United States had made 
concessions that should be answered by the EEC w as therefore unjustified (C A C . 19920056, art 7.
14.11.1991. Desponts, DREE. Note pour le ministre d'état. Objet: négociations d 'U ruguay. Suites du 
som m et transatlantique du 9 novem bre.
403 C A C . 19920056, art 7. 1 3 .12.1991. Desponts, DREE. Note pour le ministre. Objet: NCM  agricoles. Dérivé 
des négociations entre la Com m ission et les États-Unis.
404 C A C . 19930195, art 3. 28.1 1.1991. Jean-François Collin. Note pour le ministre. Objet: G A TT réunion 
interministérielle du 29 novembre.
405 C A C . 19940617, art 8. 17.1 .1991. Mireille R iou-Canal. Note pour le ministre. Objet: position française 
sur les projets de réforme de la PAC pour le conseil agricole des 21 et 22 janvier.
406 Mitterrand and Cresson also favoured C A P  reforms in order to allow  the EEC to regain the initiative in 
the G A TT negotiations. M itterrand w as however primarily occupied w ith the negotiations on the Treaty on 
European Union and Cresson w as a w eak Prime Minister, because she derived her prestige largely from 
Mitterrand and did not enjoy a strong basis in the PS. Since neither M itterrand nor Cresson intervened, 
M erm az had ample room for m anoeuvre on the issue of C A P  reforms.
407 After a Germ an cabinet m eeting in October, at w hich the Germ an governm ent decided to defend a 
position in favour of flexibilization of the agricultural offer in G A TT (see Chapter 8), sections within the 
French Ministry of Agriculture also started to favour focusing on C A P, considering the increasing isolation of 
France on the G A T T issue (C A C . 19930195, art 3. 1 1 .10 .1991. Jean-François Collin. Note pour le ministre. 
Objet: negociations du GATT).
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been overruled within government on this issue. Mermaz argued that he had consulted the 
farmers, but that ultimately all those involved had their own competences and responsibilities.408
French preference formation on the position they would defend at the 23 December 
Council of Ministers, where the European position on the Draft Final Act would be determined, 
therefore took place under increasing international pressure from both outside and within the 
EEC. Governmental documents show the French ministries were aware of this and that the 
French permanent representatives in Brussels were already contemplating strategies to prevent 
France from being outvoted on the Council of Ministers. They did, however, expect to gain 
sufficient support for rejecting the agricultural section of the Draft Final Act.409 During an 
interministerial meeting on 21 December 1991, the French ministers involved agreed that the 
Draft Final Act would not serve the French interests, but disagreed on the position that France 
should defend at the Council meeting.410 The Ministry of Agriculture was the most critical of the 
Draft Final Act, judging it to be completely unacceptable. The green box proposed was too 
extensive and minimum access and tariffication prejudiced the principle of community 
preference, while the American system of deficiency payments was not addressed. The latter 
was also an important point for the SGCI, which thought that these payments should also be 
defined as export assistance and thus be subject to the same reductions as the EEC export 
restitutions. If France failed to obtain that objective in the negotiations, it should either block 
the Uruguay Round or adopt the American system of support in the CAP reforms. The Ministries 
of Economics and Trade, however, objected to such a bureaucratic system and attached more 
value to preventing volume reductions in subsidized exports. The SGCI suggested that it was 
worth considering agreeing to volume reductions if the other EEC member states would accept 
reform of the CAP along French lines in exchange. The SGCI realized, however, that a 
disadvantage of that option was that it could undermine the Franco-German axis.411 The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was particularly anxious about damaging French prestige. It argued 
that rejecting the Draft Final Act in the way demanded by the Ministry of Agriculture would
408 Journal O fficiel de la République Française (1991), Assem blée nationale, 2e séance du 23 octobre 1991, 
4941
409 C A C . 19940617, art 8. 1 6 .12.1991. Chéreau, directeur de la production et des échanges, Ministère de 
l'agriculture et de la forêt. Note pour M onsieur le Ministre. Objet: situation des négociations d'U ruguay; 
C A C . 19940617, art 8. 1 9 .12 .1991. Ministre conseiller pour les affaires com m erciales, J.M . M etzger. Note. 
Objet: perspectives du conseil affaires générales du 23 décem bre. From: représentation perm anente de la 
France auprés des Com m unautés européennes.
410 All the positions presented in this paragraph are based on the follow ing source: C A C . 19940617, art 8. 
Com pte rendu de la réunion interministérielle du 21 decem bre 1991 à 11 heures sous la présidence de M. 
M oine, directeur du cabinet du Premier Ministre.
411 The fact w as that France and Germ any had conflicting interests in the debate on C A P  reform. Germ any 
favoured direct incom e support, while France preferred price cuts w hich could enable it to increase its share 
in the European internal market. French opposition to a large green box w as also related to its goal of 
increasing market shares. If all form s of direct support were to be placed in the green box (as a result of 
w hich these support instrum ents w ould not be subject to reductions), this w ould  enable less competitive 
European farmers (the Germ an farmers for exam ple) to maintain their share of the internal agricultural 
market as a result of w hich it w ould be more difficult for France to increase its market share.
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isolate France and expose the President to international criticism. It would give the impression 
that France was blocking the negotiations on agriculture. The Prime Minister's Cabinet 
summarized the French position on agriculture with three fundamental elements: the 
unacceptability of reductions in the volume of subsidized exports; the demand for rebalancing; 
and the limitation of the measures included in the green box. With respect to the agricultural 
chapter, France would refuse to negotiate on the basis of the Draft Final Act.412 In the Council 
meeting of 23 December, Mermaz explained that the Act was unacceptable to France as a 
negotiating basis, because it forced the EEC to give up a part of its agricultural exports by 
dismantling the existing system of support, while the American system remained unaffected.413 
Mitterrand clearly supported the hard-line French position, considering statements that he made 
in January 1992. According to the Financial Times, Mitterrand had commented during a cabinet 
meeting that 'France is not ready to bow to American demands, or to submit itself to the 
interest of any other country, and it will not give in' (16.1.1992). The French spokesman, 
Jacques Lang, stated that France was not planning to give in to American demands.414 While in
1990 the French government (in reaction to allegations made by the Farm lobby) had denied 
that accepting the adapted Commission proposal would represent a surrender to the Americans, 
it now justified its rejection of the Draft Final Act with that very same argument -  that 
acceptance would mean capitulating to the United States.
7.5.2.3 Analysis
A comparison of the French preferences and the prediction formulated earlier shows that the 
two correspond: France refused to accept the Draft Final Act as a basis for negotiation. 
International economic considerations are again clearly evident in the French deliberations -  in 
terms of safeguarding both French export potential and the community preference. International 
political considerations also appear to have played a part in in French decision making 
immediately before the Council meeting on the Draft Final Act. But in its public discourse, the 
government employed ideological arguments, in particular, to legitimize its opposition to the 
Draft Final Act: the proposal was modeled too closely on American demands. Mitterrand 
appeared to be personally concerned about American dominance in the relationship with the 
EEC. It is striking that these international ideological considerations seem to have been so 
important in this case; on the basis of the theoretical model, such considerations may have had
412 A  letter from M erm az, Jeannery and Strauss-Kahn to Mitterrand on the Draft Final Act show s that they 
considered the Act to be unbalanced as a w hole, despite a few  positive issues. A part from  the agricultural 
section, the sections on textiles and audiovisual services were also explicitly branded as h ighly problematic 
(C A C . 1 9 9 40617, art 8. Note pour le président de la République. Objet: négociations du GATT).
413 C A C . 19930192, art 1. 2 6 .1 2 .19 9 1 . Conseil des ministres 23 décem bre 1991.
414 C A C . 19920056, art 1. 15.1 .1992. FRA 0260 3FIP 0480 FRA/AFP-BC35: Le président juge inacceptable le 
rapport Dunkel.
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some influence, but they were expected to be of secondary importance compared to 
international political and economic interests.
7.5.3 The Blair House Accord of November 1992
7.5.3.1 Predictions
With respect to the Blair House Accord, international considerations alone would result in the 
prediction that France will favour acceptance of the Blair House Accord. Although the accord 
was likely to damage the French trade balance (it is questionable, however, that this would have 
exceeded the damage already introduced by the CAP reform), and was incompatible with both 
the vocation exportatrice and the idea of the EEC negotiating on an equal footing with the 
United States, accepting the accord would at the same time be in France's interest of 
maintaining the international trading system and compatible with the Franco-German 
friendship. But above all, acceptance of the Accord would be in France international political 
interests, as both third states and EEC member states urged France to accept the deal. Given the 
high governmental sensitivity and high degree of societal mobilization in 1992, however, 
domestic political considerations also are expected to increase in importance, and in the face of 
opposition from both farm groups and all the political parties, accepting the deal would be 
domestically politically costly. For this decision moment the theoretical framework therefore does 
not allow a clear-cut prediction on the French preference on the Blair House Accord. We can, 
however, formulate the expectation that if France accepted the Blair House Accord, we should 
find that international political considerations played a substantial role in the French preference­
formation process, while domestic political considerations should be found to do so if the French 
government decided to reject the Accord.
Table 7.3c: Issue: Acceptance of the Blair House Accord
INTERNATIONAL DOMESTIC
Political + + -
Economic + /- x
Ideological - x
BALANCE + -
Prediction: No c ear-cut prediction can be formulated on the basis of the theoretical model.
Key to symbols: + =  benefits exceed costs, + + = benefits considerably exceed costs, -  = costs exceed benefits, 
+ / -  = benefits equal costs, x = non-decisive consideration
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7.5.3.2 Preferences
In 1992, France maintained its opposition to concessions in the agricultural negotiations. It 
objected to submitting product lists to GATT in February, as required by the agenda proposed in 
the Draft Final Act, because by doing so the EEC would implicitly be signalling its willingness to 
negotiate on the reduction in the volume of subsidized exports.415 France, once more, stressed 
that the agricultural issue was not the only obstacle in the GATT negotiations,416 since the 
negotiations on services and peak tariffs were being blocked by intransigence on the part of the 
United States.417 A number of trade diplomats did indeed agree that rifts with respect to services 
would jeopardize a successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round at least as much as the 
agricultural negotiations (New York Times 24.3.1992). The French government was not 
confident of gaining the support of other member states in refusing to submit the product lists. 
It spoke of fractures in the Franco-German axis and feared becoming isolated in the 
negotiations.418 Nevertheless, France continued its resistance, arguing that the Franco-German 
axis did not justify all possible compromises.419 By April 1992, however, opinions within the 
French government on whether or not France should accept a more flexible EEC position on 
agriculture began to diverge. The Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Economics, and the Prime 
Minister's office wanted to concede to the German wish to conclude the GATT negotiations as 
swiftly as possible, and to accept quantitative export limitations to that end (without which the 
United States would refuse to conclude a GATT deal).420 In exchange, Germany would have to 
accept substantial price cuts in the context of CAP reforms. This would enable France to make 
gains within the European internal market in exchange for accepting limits on French extra-EEC 
exports.
The Ministry of Agriculture opposed this compromise. It argued that such concessions 
would not guarantee the conclusion of the Uruguay Round at all. According to them, the United 
States was the problem and it was likely to remain unyielding due to the presidential elections
415 C A C . 19930316, art 1. 25 .2 .1 99 2 . Ministère de l'agriculture et de la forêt. Direction de la production et 
des échanges. Préparation des listes agricoles pour l'U ruguay Round.
416 C A C . 19940617, art 9. 26/27.3.1992. Réunion du com ité de l'agriculture au niveau ministériel. 
Intervention de M. Louis M erm az, Ministre de l'agriculture et de la forêt. See also: C A C . 19930195, art 2. 
Ministère de l'agriculture et de la forêt, H. Durand. Conseil agricole, 15 et 16 juin 1992.
417 C A C . 19940167, art 8. 3 .4 .1 9 92 . Jacques Desponts. Note. Objet: G A T T cycle d 'U ruguay et som m et 
transatlantique du 22 avril; C A C . 19940167, art 8. 13.4 .1992. G. Moulin DREE. Note pour le ministre.
418 W ithin the governm ent, positions diverged on the question w hether the Franco-Germ an solidarity had 
changed (C A C . 19930316, art 1. 6 .2 .1 9 92 . De la part du ministre conseiller pour les affaires économ iques 
et com m erciales et de l'attaché agricole. Objet: positions allem andes à la veille du conseil agriculture des 10 
et 11 février 1992.)
419 C A C . 19930195, art 3. Note pour le ministre. Objet: préparation du conseil des ministres de 2 et 3 mars
1992. During the preparatory meeting it w as also decided that the French delegation w ould  request an 
expert report on the docum ents if it seem ed likely that the delegation w ould be left isolated in the 
negotiations.
420 The positions of the various ministries presented here are based on: C A C . 19940617, art 8. 14.4 .1992. 
Jean-François C ollin, conseiller technique, ministère de l'agriculture et de la forêt. Note pour le ministre. 
Objet: réunion restreinte présidée par le président de la République au sujet du GATT.
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that were scheduled for the autumn of 1992. In addition, the Ministry of Agriculture claimed 
that the farm lobby would consider such a proposal as capitulation to the United States and that 
it would subsequently be impossible to gain farm lobby acceptance for CAP reforms if the 
proposals were accepted. Here, the ministry clearly anticipated the hostile reaction of the French 
farm organizations. Of course, such an argument could have been deployed as a strategy to 
strengthen the negotiating position of the Ministry of Agriculture within the government, but the 
conclusion appears to be justified that a certain degree of influence should be ascribed to the 
farm lobby here.421
When the Uruguay Round was discussed during the G7 meeting in Munich, France was 
still reluctant to make concessions. It is claimed that over dinner James Baker asked Dumas 
whether France was ready to accept a deal, supposing all the conditions he was seeking were 
fulfilled, and that Dumas replied 'no' (New York Times 9.7.1992). According to Le Monde 
(16.7.1992), Mitterrand had been willing to make concessions in Munich, but Dumas had 
dissuaded him from doing so, because the EEC had already made a substantial gesture in the 
form of MacSharry's reforms, and the ball was now in the court of the United States.422 A key 
official in Paris allegedly claimed that France was not yet ready to conclude an agreement 
because Mitterrand first had to win the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in September and 
could not afford to have the farmers on the street during the months to come. Mitterrand denied 
this rumour and argued that in May, France had also agreed to the CAP reforms, in spite of farm 
lobby opposition.423 The issue was simply that it was the United States' turn to make 
concessions now (Financial Times9.7.1992).
When negotiations between the EEC and the United States were intensified in the autumn 
of 1992 in order to arrive at a deal before the United States presidential elections in November, 
France was still blocking the negotiations (Meunier 2005, 109-110). Officials close to the French 
government claimed that, when it became clear on 3 November, the day of the elections, how 
close the negotiators were to reaching a deal, Soisson, Mermaz's successor, was charged to 
intervene (The Financial Times 6.11.1992). He made a phone call to Chicago, where the
421 An additional reason to assum e that the Ministry of Agriculture w as genuinely anticipating hostile 
reaction of the farm lobby is that the argum ent of listening to the farmers w as not part of a strategic advice 
for the negotiators in this case (this had been the case in 1990). The argum ent is substantive here: we 
cannot ask price cuts from  the farmers, and then deprive them  of the opportunity to use the concom itant 
com petitive advantage to gain greater shares in international markets.
422 An earlier clue that Mitterrand w ould  be w illing to make concessions can be found in March 1992. In 
that month, Kohl visited Bush and proposed that the EEC accepted reductions in the volum e of subsidized 
exports in exchange for United States acceptance of rebalancing. Kohl claimed that he had the approval of 
both the Com m ission and Mitterrand in m aking this proposal (Financial Times 18.3 .1991)
423 On 25 May 1992 the Agricultural council reached agreem ent on the M acSharry reforms. This deal had 
not been reached easily. A ccording to Legras, M ermaz had prom ised M acSharry to accept the C A P  reform 
in exchange for additional concessions on the part of the Com m ission. W hen it came to the crunch, 
however, M erm az refused to accept the proposal. A ccording to Legras, it w as only after he and M acSharry 
had reminded M erm az of their agreem ent and threatened to make this agreem ent public, that M erm az 
finally agreed to the C A P  reform s (interview Legras 12.11.2007).
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negotiations between the Commission and the United States were taking place at the time, and 
demanded that MacSharry should remain within the limits of the Commission's mandate 
(Soisson 1993, 60). Ever since Soisson had taken office, he had stressed that France would not 
accept any agreement that was not favourable to French agricultural interests, because the 
agricultural sector was of substantial importance for the French economy (Le Figaro 18.9.1992). 
He argued, moreover, that France should learn the lessons of the Maastricht referendum. In this 
referendum, the French farmers had voted heavily against ratifying the Maastricht Treaty 
(Soisson 1993, 32-33). If further concessions were made, farm protests were certain to erupt. In 
mid-November, Dumas requested in the General Affairs Council a report on whether the basis 
on which the Commission was negotiating with the United States at the time, was within the 
boundaries of the CAP reforms. Soisson reiterated this request in the Agricultural Council.424 
Meanwhile, domestically, during a conseii restreint on 18 November convened by Mitterrand 
himself, it was decided that France would object to any agricultural deal that did not accord 
with the CAP reforms (Le Monde 19.11.1992).425 Soisson was keen to voice French reservations, 
and in his speeches at farm organization conferences, he emphasized that the government 
would not accept every possible agricultural deal.426 This public commitment to resistance on 
behalf of France meant, however, that any eventual acceptance of an accord or softening of the 
French stance would damage the government's credibility. French obstinacy in the negotiations 
was attributed principally to domestic political considerations. It was claimed that the French 
government was anxious about the coming parliamentary elections in 1993, and was in effect 
holding the EEC and the world economy hostage in order to protect its cereal farmers (The 
Financial Times 21.10.1992). As early as November, speculation emerged on a possible French 
veto due to their concerns about the approaching elections.
Although the media, from October 1992 onwards, propounded the idea that France was 
risking becoming isolated in the agricultural negotiations, the French government claimed that it 
did not stand alone (Agence France Presse 15.10.1992; Le Monde 11.19.1992). Only Soisson 
mentioned that France found itself in a 'solitary position', but that Mitterrand would solve that 
problem through his contacts with Kohl (The Financial Times 7.10.1992). Dumas emphasized 
that Germany had always shown solidarity with France previously. Bruno Durieux, the Minister 
of Trade also still counted on German support, and Strauss-Kahn, Minister of Industry, claimed
424 C A C . 19930192, art 1. 9.1 1.1992. G A TT. Conseil affaires générales. Intervention de M. Roland Dum as, 
ministre d'état, ministre des affaires étrangères; C A C . 19930192, art 1. 17.1 1.1992. Ministère de 
l'agriculture et de la forêt. Com m uniqué de presse.
425 See also: Libération 1 8 .11 .1992; C A C . 19930192, art 1. 18.1 1.1992. Com m uniqué de la présidence de 
la République.
426 C A C . 19930192, art 1. 1 9 .10.1992. Intervention Soisson à l'assem blée générale des caisses de mutualité 
agricole; C A C . 19930192, art 1. 19.1 1.1992. Intervention Soisson à l'assem blée générale de la fédération 
française des coopératives agricoles de céréales et d 'oléagineux.
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that, although some in the German government wanted to accept a compromise, the Chancellor 
was far more reluctant and sympathetic to France.427
When the Commission and the United States administration reached agreement in the 
Blair House Accord of 21 November 1992, Bérégovoy and Soisson rejected the Accord 
immediately. According to Bérégovoy, the Accord was unacceptable, but he also said that 'a 
veto was still a long way down the line if it happened at all' ( The Irish Times 23.11.1992). 
According to Paul Epstein (1997, 360), some Ministers in the French government would have 
preferred to accept the Blair House Accord, but Soisson had successfully opposed such demands 
and had been able to win the day. Soisson claimed he had obtained Bérégovoy's approval (but 
not yet the authorization of the President) before he reacted to the Blair House Accord on behalf 
of France (Soisson 1993, 80-82). In Paris, the rumour was circulating, however, that Bérégovoy 
and Mitterrand disagreed on the matter. Mitterrand attached great value to the 'European idea' 
and on this basis was not keen to use the Declaration of Luxembourg.428 It should be 
remembered, of course, that Mitterrand had almost caused a crisis within the process of 
European integration already that year with his referendum on the Maastricht Treaty. Soisson 
did not want to backtrack however, and Bérégovoy supported him (Soisson 1993, 88-89). He 
declared in the Assemblée that France would use its veto if French interests were insufficiently 
taken care of (,Agra Europe 27.11.1992). Officials at the Élysée ascribed this threat of a veto to 
electoral considerations. It was claimed that Bérégovoy aimed at using the French veto, and 
Mitterrand, notwithstanding his objections, did not want to oppose the Prime Minister. As 
indicated in Section 7.3.1, the government put the issue to parliament in the form of a 
declaration that, among other things, stated that France would veto any agreement that 
prejudiced fundamental French interests. The reasons for asking for parliamentary approval of 
this declaration were twofold. First, the government wanted to strengthen its position in the 
European negotiations (tied hands), and, second, it wanted the opposition to commit itself to 
this declaration so that the issue could not be used against them during the campaign for the 
parliamentary elections.429 The government did not succeed in its latter objective, however, 
because the opposition mainly voted against the declaration. Although the opposition parties 
were in favour of a French veto against the Blair House Accord, they criticized the way in which 
the socialist government had conducted the negotiations and refused to make themselves an 
accessory to that (Le Monde 20.11.1992; 24.11.1992; 27.11.1992). While nearly all EEC
427 Libération 1 4 .10.1992; http://w ww .vie-publique.fr/discours: 9.1 1.1992. Interview accordée par Strauss- 
Kahn à Europe I; 1 2 .11.1992. Interview accordée par Straus-Kahn. Le Nouvel Observateur. 'En nous 
m enaçant, les am ericains ont pris un risque!'
428 W hen Bérégovoy heard about these rum ours, he em phasized that both he and M itterrand attached great 
value to the 'European idea' (http://w ww .vie-publique.fr/discours: 22.1 1.1992. Interview accordée par 
Bérégovoy à France 2).
429 C A C . 19930379, art 6. 18.1 1.1992. Note pour M onsieur le president de la République.
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member states, including Germany, approved of the Blair House Accord, France continued to 
insist that it was not isolated in the negotiations.430
Arguments repeatedly used by the French government against the Blair House Accord 
were that the Accord was not compatible with CAP reform, and therefore entailed additional 
costs for the agricultural sector, and that it was incompatible with France's vocation 
exportatrice, as well as the future of the French countryside and the balance in French society. 
Neither did the Accord safeguard community preference sufficiently, and its provisions for the 
reduction of export restitutions (both in expenditure and in volume) would lead to additional 
compulsory set aside,431 which could damage the French share of the world market and thereby 
its income from trade with third countries. France therefore demanded renegotiation in order to 
strike a better deal. Europe should negotiate on an equal footing with the United States and 
should not allow the United States to dictate European policy.432 The contribution of the GATT 
accord to economic recovery should, moreover, not be overestimated, according to the 
French.433 Finally, several members of government repeatedly stressed that they would defend 
the farm interests.434 The farmers had already made such significant concessions through the 
CAP reforms that they could not be expected to make further sacrifices.
7,5,3,3 Analysis
With respect to the Blair House Accord, the expectation was formulated that a positive stance 
towards the Accord in particular should have been based on international political 
considerations, while domestic political considerations should have figured prominently in the 
decision-making process if France rejected the Accord. Domestic political considerations indeed 
made their mark on the decision-making process and the position defended by the French 
government. The Ministry of Agriculture in particular anticipated potential farm lobby reactions. 
The approaching elections of March 1993 and the narrow majority by which the Maastricht 
referendum was passed (despite the massive 'no' vote of the agricultural electorate) compelled 
the French government to put farm interests first and oppose the Blair House Accord, of which 
the farmers -  at least -  were sure it was counter to their interests. It is striking in this respect
430 http://w w w .doc.diplom atie.gouv.fr: 22.1 1.1992. GATT. Interview accordée par M. Roland Dum as, 
ministre d'état ministre des affaires étrangères au journal de France 3, le '19/20'; Déclaration de politique 
générale de M. Pierre Bérégovoy, Premier Ministre, à l'Assem blée nationale le 25 et déclaration au Sénat le 
26 novem bre 1992, sur les négociations sur le volet agricole du GATT.
431 The C A P  reforms also included obligatory set aside in order to be eligible for direct incom e support.
432 http://w ww .vie-publique.fr/discours: 22.1 1.1992. Interview accordée par Bérégovoy à France 2;
27.1 1.1992. Interview accordée par Fabius à RTL French anti-Am erican tendencies were noticed 
internationally. In July 1992, the Washington Post( 12.7 .1992) already suggested that France w as 'having a 
bout of anti-Am ericanism  [...] w ithdraw ing into an anti-Am erican cocoon, curling itself up against the 
invidious vagaries of a single superpow er's suprem acy'.
433 http://w ww .vie-publique.fr/discours: 2 0 .1 1 .19 9 2 . Interview accordée par Strauss-Kahn à France-inter,
27.1 1.1992. Interview accordée par Strauss-Kahn. Le Nouvel Économiste, 'Strauss-Kahn: "Attendre la sortie 
de crise d'un accord au G A T T est une plaisanterie"'.
434 http://w ww .vie-publique.fr/discours: 22.1 1.1992. Interview accordée par Bérégovoy à France 2.
We are Not Alone: France 1990-1993 |259
that the government argued explicitly that the Accord was disadvantageous for the French 
farmers, who could not be expected to make additional compromises after the May 1992 CAP 
reforms. The French arguments and discourse also demonstrate that, apart from domestic 
political considerations, the international ideological consideration of guarding against United 
States dominance also played an important role in French preference formation, and was in fact 
prioritized over the Franco-German friendship. What is striking in the empirical analysis 
however, is that the French government appeared to have a different perception of the 
international political costs associated with rejecting the Blair House Accord than I assessed in 
my analysis. By the end of 1992, they still seemed convinced that they were not isolated within 
the EEC on the issue of the agricultural negotiations, while according to my analysis France 
practically stood alone in its opposition to the Accord.
We may conclude that, although the theoretical framework did not allow the formulation 
of a clear-cut prediction on the French preference with respect to the Blair House Accord, it did 
correctly predict that domestic political considerations should have played an important role in 
the decision-making process if France decided to reject the Accord. The French preference to 
reject the Blair House Accord is compatible with the theoretical framework.
7.5.4 The Final Accord of December 1993
7.5.4.1 Predictions
In 1993, it was in France's international interests to accept the final GATT Accord in December. 
Both third countries and EEC member states exerted pressure on France not to raise objections 
to the conclusion of the negotiations. In addition, the final Accord was an overall package that 
included other sectors such as the service sector. In the interests of the general economy, France 
could therefore not permit itself to cause a collapse of the negotiations. Finally, the deal was 
also in the interest of preserving the Franco-German friendship, although the French vocation 
exportatrice was still likely to be damaged. Considering the French international interests in its 
entirety, it is therefore predicted that France will accept the final deal.
Table 7.3dIssue: Acceptance of the final GATT Accord
INTERNATIONAL DOMESTIC
Political + + x
Economic + + x
Ideoloqical + /- x
BALANCE +
Prediction: France will accept the final GATT Accord.
Key to symbols: + =  benefits exceed costs, + + = benefits considerably exceed costs, + / -  = benefits equal 
costs, x = non-decisive consideration.
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7.5.4.2 Preferences
When the socialist government was replaced by a centre-riqht coalition after the March 1993 
parliamentary elections, this was not accompanied by any relaxation of the French attitude 
towards the GATT negotiations. The new government led by Balladur continued to stress the 
demands of a global and balanced GATT agreement and wanted the EEC to enter into new 
negotiations with the United States in order to strike a better deal on agriculture.435 The new 
government regarded the Blair House Accord as unacceptable for three reasons. Firstly, the 
concessions went beyond the commitments already made within the context of the CAP reforms. 
Secondly, the Accord undermined the fundamental principles of the CAP, community preference 
in particular. Third, the Accord would adversely affect the French export potential.436 This line of 
argument closely resembled the one put forward by the socialist government in its position 
against the Blair House Accord, and Juppé, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, explicitly 
acknowledged the continuity of the French position.437 France also continued to stress that 
agriculture was not the only obstacle in the negotiations which were stalling in other areas as 
well -  areas in which France had an interest in liberalization (the service sector for example) -  
while the United States as the main source of the lack of progress on those issues.438 A final 
aspect of continuity with previous policies was that the new government was unconvinced of 
the huge advantages that -  it was widely argued -  would flow from concluding the Uruguay 
Round.439
Apart from this significant continuity in the preferences of the two governments, there 
were, nevertheless, significant differences in how the negotiations were conducted. In the first 
place, decisions on GATT were taken at a higher level within the government: Prime Minister 
Balladur now intervened extensively in the process, while the new Minister of Agriculture,
435 ArchBuZa. DDI DIE A RA: 2755. 28 .4 .1 99 3 . M em orandum . Verslag Landbouw raad; See also: Gyom arch et 
al. 1998, 145; http://w w w .doc.diplom atie.gouv.fr: 18.5 .1993. Interview accordée par M. Edouard Balladur, 
Premier Ministre, au journal Le Monde. Balladur however seem ed to be more cautious w ith using the term 
'renegotiation' and rather spoke of correcting and com plem enting the Blair House Accord.
436 http://w ww .vie-publique.fr/discours: 13.5 .1993. Discours de M. Christian Ligeard au nom de M. Jean 
Puech, ministre de l'agriculture et de la pêche, sur les propositions françaises d 'am énagem ent à réforme de 
la PA C, sur le com prom is de Blair House sur les o léagineux, le volet agricole du G A TT et les jachères 
industrielles, La Rochelle le 13 mai 1993; 14.7 .1993. Interview de M. François M itterrand, Président de la 
République, accordée à TF1, France 2 et Europe 1 le 14 juillet 1993, sur la nouvelle cohabitation, l'em prunt 
Balladur et les privatisations, la lutte contre l'im m igration, la réforme de la constitution et sur les questions 
internationales.
437 http://w w w .doc.diplom atie.gouv.fr: 5 .4 .1993. Conseil Affaires Générales. GATT: Intervention de M. Alain 
Juppé, ministre des Affaires Étrangères.
438 http://w w w .doc.diplom atie.gouv.fr: 18.5 .1993. Interview accordée par M. Édouard Balladur, Premier 
Ministre, au journal Le Monde; 10 .6.1993. Conférence de presse conjointe du Premier Ministre M. Édouard 
Balladur et du président de la Com m ission des Com m unautés européennes, M. Jacques Delors.
439 http://w w w .doc.diplom atie.gouv.fr: 18.5 .1993. Interview accordée par M. Édouard Balladur, Premier 
Ministre, au journal Le Monde.
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Puech, appeared to play a less important role than his predecessors Mermaz and Soisson.440 
Secondly -  and this difference with the socialist approach was emphasized by the new 
government -  the government sought to regain the initiative in the negotiations by making a 
more substantive contribution to the negotiations.441 It issued a memorandum including specific 
positions and demands, thereby displaying that it was not simply rejecting the Blair House 
Accord, but was making a constructive and substantive contribution, according to Lamassoure, 
Minister of European Affairs.442 Through this approach, the government wanted to resume its 
role in the diplomatic game and find allies in the EEC, which was its first priority.443 The centre- 
right government believed that France had been isolated within the EEC for months, due to the 
conduct of the socialist government in the negotiations. The new government now ascribed 
itself the difficult task of finding support from other member states in order to escape from its 
isolation (L'Année politique, économique et sociale 1993, 17-18). According to Balladur, 
Mitterrand was sceptical about the likelihood of being able to mobilize the European partners, 
but he did not object to Balladur taking this course of action (Balladur 1995, 111 and 199). 
Making concessions would be disadvantageous for several important economic sectors, while 
persistently refusing to accept a GATT deal could provoke a European crisis. French priorities 
were therefore to end their isolation and to specify the French demands and discuss the GATT 
negotiations in the European arena (Balladur 1995, 138). By June 1993, the government 
observed that its policies were beginning to bear fruit and that understanding for the French 
position on the part of other European member states was increasing.444 A third difference 
between the Balladur government's approach and that of the previous government was that 
Balladur added a new demand in the negotiations -  namely that all GATT partners should have 
similar trade political instruments at their disposal. This was not about extending protectionist 
mechanisms per se, but it was about being treated equally. France simply wanted EEC states to 
have the same policy instruments at their disposal as other states.445 Although France did not 
refer specifically to them, it had in mind the trade political instruments of the United States (e.g.
440 Epstein (1997) claims that w ith the entering in office of Balladur as Prime Minister, decision m aking on 
the French position in G A TT prim arily took place in interministerial com m ittees.
441 http://w w w .doc.diplom atie.gouv.fr: 18.5 .1993. Interview accordée par M. Édouard Balladur, Premier 
Ministre, au journal Le Monde.
442 In this m em orandum , France defined four goals for the G A TT negotiations: establishing a 'paix 
commerciale durable; increasing access to industrial m arkets; im proving em ploym ent through controlled 
liberalization; establishing a stronger trade organization.
443 http://w w w .doc.diplom atie.gouv.fr: 24 .6 .1 99 3 . Audition du Ministre délégué aux Affaires eurpéennes, 
Alain Lam assoure devant la com m ission des affaires étrangères de l'Assem blée nationale. Com m uniqué de 
presse.
444 http://w w w .doc.diplom atie.gouv.fr: 22 .6 .1 99 3 . Conférence de presse conjointe du Président de la 
République, du Premier Ministre M. Édouard Balladur et du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères M. Alain Juppé;
29.6 .1 99 3 . Interview accordée par le Premier Ministre M. Édouard Balladur a Europa I.
445 http://w w w .doc.diplom atie.gouv.fr: 10.6 .1993. Conférence de presse conjointe du Premier Ministre M. 
Édouard Balladur et du Président de la Com m ission des Com m unautés europeénnes, M. Jacques Delors;
15.6 .1993. Conférence de presse du Premier Ministre M. Édouard Balladur à l'issue de sa visite à 
W ashington.
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the Super 301 clause), which enabled the United States to take unilateral action against other 
states.
In September 1993, prior to the Jumbo Council requested by France, the French 
government presented a memorandum on the agricultural chapter of the Uruguay Round. This 
document reiterated once more France's objections to the Blair House Accord.446 The French 
objective for the Jumbo Council of 20 September was to secure a mandate from the Council for 
the Commission to resume negotiations with the United States on agriculture.447 A new 
argument with which France legitimized its position was that not only French interests were 
involved, but the future of Europe: Europe should be able to maintain her 'personality'.448 The 
argument of safeguarding the European 'personality' or 'identity' would subsequently be used 
often during the autumn of 1993. In specific terms this argument meant that Europe was more 
than ju st an internal market; it also had a role in the world and as such its common policies had 
to be defended and guaranteed.449 Although the government had hitherto been reluctant to 
make explicit references to any use of the veto by France, it became clear in September that a 
French veto was still considered a genuine possibility.450 At a press conference, Juppé stated 
that France would not give in where its vital interests were at stake, and a communiqué issued 
by Balladur also referred to the possibility of a French veto.451 But in any case, France believed it 
could again count on the support of its European partners. While France had been isolated less 
than a year before, its European partners were now showing more and more understanding for 
its position, according to Puech.452 During the negotiations in the Jumbo Council, France set its 
sights high with its demand for renegotiation. Once it became clear that the other member 
states, including Germany, would not support this demand, France settled for 'clarification'
446 France claimed the accord w as problem atic for procedural reasons, because it w as not com patible with 
the provision in the only m andate provided for the Com m ission in Novem ber 1990. Concerning substance, 
the accord displayed four im portant shortcom ings: (1) the accord w as insufficiently balanced due to its 
em phasis on export assistance; (2) the accord included com m itm ents that w ent beyond the M acSharry 
reforms; (3) by the accord, the EEC w ould be excluded from  sharing in the expansion of third m arkets; and 
(4) the continued existence of the C A P  w as at stake if the peace clause w ould only be in operation for six 
years (C U E A C . 8409/93, G A T T 134, A G R IC O R G  261. 1 .9.1993. Note. From: French delegation. Subject:
Blair House pre-agreem ent.
447 http://w w w .doc.diplom atie.gouv.fr: 19.9 .1993. G A TT. Com m uniqué du Premier Ministre M. Édouard 
Balladur.
448 ibid.
449 http://w w w .doc.diplom atie.gouv.fr: 2 3 .1 0 .19 9 3 . Interview accordée par le Premier Ministre aux 
quotidiens E l Pais, The Independent, La Repubbllca, Süddeutsche Zeltung.
450 In June 1991, Juppé had explained to a parliam entary com m ittee on foreign affairs that a French veto 
could not be ruled out, but that one did not need to threaten such a veto at every European m eeting, 
because France had already sufficiently dem onstrated its persistence (http://w w w .doc.diplom atie.gouv.fr:
24 .6 .1 99 3 . Audition du ministre délégué aux affaires europeénnes, Alain Lam assoure, devant la com m ission 
des affaires étrangères de l'Assem blée nationale. Com m uniqué à la presse.)
451 ArchBuZa. DDI DIE A RA: 1756. 16.9 .1993. BZ vertrouw elijk. pari 298/16436. U itspraak van Juppé tijdens 
perconferentie in M adrid, 7 .9 .1 9 93 ; http://w ww .vie-publique.fr/discours: 19.9 .1993. Com m uniqué services 
Premier Ministre.
452 http://w w w .doc.diplom atie.gouv.fr: 15 .9.1993. Interview accordée par Puech à RTL
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rather than 'renegotiation'. After the meeting, France appeared satisfied with the resumption of 
negotiations between the United States and the EEC on agriculture and the acknowledgement 
of the incompatibility of the CAP reforms and the Blair House Accord. France claimed that its 
four essential conditions now had been met: the continuation of the CAP, the guarantee of 
compatibility, the guarantee of community preference, and the vocation exportatrice of the 
EEC.453
According to Devuyst (1995:451), France's obstinate position in September 1993 must be 
attributed to domestic political considerations. In his view, France perceived the Jumbo Council 
as an opportunity to convince its sceptical population that it could trust the government as a 
'staunch defender of French values and interests'. In addition, the Council served as an occasion 
to convince France's European partners that France was prepared to use its veto if the final 
GATT deal did not meet its demands. Although domestic political considerations also seem to 
have played a role here, I would argue that these considerations mainly concerned the 
reputation of the government. First of all, in the campaign for the March 1993 elections, the 
centre-right parties had criticized the approach of the socialist government in the agricultural 
negotiations, and had promised not to accept any accord that would prejudice French 
agricultural interests. Balladur had proclaimed that his government would not accept a single 
additional hectare of compulsory set aside.454 Secondly, in September 1993, Puech viewed the 
mobilization of the farm lobby as limited and encouraged demonstration in support of the 
government.455 It would therefore appear implausible that it was farm lobby pressure that led to 
France's hard-line position in the negotiations in September.
In the autumn of 1993, France repeatedly stressed, with reference to the outcome of the 
20 September Jumbo Council, that it was not isolated in the negotiations, but rather played a 
decisive role in defining the European position.456 It was also claimed that support from the 
European member states was substantial.457 France therefore emphasized that the United States 
had to make concessions before France could agree to a GATT deal.458 The argument that 
negotiations were also stalling in other negotiating areas was also repeated.459 Domestically,
453 http://w w w .doc.diplom atie.gouv.fr: 21 .9 .1 99 3 . G A TT. Com m uniqué du Premier Ministre M. Édouard 
Balladur.
454 Journal Officiel de République Française (1993), Assem blée nationale, 1re séance du 13 octobre 1993, 
4126.
455 http://w w w .doc.diplom atie.gouv.fr: 15 .9.1993. Interview accordée par Puech à RTL
456 http://w w w .doc.diplom atie.gouv.fr: 17 .10 .1993. Interview accordée par le Premier Ministre M. Édouard 
Balladur a 'Sept sur sept'; 2 3 .1 0 .19 9 3 . Interview accordée par le Premier Ministre aux quotidiens El Pals, The 
Independent,, La RepubbUca, Suddeutsche Zeitung; 2 8 .1 0 .19 9 3 . Discours prononcé par le Premier Ministre 
au colloque de l'international Herald Tribune.
457 http://w w w .doc.diplom atie.gouv.fr: 10.1 1.1993. Assem blée nationale. G ATT: Réponse du ministre à une 
question d'actualité.
458 The RPR and UDF (governm ental parties) did not entirely agree on this issue though: the RPR favoured 
far-reaching tenacity, whereas the UDF believed that France could not say 'no ' to an eventual G A TT deal 
(L'Année politique, économique et sociale 1993, 101-102).
459 As main obstacles, France mentioned the peak tariffs in the industrial sector w hich  the United States did 
not w ant to cut, and the exception culturelle that France w anted to obtain w ith respect to audiovisual
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the government simultaneously tried to pave the way for acceptance of a GATT deal. It 
emphasized that an accord was in France's interest because it was one of the most open 
economies in the world (the third largest exporter and the fourth largest importer in global 
terms). Balladur stated that he was convinced that the opening up of markets would be 
beneficial for the majority of French business and that the French economy was sufficiently 
competitive to survive in the face of international competition. 460
Once the United States had made a small number of additional concessions on agriculture, 
a deal was struck between the United States and the EEC on 6 December 1993. A day later, 
Juppé denied this. The exception culturelle regarding audiovisual services had not yet been 
obtained, and no agricultural agreement had been reached, in contrast to existing claims.461 It 
was believed that France had sent a letter to Kohl, Delors and the Council presidency, in which it 
specified the conditions under which it could accept a GATT deal. These conditions concerned 
the area of agricultural land to be set aside, the exception culturelle for the audiovisual sector 
and the trade policy instruments available to the EEC (Agence Europe 6/7.12.1993; Financial 
Times 7.12.1993). After the audiovisual sector had been excluded from the accord and the 
Council of Minister had agreed on greater flexibility on the use of a range of trade policy 
instruments, France accepted the deal (Vahl 1997, 233; Meunier 2005, 122; interview Genee 
15.12.2004). On 15 December, Sutherland was therefore able to announce the conclusion of 
the Uruguay Round. France presented the Final Accord as a victory. It had demanded significant 
changes in the Accord and these demands had been met. The vocation exportatrice of European 
agriculture as well as community preference had been preserved, and the CAP was now 
recognized at the international level. Balladur stressed the consequences of the accord for 
France as a whole: the potential for economic growth, the international image of France and its 
role in the world. On the basis of these considerations, he had decided to accept the accord.462
services. Sectoral problems further existed w ith respect to textiles, transport and agriculture 
(http://w w w .doc.diplom atie.gouv.fr: 2 7 .1 0 .19 9 3 . G ATT: Article du ministre au journal le Figaro. See also: 
http://w w w .doc.diplom atie.gouv.fr: 17.10 .1993. Interview accordée par le Premier Ministre M. Édouard 
Balladur à 'Sept sur sept'; 1 .12 .1993. Réponse du Premier Ministre, Édouard Balladur, à une question 
d'actualité a l'Assem blée nationale.
460 http://w w w .doc.diplom atie.gouv.fr: 27 .1 0 .19 9 3 . G ATT: Article du ministre au journal Le Figaro;
9.1 1 .1 99 3 . Discours prononcé par le Premier Ministre au colloque de l'international Herald Tribune.
461 http://w w w .doc.diplom atie.gouv.fr: 7 .12 .1 99 3 . Alain Juppé. G ATT: intervention du ministre des affaires 
étrangères au Sénat. W ith respect to the agricultural deal of 6 December, Balladur claim ed that France had 
left its isolated position w ithout having to make concessions on essential issues. He remarked moreover that 
France did not fear 'solitude', but indeed found its strength in solitude. The great periods in French history 
had been characterized by 'effortssolitaires', according to Balladur.
462 http://w w w .doc.diplom atie.gouv.fr: 1 5 .12.1993. Déclaration de politique générale de M. Édouard 
Balladur, Premier Ministre, devant l'Assem blée nationale le 15 decem bre 1993, sur le bilan d'action du 
gouvernem ent, l'accord concluant les négociations du G A TT et les 10 projets de réforme pour 1994;
1 5 .12.1993. Déclaration de politique générale à l'Assem blée nationale le 15 decem bre 1993 en 
engagem ent de la responsabilité du gouvernem ent en vertu de l'article 49-1b.
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The eventual acceptance of the GATT deal corresponds with the prediction based on the 
theoretical model. France's demands for renegotiations of the Blair House Accord in the 
September Jumbo Council can be explained by both its international interests and its domestic 
political interests. Internationally, the government believed it had gained sufficient support 
within the EEC to be able to make this demand, and changes to the Blair House Accord were 
needed to make it compatible with the vocation exportatrice, a key ideological interest of 
France. Domestically, the government's credibility was at stake if it did not succeed in obtaining 
changes to the Blair House Accord, before accepting a final GATT deal.
The interests that Balladur emphasized as decisive for the acceptance of the Accord 
appear to indicate that the role of international ideological considerations next to economic 
considerations should also not be underestimated. The proposal was not only economically 
attractive because the United States had made additional concessions, but also because it 
concerned a complete package. Balladur's claim that France's vocation exportatrice and its role 
in the world were now safeguarded also demonstrates the importance of ideological 
considerations in the French preference-formation process.
7.5.4.3 Analysis
7.6. Conclusion
On the basis of the theoretical framework, I predicted that international political and 
international economic considerations would prevail in the French preference-formation process 
during the period 1990-1993. Only in 1992 did I predict a greater role for domestic political 
considerations due to the high degrees of governmental sensitivity and societal mobilization. On 
the basis of the empirical analysis, it may be concluded that the preferences that France 
defended in this period correspond with the predictions derived from the theoretical framework. 
What is striking, however, is that international ideological considerations also appear to have 
played a significant role alongside international political and international economic 
considerations, while I had formulated the prediction that these political and economic interests 
would prevail over ideological considerations. The assumption of the predominance of material 
interests on the one hand over immaterial interests on the other hand appears to be unjustified 
in this case.
As in the first French case, the widely assumed importance of farm lobby influence proved 
far more limited than it is usually claimed. It was only in 1992 that the government explicitly 
anticipated farmers' reactions to the proposals on the table in the GATT negotiations and 
tailored its public discourse accordingly. In 1990 and 1991, the influence of the French farm 
lobby should not be overestimated. The French government did indeed defend French 
agriculture, but did so according to its own perception of the French agricultural interests. These 
did not always correspond with the ideas and demands of the French farm lobby. In the 
negotiations on the Commission proposal in 1990, the French government emphasized the
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demand of accompanying measures, whereas the majority of the farm lobby opposed that 
position. Moreover, the government accepted both the adapted Commission proposal in 1990 
and the MacSharry reforms in 1992, in face of specific opposition from the farm lobby. We may 
therefore conclude that, although the government sought to protect French agriculture, this was 
not primarily the result of farm lobby influence. To the extent that domestic political 
considerations played an important role, these were particularly immaterial political concerns 
centring on governmental credibility. These concerns proved to be important in 1992 after the 
socialist government had promised not to accept the Blair House Accord and to use its veto if 
necessary, and in 1993 after the new centre-right government had made specific demands with 
respect to the parts of the Blair House Accord that should be adapted before France could 
accept it. Had the governments backtracked on its promises and threats, then it undoubtedly 
would have lost credibility in the eyes of the French people.
CHAPTER 8
SUPPORTING FRENCH DEMANDS BIS ZUM AUSSERSTEN: 
GERMANY 1990-1993
8.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses preference formation in Germany with respect to the agricultural part of 
the GATT negotiations between 1990 and 1993. During this period Germany was torn between 
two contradictory traditions regarding the issue of (agricultural) trade liberalization. The first 
was the liberal free trade tradition, which was advocated by the Ministry of Economics in 
particular; the second was the tradition of safeguarding the financial position of the German 
farmers, which was promoted by the Ministry of Agriculture (Landou 1998, 7). Between 1990 
and 1993, within the framework of decision making on the position to be taken by the EEC on 
agriculture in the Uruguay Round, Germany defended trade liberalization in agricultural products 
on some occasions, while on others it clearly defended farm interests and tried to minimize 
liberalization in the area of agriculture. This indicates that Germany did not constantly defend 
one preference, but alternately defended two different positions, depending on which lobby 
gained the upper hand in the intra-governmental debate. One of these switches took place in a 
cabinet meeting on 9 October 1991. At this meeting, the government decided to prioritize 
securing a successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round over protecting the agricultural sector. 
From the end of 1991 onwards, Germany did not hesitate to support initiatives that were likely 
to increase the likelihood of a successful conclusion of the GATT negotiations. However, at the 
end of 1993, Germany again seemed prepared to compromise this goal in order to appease 
French agricultural interests, even though it remained adamant that the Uruguay Round should 
be concluded before December.
In the remainder of this chapter, I will establish whether German preferences and the 
switches that occurred can be explained with the help of the theoretical model elaborated in 
Chapter 2. Section 8.2 will outline developments in Germany's domestic political situation in 
order to establish the sensitivity of the government to domestic pressure. Germany's domestic 
and international interests will be the subject of Section 8.3 and 8.4, respectively. These sections 
will focus on the political, economic and ideological consequences of accepting or rejecting 
proposals and agreements that were on the table during the second half of the Uruguay Round. 
In Section 8.5, predictions will be formulated on the preferences that Germany will defend. 
These expectations will subsequently be contrasted with the preferences that Germany actually 
defended during the second half of the Uruguay Round. The chapter will end with a reflection
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on the explanatory power of the theoretical model as far as this second German case is 
concerned.
8.2 The German Government Between 1990 and 1993
As mentioned in Section 6.2.3, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent efforts of the 
West-German government to unite the Federal Republic of Germany and the German 
Democratic Republic led to increased popularity for Chancellor Kohl and the governing 
CDU/CSU/FDP coalition. After a period of declining confidence in the government and many 
disagreements within the coalition in 1989, there was a revival in the fortunes of the 
government (Clough 1998, 170-171; Agence Europe 21.2.1990). While the SPD was still ahead 
in the polls in the autumn of 1989, this situation changed to the advantage of the CDU/CSU 
between December 1989 and January 1990 (Der Spiegel 5.2.1990). Meanwhile, the 
government was also charged with the difficult task of unifying the two countries. It soon 
became clear that this process would be accompanied by undesirable social and financial 
consequences. After the Berlin Wall fell, migration from East Germany to West Germany 
increased dramatically. The negative effects of this migration on employment, housing and 
health insurance were discussed as early as January 1990 (Der Spiegel 22.1.1990). The West 
Germans perceived the Ubersiedier as competitors for labour and housing (Der Spiegel
19.2.1990) and they rapidly became less willing to receive these migrants. In the autumn of 
1989, 60%  of the West German population favoured accepting all Aussiedier, but by February, 
March and April 1990, this percentage had dropped to 33% , 22%  and 11% , respectively (Der 
Spiegel, various issues). By April, 87%  of the population believed that the influx of Aussiedler 
should be limited. But there was another problem underlying the significant inflow of migrants 
from East Germany: the gulf between the standard of living and economic development of the 
two Germanies. In the East, economic restructuring soon led to increased unemployment and 
inflation (Der Spiegel 12.2.1990; 17.9.1990). In West Germany, on the other hand, economic 
indicators (production, employment, trade and inflation) remained sound in 1990 (Der Spiegel 
17.9.1990; Agence Europe 21.2.1990; 4.4.1990; 28.7.1990; 26.9.1990). The government did 
not succeed in closing this gap in the short term, and the West German population favoured a 
focus on issues such as environmental preservation (77%) and employment (70%) over German 
unification (28%), and stimulating the East-German economy (26%) (Der Spiegel 28.5.1990). 
Apart from the problems associated with the influx of migrants from East Germany and the huge 
economic disparities between East and West, the financial situation of Germany was also a 
source of particular concern. The costs of the unification process proved enormous. The Minister 
of Finance, Theodor Waigel, was forced to make continuous amendments to the budget, and 
speculation was rife that the government would have to raise taxes in order to fund the 
reunification process. During the campaign for the parliamentary elections of 2 December 1990, 
however, Kohl promised that the government would not increase taxes (Der Spiegel
26.11.1990).
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Despite all these complications, the government remained determined that German 
unification should go ahead. In May 1990, a state treaty was negotiated with the East-German 
government, and on 1 July monetary union between East and West Germany took effect. The 
government maintained its policies, despite the fact that 65%  of the population believed the 
unification process was proceeding too fast and 60%  opposed the exchange rate of one West­
German Mark to one East-German Mark (Der Spiegel 2.4.1990; 23.4.1990; 30.4.1990). 
According to Der Spiegel, Kohl's determination to press on was due to his calculation that the 
patriotic feelings incited by unification and the hope of prosperity would benefit the governing 
coalition in the elections (21.5.1990), and during 1990, Kohl's popularity did indeed increase. In 
the autumn of 1989 only 42%  of the population had indicated that they wished Kohl to 
continue to play an important role in German politics. By January 1990, this percentage had 
increased to 57%  and after the political unification in October 1990, it further increased to 68%  
(see Table 8.1). At the same time, the SPD's Chancellor candidate, Oscar Lafontaine, faced 
decreasing popularity. In contrast to Kohl, Lafontaine had been very reserved about the 
unification process, and some within the SPD even questioned his approach to the issue. To 
maintain his position as Chancellor candidate, he eventually had to acept the state treaty, even 
though he would have preferred to vote against it. This internal party conflict damaged his 
reputation (Der Spiegel 18.6.1990; Agence Europe 28.7.1990) (see Tables 8.1 and 8.2). The 
SPD's standing in the opinion polls deteriorated during 1990, while that of the CDU/CSU 
improved (see Table 8.3). Particularly after the day of political unity on 3 October 1990, the 
CDU/CSU increased their lead in the polls. The CDU scored electoral victories in the former East- 
German states and the CSU in Bavaria and by the end of October there was no doubt, according 
to Der Spiegel, that the governing coalition would win the elections of 2 December 
(29.10.1990; Agence Europe 21.12.1990). The Allensbach Institute, however, did not rule out a 
reversal in the polls (Der Spiegel 19.11.1990). The themes stressed by Lafontaine in his 
campaign (the environment, employment and housing) were indeed considered very important 
among the German population, but according to Der Spiegel this would not benefit the SPD, 
because the CDU was generally believed to be the more competent party on these issues 
(19.11.1990). In the autumn of 1990, the CDU therefore appeared to have the upper hand in 
the campaign for the parliamentary elections. Kohl continued to prioritize the approaching 
elections, however, and was not prepared to take any risks at all with the newly united 
Germany's first parliamentary elections.
Table 8.1 The popularity of Kohl and Lafontaine in 1990
Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sep Oct Nov
Kohl 57 59 54 58 57 54 64 61 64 66 68
Lafontaine 61 73 65 63 71 60 65 61 61 60 58
Source: Der Spiegel, various issues. The numbers indicate the percentages of the respondents that wished 
Kohl/Lafontaine to play an important role in German politics.
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Table 8.2 Preferences for Chancellor in 1990
Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Auq Sep Oct Nov
Kohl 46 45 47 - 44 46 49 49 49 52 54
Lafontaine 49 51 49 - 50 44 45 43 41 39 38
Source: DerSpiegel various issues. The numbers indicate the percentage of the respondents that would vote for 
the respective candidate in case of direct elections for Chancellor.
Table 8.3 Opinion polls SPD, CDU/CSU and FDP in 1990
Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Auq Sept Oct Nov
SPD 41 39 39 39 38 39 38 38 39 34 34
CDU/CSU 41 40 42 42 42 42 43 43 42 45 45
FDP 8 9 10 9 9 8 9 10 6 9 9
Bron: Der Spiegel several issues. The numbers indicate the percentage of the respondents that would vote for 
the respective parties.
The governing coalition did indeed win the elections. The CDU/CSU gained 43.8%  of the 
popular vote and the FDP 11% . The SPD received just 33.5%  of the votes. The FDP in particular 
had gained votes in comparison with earlier elections, and was now the second largest party in 
the coalition. In particular, the FDP's position relative to the CSU improved because the CSU's 
votes were no longer necessary for a majority in parliament (Der Spiegel3.12.1990). The FDP 
therefore took a tough stance in the coalition negotiations, and in January the party even 
threatened to withhold its support for Kohl as Chancellor if the CDU and CSU continued their 
opposition to the low-tax area in the former East Germany. This led to the new government's 
first cabinet crisis (Der Spiegel 10.12.1990). Furthermore, disagreement erupted within the FDP 
on which ministerial positions they should aim to secure. Mollemannn was eager to head the 
Ministry of Economics, but many party members criticized his nomination, because of his lack of 
economic expertise (DerSpiegel 17.12.1990; 21.1.1991).
This difficult start to the coalition was overshadowed by the Gulf War in the first months 
of 1991, which dominated the political debate. The government even justified the tax increases 
introduced in February 1991 (breaking promises made during the election campaign), with the 
argument that these additional tax revenues were necessary to pay for the German financial 
contribution to the war in Iraq. The tax increases were, however, viewed as a breach of election 
pledges in society, and it was widely assumed that the additional tax revenues would be used 
primarily to fund the unification process (Der Spiegel 4.2.1991; 25.2.1991). In effect, this 
damaged the government's credibility within a few months of taking office. Meanwhile, the 
economic situation deteriorated. The crisis in East Germany proved worse than had been 
expected, and unemployment in West Germany also began to rise, leading to fears that the 
economy in the West would also be dragged down (Der Spiegel 15.4.1991; 13.5.1991). This
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led to a further deterioration in the social climate between East and West Germans (Der Spiegel
25.3.1991). The West Germans believed that too much money was being spent on East 
Germany to the detriment of West Germany, while East Germans believed that they were being 
treated as second-class citizens (DerSpiegel27.9.1991). What Germans in both East and West 
agreed on, however, was that the flow of immigrants (such as the migration of Soviet-Germans) 
had to be curtailed. The asylum issue thus emerged as an important political issue. The 
government was blamed for failing to develop policies to solve these problems. According to Der 
Spiegel this was reviving memories of the final months of the SPD/FDP coalition in 1982 
(9.9.1991). The underlying problem was that the coalition could simply not agree on many 
issues. The CDU/CSU, for example, wanted to solve the asylum issue by retrenching the right of 
asylum through a constitutional amendment, something the FDP opposed (Der Spiegel
5.8.1991). Internal disagreements also emerged within both the CDU and the FDP. Within the 
CDU, Kohl was under fire for his autocratic style, and within the FDP a debate erupted on who 
should succeed Lambsdorff as party chairman (Der Spiegel 13.9.1991; 25.11.1991). These 
developments were reflected by a decline in the popularity of the government in 1991. Der 
Spiegel claimed that rarely had a party entered into such a steep decline in popularity so soon 
after an election victory as the Union (CDU/CSU) in 1991 (13.5.1991). In January, 72%  of the 
population had named the CDU/CSU as a party of which they had a positive impression, but this 
percentage had decreased to 41%  by March, and by May, only 19%  named the CDU/CSU 
(ibid.). In November 1990, 40%  had judged the government's policies as 'good' or 'very good', 
and only 16%  as 'unsatisfactory'. Only four months later these percentages had fallen to 24%  
and 27% , respectively, and the number of Germans expressing dissatisfaction with the 
government's policies was greater than the number expressing satisfaction (Der Spiegel
29.6.1992). The lack of trust in the CDU was also demonstrated in the results of state elections 
in 1991. The CDU only succeeded in winning elections in Bremen, while it lost its majority to the 
SPD in Rhineland-Palatinate and Hesse.
The problems that had begun in 1991 only worsened during 1992. The economic 
indicators for both East and West Germany deteriorated to such a degree that the government 
could no longer deny that Germany found itself on the brink of a recession, and had to 
acknowledge that unification would demand further sacrifices from the German population (Der 
Spiegel 9.3.1992). Kohl's 'Aufschwung-Ost-Poiitik had failed (Der Spiegel 23.3.1992). In 
addition, the number of applications for asylum was increasing dramatically and containing the 
inflow of asylum-seekers became the main focus of political debate (Der Spiegel 6.4.1992;
12.4.1992). Xenophobia was gaining ground rapidly and extreme right-wing groups gained in 
popularity among young people in particular. The political parties attempted to outbid each 
other with their proposals, but no policies were actually realized. Politicians were perceived by 
German citizens as desperate and helpless (Der Spiegel 6.4.1992). Within the coalition, the 
parties remained deadlocked on many key issues (asylum, healthcare and the participation of 
German soldiers in peace keeping missions) and seemed unable to develop policies (Der Spiegel 
13.4.1992; 27.7.1992). The resignation of Genscher as Minister of Foreign Affairs in May 1992
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was seen as a symptom of the crisis and ineffectiveness affecting the government (Der Spiegel
4.5.1992). The situation of the coalition was again compared with the situation of Schmidt's 
government in 1982, and speculation was rife that the cabinet was about to fall (Der Spiegel 
4.5.1992; 22.6.1992). In May 1992, the government did indeed almost fall when the FDP 
threatened to withdraw from the government due to proposed changes in health care. 
Simultaneously, the CSU also threatened to withdraw if Kohl did not force the FDP to give up its 
opposition to changes in asylum and health care (DerSpiegel4.5.1992). In the autumn, the FDP 
once again threatened to withdraw from the coalition if Kohl pressed on with his plan to 
constrain the right to asylum (Der Spiegel9.11.1992). Nevertheless, Kohl himself maintained a 
relatively strong position within the coalition. According to Der Spiegel, Kohl had surrounded 
himself with lackeys in Bonn, and he was also benefiting from the leadership vacuum within the 
FDP created by Genscher's resignation, as well as the difficulties that the leader of the CSU, 
Waigel, was facing within his own party (1.6.1992). In German society, however, criticism of the 
government was gaining ground. There were strikes in various sectors and the CDU lost further 
state elections (DerSpiegel 13.4.1992; 4.5.1992).463 There was also criticism of the 'blunderers 
in Bonn' within the CDU itself (Der Spiegel 14.9.1992). Kohl's popularity fell from 68%  in 
December 1990 to 47%  in November 1992, but the SPD proved unable to take advantage of 
this situation. It was recovering from a recent leadership crisis and in the polls they remained on 
a par with the CDU/CSU. In addition, societal discontent did not only concern the government, 
but politicians in general. Only the movements of the extreme right profited from the 
dissatisfaction in society.
In 1993, immediately before the Superwahljahr of 1994 -  when not only parliamentary 
elections were due, but also state elections and elections for the European Parliament -  societal 
confidence in politics declined further. The government still displayed a lack of initiative and 
could find no solutions to the problems that Germany faced. Der Spiegel spoke of a 'Koalition 
der Weggucker undAussitzer in this respect (7.6.1993). In addition, nearly all political parties 
were struggling with scandals and internal divisions. FDP minister Möllemannn found himself in 
political hot water in 1993 and came under pressure to resign (Der Spiegel 4.1.1993). Waigel 
became involved in a scandal concerning unemployment relief for an aircraft manufacturer, and 
within the CSU a power struggle erupted between him and Edmund Stoiber (Der Spiegel
1.2.1993; 20.12.1993). The CDU, meanwhile, faced increased opposition from its own 
members in the Bundestag (Der Spiegel, 8.3.1993). The CSU state government in Bavaria, as 
well as the CDU state governments in Thüringen, Baden-Württemberg and Hesse also began to 
oppose the federal government (Der Spiegel 6.9.1993; 13.9.1993). Within the SPD, Björn 
Engholm, the Chancellor candidate, became embroiled in a scandal and was forced to resign. A 
new battle for the party leadership erupted within the SPD (DerSpiegel5.4.1993). The standing 
of politics in general was therefore badly damaged in 1993. Unsurprisingly, 54%  of the
463 In Baden-W ürttem berg the CD U  w ent from  4 9 %  of the vote in 1988 to 39 %  of the vote in 1992. The 
SPD w as not the w inner in Baden-W ürttem berg, however, but the right-w ing Republican Party, w hich 
gained 1 0 %  of the vote.
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population was dissatisfied with governmental policies and 5 8%  favoured a change of 
government (Der Spiegel 1.3.1993). Ideas on the composition of such a new government 
diverged, however, and only 2 5%  of the population believed that the SPD would do a better 
job. As far as solving the problems on government expenditure and the asylum issue were 
concerned, none of the political parties was considered competent (Der Spiegel1.3.1993).
Based on the information presented above, we can now establish the degree of societal 
satisfaction with the government, the degree of governmental stability, and the degree of 
governmental credibility in the period 1990-1993. Immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
societal satisfaction was high, but fell rapidly during 1991 and 1992, replaced by disillusion and 
the mistrust of not only the government, but of politics in general. Although the government 
enjoyed a stable majority in the Bundestag during this period, the electoral losses suffered by 
the coalition parties in state elections led to a majority for the SPD in the Bundesrat in 1990, 
and the government was unable to regain more than a small majority in the Bundesrat during 
the remainder of 1990-1993 (see Section 3.2.1). Governmental stability suffered further 
between 1991 and 1993 due to an increasing number of disagreements within the coalition, 
and the government verged on the brink of collapse several times. Finally, when we take the 
electoral calendar into account, we can assess the sensitivity of the German government 
between 1990 and 1993. The most important elections in this period were the first 
parliamentary elections in a unified Germany in December 1990, and the elections in the East- 
German states in October 1990. Governmental sensitivity was therefore extremely high in 1990. 
Governmental sensitivity was again high in 1993, before the Superwahjjahr 1994. We can 
conclude that the period of 1990-1993 was an unusually tempestuous period in German history. 
Particularly in 1990 and 1993, due to the lack of stability and electoral considerations, the 
German government could be expected to attach increased importance to domestic political 
considerations in the preference-formation process.
8.3 The German Interest: Domestic Considerations
8.3.1 Political interests
As in previous chapters, this section will focus on the domestic political consequences of the 
various behavioural options open to Germany during the second half of the Uruguay Round 
negotiations. To this end, we will analyse the preferences of various domestic actors, such as the 
agricultural and industrial lobby and political parties, with respect to the GATT negotiations.
1990: The run-up to the Heysel conference
The negotiations on the EEC agricultural proposal took place against a background of general 
unrest and discontent among farmers and deteriorating relations between farmers and the 
government. The agricultural community continued to be angered by the price cuts accepted by 
the Council during its annual deliberations on agricultural intervention prices in April 1990. With
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respect to the Uruguay Round, the farm lobby demanded tenacity in the negotiations with the 
United States and the Cairns Group and the preservation of the bäuerliche Landwirtschaft. On 
the basis of these arguments, the DBV rejected the Commission proposal for the negotiating 
mandate on agriculture, which it equated with selling out on the notion of the bäuerliche 
Landwirtschaft and submitting to the demands of the United States (Die Weit 8.10.1990). It 
insisted that farm interests should not be sacrificed for the trade interests of German industry 
(ibid.). In addition, the farm lobby now also used the argument that the support reductions 
proposed in the mandate would endanger the multifunctionality of the European agricultural 
sector and compromise community preference, which they regarded a key principle of the CAP 
(Deutsche Bauern Korrespondenz November 1990). The use of the multifunctionality argument 
coincided with increasing interest in this phenomenon in both the domestic and European 
debates on agricultural policy. Using these arguments, the DBV called on the government and 
the Council of Ministers to reject the mandate proposed by the Commission and appealed to 
Chancellor Kohl 'sich mit seinem ganzen politischen Gewicht für eine Lösung im GATT, die den 
Bauern wieder eine Perspektive vermittelt, nachdrückiick einzusetzeh (Deutsche Bauern 
Korrespondenz November 1990; Bulletin 18.10.1990). On the issue of the Commission's 
agricultural proposal, the farm lobby was opposed by the industrial lobby and the FDP 
leadership. German industry attached great importance to concluding the Uruguay Round as 
soon as possible, if necessary by making concessions in the area of agriculture, while the FDP 
chairman, Lambsdorff, welcomed the proposal for the mandate and encouraged the Commission 
to take an even more liberal stance on agricultural trade (BMWI Tagesnachrichten 17.10.1990; 
Agra Europe 7.12.1990; Die Welt 8.10.1990). The CDU/CSU, however, was anxious about the 
potential consequences of the Commission proposal on farm income and community 
preference.464 Once more, the German government thus faced domestic pressures that pulled in 
opposite directions.
The government's electoral concerns, combined with the fact that the farm population 
formed an important part of the grassroots support of the governing coalition, increased the 
likelihood that farm pressure would influence the German government in the autumn of 1990. 
Elections for the Landtagin Bavaria and the five East German Länder were due on 14 October, 
and the first all-German general elections were scheduled for 2 December. As indicated in 
Section 3.3.2, the CDU and, more particularly, the CSU were highly dependent on agricultural 
votes. There were also concerns about the farm vote in the East-German Länder, because the 
disintegration of the agricultural Produktionsgenossenschaften had created discontent among 
farmers in these areas (Der Spiegel 8.10.1990). The farmers' awareness of their own electoral 
importance was demonstrated during an electoral meeting in Kiel, where German farmers 
explicitly threatened Kohl that he would lose their votes if he would not promise to reject
464 D eutsch er  B un d estag .  Drucksache 1 1 /8298.  2 6 . 1 0 . 1 9 9 0 ,  6.
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outright any proposal resulting in farm price reductions.465 Researchers generally agree that the 
German government was not able to risk alienating the farmers and that the political costs of 
sacrificing farm interests in the GATT negotiations were accordingly high (Webber 1999, 52; 
Paemen and Bensch 1995, 178; Woolcock and Hodges 1997, 314; Davis 2003, 287).
Once the Council had accepted a watered-down version of the Commission proposal, it 
was criticized by both the protectionist and the free trade lobbies in Germany. The DBV claimed 
that the mandate was not a sufficiently firm guide for the Commission in the negotiations 
[Handeisbiatt 8.11.1990).-466 When the negotiations got underway in Heysel in December, the 
DBV took part in the demonstration of 35,000 farmers near the negotiating venue. It protested 
against sacrificing agricultural interests on 'the altar of export interests' and warned that any 
further softening of the EEC position was out of the question (Deutsche Bauern Korrespondenz 
December 1990). Surprisingly, the SPD, not known for being receptive to farmers' interests, 
agreed that the offer was a disaster for the farming community.467 The CDU/CSU and FDP 
emphasized that the potentially negative consequences of a GATT deal for German farmers 
should be compensated by additional support measures, preferably at the European level, but 
failing that at the national level.468 Meanwhile, industrial groups such as the BDI and the DIHT, 
together with the BGA, judged the Commission proposal to be inadequate (Handeisbiatt 
13.11.1990; 16.11.1990). It was even thought that the BDI had actually tried to convince the 
United States to increase its pressure on the EEC (Deutsche Bauern Korrespondenz January
1991). The German media were also generally critical of the Commission proposal. The 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung estimated that the offer would not contribute to the 
liberalization of world trade and Handeisbiatt stressed that Kohl's contribution to the discussion 
had disappointed European member states and the United States. A  similar point was made by 
the Süddeutsche Zeitung, which specifically denounced the fact that the German government 
had supported French demands with regard to the proposal.469
It may be concluded that once the German government had agreed to these watered- 
down proposal, making further concessions to the United States during the negotiations in 
Heysel would be politically costly for the German government. Even though industrial groups 
also began to increase their pressure on the government, farm pressure in the form of mass 
protests was more difficult to ignore and the electoral interests of the governing coalition were 
served by placating the farming community.
465 C A C . 19920056, art 8. 2.1 1.1990. TD BONN. De la part du ministre conseiller pour les affaires 
économ iques et com m erciales et de l'attaché agricole. Objet: UR préparation du conseil du 5 novembre 
1990
466 C A C . 1992056, art 7. TD  BONN 2967 A G RI SG CI. 9.1 1.1990. Boidevaix. Objet: Accord sur l'offre 
agricole com m unautaire dans le cadre de l'UR. Réactions Allem andes.
467 C A C . 1992056, art 7. TD  BONN 2967 A G RI SG CI. 9.1 1.1990. Boidevaix. Objet: Accord sur l'offre 
agricole com m unautaire dans le cadre de l'UR. Réactions allem andes.
468 Deutscher Bundestag. Drucksache 11/8481. 2 2 .1 1 .19 9 0 , 1.
469 C A C . 1992056, art 7. TD  BONN 2967 A G RI SG CI. 9.1 1.1990. Boidevaix. Objet: Accord sur l'offre 
agricole com m unautaire dans le cadre de l'UR. Réactions allem andes.
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1991: Dunkel intervenes: from Heysel to the Draft Final Act
After the Heysel negotiations, the debate in the European Community was no longer restricted 
to the GATT-negotiations, but also involved the plans for CAP reform of Commissioner 
MacSharry. These two negotiation processes can hardly be separated in a strict fashion since the 
outcome of the one was likely to influence the other. With respect to the GATT negotiations, 
domestic pressure remained divided along the same lines as in 1990. The DBV continued to 
argue that introducing world market conditions into the European agricultural sector would be 
inconsistent with the notion of the bäuerliche Landwirtschaft and the principles of the CAP, 
particularly community preference.470 Moreover, it demanded full compensation for any losses in 
farmers' incomes resulting from a GATT-agreement.471 On the other side of the debate, there 
was increasing mobilization by the industry and business lobbies, who argued that concessions 
on agriculture should be accepted in return for gains in other negotiating areas [Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung4.3.1991; Landou 1998, 24).472 This upsurge in mobilization may have been 
due to increasing pressure from UNICE on its constituent organizations to lobby their own 
national governments. After the Heysel debacle, the mobilization of the industrial lobby had 
increased throughout Europe, but industry's demands for concessions on agricultural trade were 
especially pronounced in Germany (Davis 2003, 296-297). The lobbies also took different 
positions with respect to CAP reform. The DBV dismissed MacSharry's plans, claiming that the 
proposals would damage the bäuerliche Landwirtschaft, since they favoured mass-production 
farming over family-operated farms.473 Furthermore, the DBV argued against the introduction of 
direct income transfers as a replacement for the European farm price policy. This preference was 
consistent with its earlier positions on the solution to the crisis on agricultural markets (see 
6.3.1). The DBV favoured stabilizing markets through production controls rather than through 
cuts in support prices compensated by direct income payments (Handeisbiatt20.11.1990). The 
industrial lobby, however, favoured the latter option and argued that the money spent on this 
policy, as opposed to the income-oriented price policy, would actually reach the farmers who 
needed it most [Handelsblatt13.11.1990; 20.11.1990).
The government was thus again confronted with contradictory societal pressure. But, as 
we will see in Section 8.5.2, the government was itself also suffering from internal divisions on 
the issues of GATT and CAP reform. A cabinet meeting on these issues was planned on 9 
October 1991. The farm lobby was aware of the intra-governmental struggle and feared that 
Kiechle would be outvoted during this meeting. Under pressure from the Bayerischer
470 BArch. N 1432: 12. 1 1.7.1991. Letter of the DBV to Kiechle; 16.4 .1991. Letter of the Bayerischer 
Bauernverbandto Kiechle.
471 ibid. It is interesting to note here that Germ an negotiators in Brussels had already made sim ilar dem ands 
to the Com m ission during the negotiations on the agricultural offer in 1990.
472 In 1991, Handelsblatt\ncreasing\y reported on appeals the industrial lobby made in favour of a sw ift 
conclusion of the G A T T negotiations (see for exam ple 19.2.1991; 12.6 .1991; 27 .11.1992).
473 BArch. N 1432: 12. 11 .7.1991. Letter of the DBV to Minister Kiechle.
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Bauernverband, Max Streibl, Minister-Pesident of Bavaria, wrote Kohl a letter, copies of which 
he also sent to the other CDU and CSU ministers in the cabinet. The letter warned against 
showing too much flexibility on the issue of agricultural trade and asked the ministers to back 
Kiechle against Möllemannn. The EEC should not make unilateral concessions on agriculture.474 
In the months after the cabinet meeting the farm lobby staged protest in cities all over Germany 
[Der Spiegel28.10.1991).
When Dunkel presented his Draft Final Act in December 1991, the DBV immediately 
rejected this compromise, stating that the EEC should not give up its right to decide on an 
autonomous agricultural policy for the sake of an international free trade ideology. The Draft 
Final Act would undermine the EEC system of market regulation, as tariffication would render 
the double-pricing system ineffective. Furthermore, Dunkel's proposals on internal support 
would bring to an end the income-oriented price policy in favour of an individual-support policy, 
downgrading farmers to a ' Sozialhilfestatus (Deutsche Bauern Korrespondenz January 1992). Of 
course, the Act could have been a step towards the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round 
which the industry and business lobbies were so eager to see, but their mobilization effort 
remained limited compared to the protests staged by the farm lobby. The political parties in the 
Bundestag all agreed on the importance of a successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round for the 
German economy, and urged the government to step up its efforts to achieve this goal on the 
basis of the Dunkel Draft.475 The SPD accused the government of taking insufficient action to 
reach this goal, and even held it partially responsible for the 'völlig unrealistische 
Verhandlungsposition der EG im Agrarbereich, which was damaging German export 
interests.476 In the intra-governmental battle between Möllemannn and Kiechle, the SPD sided 
with the Minister of Economics.477 The FPD emphasized that the Uruguay Round should not be 
allowed to fail as a result of narrow agricultural interests.478 The CDU/CSU also called on the 
government to take all necessary action to ensure a swift conclusion of the Uruguay Round, but 
pointed out that a balance had to be struck between export-oriented policies and agricultural 
interests.479 Although the political parties did not discuss the Draft Final Act specifically, it is 
reasonable to conclude that, in light of the importance they accorded to the success of the 
Uruguay Round, they would have preferred to accept the Draft Final Act as a basis for further 
negotiations rather than reject this proposal outright.
We can conclude that during 1991, the domestic political costs associated with a more 
flexible position on agriculture decreased. Although the farmers remained relatively vociferous in 
their protests, the mobilization of the agricultural lobby met with increasing opposition and 
counter-mobilization on the part of the industrial lobby and political parties. However,
474 BArch. N 1436: 16. 8 .10 .1 99 1 . Letter from  Streibl to Kohl.
475 Deutscher Bundestag. Plenarprotokoll 12/67. 1 2 .12.1990; Drucksache 12/2016.
476 Deutscher Bundestag. Plenarprotokoll 12/67. 12 .1 2 .19 9 0 , 5753.
477 Deutscher Bundestag. Plenarprotokoll 12/67. 12 .1 2 .19 9 0 , 5754.
478 Deutscher Bundestag. Plenarprotokoll 12/67. 12 .1 2 .19 9 0 , 5759.
479 Deutscher Bundestag. Plenarprotokoll 12/67. 12 .1 2 .19 9 0 , 5756; Drucksache 12/2016.
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governmental sensitivity decreased after the governing coalition had secured victory in the 
parliamentary elections of December 1990, allowing the government greater freedom of 
manoeuvre. Before the elections in December 1990, the governing coalition had had 41 more 
seats than the opposition in the Bundestag, while afterwards it could rely on a majority of 134 
seats. Overall, the domestic political costs of accepting the Draft Final equalled the domestic 
political benefits for Germany.
1992: From the Draft Final Act to the Blair House Accord
The trend in societal mobilization, which had begun in 1991, continued during 1992. The 
balance of domestic pressure tended more and more in favour of trade liberalization. 
Proponents of free trade intensified their pressure and blamed the agricultural sector for the 
deadlock in the trade talks. The six largest economic research institutes supported the industrial 
lobby's demand that the government should overrule the narrow interests of German agriculture 
and defend Germany's wider export interests (Financial Times 21.3.1992; Deutsche Bauern 
Korrespondenz March 1992).480 In November 1992, shortly before the Blair House Accord was 
reached, the BDI and BGA criticized the government for tolerating France's efforts to block a 
GATT deal (Süddeutsche Zeitung 10.11.1992). They called on the government to take all 
necessary steps to bring about a successful agreement in the Uruguay Round (Die Weit
10.11.1992). Lambsdorff argued that the German government should undertake more vigorous 
action to secure a GATT-deal. The FDP claimed that Kohl was the only person who could put 
sufficient pressure on President Mitterrand (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung6.11.1992), and that 
'der Schlüssel Hegt in Paris .481 The SPD had already urged Kohl to contact Mitterrand in order to 
reach a compromise as early as March 1991, and they repeated these demands in 1992 
[Financial Times 5.3.1992).482 In the words of Bundestag member Wolfgang Roth: 'Unsere 
französischen Freunde müssen wir in den nächsten Tagen noch ein Bisschen bewegen483
The farm lobby continued to oppose any concessions in the GATT negotiations. Apart from 
the arguments and demands for community preference, compensation for losses in income and 
the multifunctionality of German agriculture (Deutsche Bauern Korrespondenz April 1992; May 
1992; Bulletin 18.3.1992), a new element emerged in the framing of their argumentation. By 
the end of 1992, they began to portray the GATT issue as a choice between good relations with 
France or giving in to the demands of the United States. The DBV argued that the former was 
far more important than trans-Atlantic cooperation, and even went so far as to cite Mitterrand 
as an example of a leader who resisted American pressure and stood up for European farmers 
[Deutsche Bauern Korrespondenz November 1992; Handeisbiatt 11.11.1992). Not surprisingly,
480 C A C . 19920056, art 6. 13.5 .1992. TD  BONN 1005. SG C I AGRI. Objet: 59ièm e consultation franco­
allem ande. La Rochelle 21/22.5.1992.
481 Deutscher Bundestag. Plenarprotokoll 12/112. 1 4 .10.1992, 9548.
482 Deutscher Bundestag. Plenarprotokoll 12/112. 1 4 .10.1992, 9545-6 . See also: ArchTdG . Map UR 1990­
1993. 5 .5 .1992. Nederlandse A m bassade in Duitsland aan LNV. Onderwerp: Duitse positie Uruguay Ronde.
483 Deutscher Bundestag. Plenarprotokoll 12/112. 1 4 .10.1992, 9551.
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the DBV immediately rejected the Blair House Accord in November 1992, and urged the 
Chancellor, the federal government and the Bundestag to do the same (Deutsche Bauern 
Korrespondenz December 1992). It dismissed the analysis of the agreement presented by the 
Ministry of Agriculture as far too positive (Deutsche Bauern Korrespondenz December 1992). 
Although Heereman had said he would not call on the DBV members to take militant action 
[Handeisbiatt24.11.1992), German farmers nevertheless staged a major demonstration against 
the GATT compromise in Bonn on 8 December 1992. Posters of Möllemannn were burnt, as well 
as an American car. Even Heereman himself was bombarded with eggs when he took the stage, 
but was later applauded when he said that Bonn should reopen the negotiations with Clinton in 
January. France had defended a clear position and the German government should do the same 
and say 'No!' to the compromise (Agence France Presse 8.12.1992). With 50,000 farmers on 
the street, this was the largest DBV demonstration ever (interview Lotz 18.5.2005). The BDI 
and DIHT, however, welcomed the Blair House agreement, and urged the government to 
endorse it and convince the French government to compromise (Süddeutsche Zeitung
24.11.1992). Both the coalition parties and the opposition parties in the Bundestag also agreed 
that Germany should accept the agreement.484 The farmers' protest could not count on much 
understanding in the Bundestag. On the contrary, the FDP and PDS/Linke criticized the 
aggressiveness of the farmers' demonstrations.485
We may conclude that in 1992, domestic pressure was split between a liberal coalition of 
industry and business lobbies, scientific institutes and the FDP and SPD on one side, and the 
farm lobby on the other side. This lobby now stood alone in its demand for the rejection the 
Blair House Accord. Although the farm lobby was arguably the best organized societal group, 
had preferential access to the Christian Democratic Parties (Keeler 1996, 130 and 141; see also 
Section 3.3.2), and was able to put considerable pressure on the government by its mass 
protests, it is clear that the scales began to tip in favour of trade liberalization during 1992, 
simply by virtue of the number of actors that were now calling on the government to ensure a 
deal in the GATT negotiations. Resisting concessions was becoming ever more politically costly 
for the government.
1993: From Biair House to the Final Accord
In 1993, the balance of preferences within society still favoured compromises to ensure a 
successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round. Industrial groups, such as the BDI and DIHT, 
maintained 'a constant barrage of messages to Kohl's office, urging him to finish the Uruguay 
Round without further ado' (Paemen and Bensch 1996, 239). One argument increasingly 
deployed by the proponents of a GATT agreement was that the German government should 
resist pressure from the French. Lambsdorff urged the government finally to prioritize German 
trade interests over French agricultural interest [Handeisbiatt 18.2.1993) and the BDI echoed
484 Deutscher Bundestag. 12. Plenarprotokoll 12/123. 25.1 1.1992; Plenarprotokoll 12/129. 1 1.12.1992.
485 Deutscher Bundestag. Plenarprotokoll 12/129. 11 .1 2 .19 9 2 , 1 1198 and 11200.
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these calls for the government not to sacrifice German interests for the German-French 
friendship [Handeisbiatt 10.3.1993). When France began to step up its lobbying efforts for the 
renegotiation of the Blair House accord, the BDI and DIHT demanded that the government resist 
these French demands [Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 10.7.1993). The SPD argued that in view 
of the gulf between France's demands and the interests of other member states, it would be 
impossible to avert an open conflict within the EEC and that Germany's reputation as a 
Handelsstaat was at stake.486 As for French demands for reopening agricultural negotiations, the 
industrial groups warned that this would also lead to negotiations in other areas being 
reopened, which would jeopardize the chances of success for the Uruguay Round as a whole 
[Handelblatt 10.9.1993). The Scientific Council of the CDU as well as all the parties in 
parliament took a similar view (Lüttiken 2001, 113; Handeisbiatt 13.9.1993). The DBV, 
however, supported France's demand for renegotiation (Süddeutsche Zeitung 11.9.1993). They 
were supported only by the European farm organizations COPA and COGECA, which urged the 
government not only to defend European industrial interests in negotiations with the United 
States, but also the interests of the European farmers (Handeisbiatt 13.10.1993).
When the GATT partners reached a final agreement in December 1993, most domestic 
actors approved the deal. The DIHT stressed that Germany's export economy stood to gain 
enormously from the expected increase in world trade [Handeisbiatt 15.13.1990), and the BDI 
welcomed the agreement as a positive signal for the world economy. Klaus Kinkel (FDP) spoke 
of a 'Sieg der wirtschaftspolitischen Vernunft [Handelsblatt 17.12.1993). Although the DBV 
admitted that the final agreement contained improvements compared to the Blair House Accord, 
it believed that the agreement was incompatible with CAP reform and that it lacked a genuine 
solution to the issue of cereal substitutes (Deutsche Bauern Korrespondenz January 1994).
We may conclude that in 1993 domestic pressure was almost exclusively directed at 
convincing the German government to ensure a successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round and 
resist the French demands of the renegotiation of the Blair House Accord. Any policy option that 
could undermine the GATT negotiations was thus politically costly. The approaching elections in 
1994 -  with elections at the state, federal and Europen level -  must also be taken into account. 
This increased the sensitivity of the German government (see Section 8.2). Notwithstanding the 
fact that the farm lobby was electorally important for the Christian Democrats, the party could 
not afford to alienate itself from other significant groups within society (cf. Lüttiken 2001, 110). 
A  negotiating success in the Uruguay Round would be an important asset for the government 
and enhance its chances of re-election (Webber 1999), and this was important at a time when 
Germany was still experiencing an economic downturn and there was a general shortage of 
good news regarding the economy (see Section 8.2).
486 D eutsch er  B un d estag .  Plenarprotokoll 12/1 90.  2 . 7 .1 9 9 3 ,  1 4 6 1 3.
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8.3.2. Economic interests
The domestic economic considerations are based on an estimation of the effects of the various 
behavioural options open to the German government on Germany's GDP and employment rate. 
As argued in Section 6.3.2, German agricultural income and employment were best served by 
high EEC intervention prices. Apart from the direct effect of these high intervention prices on 
farm incomes, the prices (combined with the double pricing system) also enabled Germany's 
agricultural sector (small-scale farming) to export farm produce within the EEC and thus 
generate income from exports.
From this point of view, the Commission proposal for an agricultural offer in the GATT 
negotiations in the autumn of 1990 was not economically attractive. Although the Commission 
had no plans to scrap the double pricing system, the 3 0%  cuts in the actual intervention prices 
would lead to income losses for farmers. While the relatively competitive French farmers may 
have stood to benefit from these price cuts by regaining other parts of the European market, the 
relatively uncompetitive German farm sector was certain to lose out. Moreover, the proposals 
included provisions for minimum access to the European market for third countries, and this was 
likely to damage German income from intra-EEC agricultural exports even further. Since the 
Commission provided no corresponding plan on how these losses in income would be 
compensated, its agricultural proposal can only be considered detrimental to German 
agriculture.
The Draft Final Act that Dunkel proposed in December 1991 was even less attractive than 
the Commission proposal in 1990. As indicated in Section 7.3.2, it included price cuts higher 
than those proposed by the Commission, and direct income payments would remain outside the 
green box. These forms of compensations would thus also be subject to the reductions in 
internal support. Furthermore, the tariffication proposed under the Draft Final Act would 
undercut the EEC's variable import levies that were essential to the functioning of the double 
pricing system, meaning that community preference was at stake. The minimum access 
requirements of 3-5%  of the domestic market were also expected to be costly for Germany for a 
number of products.487 Nevertheless, an important difference between the Draft Final Act and 
earlier proposals was that it represented an overall agreement that included all negotiating 
groups (of which agriculture was only one). The negative economic consequences for the 
agricultural sector could thus potentially be offset by the benefits in other sectors. While prior to 
the Draft Final Act in 1991 no real break-throughs had been achieved in the negotiations in the 
non-agricultural groups (Lüttiken 2001, 66), the Act itself was an attempt to provide a balanced 
compromise, including the agricultural sector in which Germany had a vested interest, and was 
judged to have a positive overall effect on the economies of industrial countries (Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung 23.12.1991). On balance, the Draft Final Act was therefore likely to bring 
economic benefits for a trading nation like Germany. As a result, even though the Draft Final Act
487 D eutsch er  B un d estag .  Drucksache 1 2 /2028.  3 1 . 1 . 1 9 9 2 ,  20.
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was economically costly from the perspective of the agricultural sector, it was economically 
attractive in terms of the German economy as a whole.
The Blair House Accord of 1992 addressed a number of drawbacks associated with the 
Draft Final Act. It provided for smaller reductions in internal support and export restitutions, and 
the base year from which these reductions would be calculated was altered to the advantage of 
the EEC. In addition, the CAP reform agreed by European member states in May 1992 already 
provided for substantial cuts in support for the principal agricultural products. As a result, a 
substantial portion of the obligatory cuts foreseen under the Blair House Accord had either 
already been established or would be established by the implementation of the 1992 CAP 
reforms. Additionally, under the Blair House Accord, the direct income payments to be 
introduced under the CAP reforms as compensation for losses in farm income were added to the 
green box and would therefore be exempt from reductions. To the extent that the Blair House 
Agreement did not go beyond the commitments entered into by the CAP reform, the agreement 
was not economically costly. However, opinions differed on whether the two agreements were 
compatible or not. In at least one respect, the Blair House agreement was potentially more 
costly than the CAP reform. It still included tariffication and this had the potential to undermine 
community preference in the longer term. Furthermore, as indicated in Section 7.3.2, potentially 
negative consequences that exceeded the effects of CAP reform, were expected in the area of 
export assistance. Given that Germany did not benefit much from European export restitutions, 
the additional economic costs of the Blair House Accord (as compared to the CAP reforms) were 
likely to be negligible.
In economic terms, the Final GATT deal reached in 1993 was even more attractive than 
the Blair House Accord for two reasons. First of all, it included additional concessions from the 
United States with respect to the agricultural chapter. Secondly, it was an overall accord that 
concluded the entire round of GATT negotiations. Not only were the potential negative effects 
on the German agricultural sector addressed by changes introduced by the agreement, these 
costs would also be offset by the benefits that the overall agreement would bring to other 
German sectors, particularly the industrial sector.
8.3.3. Ideological interests
In order to establish whether the various proposals in the second half of the Uruguay Round 
were ideologically attractive, we need to assess to what extent the underlying ideas of these 
proposals were in line with the German agricultural policy paradigm. As we have seen in 
Sections 3.3.3 and 6.2.2, the central elements in the German agricultural paradigm were: the 
legitimatcy of state intervention, an income-oriented price policy (enabling fulfilment of the 
Leistungsprinzip and the ideal of a multifunctional baueriiche Landwirtschaft. With respect to 
this last notion, it is important to note that since German reunification in 1991, large 
agricultural cooperatives accounted for some 25%  of agricultural land. Although throughout the 
years of this case study the annual Agrarberichte continued to emphasize the importance of the
Supporting French Demands 'bis zum Aussersten': Germany 1990-1993 |283
principles and conditions of the bäuerliche Landwirtschaft, an increasing emphasis was now 
placed on a ' vielfältig strukturierten[ ...]Landwirtschaft and providing equal opportunities for 
different farm-structures (Agrarbericht 1991). While the bäuerliche Landwirtschaft figured less 
prominently in the German agricultural paradigm, ensuring and promoting multifunctionality 
was increasingly being prioritized (Koalitionsvereinbarung 1991; Agrarbericht 1993). It was not 
until 1993, with the arrival of Borchert as farm minister that the idea of strengthening market 
forces in agriculture really took hold in the ministry. Borchert stressed the importance of a more 
competitive German agricultural sector, which required restructuring, because the larger farms in 
East Germany had an advantage over smaller-scale (,Agrarbericht 1994). Between 1990 and
1993, the idea of a bäuerliche Landwirtschaft was thus decreasing in importance, while 
multifunctionality, which had always been closely related to the bäuerliche Landwirtschaft 
increased in importance within the German agricultural paradigm. To the extent that the 
proposals in the negotiation corresponded with these ideas, the proposals would serve German 
domestic ideological interests.
Although the 30%  support cuts proposed by the Commission in 1990 were de facto likely 
to reduce the effectiveness of European price policy as an income-oriented price policy, and 
undermine the multifunctional bäuerliche Landwirtschaft, the ideas underlying the proposal still 
included the legitimacy of state intervention and the key intervention instruments of the CAP 
would remain untouched. It was not until the Commission presented its proposals on CAP 
reform that there was a departure from the idea of an income-oriented price policy, as in these 
proposals price policy and income policy would be separated. This separation was to be effected 
by reducing prices and supplementing farm income through direct payments.
The ideas behind the Draft Final Act proposed by Dunkel in 1991, however, were at odds 
with the German agricultural policy paradigm, because the Act introduced more elements of a 
free market system into agricultural trade and allowed only tariffs as a legitimate means of 
intervention. These ideas clashed with the flexible double-pricing system and the German 
income-oriented price policy. In effect, the Act implied that income policy should not be 
achieved through price policy. Furthermore, introducing a free market system for agriculture 
would favour larger-scale farms, since these -  through economies of scale -  were most likely to 
survive the battle for price-competitiveness. As a result the Draft Final Act was de facto also 
likely to jeopardize the bäuerlich strukturierte Landwirtschaft even though it did not exclude 
such a structure in principle. Finally, by introducing the free market paradigm into the 
agricultural sector, it treated agriculture ju st like any other economic sector. Such an idea was 
also at odds with the German agricultural paradigm, in which the role of agriculture was to fulfil 
multiple social functions alongside its economic function.
Although in the Blair House Accord the EEC had succeeded in gaining concessions from 
the United States on reduction percentages and base years, the Accord was still based on the 
free market paradigm (Daugbjerg 2008). The accord was therefore at odds with an income- 
oriented price policy and the legitimacy of far-reaching state intervention. On the other hand, 
because it placed direct income payments in the green box, the Accord was compatible with the
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preservation of a bäuerliche Landwirtschaft since it legitimized financial compensation for the 
multiple social functions (multifunctionality) of the agricultural community.488 As a result, even 
though the ideological basis of the Blair House Accord did not differ from that underlying the 
Draft Final Act, the former was somewhat less ideologically costly, for in practice it left more of 
the key elements of the German agricultural paradigm intact. Since the differences between the 
1993 Final Act and the Blair House Accord were minor, ideological considerations were similar 
with respect to both agreements.
8 .3 .4  Domestic costs and benefits
On the basis of the previous sections on German domestic political, economic and ideological 
interests, an overview is given in Table 8.4 of the domestic costs and benefits related to the 
various proposals and outcomes.489 This concerns the costs and benefits relating to the effects of 
accepting the Commission proposal in 1990, the Draft Final Act in 1991, the Blair House Accord 
in 1992 and the Final Accord in 1993. This overview shows that, given Germany's overall 
domestic interests, it can be expected that Germany will reject the Commission proposal and the 
Draft Final Act, but accept the Final Accord. With respect to the the Blair House Accord, the 
domestic picture is mixed and no clear expectations can be formulated on the basis of domestic 
considerations alone. Section 8.4 will describe how the same policy options should be judged on 
the basis of Germany's international interests.
488 Of course, these direct paym ents (as part of a policy to separate incom e policy and price policy) did not 
sit well w ith the second aspect of the Germ an agricultural paradigm . So the paradox here is that allowing 
and im plem enting policies that, on the one hand, were not in line w ith one elem ent in the Germ an 
agricultural paradigm , on the other hand, enabled the preservation of other elem ents in this paradigm .
489 See Section 3.3.3. for an explanation of how  the political, econom ic and ideological 'balances' in Table 
8.4  are calculated.
Table 8.4. German domestic costs and benefits with respect to the proposals during the second half of the Uruguay Round
Commission Proposal 1990 Draft Final Act 1991 Blair House Accord 1992 Final Accord 1993
POLITICAL(a)
Farm lobby — — — -
Industry and trade lobbies + + + + + +
Political parties - + + + + +
BALANCE POLITICAL - + /- + +
ECONOM IC(b)
Income and employment 
farm sector
- - 0 0
GDP and employment 
total economy
0 + 0 + +
BALANCE ECONOMIC - + 0 +
IDEOLOGICAL(c)
Legitimacy of state 
Intervention
0 - - -
Income-oriented price 
policy
0 - - -
Bäuerliche Landwirtschaft 0 - 0 0
BALANCE IDEOLOGICAL 0 — - -
SUM DOM ESTIC(d)
- - + /- +
Legend: (a) -  = pressure against the proposal, -  -  = extensive pressure against the proposal, + = pressure in favour of the proposal , and + +  = extensive 
pressure in favour of the proposal. (b) -  = economic costs, -  -  = high economic costs, + = economic benefits, + +  = high economic benefits. (c) + = the 
underlying ideas of the proposal considered in the policy option are in accordance with the German policy paradigm, -  = the underlying ideas of the proposal 
considered in the policy option are at odds with the German policy paradigm. The balances are accorded a value of + = benefits exceed costs; + + = benefits 
considerably exceed costs; -  = costs exceed benefits; -  -  = costs considerably exceed benefits; + / -  = costs equal benefits. In assessing the balance of economic 
costs/benefits, the consequences for the economy as a whole are attributed more weight than the consequences for agriculture. (d) The sum domestic is either + 
= benefits exceed costs; -  = costs exceed benefits; or + / -  = costs equal benefits. 0 = no clear costs or benefits with respect to the criterion involved.
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8.4. The German Interest: International Considerations
8.4.1. Political interests
During what was originally scheduled to be the final year of the Uruguay Round, the EEC came 
under increasing pressure, particularly from the United States, to make concessions on 
agricultural trade (see Sections 4.3.4. and 7.4.1). While the Council negotiations with respect to 
the European agricultural offer were underway, the United States also exerted direct pressure on 
Germany. In talks between Bush and Kohl in mid-October, Bush urged Kohl to soften his stance 
on the issue. According to the United States this approach had been effective, and it claimed 
that Kohl had promised Bush to adopt a more flexible position once the parliamentary elections 
had been held (Die Tageszeitung 17.10.1990). After the EEC had tabled its agricultural offer in 
November 1990 -  an offer that was a far cry from the United States demand for a 70%  
reduction in agricultural support -  the United States once again stepped up its pressure on 
Germany. Yeutter and Hills were sent to Germany to appeal to the country's image as a trading 
nation and help bring the round to a successful conclusion. It was claimed that during this visit, 
Hills warned that 'geopolitical stability was at stake' [Financial Tmes15.11.1990).
Within the EEC, the situation was somewhat different. Initially, only the United Kingdom 
and the Netherlands advocated a more flexible position in the GATT agricultural negotiations. 
The other member states rejected the Commission proposal, albeit for a range of different 
reasons (see Section 7.4.1). By the end of October, however, the Commission had succeeded in 
winning the support of nearly all the member states except France and Germany, and the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands began to pressure the Chancellor's Office and the Ministry of 
Economics to accept the agricultural offer.490 However, Germany also came under pressure from 
France to stand by its rejection of the Commission proposal. It was claimed that the telephone 
between Paris and Bonn had not stopped ringing (Süddeutsche Zeitung 18.10.1990). Although 
the scales of Germany's international political interest thus began to turn in favour of making 
compromises on agriculture, such a step would still compromise Germany's relations with 
France.
In 1991, trade relations between the Untied States and the EEC came under increasing 
pressure. The two crossed swords in a number of trade disputes and the NAFTA negotiations 
showed that the United States regarded regional cooperation as a viable alternative to 
multilateral cooperation within GATT, and was offering members of Congress the opportunity to 
obtain government commitments to resisting concessions on agriculture in the GATT 
negotiations (see Section 4.3.5.). Within the context of the GATT talks, the United States 
expressed its disappointment with Kohl in no uncertain terms. It claimed that Kohl had promised
490 ArchBuZa. V N /1985-1994: 08640. 24 .1 0 .19 9 0 . Refnr: boni 131/10062. Codebericht van EZ aan PV 
Bonn. O nderw erp: GATT/UR. Verzoek te dem archeren.
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to convince Mitterrand to accept the cuts in agricultural support after German unification, and 
that Kohl had not yet delivered on this promise (Wirtschaftswoche 11.10.1991).
Positions within the EEC in 1991 were still divided between states in favour of concessions 
in the area of agriculture -  such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Denmark -  and 
those resisting concessions, most importantly France. Germany found itself caught between the 
two camps. It agreed with France that international agricultural markets should be stabilized, 
but the solutions both states preferred were diametrically opposed (see Section 7.4.1). During 
the French-German summit in May 1991, Germany was pressurized again by France to stick to 
the mandate of November 1990,491 and after Dunkel presented his Draft Final Act in December, 
the French seized every opportunity to express their total opposition to it (see section 7.5). After 
the EEC member states agreed in a Council meeting on 23 December that the agricultural 
chapter of the Act yielded disproportionally to United States demands, it was in Germany's 
(intra-European) political interests to reject it.
As we saw in Section 4.3.6, the United States accepted the Draft Final Act and was not 
content with the EEC's reaction to it. Furthermore, trade political tensions between the United 
States and the EEC increased still further (see Section 7.4.1.), and the United States threatened 
to introduce sanctions if a satisfactory GATT deal on agriculture was not forthcoming before 5 
December 1992. Meanwhile they also continued to pressurize Chancellor Kohl, especially during 
his visit to Washington in March 1992. The United States complained that Kohl was prioritizing 
the interests of his farmers and his friend Mitterrand over both the promises he had made earlier 
and Germany's wider economic interests [Financial Times 6.3.1992; 18.3.1992). Kohl's 
reputation was thus at stake if he failed to help bring about a successful conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round by influencing European decision making.
Within the EEC, unity among member states over rejecting the Draft Final Act was short­
lived, as a number of member states, including Germany, began to argue for a more positive 
stance toward the Act.492 As a result, Germany was confronted with increasing pressure from 
the French, who appealed to Franco-German solidarity to win German backing on the 
agricultural issue.493 This pressure increased during the negotiations that led to the Blair House 
Accord in the autumn of 1992, and culminated in French demands to reject this agreement 
(interview Schloder and Witt 4.8.2008; see also Section 7.5). However, most member states 
were satisfied with the Blair House Accord, and there was a majority at the European level in
491 C A C . 19940617, art 9. Entretiens entre Louis M erm az, Ministre de l'Agriculture et de la Forêt, et M. 
Ignaz Kiechle, Bundesm inister der Ernährung, der Landw irtschaft und der Forsten. Lille, 29-39 mai, 1992; 
C A C . 19930195, art 3. 27 .6 .1 99 1 . Note pour le ministre.
492 C A C . 19920056. 10.1 .1992. Ministère de l'agriculture et de la forêt. Conseiller technique Jean-François 
Collin. Note pour le ministre. Objet: Négociations du G A T T conseil de ministres du 10 et 11 janvier;
10.1 .1992. Ministère de l'agriculture et de la forêt. Proposition d'am endem ents au projet de déclaration 
présenté par M. Feiter.
493 BArch. N 1436: 21. 2 1 .2 .1 99 2 . Fernschreiben aus Paris diplo an Bonn A A . Betr.: Uruguay-Runde. Hier: 
die frze Spracheregelung. Jonker stated that France w arned that Germ any w ould strike Franco-Germ an 
relations at the core if it failed to support France.
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favour of accepting it. It was accordingly in Germany's overall international political interest to 
endorse the Blair House Accord.
In 1993, the pressure from the United States diminished, but it clearly signalled that the 
Blair House Accord was non-negotiable (see Sections 4.3.7 and 7.4). Furthermore, as described 
in Chapter 7, both United States officials and Sutherland had signalled that December 1993 was 
the final deadline. They expected Germany to intervene, as Germany was widely seen as the 
European member state that could convince the French of the importance of a successful 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round (Frankfurter Aiigemeine Zeitung 2.9.1993; Die Weit
11.9.1993). Germany was thus compelled to make an effort to reach a deal in the Uruguay 
Round if it was to safeguard its international reputation. At the same time, however, Germany 
was confronted with increasing pressure from the new French government to support its 
demand for a renegotiation of the Blair House Accord. Since renegotiation was rejected by most 
other member states,494 it was not in Germany's political interest to defend the French demand. 
But when a monetary crisis erupted in the EMS in the summer of 1993 and Germany needed 
cooperation from France to get the additional support measures for agriculture through the 
Council of Ministers, its negotiating position on the issue of potential renegotiation of the Blair 
House accord was weakened.495 The French were, it is claimed, skilful in connecting the two 
issues to put Germany under additional pressure to back the French demands in the GATT 
negotiations [Frankfurter Aiigemeine Zeitung 10.9.1993; 19.9.1993; Financial Times
30.9.1993). Nevertheless, when one looks at the balance of international preferences both 
outside and inside the EEC, it was in Germany's political interest to contribute to a successful 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round. Supporting French demands for renegotiation would not have 
been conducive to this end.
As indicated in Section 7.4, the pressure of transnational groups in support of German 
domestic organizations was divided. On the one side, the business and employer lobbies 
favoured making concessions on agriculture to increase the likelihood of a successful conclusion 
of the negotiations. On the other side, the international farm lobby was trying to convince the 
Commission and the European member states not to make concessions. Although the intensity 
of the pressure exerted by the latter through large-scale protests was higher than the lower-key 
pressure being exerted by the former, non-agricultural lobbies intervened with respect to the 
agricultural issue increasingly during the period 1990-1993. For an industrial trading nation like 
Germany it was less easy to put such pressure aside than it was for France.
494 ArchEZ. G A TT-U R  1990-1993. Soc 1-199. Aanvullende notitie ten behoeve van REZ dd 3 .9 .1993; 
Informele bilaterale BRD-N L debriefing over hoogam btelijk  Frans-Duits overleg; Vervolgnotitie t.b .v de REZ 
dd 16-9-1993 ter voorbereiding van de jum boraad dd 20-9 -1 9 93 . Betreft: G A T T UR; actuele 
ontw ikkelingen.
495 ArchBuZa. DDI-DIE A RA : 01763. 8 .9 .1 9 93 . BZvertrouwelijk. brei 313/15939. Onderw erp: PV lunch dd 8 
septem ber 1993. The monetary crisis worried the Germ ans, as it endangered the European system of 'green 
currencies' used in intra-European agricultural trade. Germ an agriculture profited from this system, because 
it kept agricultural prices in Germ any relatively high com pared to prices in other member states.
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8.4.2  Economic interests
To estimate the international economic consequences of the various behavioural options, we 
need to focus on three aspects. The economic attractiveness of the alternatives depends first of 
all on whether they would involve liberalization in competitive sectors or in non-competitive 
sectors. In the case of agriculture, this implies that Germany was interested in maintaining a 
sufficient degree of protection, specifically in the form of high guarantee prices and through the 
double pricing system (see Section 6.4.2). Secondly, we need to establish to what extent the 
agricultural negotiations were the key to a successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round. If 
profitable deals had been reached in other sectors, such as industry and services, and if it can be 
shown that the deadlocked talks on agriculture negatively affected negotiations and 
undermined potential deals in these other areas, then the overall economy would profit from 
making concessions on agriculture. Finally, the high degree to which Germany, a trading nation 
par excellence, was dependent on the proper functioning of the GATT system, meant that it was 
in Germany's interest to support the system of multilateral trade agreements, and any action 
that compromised the proper functioning of this system was contrary to Germany's international 
economic interests.
The Commission proposal for a European agricultural offer in 1990 meant the 
liberalization of the non-competitive German agricultural sector. The substantial reductions in 
support and partial tariffication gave rise to concerns about the preservation of a sufficient 
degree of community preference. Compromising on community preference would lead to a 
decrease in Germany's market share of intra-European agricultural trade. The World Bank's 
predictions of US$50 billion in gains for the OECD member states through agricultural 
liberalization may be plausible, but Germany was unlikely to share in these gains. With respect 
to the expected effects on the German trade balance (the first aspect of the international 
economic interest), the Commission proposal was therefore not economically attractive. 
Considering the second aspect, the proposal was unlikely to be in Germany's interest either. As 
explained in Section 7.4.2, agriculture had become one of the most important -  but certainly 
not the only -  unresolved issue in the negotiations. Furthermore, since the Commission proposal 
was already considered inadequate by the United States, it was questionable whether 
agreement within the EEC on that offer would, in any case, actually bring a GATT deal on 
agriculture any closer. It is only with respect to the third aspect, the functioning of the 
international trading system, that compromising on agriculture might be beneficial to the extent 
that it may stop the United States from taking action that broke existing GATT rules. 
Nevertheless, overall, the potential economic benefits of accepting the Commission offer did not 
outweigh the certain costs.
In terms of its likely effect on German agricultural trade, the Draft Final Act of December
1991 was even less attractive than the Commission proposal of 1990, but since the Act also 
included agreements on most of the other negotiating issues, including industrial trade, 
acceptance of the Act was in the interest of German overall trade. With respect to agriculture, 
the Draft Final Act entailed larger support cuts than the Commission proposal of 1990, as well
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as a method of tariffication that was more damaging to community preference, and thus for the 
German position within the European agricultural market. The Act was therefore unattractive for 
German agriculture. But the liberalization of industrial trade that the Act provided for would be 
economically advantageous for German industrial trade (cf. Paemen and Bensch 1995, 195). 
Given the fact that the industrial sector in Germany was considerably larger than the agricultural 
sector (both in terms of the number of people employed and its share of German trade and 
GDP), the Draft Final Act was in Germany's international economic interest when we focus on 
the first aspect given above, its trade effects. Focusing on the second aspect, whether 
agriculture was the main stumbling block in the negotiations and making concessions on this 
issue would contribute to the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round, we must conclude 
that this argument was gaining ground (see also Section 7.4.2). The Heysel debacle in 1990 had 
shown that in the heat of the negotiations, conflicts in one of the negotiating groups could lead 
to stagnation and deterioration in the negotiating climate in other groups, eventually resulting 
in stalemate in the negotiations as a whole. Adding the fact that Germany would benefit 
economically from liberalization in the other sectors included in the Draft Final Act, making 
compromises on agriculture in order to remove the main stumbling block from the negotiations 
and enhance the chances of a final GATT deal was in Germany's international economic interest. 
With respect to the third aspect, the multilateral trading system had taken a blow when the 
Heysel conference had ended in stalemate in December 1990. Considering, moreover, the 
United States tendency to prioritize bilateral and regional trade agreements, a GATT deal, such 
as the Draft Final Act, was welcome as a means of strengthening the multilateral trading 
system. In 1991, it was clearly in Germany's international economic interest to accept the Draft 
Final Act.
Although the Blair House Accord on agriculture of 1992 was economically less costly for 
the German agricultural sector than the agricultural chapter of the Draft Final Act (see Section 
4.3.6 and 7.4.2), the Accord was less attractive than the Draft Final Act as a whole, because it 
did not offer an overall GATT agreement that also included other sectors important to the 
German economy. With respect to the first aspect of the German international economic 
interest, the Accord was therefore more likely to cause slight economic costs through diminished 
agricultural exports than economic benefits, because the German agricultural sector was 
relatively uncompetitive. Concerning the question of whether agriculture was the key issue in 
the negotiations, it had become clear at this stage that a deal on agriculture was essential if the 
Uruguay Round as a whole was to be concluded. Once the Blair House Accord had been 
reached, accepting this agreement was likely to enhance the chances of a successful final GATT 
deal. Considering the second aspect of its international economic interests, it was thus in 
Germany's interest to accept an agreement that solved the agricultural issue. Finally, in view of 
the increasing number of United States initiatives to enter into regional and bilateral trade 
agreements outside the international trading system of the GATT (NAFTA was signed in October
1992), a successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round would strengthen the multilateral trading
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system. Considering the varous aspects of German international economic interests, acceptance 
of the Blair House Accord thus on balance constituted an attractive option.
Since the final GATT deal of December 1993 was only a slightly changed version of the 
Blair House Accord (based on some additional concessions by the United States) and because it 
encompassed agreements in other sectors, such as industry, which were in the interest of the 
German economy as a whole, accepting this agreement was attractive in terms of Germany's 
international economic interests.
8.4.3 Ideological interests
Behavioural options that are not compatible with relevant aspects of the German state identity 
are ideologically unattractive. Two aspects of Germany's identity are particularly relevant here 
(see Section 3.2.3): the idea of Germany as a trading nation (Handeisstaat and Franco-German 
friendship.
During the second half of the Uruguay Round negotiations, the international ideological 
considerations based on these two aspects of German identity were contradictory with respect 
to nearly all the proposals and accords tabled in the course of the GATT negotiations. 
Acceptance of the 1990 Commission proposal, the 1991 Draft Final Act and the 1992 Blair 
House Accord would enhance Germany's image as a Handeisstaat pursuing free trade. In 1991 
and 1992, other states were increasingly beginning to point out Germany's responsibilities as 
the champion of free trade (see Section 8.4.1 above). They were also relying on Germany to 
convince other EEC member states, notably France, to accept an agreement on agriculture. 
However, German acceptance of these proposals was at the same time incompatible with the 
Franco-German friendship, for this would have implied that Germany would not support France 
on a matter that the latter considered absolutely vital, and, as described earlier, France did not 
hesitate to demand solidarity from its German partner. Particularly in 1992, when the French 
government was facing political problems as a result of the Maastricht-referendum, it was 
widely believed that Germany would not risk isolating President Mitterrand and undermining the 
Franco-German friendship (Financial Times 10.10.1992).
8.4.4 International costs and benefits
On the basis of the previous sections on German international political, economic and 
ideological interests, an overview is given in Table 8.5 of the international costs and benefits 
related to the various proposals and outcomes.496 The costs and benefits relate to the effects of 
accepting the Commission proposal on an agricultural offer in 1990, the Draft Final Act in 1991,
496 Com pared to the tables in the previous chapters, a row  has been added here under the international 
political interests, involving Germ any's international credibility. It w as only in the second Germ an case that 
this international credibility w as so clearly at stake.
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the Blair House Accord in 1992 and the Final Accord in 1993. This overview shows that, given 
Germany's overall international interests, Germany can be expected to accept the Draft Final 
Act, the Blair House Accord and the Final Accord. The picture is ambiguous in relation to the 
Commission proposal. In this case, no clear expectations on German preferences can be 
formulated on the basis of international considerations alone.
Tabel 8 .5. German international costs and benefits with respect to  the proposals during the second half o f the Uruguay Round
Commission Proposal 1990 Draft Final Act 1991 Blair House Accord 1992 Final Accord 1993
POLITICAL(a)
Extra-EEC pressure + + + + + + +
Intra-EEC pressure + + + +
French Pressure --- -  -
Reputation 0 + + +
BALANCE POLITICAL + - + + +
ECONOMIC(b)
Trade balance - + - +
Agriculture as the obstacle 
In the UR
0 + + 0
Multilateral trading system 0 + + +
BALANCE ECONOMIC - + + + +
IDEOLOGICAL(c)
Germany as Handeisstaat + + + +
Franco-German friendship - - - 0
BALANCE IDEOLOGICAL +/- + /- + /- +
SU M INTERNATIONAL(d)
+/- 1 + 1 +
Legend: (a) In the case of extra-EEC and France: -  = pressure against the proposal, -  -  = extensive pressure against the proposal, + = pressure in favour of the
proposal, + +  = extensive pressure in favour of the proposal. With respect to intra-EEC: -  -  = united rejection or resistance; + +  = united acceptance; -  = 
disunity within the EEC, but predominant resistance; and + = disunity within the EEC, but predominant acceptance. (b) -  = economic costs, + = economic 
benefits (c) + = the policy option corresponds well with the aspect of the German identity involved; -  = the policy option is at odds with the aspect of the 
German identity involved. The 'balances' may take values of either + = benefits exceed costs; + + = benefits considerably exceed costs; -  = costs exceed 
benefits; -  -  = costs considerably exceed benefits; or + / -  = costs equal benefits. (d) The 'sum ' may take values of either + = benefits exceed costs; -  = costs 
exceed benefits; or + / -  = costs equal benefits. 0 = no clear costs or benefits with respect to the criterion involved.
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8.5 Theoretical expectations and German Preferences
As explained in earlier chapters (see Sections 2.5 and 6.5), during the period of the case studies, 
Germany's domestic structure was one of low domestic polarity. This meant that Germany had 
to take account of its domestic interests, and domestic considerations are thus expected to be of 
importance in the preference-formation process. While in the first case study (1982-1989) 
international polarity was high, as a result of which Germany was expected to be able to 
prioritize its domestic interests over its international interests, during the time of this second 
case study (1990-1993) international polarity was low, implying that Germany also had to take 
its international interests into account. On the basis of the theoretical framework, I expect that 
in cases of low international polarity and low domestic polarity, political and economic 
considerations, both international and domestic, will assume the greatest level of importance in 
the process of preference formation. To the extent that domestic political mobilization and 
governmental sensitivity increase, the government will prioritize its domestic political and 
economic interests over its international interests.
In Sections 8.5.1 to 8.5.4 I will now discuss the various decision moments separately. As 
in the previous chapters, a prediction will first be formulated on the expected German 
preference at each of the decision moments. In this case these predictions are based on 
Germany's domestic and international political and economic interests. In the cost and benefit 
tables for each decision moment below, only the balances concerning these interests are 
therefore reproduced from Tables 8.4 and 8.5. The other balances are indicated with an X as 
considerations that are regarded to be non-decisive on the basis of the theoretical framework. 
After having formulated the prediction, the preferences that Germany actually defended in the 
negotiations will be analysed in order to establish whether these preferences are in accordance 
with the predictions based on the theoretical framework.
8.5.1 The Commision proposal of 1990
8.51.1 Predictions
Table 8.6a presents the domestic and international costs and benefits for Germany associated 
with accepting the Commission proposal, which are expected to be decisive on the basis of the 
theoretical framework. As the table shows, it would be both in Germany's domestic and 
international economic interests, as well as in its domestic political interests to reject the 
Commission proposal. The proposal was likely to have negative effects on income and 
employment in German agriculture, and the government was under great pressure from both 
the farm lobby and most of the political parties to refuse the proposal. The only factors that 
worked in favour of accepting the proposals were international political considerations. This was 
due to United States pressure and the changing position of an increasing number of EEC
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member states from opposition to support for the Commission proposal. Given the high degree 
of governmental sensitivity resulting from the parliamentary elections in December 1990 and the 
high degree of societal mobilization (see Section 8.2), domestic political interests may be 
expected to be prioritized by the German government. I therefore predict that Germany will not 
accept the Commission proposal.
Table 8.6a: Issue: Acceptance of the Commission proposal of 1990
INTERNATIONAL DOMESTIC
Political + -
Economic - -
Ideological x x
BALANCE +/- -
Prediction: Germany will not accept the Commission proposal.
Key to symbols: + = benefits exceed costs, -  =  costs exceed benefits, + / -  = benefits equal costs, x = non-
decisive consideration.
8.5.1.2 Preferences
What was most striking in Germany's preference-formation process on the Commission proposal 
was the intra-governmental struggle between opponents and proponents of the liberalization of 
agricultural trade, and Kohl's ultimate decision to intervene in favour of the Minister of 
Agriculture. The two main factors that both Germany, as a country, and Kohl, as a politician, 
took into consideration were preventing trouble with the farming community, on the one hand, 
and avoiding stalemate in the Uruguay Round, on the other hand (interview Ludewig 5.4.2007). 
Different ministers clearly defended different choices with respect to how these priorities should 
be ordered.
In the Council of Agriculture Ministers of 8 October 1990, Kiechle rejected the 
Commission proposal on the grounds that farmers would suffer price decreases and 
unemployment in exchange for a GATT deal. He preferred to see a failure of the Uruguay Round 
rather than a 70% drop in German farm incomes (Frankfurter Rundschau 9.10.1990; Agra 
Europe 12.10.1990). At the same time however, Haussmann, Minister of Economics, defended 
the Commission proposal and urged EEC member states not to amend it (Süddeutsche Zeitung
9.10.1990). Germany needed a successful conclusion of the GATT negotiations, the likelihood of 
which would be enhanced by a far-reaching EEC agricultural offer (BMWI Tagesnachrichten
17.10.1990). Haussmann was backed by the FDP ministers (die Welt 10.10.1990), but Kiechle 
claimed he enjoyed the support of Chancellor Kohl in this debate (Frankfurter Rundschau
9.10.1990). Both Kiechle and Kohl indeed agreed that a GATT deal was important for German 
industry and agriculture, but they were unwilling to sacrifice the agricultural sector in order to 
reach such a deal (Bulletin 7.5.1990; 26.10.1990; interview Schlöder and Witt 4.8.2008). The 
claim that Kiechle was supported by Kohl is further substantiated by a French document
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referring to an intervention by Kohl on 11 October 1990 as a result of which the German 
Ministry of Agriculture had concluded that Kohl was on their side.497 Furthermore, on 17 
October, Kohl called a coalition meeting between the ministers involved and the leaders of the 
coalition parties in order to build a bridge between Haussmann and Kiechle (Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, 10.10.1990; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 18.10.1990). It was decided that 
Germany would take the position that the Commission proposal could only be accepted if 
accompanying measures were included (in the form of direct income support), and community 
preference was guaranteed (Agra Europe 19.10.1990). This outcome clearly corresponded to 
the position that Kiechle had defended. Kohl's support of Kiechle is also evidenced by the 
observation that the Chancellor's Office 'hat immer besonderes darauf geachtet dass das 
Landwirtschaftsministerium nicht überfahren wurde (interview Schomerus 29.3.2007). 
Haussmann immediately altered his rhetoric in public. He now seemed to defend the bäuerliche 
Landwirtschaft and stated that he did not wish to submit to the demands of the United 
States.498 Nevertheless, at the coalition meeting, Haussmann had also enjoyed a measure of 
success in that he obtained a public confirmation that Germany wished to contribute to a 
successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round, and that the GATT negotiations could not be 
allowed to fail (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 18.10.1990; Stuttgarter Zeitung 18.10.1990). 
Moreover, Kiechle now had to agree to the replacement of price support by direct income 
support -  a position he had had until then rejected (Süddeutsche Zeitung18.10.1990).499
As a result, in the meeting of the European Agricultural Council on 19 October, Germany 
maintained its resistance to the Commission proposal (Agence Europe 24.10.1990). It has even 
been claimed that Germany, as it had done in 1987 and 1988 (see Chapter 6) took a tougher 
line against the proposal than France did, enabling France to hide behind Germany's back 
(RheinischerMerkur26.10.1990; interview Schomerus 29.3.2007).500 Furthermore, Kohl argued 
the case almost as forcefully as Kiechle, intervening directly by telephoning Delors and warning 
him that the current proposal was unacceptable and that the German farm minister would be 
seeking significant changes (cf. Swinbank and Tanner 1996, 78: Agra Europe 19.10.1990).501 
Why did Kohl support the position of the Agricultural Minister so tenaciously? Apart from the
497 C A C .  1 9 9 2 0 0 5 6 , art 3. 1 1 .1 0 .1 9 9 0 . O bjet: P ositions a lle m a n d e s en vue du co n seil a g rico le  de 15 et 16 
o cto b re  1 9 9 0 .
498 C A C .  1 9 9 2 0 0 5 6 , art 8. 1 8 .1 0 .1 9 9 0 . De la part du m inistre  co n se ille r p o u r les a ffa ire s é co n o m iq u e s  et 
co m m e rcia le s et de l'a ttach é  a g rico le . O bjet: p o sition  a lle m a n d e  a la veille  du co n seil ag r ico le  e xce p tio n n e l 
du 19 o cto b re  (n é g o c ia t io n s  G A T T ).
4" ib id .
500 See a lso : C A C .  1 9 9 2 0 0 5 6 , art 2. 1 3 .9 .1 9 9 0 . M inistère  de l'a g ricu ltu re  et de la forêt. Je a n -L u c  Pelletier. 
U ru g u a y  R o u n d ; A rc h B u Z a . D D I DIE A R A : 1 0 1 2 . 1 9 .1 0 .1 9 9 0 . M e m o ra n d e m  DIE verslag  la n d b o u w ra a d ; 
C A C .  1 9 9 2 0 0 5 6 , art 7. 8 .1 1 .1 9 9 0 . TD  Lon dres 1 9 2 4  A G R I 2 E C O N  S G C I. N anteuil. Earlier th at year, the 
New York Times( 1 0 .7 .1 9 9 0 ) had a lre ad y  in d ica te d  th a t K o h l w a s  the m ost in tra n sig e n t Eu ro p ean  
n e g o tia to r d u rin g  the G 7  m eetin g in H o u sto n . S e co n d a ry  literature  a lso  p o ints o u t th a t it w a s  esp e cia lly  
G e rm a n y  th at d e fen d e d  its farm e rs' interests in the a u tu m n  o f 1 9 9 0  (cf. M e u n ie r 2 0 0 5 , 106).
501 See a lso : C A C .  1 9 9 2 0 0 5 6 , art 6. T D  D F R A  B R U X E LL E S  1 3 5 9 . O bjet: co n seil a g ricu ltu re  du  19 o cto bre  
1 9 9 0 . Su ite  de la session  des 15 et 16 o cto b re . U ru g u a y  R o u n d : O ffre  de la C E E  c o n c e rn a n t l'a g ricu ltu re .
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fact that Kohl was generally considered to be sympathetic to agricultural interests, appreciating 
both the economic and the social value of agriculture (interview Feiter 21.5.2007), the elections 
in the autumn of 1990 played an undeniable role.502 Feiter has emphasized that in 1990 the 
reasons for defending farm interests were mainly political. 90% of the farmers were inclined to 
vote CDU/CSU and non-agricultural party members were also sympathetic to farmers (interview 
Feiter 21.5.2007). Both the German and the international press also claimed that Kohl was 
unwilling to risk angering the farmers before the elections (Agra Europe 26.10.1990; Financial 
Times29.11.1990; 30.11.1990; New York Times 13.11.1990). As early as February 1990, Der 
Spiegeihad noted Kohl's ambition to be the first elected Chancellor of a unified Germany (Der 
Spiegel 19.3.1990). The 1990 elections were thus of major importance to Kohl personally and 
he did not want to risk losing them over farm issues.503 Finally, coalition tactics also played a 
role. Die Tageszeitung (31.10.1990) claimed that Kohl rejected the Commission proposal, 
because he did not want the CSU (the Bavarian sister party of the CDU, which was highly 
dependent on the votes of Bavarian farmers) to lose the agricultural vote in the elections as this 
would strengthen the position of the FDP within the coalition (see also The Guardian
14.11.1990).
In the European Agricultural Council of 26 October, a Council Declaration was proposed 
that went a long way to meeting German demands. Germany initially seemed willing to accept 
the compromise, until Mermaz indicated that the solution did not satisfy France.504 Kiechle then 
stated that he could not accept the prospect of adverse consequences for farmers without 
guarantees of adequate compensation (Agence Europe 27.10.1990), and explained that 
Germany was not prepared to accept a proposal that was opposed by France (Agence Europe 
29.10.1990; Agra Europe 2.11.1990; Frankfurter Rundschau 30.10.1990).505 Until this 
meeting, Germany had been the most recalcitrant member state, but France now seemed to be 
assuming that role (Frankfurter Rundschau 30.10.1990).
These developments were an increasing cause of concern for the Ministry of Economics 
and the permanent representation of Germany in Geneva. The latter claimed that if a European 
offer was not forthcoming within a week, the Heysel conference and the entire Uruguay Round 
with it, would be in jeopardy. The EEC, particularly Germany and France, would be blamed if 
this were to happen. GATT members were relying on Germany to ensure a deal, given its 
traditional commitment to free trade.506 The Ministry of Economics applied similar arguments in
502 The 'social' value of agriculture lay in its im portance as a basis for rural areas and the preservation of the 
Germ an Sied/ungsstruktur(cf. interview Schom erus 29.3.2007).
503 Secondary literature substantiates the claim  that Kohl did not w ant to antagonize farmers before the 
elections: see W ebber 1999, 52; Paemen and Bensch 1995, 178; W oolcock and Hodges 1997, 314.
504 ArchBuZa. DDI DIE A RA : 1012. 2 6 .1 9 .19 9 0 . M em orandum .Verslag landbouw raad met deelnem ing van 
handelsministers.
505 C A C . 19920056, art 8. Telex Diplom atique de Vidal. Conseil agriculture du 20 octobre 1990 en présence 
des ministres du com m erce extérieur. Offre agricole à présenter dans le cadre de l'U ruguay Round.
506 BArch. B102: 736231.Telex von ständiger Vertretung BRD in G enf an BMWI. Betr.: G A T T  UR. Hier: 
Bedeutung des EG -Agrarangebots.
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the Staatssekretär Ausschuss für Europafragen.501 In a meeting of this Committee in early 
November, the draft instructions for the German negotiators showed that the French position 
was of particular importance to Germany. The Committee decided that Germany should, in the 
end, agree to the Commission proposal, but various formulations were prepared for the German 
representatives at the Council meeting -  as had been the case in 1985 (see Section 6.5.1.2) -  
depending on whether France would accept the proposal or not. In the case of a French 
rejection, Germany would emphasize that the reputation of the EEC was at stake and that it was 
highly unlikely that GATT members would be willing to take agriculture out of the negotiations. 
An EEC offer on agriculture was thus necessary if the Uruguay Round was to be concluded 
successfully. The German negotiators were also instructed that insisting on decision making by 
unanimity would imply a refusal to make a decision at all. Germany had always defended that 
the principle of qualified majority voting was indispensible for the proper functioning of the 
EEC.508 This seems to imply that the Committee had decided that, contrary to the position 
Germany defended at the 26 October Council meeting, if the worst came to the worst, Germany 
was now prepared to see France outvoted on the issue of the agricultural proposal.
Although the Commission had met most of the German demands, in the meeting of the 
Agricultural Council of 5 November 1990, Kiechle did not accept the Commission proposal, but 
instead supported the French demand for 'a more precise statement on Community preference' 
(Vahl 1997, 137).509 Chancellor Kohl had apparently overruled the state secretaries' committee, 
and given instructions to the German delegation to support the French demands 'bis zum 
äussersten’ (Frankfurter Rundschau 7.11.1990). Only after changes were made in the Council 
declaration in accordance with France's wishes, did Germany accept the Commission package 
and the Council declaration on 6 November 1990. Despite speculation that Germany would 
soften its stance after the parliamentary elections of 2 December (New York Times 10.12.1990), 
Germany held firm in its support for the French and backed France's rejection of additional 
concessions in general and the Hellström proposal in particular, during the Heysel conference 
(Davis 2003, 292; interview Schlöder and Witt 4.8.2008).
8.5.1.3 Analysis
Germany's rejection of the Commission proposal until guarantees had been provided on 
accompanying measures and community preference, accords with the theoretical expectations. 
Domestic political considerations were clearly of major importance, considering the importance 
of the electoral timetable to the government, and to Kohl in particular. These electoral
507 BArch. B102: 7 3 6231. 5 .11.1990. V  A  2 49 13 07. Einleitende A u fzeichn un g. Betr: Tagu ng der 
Europastaatssekretäre. Top: Bericht zum  Verhandlungsstand in der UR.
508 BArch. B102: 7 3 6231. V  A  2. Sprechzettel. Betr: Agrarrat unter Beteiligung der für den Aussenhandel 
zuständigen Minister am 5. Novem ber 1990 in Brüssel. Top: UR. Hier: Verhandlungsgruppe Agrar. 
Vorschlag der EG K.
509 See also: A rchBuZa. DDI DIE A RA : 1012. 5 .11 .1990. Verslag van de Raad van ministers van landbouw  en 
handel.
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considerations enabled farm groups to influenc German decision making. However, their 
influence had its limits. The government adopted their position of rejecting the Commission 
proposal, but the government's insistence on accompanying measures in the form of direct 
income support did not correspond with the farmers' wishes. On the contrary, the DBV 
vigorously opposed replacing price support with direct income support and had warned that the 
focus on accompanying measures was misguided (see Section 8.3). Furthermore, the account 
given above strikingly shows how highly Germany valued its relations with France and took 
French interests into consideration when deciding on the German position in the negotiations. 
Germany even withheld its approval of the proposal when most of its demands had already 
been met and only accepted the Commission proposal after additional guarantees were 
provided in accordance with France's wishes. This shows that the Franco-German friendship 
played a crucial role in German decision making, although, on the basis of the theoretical 
model, such considerations should have been less important in a case with low domestic and 
low international polarity such as this.
8.5.2. Dunkel's Draft Final Act of December 1991
8.5.2.1 Predictions
Considering the political and economic costs and benefits (both domestic and international) 
depicted in Table 8.6b, we may say that the Draft Final Act was overall more attractive than the 
Commission proposal of 1990. The main reason for this is that it was a total package for the 
entire Uruguay Round as a result of which economic costs in the agricultural sector were 
outweighed by economic benefits in Germany's competitive sectors. In addition, pressure from 
the agricultural lobby against the Draft Final Act was now counter-balanced by increasing 
pressure from the industrial and trade lobbies and by the support of most political parties for 
securing a swift conclusion of the Uruguay Round. Only international political considerations 
worked against accepting the Draft Final Act. Judging from political and economic 
considerations (domestic and international), the overall balance is eventually tilted in favour of 
accepting the accord. Given the decreased level of governmental sensitivity after its election 
victory of December 1990, it may be expected that Germany's international considerations will 
carry at least as much weight in the preference-formation process again as domestic 
considerations. Considering that particularly the international economic benefits of the Draft 
Final Act considerably exceed the international economic costs, this interest is likely to play an 
important role in the decision-making process.
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Table 8.6b: Issue: Acceptance of the Draft Final Act
INTERNATIONAL DOMESTIC
Political - +/-
Economic + + +
Ideoloqical x x
BALANCE + +
Prediction: Germany will accept the Draft Final act as a basis for negotiation.
Key to symbols: + = benefits exceed costs, + + = benefits considerably exceed costs, -  =  costs exceed benefits, 
+ / -  =  benefits equal costs, x = non-decisive consideration
8.5.2.2 Preferences
As in 1990, the German government continued to struggle to find a balance between the 
importance of preserving German agricultural interests and its relation with France on the one 
hand, and the necessity of reaching a successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round on the other 
hand. Realizing that the EEC had tested the patience of its negotiating partners to the limit 
during the Heysel conference, many in Germany began to believe that something must be done 
about the issue of agriculture if the Uruguay Round was to succeed (interview Feiter 21.5.2007). 
Even Waigel, the CSU Minister of Finance, had openly supported the Ministry of Economics and 
asked the managing director of the IMF to send a letter to the Finance Ministers emphasizing 
the importance of succesfully concluding the GATT negotiations.510 Although both Kiechle and 
Möllemann, the new Minister of Economics, subscribed to the view that a GATT deal was 
important for Germany, they did not agree on whether concessions should be made on 
agriculture in order to reach this goal. Möllemann began lobbying for concessions (BMWI 
Tagesnachrichten 27.2.1991) and argued that the Uruguay Round was of such importance for 
an exporting nation such as Germany, that it should be willing to risk a conflict with France if 
necessary (Süddeutsche Zeitung 6.2.1991).-511 The Gulf crisis and a looming recession made a 
GATT deal more important than ever.512 Kiechle, for his part, emphasized that agricultural 
interests had to be defended in a GATT deal and remained adamant that he would not sacrifice 
German agriculture for Germany's wider exporting interests (Bulletin 9.1.1991; 10.5.1991).
According to Der Spiegel, Kohl still supported Kiechle (4.3.1991) in the spring of 1991, 
but the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of that same day claimed that Kohl had become 
convinced of the importance of successfully concluding the Uruguay Round and was no longer 
prepared to give his unconditional support to farmers. Kohl's preoccupation with concluding a
510 ArchEZ. GATT/UR 1985-1992. 1 4 .12.1990. Refnr: evi721/26083. Codebericht van PV Geneve aan BuZa. 
Onderw erp: GATT/UR/post-Brussel proces.
511 See also: BArch. N1436: 15. 18.9 .1991. Bundesm inisterium  für W irtschaft. Pressestelle. 
Bundeswirtschaftsm inister Jürgen W . M öllemann zu EG -Agrarpolitik, Aussenw irtschaft, G A TT und 
Entw icklungspolitik.
512 ArchiBuZa. DDI-DIE A RA : 1055. 4 .2 .1 9 91 . Permanente Vertegenw oord iging in Brussel. 1e deelverslag van 
de 1471e raad van de EG (Algem ene Zaken) van 4 februari 1991.
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GATT agreement was evident during his visit to Washington in September 1991. There he tried 
to get the GATT talks back on track and said that both the EEC and the other participants in the 
negotiations should be willing to make comprimises on textile, services and agriculture 
[Financial Times 17.9.1991).
But the shifting balance of German priorities, away from protecting agricultural interests 
and towards securing a GATT deal became particularly apparent at the 9 October cabinet 
meeting on the Leitlinien for GATT and CAP reform. At this meeting, the government clearly 
prioritized the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round and decided to urge the Commission 
to increase its efforts to reach a GATT deal by the end of 1991. To this end, the Commission 
should show more flexibility in its negotiating position on agriculture.513 Kiechle did not support 
this, arguing that such a decision would anger the farmers and harm the Franco-German 
relations (SüddeutscheZeitung9.10.1991). But Kiechle's efforts were to no avail. The Ministries 
of Economics, Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation did not fear the wrath of the 
farmers and were convinced that the Uruguay Round could not be concluded without a deal on 
agriculture (Süddeutsche Zeitung 9.10.1991). Kiechle no longer enjoyed the support of Kohl, 
who now stressed that the failure of the Uruguay Round would be a catastrophe (Webber 
1999). A combination of political and economic factors offers a plausible explanation as to why 
Kohl decided to withdraw his support from the Agriculture Minister. First of all, governmental 
sensitivity had decreased during 1991 since no major elections were due in the near future, 
meaning that electoral concerns faded into the background. Furthermore, farm groups were 
now increasingly competing with industrial groups urging for a speedy conclusion of a GATT 
deal. Secondly, the costs of German unification were turning out to be far higher than foreseen 
and the German economy seemed to be on the brink of a recession (see Section 8.2). Under 
these circumstances a GATT deal would be welcome for Germany, since it was thought that this 
would benefit the economy as a whole. It is likely that Kohl was now convinced that holding up 
a GATT deal for the sake of German agriculture was no longer a viable option.
Having got his way in cabinet, Möllemann immediately signalled that the German 
government was prepared to be more flexible at a meeting of the Council of Trade Ministers. He 
argued that the EEC should soften its stance on agriculture in the Uruguay Round [Agence 
France Presse 11.10.1991). He also stated that a coalition between France, Germany and 
Ireland would no longer stand in the way of an agreement between the EEC and the United 
States (Vahl 1997, 160). When Dunkel introduced his Draft Final Act in December 1991, Kiechle
513 A lthough  Kiechle and M öllemann disagreed on w hether the decision implied com prom ising on the EEC 
proposal on agriculture within G A TT or not, the newspapers covering the cabinet decision concluded a 
change had taken place in the Germ an position (e.g. Die Welt 1 4 .10.1991; Frankfurter Rundschau 
10.10.1991; 1 5 .10.1991; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 1 0 .10.1991; Financial Times 14.10.1991; Agence 
Europe 11.10.1991). French and Dutch archival material also show s that these states regarded the Germ an 
cabinet decision to entail as a softening in the Germ an stance on the agricultural negotiations in the 
U ruguay Round (C A C . 19930195, art 3. 1 1 .10.1991. Note pour le ministre. Objet: Négociations du GATT. 
Évolution de la position allem ande; PersArchTdG. G A TT Uruguay Ronde 1990-1993. 15.10.1991.
Conclusies van de Coördinatie Com m issie).
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set out his concerns in a letter to Chancellor Kohl.514 However, the protests of Kiechle and the 
DBV were to no avail. Kiechle was outweighed by the other ministries involved in the intra­
governmental decicion making, including the Chancellor's Office, which emphasized that 
problems in one sector could no longer be allowed to block progress in other areas of the 
negotiations (interview Schomerus 29.3.2007). At the General Affairs Council on 23 December, 
when France demanded that the EEC reject the Draft Final Act, Germany did not oppose the Act 
and seemed to have accepted it as a basis for further negotiations (Agence Europe 
23/24.12.1991). Meanwhile, Kiechle did support the claim made by most ministers that the 
agricultural chapter of the Act was unacceptable (Handelsblatt 14.12.1991). Möllemann 
emphasized that failure in the Uruguay Round would be a disaster and that the EEC could not 
afford to reject the Draft Final Act in total (ibid.). Germany thus agreed to the rejection of the 
agricultural chapter by the EEC, but refused to reject the Act in its entirety. Furthermore, shortly 
after the Council decision on 23 December, Germany sought to convince its European partners 
that the EEC should react to the Draft Final Act more positively and accept it as a basis for 
futher negotiations. Schomerus has made it clear that Germany took a positive stance on the 
Draft Final Act overall because it was a step forwards and a balanced attempt to achieve a 
compromise in all areas of the GATT negotiations (interview Schomerus 29.3.2007).
8,5,2,3 Analysis
With respect to the Draft Final Act the expectation was formulated that Germany would accept 
the Act as a basis for negotiations and that international economic considerations would play an 
important role in the German decision-making process. The case study shows that in 1991, the 
German government became convinced that agriculture had become the obstacle holding up the 
Uruguay Round. At the same time, the government became adamant that a GATT deal should 
be secured as soon as possible. This led ultimately to the cabinet decision of October 1991 that 
the EEC should adopt a more flexible position on agriculture in order to enhance the chances of 
concluding the Uruguay Round successfully. Economic considerations thus clearly prevailed in 
intra-governmental decision making, and outweighed the political and ideological 
considerations (such as the preservation of the Franco-German friendship) that Kiechle deployed 
in the intra-governmental debate. But what about Germany's endorsement of European 
rejection of the agricultural chapter of the Draft Final Act? Although no expectations have been 
formulated here on the German reaction to specific sections of the Draft Final Act, the German 
position on the agricultural chapter can be explained on the basis of both economic 
considerations -  since the agricultural part, when viewed in isolation from the rest of thre deal, 
was economically costly -  and on the basis of its political interests, since there was a consensus 
on the Council on this issue. Both the German preference to accept the Act as a basis for further 
negotiations, and the preference to reject its agricultural part, are therefore compatible with the 
theoretical framework.
514 C A C  FTB 19940617, art 8. Decem ber 1991. Letter from  Kiechle to Kohl.
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8.5.3. The Blair House Accord of 1992
8.5.3.1 Predictions
Considering both Germany's political and economic interests, it may be predicted that Germany 
will accept the Blair House Accord. The domestic economic costs of the Accord were very limited 
(negligible considering the fact that German agriculture would already be confronted with 
similar costs as a result of the CAP reform of May 1992), while the international economic 
benefits in terms of making progress in the GATT negotiations and strengthening the 
multilateral trading system were substantial. As for Germany's political interests, only the farm 
lobby opposed the Accord at home, while other domestic lobbies and the political parties 
favoured it. Internationally, only France still opposed the Accord, while other GATT partners and 
EEC member states accepted it, and acceptance would also enhance Germany's reputation 
abroad. Overall, both domestic political considerations and international political considerations 
thus favoured acceptance of the Accord.
Table 8.6c: Issue: Acceptance of the Blair House Accord
INTERNATIONAL DOMESTIC
Political + +
Economic + 0
Ideoloqical x x
BALANCE + +
Prediction: Germany will accept the Blair House Accord
Key to symbols: + =  benefits exceed costs, o = no clear costs or benefit, x = non-decisive consideration
8.5.3.2 Preferences
The course the government had chosen to pursue at the October 1991 cabinet meeting was 
maintained in 1992. Germany sought to convince its negotiating partners of the importance of a 
swift conclusion of the Uruguay Round and supported the action of the Commission to that 
effect. Möllemann in particular can be considered a vigorous lobbyist in this matter. Not only did 
he argue in favour of greater concessions on agriculture, but he also wanted Kohl to put more 
pressure on the French government, since the French continued to claim that they had 
Germany's support.515 In February Möllemann stated that Kohl would phone Mitterrand to get 
the GATT negotiations back on track (New York Times 22.2.1992), but according to a 
government spokesman, such a phone call never took place (Financial Times 5.3.1992). In a 
meeting with Mitterrand in February, Kohl indeed emphasized the importance of a GATT deal,516
515 BArch. N1436: 21. 24 .2 .1 99 2 . Letter from M öllem ann to Kohl.
516 C A C . 19930195, art 3. 18.2 .1992. Note pour le ministre. Objet: négociations du G ATT. Éléments 
d'actualité.
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but at the same time he exercised restraint in putting pressure on Mitterrand and seemed 
determined not to convey the impression of doing this in public (Financial Times21/22.3.1992). 
Kohl stated that he was not ready to apply pressure to another member of the European 
Community: 'Anybody who knows French politics should know that would be a fatal thing to 
do' (Financial Times 24.3.1992). Moreover, the spokesman for the German government denied 
that Franco-German relations were the critical factor in the GATT talks, and rebutted claims that 
Germany failed to put more pressure on France (Financial Times5.3.1992).
When the bilateral negotiations between the EEC and the United States entered a decisive 
phase in the autumn of 1992, the internal divisions within the German government surfaced 
again. Möllemann again urged Kohl to exert more pressure on the French, and in a meeting 
with European Ministers of Trade he warned the French Minister Soisson that any deal resulting 
from the bilateral negotiations with the United States would be subject to a vote by qualified 
majority (Süddeutsche Zeitung 7.11.1992; Die Weit 7.11.1992; Daily Mail 7.11.1992).-517 On 
the General Affairs council of 9 November 1992, Möllemann also criticized the French for 
making the whole of the GATT negotiations dependent on sectoral interests. At the same 
meeting, Germany rejected the French proposal for retaliation against the United States 
sanctions in the oilseeds dispute, if these sanctions did indeed take effect on 5 December 
1992.518 However, it is claimed that Kiechle stated that France was not isolated and that 
Germany would try and find common ground with France.519 On the Agricultural Council of 16 
November, Kiechle said Germany shared the French concerns with respect to the question 
whether the Commission was negotiating within the limits of the Council mandate.520 Although 
Kohl had repeatedly emphasized the importance of a GATT deal, he was criticized for failing to 
put pressure on the French (Der Spiegel 9.11.1992). Wirtschaftswoche (13.11.1992) even 
argued that it was Kohl's 'Nibelungentreu an Mitterrand' that had caused the collapse of the 
bilateral negotiations with the United States in early November.
Nevertheless, by the time the Commission and the United States administration reached a 
deal, the German government accepted the Blair House Accord and regarded it as a good basis 
for progress in the Uruguay Round (Bulletin 20.11.1992). Even Kiechle agreed that Germany 
should accept the Blair House Accord in the interest of a well functioning trading system.521 He 
advised Kohl not to reject the accord, since on the agricultural issue German and French
517 This w as the period in w hich  France dem anded that any outcom e of the bilateral negotiations be 
evaluated w ith respect to its com patibility w ith the 1992 C A P  reform and argued that decisions on 
acceptance of the agricultural deal should be taken unanim ously.
518 ArchBuZa. DDI-DIE A RA : 1763. 10.1 1.1992. BZ vertrouwelijk. Onderwerp: Verslag algem ene raad 9 
novem ber 1992.
519 European Information Service. European Report. 3.1 1.1992. G ATT: The w orld w aits for EC and US to 
meet.
520 C A C . 19930379, art 6. 1 6 .11 .1992. Notes prises par M. Jean Pierre Soisson lors du conseil restreint des 
ministres de l'agriculture.
521 BArch. N1436: 78. 28.1 1.1992. Kiechle für die Landesversam m lung der A G  Landw irtschaft der CSU . Die 
Ausw irkungen  der EG-Agrarreform  auf die bayerische Landwirtschaft.
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interests were opposed and he warned that the government had to ask itself how far solidarity 
with France should be taken on this issue (Süddeutsche Zeitung 30.11.1992; see also Webber 
1998b, 49).522 Kohl indeed took a positive stance on the Blair House Accord. In his explanation 
of this position in the Bundestag, he only mildly criticized the French position and emphasized 
the importance of a sympathetic attitude to the French difficulties.523
8,5,3,3 Analysis
German acceptance of the Blair House Accord accorded with the expectation formulated earlier. 
What is striking in the case study is that Kohl seemed unwilling to apply too much pressure on 
the French. It is argued that Kohl had his reservations about pressurizing the French, because he 
understood that important agricultural interests were at stake for France (New York Times 
7.11.1992; interview Legras 12.11.2007). Kohl had to face GATT partners who expected him to 
convince France of the importance of a GATT deal on the one hand, and, at the same time, 
French expectations that Germany should, for the sake of the Franco-German partnership, show 
solidarity with France on an issue that was vital to France. Although throughout 1992, Kohl 
avoided an open confrontation with France, he did in the end accept the Blair House Accord, 
despite French pleas to reject it. The Franco-German relationship, thus eventually had to make 
way for Germany's wider economic and political interests.
8.5.4. The Final Accord of 1993
8.5.4.1 Predictions
The Final Accord was even more attractive than the Blair House Accord in terms of Germany's 
political and economic interests. Not only was its agricultural section a slightly watered-down 
version of the Blair House Accord, but more importantly, the Accord also covered all other areas 
of negotiations. Furthermore, the deadline of 15 December was generally considered the last 
opportunity to conclude the GATT negotiations. Rejecting the Final Accord would therefore have 
adverse consequences for the German economy and for the international trading system as a 
whole. Moreover, even France was eventually able to accept the deal, meaning that the 
potential international political costs of German acceptance of the Accord were negligible. I 
therefore expect Germany to accept the Final Accord of December 1993.
522 The same Kiechle that defended the French position earlier that m onth now  seem ed unw illing to give in 
to French dem ands. In the margin of the speech to the Landesversam m lung of the C SU , Kiechle wrote 
down 'W arnung für die französischen Karte'. A  w arning that farm dem ands to take the same position as 
the French w as unwise, because French farm interests differed from  Germ an farm interests.
523 Deutscher Bundestag. Plenarprotokoll 12/123. 25.1 1.1992.
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Table 8.6d: Issue: Acceptance of the Final Accord of December 1993
INTERNATIONAL DOMESTIC
Political + + +
Economic + +
Ideoloqical x x
BALANCE + +
Prediction: Germany will accept the Final GATT Accord.
Key to symbols: + =  benefits exceed costs, + / -  = benefits equal costs, x = non-decisive consideration.
8.5.4.2 Preferences
In 1993, before the final GATT deal had been struck, two important German priorities were 
pulling the German government in opposite directions. As mentioned earlier, Germany attached 
great value to concluding the Uruguay Round swiftly. The cabinet decision of October 1991 had 
already demonstrated German willingness to achieve this goal at the expense of German farm 
interests, provided that farmers were compensated. Germany also wanted to preserve the 
Franco-German friendship. Due to intensive pressure from the new French government in 1993, 
which demanded the renegotiation of the Blair House Accord, these two German priorities were 
at odds.
In 1993, all ministers in the German cabinet agreed that reaching a GATT deal that year 
was of major importance and could be the last chance to do so (BMWi Tagesnachrichten 
21.6.1993).524 Kinkel, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, argued: 'Wir sind was die Unterstützung 
der Franzosen anbeiangt bis an die Schmerzgrenze gegangen. Wir müssen jetzt dringend zu 
einer Ergebnis kommen 525 Even the new Minister of Agriculture, Borchert, agreed and argued 
that any renegotiation of the Blair House Accord would probably not be in the advantage of 
Germany (Bulletin 27.2.1993). Prior to the meeting between Kohl and Mitterrrand in August 
1993, Kohl's ministers therefore advised him to give nothing away on the GATT issue (Paemen 
and Bensch 1995, 239; Handelsblatt 31.8.1993).
Nevertheless, at a press conference after his meeting with Mitterrand and Balladur, Kohl 
stated that Germany also had problems with the Blair House Accord and that cooperation was 
needed to reach a solution (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2.9.1993; Der Spiegel 6.9.1993). 
According to Webber (1998a, 52; 1998b, 584), Kohl had been convinced by the French 
argument that the French government would fall if the Blair House Accord was not renegotiated
524 In January 1993, a cabinet reshuffle had taken place. Kiechle and M öllemann were replaced by Jochen 
Borchert and Günther Rexrodt respectively. A ccording to Paemen and Bensch (1995, 239), this resulted in a 
w eakening of the position of the Ministry of Agriculture, because Borchert w as no m atch for Kinkel and 
Rexrodt. W hether this w as decisive in the intra-governm ental negotiations is nevertheless doubtful. First, 
because the position of the Ministry of Agriculture had already started to deteriorate in 1991. Second, in 
the final phase of the negotiations Kohl and the Bundeskanzleramtwere claim ed to have taken the leading 
role rather than the Ministries of Econom ics and Agriculture (interview Lotz 18.5.2005).
525 ArchBuZa. DDI-DIE A RA : 1763. 4 .2 .1 9 93 . Zendbrief.
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and that the French government would rather use its veto in European decision making than 
ending up facing a governmental crisis at home. As to the question of whether Kohl really was 
convinced that the French threats were real or not, I have found no evidence with which to 
substantiate or refute this claim. Officials involved in the negotiating process, however, agree 
that Kohl's statement can only be explained by his wish to do something for the French, on the 
basis of the value he attached to the Franco-German friendship and his personal relations with 
Mitterrand (interview Legras 12.11.2007; interview Feiter 21.5.2007; interview Schomerus 
29.3.2007; interview Ludewig 5.4.2007; interview Schloder and Witt 4.8.2008; cf. Meunier 
2005, 118).
The German ministers involved in the GATT negotiations were puzzled by Kohl's statement 
and immediately emphasized that the German position with respect to Blair House had not 
changed (Webber 1998b, 50; Agra Europe 27.8.1993). In accordance with earlier statements 
made by Kinkel, Rexrodt and Borchert, Kohl released a statement in which he sought to distance 
himself from any suggestion that Germany may join France in demanding a renegotiation of the 
Blair House Accord [Agra Europe 3.9.1993). Nevertheless, GATT director Sutherland was 
unconvinced by the German explanations and concluded that the German position had shifted 
(DerSpiegei6.9.1993). I believe that German preferences had not actually changed. Concluding 
the Uruguay Round and safeguarding the Franco-German friendship had been and remained 
Germany's two constant and conflicting priorities. These priorities did not change, but after the 
former had been prioritized over the latter in the 1991 cabinet decision, the latter seemed to 
increase in importance again in 1993 but was not prioritized over the former. No change of 
priorities had therefore taken place.
Kohl's statement had, however, stirred up intra-governmental divisions again (Webber 
1998b, 54). The Ministry of Economics judged that the French could eventually be convinced to 
accept a final package in the GATT negotiations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Chancellor's Office, for their part, feared that France would attempt to tear up the agricultural 
chapter and preferred to cause a crisis in the EEC rather than face a political crisis at home.526 
They therefore preferred to placate the French as much as possible, without endangering the 
GATT negotiations. As a result, Germany agreed to begin consultations with France on the 
matter [Agra Europe 3.9.1993; Wirtschaftswoche 17.9.1993), apparently without success,527 
and called on other European member states to take French concerns seriously.528
In preparation for the Council meeting of 21 September, during which the French demand 
for renegotiation was to be discussed, the Germans signalled that they would not agree to a 
renegotiation of the Blair House Accord, but could accept bilateral talks between the United 
States and the EEC on how the Accord was to be interpreted (,Agra Europe 10.9.1993; General
526 ArchBuZa. DDI-DIE A RA : 1763. 3 .9 .1 9 93 . BZ vertrouwelijk. boni 300/15691; 10.9 .1993. BZ vertrouwelijk. 
brei 075/5829.
527 ArchBuZa. DDI-DIE A RA : 1763. 16.9 .1993. BZ vertrouw elijk. Van am bassade Bonn aan BuZa en EZ. 
boni317/16424.
528 ArchEZ. 13 .9 .1993. Verslag C S A  hoog niveau.
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Anzeiger 16.9.1993). Germany assured the French that they would help them in any way they 
could, but immediately added that the Uruguay Round had to be concluded before 15 December 
1993.529 Wirtschaftswoche (17.9.1993) argued that accepting new 'interpretations' as opposed 
to a 'renegotiation' of the Blair House Accord, would enable Balladur to present himself to the 
French public as a winner in the negotiations, without forcing the Commission to conduct actual 
renegotiations. Schomerus has explained that it was Germany's aim in the 21 September 
Council meeting to seek a solution that would save the face of the states involved and make 
things easier for the French. Germany was willing to go a long way in order to get France on its 
side, provided that doing so would endanger the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round 
(interview Schomerus 29.3.2007). These two priorities were exactly the priorities that formed 
part of Kohl's instructions for the German negotiators. He specifically instructed them to ensure 
that the Uruguay Round would not precipitate a crisis in Franco-German relations, but also 
stressed that the GATT negotiations could not be allowed to fail (Webber 1998b, 55; Devuyst 
1995, 454).530
At the Council meeting, Germany eventually agreed to authorize the Commission to enter 
into consultations with the United States to seek 'clarification' of the Blair House Accord 
(Webber 1998b, 55). There were speculations that Germany had agreed to a 'clarification' of 
the Blair House Accord in exchange for French support with respect to Germany's agrimonetary 
concerns and the German wish to locate the European Central Bank in Frankfurt (Agra Europe 
24.9.1993; Financial Times 30.9.1993). The German Ministry of Agriculture denied that this 
was the case, however.
When the final deal was struck in December 1993, Germany accepted it immediately. It 
had not been easy to obtain French acceptance during the final weeks of the negotiations. It is 
claimed that Germany had to vote in favour of a French proposal on the application of European 
trade policy instruments, a proposal Germany had until then always opposed, before the French 
would finally accept the GATT agreement (cf. Meunier 2005, 117 and 122).531
8,5,4,3 Analysis
German acceptance of the Final Accord is in accordance with the expectations formulated 
earlier. But what should we make of the German efforts to placate the French during 1993? 
Being accommodating to French demands served Germany's international ideological and 
political interests, but it also invoked political and ideological costs as it damaged Germany's 
relations with its other trading partners, particularly the United States, and Germany's 
reputation as a Handelsstaat. It is striking that the Franco-German friendship, which had not
529 Arch iBU ZA . DDI-Die A R A . 1763. 16.9 .1993. BZ vertrouwelijk. par¡298/16463.
530 Ludew ig, one of the Germ an negotiators, said that Kohl did not provide actual m andates, but those close 
to him knew  his position: be nice to the agricultural people, be nice to the French, but do not put the 
U ruguay Round at risk (interview Ludew ig 5.4.2007).
531 The proposal entailed, am ong other things, that decisions on anti-dum ping m easures could now  be 
taken by a sim ple majority instead of a qualified majority.
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prevented Germany from accepting the Blair House Accord in November 1992, did lead 
Germany to do everything in its power to help the French with regard to the agricultural section 
of the GATT negotiations in 1993. The best explanation for this seems be that, while in 1992 
the Germans were convinced that disagreement on agriculture was the chief obstacle to a GATT 
deal and that the Blair House Accord would remove this obstacle, in 1993 they came to realize 
that French resistance to the agricultural deal (e.g. their threat of a veto) was the main obstacle 
to achieving a deal. Thus, paradoxically, the policy option of appeasing the French seemed both 
a necessary condition for and a potential risk to a successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round. 
During 1993, the importance of the Franco-German friendship did increase, but without 
challenging the primacy of the German aim of a GATT agreement before 15 December 1993.
8.6. Conclusion
From the empirical analysis, it may be concluded that with respect to the four decision moments, 
the preferences Germany defended coincided with the expectations derived from the theoretical 
model. What is striking is that particularly in 1991 and 1993, the personal influence of 
Chancellor Kohl appears to have played a significant role. It is also noteworthy that, while 
between 1982 and 1989 protectionist German preferences stemmed mainly from domestic 
political considerations, during the second half of the Uruguay Round, Germany's defence of 
agricultural interests was neither only nor mainly based on domestic political considerations. 
Instead, the international ideological consideration of the Franco-German friendship became the 
major reason for Germany's defence of agricultural interests. This finding corroborates the 
prediction made on the basis of the theory, that the German government would take greater 
account of Germany's international interests in the second case (low international and low 
domestic polarity) than in the first case (high domestic and low international polarity), but 
international ideological considerations seem to have played a more significant role than was 
predicted. The consequences of these findings -  and of those of the other case studies -  both 
for the theoretical model developed in Chapter 2 and the wider theoretical debate, will be 
addressed in the concluding chapter.
8

CHAPTER 9
FRANCE AND GERMANY: THE POWER OF IDENTITY 
AND THE INFLUENCE OF FARM LOBBIES
9.1 Introduction
At the outset of this research, I have drawn attention to the discrepancy between, on the one 
hand, the commonplace observation that farmers both in France and Germany influence 
national and international agricultural policy to a large degree, and, on the other hand, the 
expectations one can derive from the domestic structure approach in the field of FPA. Given the 
variation in French and German state structure, societal influence is to be expected in Germany, 
but not in France. Did the French farm lobby really exert such a significant influence on French 
preference formation during the Uruguay Round? Furthermore, if this was indeed the case and 
the domestic structure approach offers no explanation, then how should the considerable 
degree of farm influence in both France and Germany be explained? Apart from this empirical 
puzzle, the inadequacy of the domestic structure approach also exposes a theoretical lacuna, 
because this approach is one of the few approaches allowing predictions on the relative 
importance of domestic considerations relative to international considerations in national 
preference formation.
In this research I have attempted to fill this void by developing a theory that genuinely 
combines domestic and international variables in order to arrive at hypotheses on the relative 
importance of domestic and international considerations, without falling into the trap of 
including a potentially endless list of domestic variables. The empirical analysis I have conducted 
has revealed that farm lobby influence in France with respect to the Uruguay Round of GATT 
negotiations was much more limited than is often claimed. Ideological considerations, both 
international and domestic, played a far greater role in French rejections of liberalization 
initiatives than domestic political considerations. Although a greater degree of societal influence 
was found in the German case, international considerations including ideological ones turned 
out to be more important than expected here as well. In this chapter, I will compare the case 
results from the previous chapters. I will first reflect on the individual case results and then 
evaluate the theoretical hypotheses formulated in Chapter 2. I will also discuss the value of this 
research for the scientific debate between scholars of International Relations in general and for 
the debate in the subfield of FPA in particular.
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9.2 Evaluating the Hypotheses
In the theoretical chapter, hypotheses were formulated on the effects of both domestic and 
international polarity on (1) the relative influence of domestic compared to international 
considerations in the preference-formation process, and (2) the relative importance of political 
and economic (material) considerations compared to ideological (immaterial) considerations. 
This produced four pairs of hypotheses (depicted in Box 9.1): the first pair (1a and 1b) relate 
international structure to the relative influence of domestic as compared to international 
considerations; the second pair (2a and 2b) relate international structure to the relative 
influence of political and economic considerations as compared to ideological considerations; 
the third pair (3a and 3b) relate domestic structure to the relative influence of domestic as 
compared to international considerations; and the fourth pair (4a and 4b) relate domestic 
structure to the relative influence of political and economic considerations as compared to 
ideological considerations. The 'a-hypothesis' in each pair concerns the effects of low domestic 
polarity (society-dominated state-society relations) or international polarity (a multipolar 
international system), while the 'b-hypothesis' concerns the effects of high domestic polarity 
(state-dominated state-society relations) or international polarity (a bipolar international 
system). In addition to these four pairs of hypotheses based on domestic and international 
structure, a fifth hypothesis was added with respect to process variables. I expect that the higher 
the degree of domestic pressure and governmental sensitivity, the greater the probability that 
the State will attach more influence to its domestic political and economic interests than to its 
other interests.
Concerning the evaluation of the hypotheses on the basis of the case studies, I distinguish 
between testing hypotheses within cases and testing hypotheses between cases. With respect to 
the former, for instance, during the first German case (1982-1989) the international system was 
bipolar (high international polarity) and German state-society relations were society-dominated 
(low domestic polarity). Considering these scores on domestic and international polarity, 
hypotheses 1b, 2b, 3a and 4a have to be combined in the first German case. In section 2.5 I 
argued that based on the combination of these four expectations, the operational hypothesis for 
this case should be that domestic political and economic considerations will be decisive in the 
German preference-formation process. Based on the specific combinations of the theoretical 
hypotheses in the other three cases, I have defined one operational hypothesis for each of those 
cases as well (see Box 3.1 in Chapter 3). Each of these four operational hypotheses will be 
evaluated within a single case and hypothesis 5 is evaluated in each of the four cases. The 
results of this analysis are presented in Section 9.2.1.
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BOX 9.1: HYPOTHESES
1a: The lower the polarity of the international system, the greater the probability that a state 
will attach more importance to its political and economic interests than to its ideological 
interests.
1b: The higher the polarity of the international system, the greater the probability that a state 
will attach more importance to its ideological interests than to its political and economic 
interests.
2a: The lower the polarity of the international system, the greater the probability that a State 
will attach more importance to its political and economic interests than to its ideological 
interests.
2b: The higher the polarity of the international system, the greater the probability that a State 
will attach more importance to its ideological interests than to its political and economic 
interests.
3a: The lower a state's domestic polarity, the greater the probability that a State will attach 
more importance to its domestic interests than to its international interests.
3b: The higher a state's domestic polarity, the greater the probability that a State will attach 
more importance to its international interests than to its domestic interests.
4a: The lower a state's domestic polarity, the greater the probability that the government will 
attach more importance to its political and economic interests, than to its ideological 
interests.
4b: The higher a state's domestic polarity, the greater the probability that the government 
will attach more importance to its ideological interests than to its political and economic 
interests.
5: The higher the degree of societal mobilization and governmental sensitivity, the greater 
the probability that the State will attach more importance to its domestic political and 
economic interests, than to its domestic ideological and international interests.
The hypotheses that are evaluated on the basis of a comparison between cases are the four 
pairs of hypotheses 1a+1b, 2a+2b, 3a+3b and 4a+4b. These pairs of hypotheses cannot be 
tested in one single case, because the single cases do not offer variation on either domestic or 
international polarity. But the comparison between different cases does allow for the evaluation
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of each of these pairs of hypotheses. In order to evaluate hypotheses 1 (a + b) and 2 (a + b), we 
need to compare the first French and German case studies with the second French and German 
case studies. We should find that in the later case studies international considerations assume 
greater relative importance than in the earlier case-studies. Moreover, ideological considerations 
are expected to assume greater relative importance in the earlier case studies than in the later 
case studies, and political and economic considerations are expected to be relatively more 
important in the second case-studies than in the first case-studies. To evaluate hypotheses 3 (a 
+ b) and 4 (a + b), the French case studies have to be compared to the German case studies. 
According to the hypotheses, we should find that domestic interests have a relatively greater 
impact in the German case studies than in the French ones and that ideological considerations 
are relatively more important in the French than in the German case studies. Section 9.2.2 will 
focus on the evaluation of these theoretical hypotheses.
9.2.1 Evaluating the case study results
9.211 France 1982-1989
The operational hypothesis formulated for the first French case was:
Considering that between 1982 and 1989 international polarity and French domestic polarity 
were both high, French preference formation with respect to the agricultural chapter of the 
Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations should be influenced predominantly by ideological 
considerations, both domestic and international.
The empirical analysis indeed shows that the French were particularly concerned with their 
ideological interests during this period. In 1985 and 1986, the French did not explicitly refer to 
their concerns for the Franco-German friendship as a reason for accepting a new round of GATT 
negotiations -  at least not in any of the documents studied with respect to this case. 
Nevertheless, French acceptance of the idea of new GATT negotiations in 1984, and its 
subsequent endorsement of the Punta del Este declaration in 1986, both followed a period of 
intense effort on the part of the Germans to convince the French of the need for new trade 
negotiations. The conclusion often drawn in the secondary literature that France finally accepted 
new GATT negotiations in order to safeguard its relations with Germany (see Chapter 5), 
therefore appears to be justified. In 1986, it was in the interest of the Franco-German friendship 
for the French to curb their obstinacy regarding a new round of GATT negotiations, and agree to 
the Punta del Este opening declaration. The French vocation exportatrice was best served by 
rejecting the United States zero option and resisting concessions during the Mid Term Review in 
Montreal in 1988, as the French government argued. The empirical analysis in Chapter 5, 
therefore, does not imply that the operational hypothesis formulated above must be rejected.
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As for hypothesis 5, domestic pressure was low to medium and governmental sensitivity 
was low until 1987. As a result, we should expect no increase in influence of domestic political 
considerations and indeed, the empirical research shows that these considerations did not play a 
significant role. It is only in the period 1987-1989 that an increase in influence of domestic 
political considerations was expected on the basis of greater governmental sensitivity and 
medium to high domestic pressure. The empirical analysis does not, however, lead to the 
conclusion that domestic pressure was of great influence in this period. No evidence was found 
that France took up a position against the proposals of the United States and the Cairns Group, 
and against making concessions in the Mid Term Review as a result of the demands of the farm 
lobby. The arguments used were in fact mainly ideological in nature and the farm lobby's 
defence of particular positions generally followedthe governmental position rather than leading 
it.
9.2.1.2 Germany 1982-1989
The operational hypothesis formulated for the first German case was:
Considering that between 1982 and 1989 international polarity was high and German domestic 
polarity was low, German preference formation with respect to the agricultural chapter of the 
Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations should be influenced predominantly by domestic 
(particularly political and economic) considerations.
On the basis of Germany's international political and economic interests, similar preferences 
were expected to those based on its domestic political and economic interests for most of the 
decision moments within this period. In other words, domestic costs and benefits pointed in the 
same direction as international costs and benefits. If, in this case, the expected preference 
indeed occurs, it is impossible to decide whether this outcome was the result of domestic 
considerations (as expected in the operational hypothesis) or international considerations. An 
evaluation of the hypothesis cannot therefore be based on the outcome alone, but also requires 
an analysis of the preference-formation process, assessing considerations at play in the internal 
government debate. Between 1982 and 1986, the German government employed an 
abundance of internationalpolitical and economic arguments to defend its position in favour of 
new GATT negotiations. It was only after 1987 that the government referred explicitly to its 
domestic political interests. Does this imply that the hypothesis should be rejected because 
international considerations seemed to be more important than domestic considerations 
between 1982 and 1986? Not necessarily. It is important to consider the degree of domestic 
pressure and governmental sensitivity, and assess whether these process variables left the 
government room to take account of its international interests, despite the structural constraints 
on the basis of which domestic interests were expected to dominate international interests. 
Between 1982 and 1985, governmental sensitivity was low and domestic pressure was low to
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medium, and in 1986 governmental sensitivity was certainly high, but domestic pressure was 
again low. It was only from 1987 onwards that both governmental sensitivity and domestic 
pressure were high or medium to high. Assuming that the process variables will lead to 
increased consideration of domestic political interests if both governmental sensitivity and the 
degree of domestic pressure are at least medium to high, then the German government could 
afford to prioritize its international interests between 1982 and 1986, but had to take account 
of its domestic political interests between 1987 and 1989. The combination of structural and 
process-variables thus explains why international political and economic considerations were of 
significant influence on the German position between 1982 and 1986. The increase in 
governmental sensitivity and domestic pressure in 1987 and 1988 explains why domestic 
(political) considerations assumed greater importance in the preference-formation process at 
that time. Only the German efforts to reach an agreement in Geneva and Germany's acceptance 
of the outcome of the Mid-Term Review in 1989 are left unexplained on the basis of the 
structural variables and the combination of structural and process variables. It is not clear 
whether this discrepancy can be solved by collecting additional empirical data or reconsidering 
the operationalization, or whether the problem resides in the weighing of the different variables 
and thus in the theoretical model itself.
9.2.1.3 France 1990-1993
The operational hypothesis formulated for the second French case study was:
Considering that between 1990 and 1993 international polarity was low and French domestic 
polarity was high, French preference formation with respect to the agricultural chapter of the 
Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations should be influenced predominantly by international 
(particularly political and economic) considerations.
The preferences defended by France between 1990 and 1993 reflected France's international 
interests. The rejections of the Commission's proposal in 1990 and Draft Final Act in 1991, were 
not only justified by referring to French international economic interests (particularly a positive 
trade balance), but also by French international ideological interest. With respect to the latter, 
the French now referred explicitly to two aspects of their state identity: the Franco-German 
relationship and their vision that Europe (read: France) should negotiate with the United States 
on the basis of equality. In 1992, when accepting the Blair House Accord furthered the interest 
of the Franco-German axis, but did not fulfil the ambition of negotiating on an equal footing 
with the United States -  the second aspect of France's state identity -  appears to have been 
assigned more importance than the first. This is the conclusion that can be drawn from the 
French claim that the Franco-German axis did not justify just any compromise. This raises the 
question of which aspect of a state's identity will generally prevail in the preference-formation 
process. Section 9.4.1 will discuss ways in which to move forward on this issue.
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Another matter requiring further attention is that in this case study, the economic and 
political consequences that the French subjectively (i.e. on the basis of their perceptions) seemed 
to attribute to the Draft Final Act and the Blair House Accord differed from my 'objective' 
evaluation of these consequences. While I argued that in 1991 and 1992 agriculture was the 
main obstacle to the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the French claimed that, on 
the contrary, other issues were at least as problematic as the agricultural issue. The French 
perceived a smaller economic benefit from accepting these accords than agrees with my 
assessment. Furthermore, in 1992, France did not consider itself to be isolated within the EEC, 
whereas my assessment was that France was indeed isolated. As a consequence, in my 
assessment, the rejection of the Blair House Accord was politically more unattractive than in the 
eyes of the French government of the day. And of course, in the end, it is the government's 
perception of positive and negative consequences that influences its preferences and behaviour. 
It is therefore necessary to reflect on the usefulness of conducting an 'objective' analysis in order 
to estimate costs and benefits on the basis of fixed interests. I will discuss this issue more 
extensively in Section 9.4.2.
For the moment, we may conclude that the second French case study provides 
corroborating evidence for the hypothesis that French preferences between 1990 and 1993 
were predominantly influenced by international considerations. It is striking however, that the 
expected hierarchy between political and economic as compared to ideological interests 
(political and economic considerations being more important than ideological ones) was not 
found. This warrants further consideration of the degree of influence of an ideological variable 
such as state identity. The model elaborated in Chapter 2 appears to underestimate the 
influence of these ideological variables. Section 9.4.1 will focus on ways in which the theoretical 
model can be extended or adapted in order to do justice to the apparently stronger influence of 
ideological considerations.
Given the degree of governmental sensitivity and domestic pressure in France between 
1990 and 1993, domestic political considerations were expected to exert a certain degree of 
influence in the period 1990-1992, particularly in 1992 when both governmental sensitivity and 
domestic pressure were high. The empirical analysis shows that domestic political influence was 
limited in 1990 and 1991, and that in 1992 governmental behaviour was clearly influenced by 
the forthcoming elections of March 1993. Process variables, therefore, seem to have been of 
less importance in the second French case study than in the first German case study, when they 
appear to have provided the German government with the opportunity to take account of its 
international interests. It could be that the low values of the process variables in cases where 
structural variables indicate the predominance of domestic interests, are more significant than 
the high values of the process variables in cases where structural variables suggest the 
predominance of international interests. Further theoretical elaboration and empirical research is 
necessary however, in order to answer the question as to why this would be the case.
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9.2.1.4 Germany 1990-1993
The operational hypothesis formulated for the second Germany case study was:
Considering that between 1990 and 1993 international polarity and German domestic polarity 
were both low, German preference formation with respect to the agricultural chapter of the 
Uruguay Round of GA TT negotiations should be influenced predominantly by political and 
economic considerations, both domestic and international.
Taking into account the process variables, this hypothesis can be further specified for the 
decision moments in 1990 and 1993. Since both governmental sensitivity and societal 
mobilization were high in these years, it may be expected that Germany would prioritize 
domestic political and economic considerations over international political and economic 
considerations. The empirical analysis shows that the German position with respect to the 
Commission proposal in 1990 was indeed largely motivated by domestic political considerations. 
In 1993, Germany's acceptance of the Final Act also dovetailed with its domestic political and 
economic interests, but it is striking that international considerations figured most prominently 
in the German government's arguments and not its domestic interests.
In 1991 and 1992, the degree of governmental sensitivity and domestic pressure did not 
result in the expected predominance of domestic political and economic considerations over 
international ones. As a result, both domestic and international political and economic 
considerations were of influence in these cases. Corroborating evidence for the hypothesis is 
therefore present, provided that the German preferences are in accordance with the whole of its 
political and economic interests. This was the case: Germany's acceptance of the Draft Final Act 
in 1991 and the Blair House Accord in 1992 was in accordance with Germany's political and 
economic interests (both domestic and international).
As for the relative weight of political and economic interests as compared to ideological 
interests, Germany consistently prioritized its economic and political interests over its ideological 
ones during this period, but the ideological interest of the Franco-German friendship 
nevertheless also considerably influenced the German preference-formation process. This 
underscores the need (already indicated in the reflection on the second French case study) to 
conduct more research into the importance of ideological variables. We may conclude that the 
preferences Germany defended in 1990 and 1992 provide corroborating evidence for the fourth 
operational hypothesis. Germany's acceptance of the Final Act in 1993 also provides 
corroborating evidence to the extent that this was consistent with German political and 
economic interests, but the lack of influence of domestic political considerations is surprising in 
view of the high degree of domestic pressure and governmental sensitivity. Finally, the second 
German case study draws attention to the influence of a variable that was not included in my 
theoretical model: the influence of individual decision makers. Chancellor Kohl appears to have 
significantly influenced the outcome of the intra-governmental debate through his support of 
specific ministers. The personal influence of Kohl in this period was not confined to the Uruguay
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Round. Van Esch (2007) has shown that the individual preferences of Kohl also played an 
important role in German preference formation on European Monetary Union in the late 1980s. 
Section 9.4.3 will discuss whether and how such variables at the level of individual actors can 
be integrated in the theoretical model.
9.2.2 Evaluating the hypotheses
Now that I have discussed the outcomes of the individual case-studies, I can turn to the 
evaluation of the hypotheses derived from the theory. The gist of the theoretical argument was 
that a bipolar international system (high polarity) would be relatively more conducive to the 
predominance of domestic considerations and ideological considerations, while a multipolar 
international system (low international polarity) would increase the importance of international 
considerations and political and economic considerations. State-dominated state-society 
relations (high domestic polarity) was expected to be relatively more conducive to the 
importance of international and ideological considerations, while society-dominated state- 
society relations (low domestic polarity) would be more conducive to the importance of domestic 
and political and economic considerations. Table 9.1 provides an overview of each pair of 
hypotheses, as well as hypothesis 5, indicating the cases to be compared in order to evaluate 
the hypotheses, the expected variation in observation in the cases compared, and a brief 
summary of the results.
The expectation that international considerations would be more important in the 
second French case than in the first case was not corroborated. International considerations 
were prioritized in both French cases, and the increased impact of domestic political 
considerations was limited to a period immediately preceding parliamentary elections. Neither 
was the expectation that political and economic considerations would be more important in the 
second French case than in the first entirely borne out. Economic and political considerations 
certainly increased in importance, particularly economic arguments concerning community 
preference and the potential for French exports, but the impact of ideological considerations did 
not decrease. Both the French vocation exportatrice and France's vision of a strong France 
within a strong Europe negotiating on an equal basis with the United States figured prominently 
in the French discourse. These considerations appear to have played a similarly important role in 
the second French case as in the first. In result, the French case studies do not provide 
corroborating evidence for hypotheses 1A and 1B. As for the process variables, increased 
importance of domestic political considerations was expected in France in 1988, 1990, 1991 
and 1992, as a result of increased governmental sensitivity and domestic pressure. However, the 
weight attached to domestic political considerations only actually increased in 1992, with the 
rejection of the Blair House Accord, four months prior to the parliamentary elections. In the 
other years, no increase in societal influence was observed. Even in 1990, when the government 
was under relatively high pressure from the farm lobby, it did not follow the wishes of the farm
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lobby, but merely used their mobilization as a means of gaining concessions from negotiating 
partners in the EC.
In the German cases, the expectation that international considerations would take 
on greater relative importance in the second case and domestic considerations greater relative 
importance in the first, was partly corroborated. Comparing the second case study (1990-1993) 
with the second half of the first case study (1987-1989), domestic considerations indeed 
decreased and international considerations increased in importance. A comparison with the first 
half of the first German case study (1982-1986) reveals an anomaly: in this period, international 
economic and ideological considerations were more important than the theoretical model 
predicted. The primacy of international considerations in this period can only be explained by the 
low scores on the process variables of governmental sensitivity and governmental pressure at 
that time, as explained in the previous section. The expectation that in the second German case 
ideological considerations would be less important than in the first one, could not be 
corroborated. Ideological considerations surfaced in the German preference-formation process in 
both cases. The Germans paid particular regard to the Franco-German friendship. International 
political and economic considerations also appear to have been of equal importance in the first 
and the second German cases. The German government consistently applied the arguments of 
preventing conflict with trading partners and Germany's dependence on free trade in both the 
first and the second German cases. We may conclude that, controlling for process variables, the 
two German case studies provide corroborating evidence for hypothesis 2B, but not for 
hypothesis 2A.
The expected variation in the French and German cases on the basis of hypotheses 3A 
and 3B is corroborated by the empirical analysis. As noted earlier, international considerations 
were decisive in both French cases. Although the difference between the French and German 
cases with respect to the primacy of international considerations was not overwhelming (it 
turned out that international economic considerations were also of major importance in 
Germany), the impact of domestic considerations was greater in Germany than in France, at 
least in the period 1987-1989.
With respect to the relative weight of ideological considerations as compared to 
political and economic considerations, the expected variation of the relatively greater impact of 
ideological considerations in the French cases than in the German cases, and relatively greater 
impact of political and economic considerations in the German cases than in the French cases, 
has been corroborated by the empirical analysis. Economic and political considerations 
eventually gained priority over ideological considerations in the German cases, while French 
rejection of the various proposals and agreements was based to a large extent on ideological 
considerations. The empirical analysis, therefore, has also provided corroborating evidence for 
hypotheses 4A and 4B.
Table 9.1: Evaluation of the hypotheses
Hypotheses
tested
Cases
compared
Expected variation Outcome
1A  and 1B France 1 & 2 
Germany 1 & 2
• Greater relative influence of domestic 
considerations in the first French and German 
cases than in the second cases.
• Greater relative influence of international 
considerations in the second French and German 
cases than in the first cases.
F: Expectation was not corroborated. International consider­
ations were of overriding importance in both French cases.
G: Expectation was partly corroborated. Overall, the influence 
of international considerations increased in the second case 
compared to the period 1987-1989, but not compared to the 
period 1982-1986 (both periods part of the first case).
2A  and 2B France 1 & 2 
Germany 1 & 2
• Greater relative influence of ideological 
considerations in the first French and German 
cases than in the second cases.
• Greater relative influence of political and 
economic considerations in the second French 
and German cases than in the first cases.
F: Expectation was partly corroborated. Economic and political 
considerations gained in importance in the second case, 
compared to the first case, but ideological considerations 
maintained their importance.
G: Expectation was not corroborated. Both political and 
economic and ideological interests appear to have been of 
similar importance in the first and second German cases.
3 A  and 3B France 1 & Germany 1 
France 2 & Germany 2
• Greater relative influence of international 
considerations in the French cases than in the 
German cases.
• Greater relative influence of domestic 
considerations in the German cases than in the 
French cases.
Expectation was corroborated. The degree to which France 
took account of its domestic political interests was very limited, 
with the exception of periods preceding elections, whereas 
Germany prioritized domestic interests over international 
interests between 1987 and 1990.
4 A  and 4B France 1 & Germany 1 
France 2 & Germany 2
• Greater relative influence of ideological 
considerations in the French cases than in the 
German cases.
• Greater relative influence of political and 
economic considerations in the German cases 
than in the French cases.
Expectation was corroborated. Economic and political 
considerations were eventually prioritized over ideological 
considerations in both German cases, while France's rejection 
of the various proposals and agreements was to a large degree 
based on ideological considerations.
5 France 1 
France 2 
Germany 1 
Germany 2
• Greater relative influence of domestic political 
and economic considerations when the degrees 
of governmental sensitivity and domestic 
pressure are high.
Expectation was corroborated in some instances and not in 
others.
322| Against the Grain
With respect to the fifth hypothesis, it was expected that the weight of domestic political 
considerations would increase to the extent to which governmental sensitivity and domestic 
pressure would increase. The empirical record with regard to this hypothesis is mixed. Of the 
four decision moments (1988, 1990, 1991, 1992) that France, on the basis of the value of these 
process variables, could have been expected to attach greater importance to its domestic 
interests, the empirical analysis has shown that only in 1992 did domestic political 
considerations indeed have a decisive impact on French preferences. Germany was expected to 
attach greater importance to its domestic interests at four decision moments (1987/1988, 1989, 
1990, 1993). It did indeed prioritize domestic interests in 1987/1988 and 1990, but not in 1989 
and 1993. As for the reinforcing effect of the process variables on the importance of domestic 
political interests, the empirical analysis does therefore not allow acceptance of the hypothesis. 
It is notable that at two of the three decision moments that domestic considerations did increase 
in importance, coming elections were the reason for increased governmental sensitivity. Should 
we conclude that the proximity of elections is the variable that is of main importance here? This 
would be a highly questionable conclusion, for the variable does not appear to have had an 
impact in Germany in the course of 1993, even though elections were to be held in 1994 at 
almost all levels of government. If the proximity of elections did not result in the primacy of 
domestic political considerations even in 1993, then this variable alone cannot provide a 
consistent explanation and other factors must be at play.
9.3 Taking Stock of the Research Outcomes
9.3.1 Back to the 'puzzle': the influence of French and German farm lobbies and the 
theoretical and empirical significance of the research project
One of the most remarkable empirical results of this research is that farm lobby influence in 
France was weaker than is commonly assumed or claimed. Granted, this research only included 
the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations in the 1980s and 1990s, and thereby focused on 
foreign and not domestic policy, but that hardly reduces the significance of this empirical 
finding. First of all -  although it is likely that the influence of the farm lobby is stronger with 
respect to domestic policy than foreign policy -  scholars actually claim that French farm 
influence is not only notoriously strong in domestic policy making, but also with respect to 
foreign policy issues such as GATT and CAP-negotiations (cf. Keeler 1987 and 1996). Secondly, 
although the results on the basis of one negotiation process (i.e. the Uruguay Round) cannot 
simply be extrapolated to other cases, it must be noted that this negotiation process took eight 
years to complete and included several decision moments at which the degree of farm lobby 
influence could be analysed separately. As a result, the findings of this research do not merely 
constitute one single exception to the commonly assumed rule of strong French farm lobby 
influence. Moreover, in this research, I have conducted an empirical analysis of decision-making 
and policy-making processes in order to establish the presence or absence of farm lobby
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influence. This is an important contribution to the literature, since previous research has often 
relied solely on references to existing literature claiming (but not always proving) the presence of 
farm lobby influence.
The finding that French farm lobby influence was limited with respect to the Uruguay 
Round leads us to the conclusion that the empirical puzzle that motivated this research -  that 
the generally observed large degree of farm lobby influence in both France and Germany is 
incompatible with expectations derived from the domestic structure approach -  was not a 
puzzle after all, because the observations on which it was based proved to be flawed. The 
domestic structure approach now appears to provide a sound explanation for differences in the 
actual degree of farm lobby influence in France and Germany with respect to the Uruguay 
Round. The question then arises of whether the extension of the theoretical model with an 
international structural component is really necessary. I would argue that this question must be 
answered in the affirmative. The domestic structure approach alone can neither fully explain the 
variation in the importance of domestic considerations relative to international considerations, 
nor the variation in the importance of material (political and economic) relative to ideological 
considerations found in the French and German case studies. Based on domestic structure 
alone, for example, the relatively greater influence of domestic considerations in the first 
German case study compared to the second German case study cannot be explained, because 
the German domestic structure remained constant in this period. The model used in this 
research provides a solution, because the combination of domestic and international structural 
variables in some cases allows for more specific propositions than the expectations that can be 
formulated on the basis of domestic structure. While the domestic structure approach, in cases 
of low domestic polarity (such as Germany), predicts strong influence of domestic 
considerations, an approach that combines domestic and international structure offers the more 
specific prediction that the influence of domestic considerations in a state with low domestic 
polarity will be greater under conditions of high international polarity than under conditions of 
low international polarity. Also in case of high domestic polarity, a more specific prediction can 
be formulated. In this case, the domestic structure approach only predicts that a state needs to 
take relatively little account of its domestic interests, while the present approach predicts that 
this expectation only holds under conditions of low international polarity. My model predicts, 
more specifically, that, when international polarity is high, states with high domestic polarity will 
take account of both domestic and international ideological interests. This expectation was 
corroborated in the first French case study. Comparison of the French and German case studies 
also corroborate my expectation that ideological considerations would be relatively more 
important under conditions of high domestic polarity that under conditions of low domestic 
polarity. My proposition that ideological considerations would also be relatively more important 
under conditions of high international polarity than under conditions of low international 
polarity was not corroborated, however. The impact of ideological considerations in the first 
French and German cases did not differ significantly from their impact in the second cases.
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We must conclude that the empirical analysis provided partially corroborating evidence for 
the predictions I could formulate by combining domestic and international polarity. It is now 
important to test the theory in additional cases. As the theory took democratic, middle-power 
states as its point of departure, further testing should first extend to other democratic, middle- 
power states (such as the United Kingdom and Canada), or to French and German preference 
formation in other issue areas with both important domestic and international aspects.
Apart from offering greater empirical descriptive accuracy than the domestic structure 
approach, the theoretical model developed in this research is also significant in theoretical terms 
because it has attempted to bridge a gap in the existing literature by developing a theory on the 
actual interaction of international and domestic variables. Because the model consists of a 
limited number of variables, it is still parsimonious, which is something of an exception in the 
field of FPA. For this reason alone, the theoretical model developed in this research offers a 
contribution to the theoretical debate. Building models to explain foreign policy (preferences) on 
the basis of the interaction of domestic and international variables thus appears to offer a 
promising direction of research. Nevertheless, while the model presented in this research has 
been a fruitful first attempt, the results of the empirical analysis have also raised three issues 
that will be addressed in the next section: (1) the surprisingly large impact of ideological factors, 
(2) the discrepancies between the 'objective' estimation of costs and benefits and the actor's 
own perception of these costs and benefits, and (3) the influence of individual decision makers.
9.4 Widening the Debate
9.4.1 The influence of ideological interests on foreign policy preferences
The model I have proposed in this research is essentially 'rationalist' in nature. I have worked 
from the assumption that political, economic and ideological considerations have constraining 
effects on the available behavioural options, and thus impact on state behaviour through a 
'logic of consequence'. I have hypothesized that the higher the domestic and international 
polarity, the greater the relative importance of ideological considerations compared to material 
considerations. With respect to the aspect of domestic polarity, this corresponded well with 
Jeffrey Checkel's (1997) expectation that norms are more likely to influence preferences and 
behaviour through a 'logic of appropriateness' under conditions of high domestic polarity. 
Nevertheless, the empirical research has demonstrated that, overall, the importance of 
ideological considerations proved to be greater than expected, and the theoretical model thus 
appears to underestimate the impact of these ideological variables on state preferences and 
behaviour. I now turn to investigating how the existing model could be adapted so as to take 
better account of the actual weight of ideological factors.
In her description of the 'state of the art' in the field of FPA, Hudson (2007) acknowledges 
that research investigating the influence of ideological factors on foreign policy formation is 
sparse. It is remarkable, however, that she fails to mention constructivist and sociological
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institutionalist approaches -  those approaches that focus predominantly on the influence of 
ideological factors on state preferences and behaviour. The constructivist literature can help to 
gain an understanding of how ideological factors influence state preferences and behaviour, and 
which aspect of state identity is likely to prevail in cases where different aspects of a state 
identity provide competing behavioural imperatives.
Constructivists claim that norms and identity have a constitutive effect on interests, as a 
result of which actors will act according to what is termed the 'logic of appropriateness'. 
Although this logic appears to be at odds with the rationalist 'logic of consequence' that I have 
applied, a number of constructivists agree that ideological variables can also be included in 
rational utility functions, acknowledging that apart from their constitutive effects, norms and 
identity may also have constraining effects. Such approaches, which are sometimes labelled 
'modernist' constructivist approaches (e.g. Checkel 1997; Risse et al 1999; Finnemore and 
Sikkink 1998; Klotz 1995), can be connected with the theoretical model proposed in this 
research relatively easily. Based on the constructivist assumption that norms and identity take 
precedence over material interests, a potential solution enabling my theoretical model to cope 
with the surprisingly significant role that ideological interests played in the case studies, is to 
add a sequential element to the model. In such a model, ideological considerations first 
circumscribe the range of possible (appropriate) actions, while material considerations 
subsequently explain the more specific choice within this range of alternatives. James March and 
Johan Olson consider this one of the possible relations between the logic of appropriateness and 
the logic of consequence: '[O]ne logic is used to establish fundamental constraints for a 
decision, and the other logic is used to make refinements within the constraints' (1998, 953).
Apart from the greater than expected impact of ideological factors, another issue arising 
from the empirical research is the question of how to establish which aspect of a state's identity 
will prevail when different aspects of identity provide competing behavioural imperatives. For 
Germany, for example, different aspects of its state identity sometimes provided contradictory 
imperatives. The behavioural imperatives of the idea of Germany as a Handelsstaat clashed with 
those embodied in the idea of the Franco-German friendship. Which aspect of the German 
identity can be expected to prevail? While a number of scientific contributions have sought to 
explain the relative impact of different norms, literature on the relative impact of competing 
identity aspects or 'identity constructions' is limited. Risse et al argue that identity aspects will 
have a greater impact when they are 'stronger among the political elite' (Risse et al. 1998, 26). 
Extrapolating from Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink's (1988) proposition that more 
prominent international norms (i.e. those shared by successful states) have a larger impact, and 
applying this to the domestic realm, would imply that the attitudes and prescriptions shared by 
the most prominent domestic actors are likely to prevail. This would underscore Risse et a/.'s 
claim that it is important to focus on the political elite. It is important to notice that introducing 
the indicator of 'shared agreement among the elite' also implies some investigation of the 
internal political dynamics of the domestic 'battle of ideas'. A potentially interest-based 
explanation is thus again introduced through the back-door. This is even more prominent in
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another essay by almost the same group of researchers, where they argue that 'political élites 
are likely to select those among the legitimately available ideas and identity constructions which 
suit their perceived power interests' (Marcussen et ai. 1999, 628).
Another solution is proposed by Van Esch. Assuming, as we did earlier, that the two logics 
may be applied sequentially, Van Esch argues that 'an actor may instrumentally weigh up the 
costs and benefits of competing identities' (Van Esch 2007, 48). A state will then prioritize the 
identity aspect which fits best with the state's material interests. What the solutions of Martin 
Marcussen et al. and Van Esch have in common is that they both explain the choice between 
competing identity aspects or 'identity constructions' on the basis of material interests, but while 
Marcussen et al. point to the interests of the elite specifically, Van Esch does not point at one 
specific level of analysis. Applying the idea of Marcussen et al. would require an additional layer 
within the domestic analysis, in which the importance that the different members of the political 
elite attach to different identity aspects is examined. One must realize that predictive accuracy 
may come at the price of diminished theoretical parsimony. Following Van Esch would be a 
more convenient option within the constraints of the current theoretical model, because it would 
not involve a more extensive domestic analysis, but only an estimation of the material (political 
and economic) costs and benefits of the behavioural imperatives associated with the competing 
identity aspects -  which my empirical research already included. Sequentially applying the logic 
of appropriateness and the logic of consequence would therefore not only enable the model to 
come to grips with the decisive influence of ideological factors such as state identity on state 
preferences, but it would also explain which identity aspects gain more weight in the 
preference-formation process when the behavioural imperatives on the basis of different identity 
aspects are contradictory.
9.4.2. Objective versus subjective measurement of costs and benefits
In this research, the expectations concerning the preferences that France and Germany would 
defend were derived from an estimate of the political, economic and ideological costs and 
benefits attached to the various behavioural options open to them. This 'objective' estimate was 
based on an operationalization of political, economic and ideological costs and benefits that I 
had constructed prior to conducting the case study analysis. However, it turned out that in some 
instances my 'objective' estimation differed from the actual French perception of the costs and 
benefits. On the one hand, this shows the limitations associated with a cost/benefit approach to 
explaining state preferences. A model that simply analyses costs and benefits and infers 
expected preferences accordingly will not tell the whole story. In the end, the state decides on 
the basis of its own perception of its interests. On the other hand, the problem observed also 
underscores the necessity of a process analysis like that conducted in this research. It is only in 
the actual decision-making process that state perceptions can be observed and compared to the 
analysis of state interests predicted by the theoretical model. At this point, it is first of all 
important to consider whether the discrepancies between the objective estimates and the
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subjective perceptions of the actors involved are systematic or merely accidental. If they are 
systematic, that would point towards a failing in either the model or the operationalization. 
Overall, the process analysis has shown that in most instances my objective estimates of the 
specific costs and benefits dovetailed with German and French perceptions. It is only with 
respect to the French case, particularly at the end of the Uruguay Round, that the French 
perceptions of the degree of its political isolation within the EC and the degree to which 
agriculture formed the main obstacle in the negotiations clearly differed from my estimates of 
these political and economic considerations. The discrepancies between objective and subjective 
measurements are thus accidental and not systematic. From my viewpoint as a researcher, it 
seems inconceivable that France could really have been unaware of its isolation among EC 
member states. However, I found no evidence in the case materials that France was in fact 
aware of its isolation, and deliberately denied it. On the contrary, the French government 
appeared to be genuinely convinced that it had the support of other member states such as 
Germany in its campaign against liberalization. It appears that France simply could not imagine 
to be deserted by the Germans, and every piece of information indicating that this was indeed 
the case, simply went in one ear and out the other. This would be consistent with the idea that 
de Gaulle's politics of grandeur and France's self-proclaimed role of the leading nation in Europe 
had never openly been questioned by Germany on account of the commonly held belief under 
German politicians that Germany's past prevented her from taking the lead in Europe (Lieshout 
2004, 161-162 and 185-187). Such experiences seem to justify the idea that in the end 
Germany would not let France down, and fall into line.
Notwithstanding potential explanation for this discrepancy, a question that has to be 
addressed is whether we should attempt to estimate costs and benefits 'objectively' at all on the 
basis of a prestructured operationalization, or whether a better approach would be simply to 
analyse 'subjective' state perceptions of their interests and take their justification of particular 
policy options at face value. An 'objective' measurement as used in this research has a number 
of advantages. It enables us to make testable predictions of state preferences on the basis of a 
relatively limited empirical analysis. This analysis is also guided by a model and 
operationalization that should be applicable to other cases as well. A subjective measurement of 
the perceived interests and state preferences that is based on the discourse of the actor himself 
does not necessarily require more extensive empirical analysis, but it provides the researcher 
with less guidance on which indicators are to be analysed. It also confronts the researcher with 
the issue of whether the discourse of the actor can be taken at face value. Do the arguments 
that a government presents publicly constitute the real considerations of that government, or is 
that discourse designed for public consumption? In order to tackle this question, it is important 
to study internal documents and notes concerning intra-governmental negotiations. Another 
difficulty encountered when conducting a subjective analysis, is how to add up competing 
perceptions of interests within a government. Both the French and German case studies have 
shown that ministries had different perceptions of costs and benefits and favoured different 
positions. One advantage of the subjective measurement of interests and preferences is that it is
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likely to result in greater descriptive accuracy. However, in applying subjective measurements it 
may be difficult to avoid circular reasoning. While in an 'objective' analysis, the measurement of 
the independent variables is based on different sources than the dependent variable, this is 
unlikely to be the case when applying subjective measurements. In a subjective analysis of costs 
and benefits, the only sources analysed are those that contain the arguments and perceptions of 
the actor whose preferences are to be explained. These sources are likely to include both 
arguments in favour of a certain behavioural option (to be classified as specific benefits) and the 
choice of the government to prefer that alternative (the outcome). A prediction based on the 
government's perception of costs and benefits is therefore likely to be derived from the same 
sources on the basis of which the governmental preference is measured. In other words, in a 
subjective analysis of costs and benefits, both the independent and the dependent variables are 
likely to be derived from the same source. The result is that such an analysis is biased in favour 
of accepting the hypothesis that certain aspects of the national interest explain state 
preferences. For if the government uses particular arguments (indicating, for example, particular 
economic or political considerations) to defend its position, entering these economic and 
political considerations in the cost/benefit model will result in a prediction of the government's 
preference that is highly likely to accord with the preference subsequently defended by the 
government. In the end, if one applies a subjective analysis alone, one runs the risk of providing 
merely a descriptive account by testing hypotheses in such a manner that they are unlikely to be 
rejected. Considering these drawbacks, I would argue that it is wiser to apply an objective 
analysis of interests -  despite the potential for miscalculations -  and to combine this with an 
analysis of the decision-making process in which one can test whether the considerations that 
were predicted to be decisive on the basis of the theoretical model, did indeed turn out to be 
the factors prevailing in the actual preference-formation process.
9.4.3. The role of individual decision makers
The second German case study has shown that Chancellor Kohl played an important role in the 
decision-making process. His interventions influenced the outcome of the intra-governmental 
negotiations at times and his international diplomatic moves showed his personal view on the 
matter, which the German negotiators subsequently had to take into account. As indicated in 
Section 9.2.1, research has shown that Kohl's personal influence was also substantial with 
respect to other issues in this period, such as the decision making on European Monetary Union 
(Van Esch 2007). How can Kohl's personal influence be explained? The FPA literature proposes 
different kinds of scope conditions in order to establish whether (characteristics of) the 
individual leader will be of importance in explaining a state's foreign policy or not. These scope 
conditions either concern conditions at the level of the leader (e.g. whether he or she is 
interested in foreign policy, or the extent of his or her diplomatic training), or are structural in 
character (e.g. whether the leader operates within a democratic or a dictatorial regime) (cf. 
Hudson 2007, 38-39). Considering the former, Kohl was neither the statesman known for his
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exceptional interest in foreign economic policy (German reunification was a far more important 
issue to him), nor for an exceptional degree of diplomatic training. Furthermore, as far as the 
variable of state structure is concerned (democracy versus dictatorship), Germany neither has the 
type of regime that is considered to be conducive to the influence of the individual leader on 
foreign policy. These variables are therefore unable to explain Kohl's personal influence in the 
case at hand. I do believe, however, that a solution can be found in the German state structure, 
but not in the regime type.
I would argue that the solution lies in the (structural) power position of the Chancellor, a 
position that is further strengthened if the German ministers involved in a particular decision­
making process are unable to reach a common position. With respect to the (structural) power 
position of the Chancellor, it is claimed that in the German constitution the Chancellor has been 
given 'a dominant position in the government' (Lieshout 1999, 52; see also Baring 1969). 
Germany is therefore sometimes labelled a 'chancellor democracy' (cf. Mayntz 1980, 144; 
Hancock and Kritsch 2009, 78). The strong position of the Chancellor is particularly related to 
the Kanzlerprinzipthat allots him or her authority to appoint (and dismiss) ministers, to organize 
the executive branch and to formulate general policy guidelines (Mayntz 1980, 142). The latter 
is referred to as the Richtlinienkompetenz, which is based on section 65 of the German 
constitution, stating that the Chancellor 'shall determine, and be responsible for, the general 
policy guidelines' (Hancock and Kritsch 2009, 85). Knill argues that in practice the Chancellor's 
use of this competence is closely circumscribed (2001, 89), but others emphasize that the 
Richtlinienkompetenz'has been used by all Chancellors in a highly selective and rather informal 
way' limited only by the Chancellor's selective interests (Mayntz 1980, 145-146). Apart from the 
constitutional factors that determine the Chancellor's power position, extra-legal factors such as 
the prominent position of the Chancellor as leader of the governing party and the support he or 
she enjoys in parliament are also considered to strengthen the Chancellor's authority (Mayntz 
1980, 147-148; Hancock and Kritsch 2009, 85). Although it is debatable to what degree the 
Chancellor's power position is in reality limited by his or her responsibility for parliamentary 
coalition-building and by the Ressortprinzipthat provides departmental ministers with autonomy 
in their sphere of jurisdiction (Mayntz 1980, 141-147; Knill 2001, 89), it appears that the 
Chancellor 'has at his disposal all the necessary legal instruments to assume a dominant role' 
(Mayntz 1980, 144).
The history of the Federal Republic shows that Chancellors have not shied away from 
assuming such a dominant role and bypassing ministerial departments. In preparing his plans for 
a European Monetary System in 1978, and during the subsequent decision making on the issue, 
Chancellor Schmidt did not inform or consult the responsible ministers within the German 
government or the Bundesbank (Van Esch 2007, 233-240 and 242). In the autumn of 1989, 
Kohl considered the issue of European Economic and Monetary Union to be Chefsache, and 
instructed Waigel and Genscher, the Ministers of Finance and Foreign Affairs, respectively, not 
to interfere (Küsters and Hofman 1998, 472). These ministries as well as Bundesbank president 
Hans Tietmeyer were again bypassed in the spring of 1998, when Kohl agreed to the French
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demand to split the term of the first president of the ECB, again catching the Ministries of 
Finance, Foreign Affairs and the Bundesbankby complete surprise (DerSpiegel, 11.5.1998).
The power position of the Chancellor is further strengthened in the decision-making 
process if interdepartmental strife erupts, particularly with respect to policy issues in which 
authority does not reside within one single ministry (as was the case with respect to the 
Uruguay Round). When under these circumstances the ministries involved are unable to reach a 
compromise, the Chancellor is in an excellent position to wield influence, if he or she wishes to 
do so. A striking example of this is Adenauer's intervention in the autumn of 1956 with respect 
to the negotiations on the Common Market and Euratom (cf. Segers 2006). The direction (in 
favour or against a certain policy option) of the personal influence of the Chancellor will 
subsequently depend on the strength of the Chancellor's involvement, and his or her personal 
preferences. Kohl's personal personal preferences are thus expected to be of importance, but 
only in explaining that he tried to influence certain policies and in what direction. Whether he 
was able successfully to exert influence depended on the domestic structure and the degree of 
interdepartmental agreement.
Kohl attached great political importance to the welfare of German farmers and to 
Germany's relationship with France in general and his friendship with Mitterrand in particular. 
These issues were considered to be at stake at the end of the Uruguay Round, which would 
explain Kohl's personal interventions. The fact that the Ministries of Economics and Agriculture 
were deeply divided on the issue, and conducted a public battle that did not go unnoticed in the 
international arena, may explain why Kohl was able to influence the preferences that Germany 
eventually defended in the second half of the Uruguay Round.
9.5 Conclusion
This research has shown that, in order to provide convincing explanations for state foreign policy 
preferences and behaviour, a one-sided focus on either domestic or international explanatory 
variables does not suffice. The model that has been developed in this research, comprising both 
domestic and international variables, appears to be able to explain most of the French and 
German preferences on the agricultural part of the GATT negotiations between 1986 and 1993. 
Against common belief, but in line with the theoretical expectations, farm lobby influence turned 
out to be less effective in a state with a state-dominated domestic structure like France, than in 
a state with a society-dominated domestic structure like Germany. Furthermore, international 
considerations indeed increased in relative importance after the polarity of the international 
system decreased due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the concomitant insecurity with 
respect to the nature of existing power relations. At the same time, the empirical analysis has 
shown that the original theoretical model underestimated the influence of ideological 
considerations and took insufficient account of the potential influence of individual decision 
makers. The latter issue can be dealt with within the confines of the original theoretical model. 
With respect to the ideological variables, doing justice to their apparent influence requires a
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change in the underlying assumption of the theoretical model concerning the relative weight 
attached to political, economic and ideological considerations. A model of a sequential nature 
should be introduced in which ideological interests provide a 'first cut' circumscribing the range 
of options, while material interests explain which option is chosen out of this range. The difficult 
task ahead is, as always, to engage in a theory-developing exercise without ending up with 
models that lack parsimony and generalization potential, and require too large a burden of 
empirical analysis. For if there is one thing that my research has shown, then it is that 
theoretical parsimony need not necessarily come at the expense of predictive accuracy.
9
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Appendix I: Guide to the Primary Sources
Archival sources were an important basis of the empirical analysis I conducted in this research. 
In Germany, I consulted collections of the Bundesarchiv (BArch) in Berlin (B102 
Wirtschaftsministeriuni) and Koblenz (B102 Wirtschaftsministerium, N1436 Nachiass Ignaz 
Kiechle, and N1392 Nachiass Joseph Ertl). These sources provided invaluable information on the 
basis of which I was able to reconstruct the German decision-making process.
Comparable information for the French case was collected in the Centre des Archives 
Contemporaries (CAC) in Fontainebleau. Here I consulted versements compiled by the French 
Ministry of Agriculture and the Prime Minister's Office, containing documents from various 
French ministries and French embassies in Bonn, London and Washington, as well as 
correspondence with pressure groups. I further made use of the governmental websites 
'http://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/' and 'http://www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr' to collect 
parliamentary discourses and speeches of, as well as interviews with members of government.
The Conseii de l'Union Européenne Archives Centrales (CUEAC) provided me with 
agenda's, notes and conclusions of meetings of the Council of Ministers and the Article 113 
Committee, and position papers of various member states. I consulted additional sources in the 
Archive of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ArchBuZa) and the Ministry of Economics 
(ArchEZ). Finally, Tjeerd de Groot, who previously conducted research on EC agricultural policy, 
was so kind to provide access to his personal archives (PersArchTdG).
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Appendix II : List of Interviewees
Frans Andriessen. EC Commissioner of Agriculture (1985-1989) and EC Commissioner for 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (1989-1993).12.02.2008 (Utrecht).
Frans Engering. Dutch Ministry of Economics. 20.02.2004 (The Hague).
Dr. Franz-Josef Feiter. Bundeskanzleramt. 21.05.2007 (Bad Honnef).
Otto Genee. Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.15.12.2004 (The Hague).
Guy Legras. General Director of DG VI (Agriculture). 12.11.2007 (Paris).
Dr. Klaus-Martin Lotz. Deutscher Bauernverband. 18.05.2005 (Rheinbach).
Johannes Ludewig. Bundeskanzleramt. 05.04.2007 (Brussels).
Louis Mermaz. French Minister of Agriculture (1990-1992). 27.11.2007 (Paris).
Herman Schlöder. German Ministry of Agriculture. 04.08.2008 (Bonn).
Dr. Lorenz Schomerus. German Ministry of Economics. 29.03.2007 (Bonn).
J. Schotanus. Dutch Ministry of Agriculture. 22.01.2004 (The Hague).
Siebe K. Schuur. Permanent Representation of the Netherlands in Brussels. 20.11.2003 
(Brussels).
Peter Witt. German Ministry of Agriculture. 04.08.2008 (Bonn).
Prof. Dr. Max Zurek. Deutscher Bauernverband. 18.5.2005 (Bornheim-Sechtem).

Appendix III: Overview of French, German and US Ministers during the Uruguay Round
France
Minister of Foreiqn Trade Minister of Agriculture Minister of Foreign Affairs Prime Minister
1981-1983 Michel Jobert 
1983-1986 Édith Cresson 
1986-1988 Michel Noir 
1988-1988 Roger Fauroux 
1988-1992 Jean-Marie Rausch
1991-1992 Dominique Strauss-Kahn
1992-1993 Bruno Durieus
1993-1994 Gérard Longuet
1981-1983 Édith Cresson 
1983-1985 Michel Rocard
1985-1986 Henri Nallet
1986-1988 François Guillaume 
1988-1990 Henri Nallet 
1990-1992 Louis Mermaz
1992-1993 Jean-Pierre Soisson
1993-1995 Jean Puech
1981-1984 Claude Cheysson 
1984-1986 Roland Dumas 
1986-1988 Jean-Bernard Raimond 
1988-1993 Roland Dumas 
1993-1995 Alain Juppé
1981-1984 Pierre Mauroy 
1984-1986 Laurent Fabius 
1986-1988 Jaques Chirac 
1988-1991 Michel Rocard
1991-1992 Édith Cresson
1992-1993 Pierre Bérégovoy 
1993 -1995 Édouard Balladur
Germany
Minister of Economics Minister of Agriculture Minister of Foreign Affairs Prime Minister
1982-1984 Otto Graf Lambsdorff 
1984-1988 Martin Bangemann 
1988-1991 Helmut Haussmann 
1991-1993 Jürgen Möllemannn 
1993-1998 Günther Rexrodt
1983-1993 Ignaz Klechle 
1993-1998 Jochen Borchert
1982-1993 Hans-Dietrich Genscher 
1993-1998 Klaus Kinkel
1982-1998 Helmut Kohl
United States
US Trade Representative US Secretary of Agriculture
1981-1985 William Brock III 
1985-1989 Clayton Yeutter 
1989-1993 Carla Hills 
1993-1997 Mickey Kantor
1981-1986 John Block 
1986 1989 Richard Lyng 
1989-1991 Clayton Yeutter 
1991-1993 Edward Madigan 
1993-1994 Mike Espy
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SAMENVATTING
De Uruguay Ronde (1986-1993) was de langste en de meest omvattende onderhandelingsronde 
uit de geschiedenis van de GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). In deze 
onderhandelingen stond niet alleen de liberalisering van de handel in goederen centraal, maar 
ook onderwerpen als de handel in diensten en handelsgerelateerde aspecten van intellectueel 
eigendom waren geagendeerd. Tevens moest de handel in landbouwproducten in deze 
onderhandelingsronde aan strengere GATT-regels worden onderworpen. Hiertoe waren in 
eerdere onderhandelingsronden soms al wel pogingen gedaan, maar deze hadden nog niet 
eerder tot belangrijke resultaten geleid. Tijdens de Uruguay Ronde bleek de landbouw een van 
de grootste struikelblokken. De meest prominente spelers in deze onderhandelingen -  de 
Verenigde Staten (VS) en de Europese Gemeenschap (EG) -  raakten herhaaldelijk in conflict. 
Waar de VS pleitten voor een volledige afbouw van landbouwsteun, deed de EG er juist alles 
aan om het Gemeenschappelijk Landbouwbeleid (GLB) met een breed scala aan 
steunmaatregelen intact te houden. Tijdens deze onderhandelingsstrijd speelden Frankrijk en 
Duitsland -  beide onder hevige pressie van hun binnenlandse landbouworganisaties -  een 
belangrijke rol in de besluitvorming in de EG ten aanzien van het standpunt dat de Europese 
Commissie namens de lidstaten in de GATT moest verdedigen. In dit proefschrift is onderzocht 
hoe de Franse en Duitse voorkeuren in deze landbouwonderhandelingen kunnen worden 
verklaard. De onderzoeksvraag die hierbij centraal staat is onder welke voorwaarden 
binnenlandse overwegingen een grotere rol spelen dan buitenlandse overwegingen (en vice 
versé) in de voorkeursvorming van middelgrote mogendheden als Frankrijk en Duitsland ten 
aanzien van buitenlands beleid.
De aanleiding voor dit onderzoek, uiteengezet in hoofdstuk 1, is allereerst theoretisch van 
aard. De meeste theoretische benaderingen binnen de leer der internationale betrekkingen (IB) 
veronderstellen dat een staat rekening moet houden met zowel de wensen van andere staten en 
internationale actoren als met de pressie van binnenlandse actoren zoals belangengroepen en 
politieke partijen. In de empirie betekent dit echter dat staten vaak met tegenstrijdige 
overwegingen worden geconfronteerd, omdat buitenlandse actoren aandringen op beleid waar 
binnenlandse actoren zich tegen verzetten. De bovengenoemde gelijktijdige pressie van de VS 
op Frankrijk en Duitsland om de handel in landbouwproducten te liberaliseren en het hevige 
verzet van de Franse en Duitse landbouwlobby hiertegen, vormt daarvan een goed voorbeeld. 
Gezien deze potentiële tegenstrijdigheid van binnenlandse en buitenlandse overwegingen is het 
theoretisch gezien van belang om verwachtingen te formuleren over de relatieve invloed van 
binnenlandse en buitenlandse overwegingen op nationale voorkeuren. Hoewel in de IB literatuur 
het belang van beide soorten overwegingen wordt onderkend, is er gebrek aan theorieën die 
beide overwegingen systematisch in één verklaringsmodel opnemen en hypothesen genereren 
over de voorwaarden waaronder binnenlandse of buitenlandse overwegingen zullen domineren 
in het proces van voorkeursvorming. Waar traditionele benaderingen als het neo-realisme en het 
neo-liberalisme eenzydig de rol van buitenlandse factoren benadrukken, vraagt theorievorming
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in de Foreign PoiicyAnaiysisalsook de InternationalPoliticalEconomy literatuur vooral aandacht 
voor binnenlandse verklaringen van buitenlands beleid. De binnenlandse structuur benadering, 
zoals uiteengezet door auteurs als Thomas Risse-Kappen en Peter Katzenstein, biedt echter wel 
de mogelijkheid om verwachtingen te formuleren over de relatieve invloed van binnenlandse en 
buitenlandse overwegingen. Zij stellen dat de mate waarin een staat rekening moet houden met 
binnenlandse actoren afhangt van de binnenlandse structuur van een staat. Het gaat hierbij in 
essentie om de machtsverhoudingen tussen de regering en de maatschappij. In een staat waar 
de binnenlandse structuur geclassificeerd kan worden als maatschappijgedomineerd, is de 
verwachting dat de regering niet om de pressie van binnenlandse actoren heen kan en niet in 
staat zal zijn rekening te houden met buitenlandse belangen. Is de binnenlandse structuur van 
een staat staatsgedomineerd, dan is de verwachting juist dat de regering gemakkelijker om de 
pressie van de samenleving heen kan en rekening kan houden met buitenlandse belangen. 
Aangezien de Franse binnenlandse structuur doorgaans als staatsgedomineerd wordt 
bestempeld en de Duitse als maatschappijgedomineerd, is de verwachting dat binnenlandse 
actoren veel invloed zullen hebben op voorkeursvorming in Duitsland en weinig in Frankrijk.
Deze verwachting botst echter met de veelvoorkomende observatie dat boeren in zowel 
Duitsland als Frankrijk grote invloed hebben op de nationale voorkeuren ten aanzien van 
binnenlands landbouwbeleid en op de standpunten van hun regering ten aanzien van 
landbouwbeleid in de EG en de GATT. De binnenlandse structuur benadering kan de 
overeenkomst in uitkomst (dominantie van binnenlandse factoren) niet verklaren, omdat de 
binnenlandse structuur van Frankrijk en Duitsland zo sterk van elkaar verschillen. Er is daarmee 
sprake van een empirische puzzel. Deze puzzel vormt samen met het hierboven genoemde hiaat 
in de theorievorming de aanleiding voor dit onderzoek.
Om de centrale vraag van dit onderzoek te beantwoorden, wordt in hoofdstuk 2 een 
alternatief verklaringsmodel opgesteld dat de kracht van de binnenlandse structuur benadering 
aan de ene kant, en de kracht van traditionele realistische benaderingen aan de andere kant, 
tracht te combineren. Een belangrijk uitgangspunt bij dit model is dat de staat rekening moet 
houden met zijn binnenlandse en zijn buitenlandse belangen. Binnen deze belangen maak ik 
(zowel binnenlands als buitenlands) onderscheid tussen politieke, economische en ideologische 
belangen. De eerste twee zijn materieel van aard en de derde immaterieel. Bij de politieke 
belangen gaat het om het handhaven van de (machts)positie van de staat in het internationale 
systeem en die van de regering in het nationale systeem. De buitenlandse economische 
belangen van de staat zijn gelegen in de verwerving van economische middelen zoals inkomsten 
uit handel, terwijl het in het binnenlands economische belang van een staat is om economische 
indicatoren als BNP en werkgelegenheid op peil te houden. De ideologische belangen van een 
staat betreffen tenslotte de waarborging van de staatsidentiteit en het bestaande binnenlandse 
beleidsparadigma. In het conceptuele model vormen deze belangen de onafhankelijke 
(verklarende) variabelen, terwijl de nationale voorkeur ten aanzien van buitenlands beleid de 
afhankelijke (te verklaren) variabele is.
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Om verwachtingen te genereren ten aanzien van de relatieve invloed van binnenlandse 
tegenover buitenlandse belangen op nationale voorkeuren, introduceer ik twee interveniërende 
variabelen in het model die de relatie tussen de onafhankelijke en afhankelijke variabelen 
beïnvloeden. Het gaat hier ten eerste, in navolging van de binnenlandse structuur benadering, 
om de binnenlandse machtsstructuur en ten tweede om de internationale machtsstructuur. 
Beide zijn uit te drukken in een zekere polariteit, afhankelijk van de verdeling van macht in het 
betreffende systeem. Naarmate de macht meer geconcentreerd is in handen van een klein 
aantal actoren, is er sprake van een hogere polariteit, terwijl een meer gelijke verdeling van 
macht leidt tot een lagere polariteit. Ten aanzien van de binnenlandse machtsstructuur spreek ik 
van een hoge polariteit als de regering een relatief sterke machtspositie ten opzichte van de 
maatschappij heeft, en van een lage polariteit als de regering zich in een relatief zwakke 
machtspositie bevindt ten opzichte van de maatschappij. Voor de casus in dit onderzoek 
betekent dit dat de binnenlandse poliariteit in Frankrijk hoog is en die in Duitsland laag. De 
verwachting is dat binnenlandse overwegingen belangrijker zullen zijn in een staat met een lage 
binnenlandse polariteit, terwijl buitenlandse overwegingen belangrijker zullen zijn in een staat 
met een hoge binnenlandse polariteit. Voor wat betreft het internationale systeem kent een 
bipolair systeem een hoge polariteit en een multipolair systeem een lage polariteit. In hoofdstuk 
2 wordt beargumenteerd dat een bipolair systeem stabieler is dan een multipolair systeem, 
evenals de specifieke machtspositie van afzonderlijke staten in dat systeem. De verwachting is 
daarom dat buitenlandse overwegingen belangrijker zullen zijn wanneer het internationale 
systeem een lage polariteit kent, terwijl binnenlandse overwegingen belangrijker zullen zijn 
wanneer het internationale systeem een hoge polariteit kent. Om het verklaringsmodel meer 
dynamisch te maken worden ook twee procesvariabelen geïntroduceerd -  de mate van 
binnenlandse mobilisatie en de mate van gevoeligheid van de regering. Deze variabelen maken 
het mogelijk om ook verschillen in uitkomst te verklaren tussen casus die overeenstemmen in 
binnenlandse en buitenlandse structuur. De verwachting is dat naarmate de binnenlandse 
mobilisatie en gevoeligheid van de regering groter zijn, het belang dat een staat aan zijn 
binnenlandse politieke en economische belangen hecht zal toenemen ten opzichte van het 
belang dat de staat aan zijn binnenlandse ideologische en buitenlandse belangen hecht.
Wanneer we de binnenlandse en de internationale structuur combineren (uitgaand van 
een hoge en een lage polariteit), leidt dit tot vier mogelijke combinaties waarvoor afzonderlijke 
hypothesen kunnen worden geformuleerd ten aanzien van de relatieve invloed van binnenlandse 
en buitenlandse overwegingen in het proces van nationale voorkeursvorming. De eerste is dat in 
casus waarin de regering een sterke positie ten opzichte van de maatschappij inneemt en het 
internationale systeem een relatief instabiele, multipolaire structuur kent, internationale 
overwegingen doorslaggevend zullen zijn. De tweede verwachting luidt dat in casus waarin de 
regering zich in een relatief zwakke positie ten opzichte van de maatschappij bevindt en het 
internationale systeem een relatief stabiele, bipolaire structuur kent, binnenlandse 
overwegingen doorslaggevend zullen zijn. De derde verwachting is dat in casus waarin de staat 
een sterke positie ten opzichte van de maatschappij inneemt en het internationale systeem een
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relatief stabiele, bipolaire structuur kent, ideologische overwegingen (zowel binnenlands als 
buitenlands) geprioriteerd zullen worden ten opzichte van politieke en economische 
overwegingen. De vierde verwachting, tenslotte, is dat in casus waarin de staat zich in een 
relatief zwakke positie ten opzichte van de maatschappij bevindt en het internationale systeem 
een relatief instabiele, multipolaire structuur kent, de procesvariabelen van de mate van 
binnenlandse mobilisatie en de gevoeligheid van de regering doorslaggevend zullen zijn in het 
bepalen of de balans doorslaat in de richting van binnenlandse of buitenlandse overwegingen.
In hoofdstuk 3 beargumenteer ik dat Franse en Duitse voorkeursvorming ten aanzien van 
de landbouwonderhandelingen in de GATT Uruguay Ronde (1986-1993) geschikte casus zijn 
voor de toetsing van het theoretische model. Deze selectie biedt variatie op beide 
interveniërende variabelen. Door naar Frankrijk en Duitsland te kijken is er respectievelijk een 
casus met een hoge interne polariteit en een casus met een lage interne polariteit geselecteerd. 
De periode van de Uruguay Ronde biedt variatie op de internationale structuur en kan 
opgedeeld worden in een periode waarin het internationale systeem een bipolaire structuur 
kende (1986-1989) en een periode waarin de structuur van het internationale systeem het beste 
als multipolair kan worden geclassificeerd (1990-1993). De variatie in de twee interveniërende 
variabelen zorgt ervoor dat de hypothesen behorend bij alle vier combinaties van interne en 
externe polariteit kunnen worden getoetst. De eerste hypothese is van toepassing op de Franse 
casus in de periode 1990-1993, de tweede op de Duitse casus in de periode 1986-1989, de 
derde op de Franse casus in de periode 1986-1989, en de vierde op de Duitse casus in de 
periode 1990-1993. Om de verwachtingen te kunnen toetsen is in de empirische hoofdstukken 
de Franse en Duitse voorkeursvorming in de betreffende periodes op basis van primaire en 
secundaire bronnen gereconstrueerd.
De daadwerkelijke casestudies, waarover in de hoofdstukken 5 tot en met 8 wordt 
gerapporteerd, worden voorafgegaan door een beschrijving van de aanloop naar en het verloop 
van de landbouwonderhandelingen tijdens de Uruguay Ronde in hoofdstuk 4. Dit hoofdstuk 
schetst de internationale achtergrond waartegen de Franse en Duitse voorkeursvorming ten 
aanzien van de landbouwonderhandelingen in de Uruguay Ronde plaatsvond.
In hoofdstuk 5 staat de Franse voorkeursvorming tijdens de aanloop naar en de eerste 
helft van de Uruguay Ronde (1982-1989) centraal. Deze periode werd gekarakteriseerd door 
vasthoudend Frans verzet tegen nieuwe GATT onderhandelingen en tegen liberalisering van de 
handel in landbouwproducten. Toen in 1982 de eerste roep om een nieuwe 
onderhandelingsronde klonk, achtte Frankrijk daarvoor de tijd nog niet rijp. Ten tijde van het 
voorbereidingsproces in de GATT tussen 1982 en 1985, vormde Frankrijk dan ook een obstakel 
in het Europese besluitvormingsproces, waarbinnen de meeste lidstaten vanaf 1984 voor een 
nieuwe onderhandelingsronde, inclusief de landbouw, begonnen te pleiten. Frankrijk betwijfelde 
echter of nieuwe onderhandelingen wel daadwerkelijk economische voordelen zouden 
opleveren en vreesde aantasting van het GLB. De Franse landbouw profiteerde namelijk in hoge 
mate van dit beleid (vooral van de exportsteun), waardoor Frankrijk zijn vocation exportatrice -  
de zogenaamde roeping om de wereld te voorzien van Franse landbouwproducten -  kon
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verwezenlijken. De landbouwexporten waren niet alleen ideologisch gezien aantrekkelijk, maar 
ook economisch gezien, omdat ze een belangrijke bijdrage leverden aan stabilisatie van de 
Franse handelsbalans. Frankrijk wilde daarom voorkomen dat de Europese landbouwsteun in de 
GATT ter discussie zou worden gesteld.
Tijdens de openingsconferentie in Punta del Este in 1986 stemde Frankrijk uiteindelijk toch 
in met de openingsverklaring, waarin ook een paragraaf ten aanzien van de landbouw was 
opgenomen. Dit besluit kan worden verklaard door de waarde die Frankrijk hechtte aan de 
Frans-Duitse vriendschap. Deze vormde een belangrijk aspect van de Franse identiteit, naast de 
eerdergenoemde vocation exportatrice en het Franse beeld van zichzelf als leider binnen een 
sterk Europa dat een tegenwicht tegen de VS zou moeten bieden, een aspect dat vooral in de 
tweede Franse casus naar voren zal komen. Zowel voorafgaand aan als tijdens de 
openingsconferentie had Duitsland, dat nieuwe onderhandelingen als essentieel achtte voor zijn 
economie, er bij Frankrijk sterk op aangedrongen om groen licht te geven voor de nieuwe GATT 
ronde. Frankrijk stemde uiteindelijk in om een breuk in de relatie met Duitsland te voorkomen. 
Toen de GATT onderhandelingen eenmaal van start gingen drong Frankrijk aan op het afwijzen 
van het voorstel van de VS dat voorzag in een volledige afbouw landbouwsteun. Ook probeerde 
het de EG landbouwvoorstellen in de GATT zodanig te beïnvloeden dat de mechanismen van het 
GLB niet werden aangetast. Concessies aan de VS, in wat voor vorm dan ook, werden door 
Frankrijk steevast afgewezen. Hierbij refereerde Frankrijk herhaaldelijk aan zijn vocation 
exportatriceen het belang van de landbouw voor de handelsbalans.
De door Frankrijk verdedigde voorkeuren tussen 1982 en 1990 sluiten aan bij zijn 
ideologische belangen, zoals verwacht op basis van de eerder geformuleerde hypothese. Waar 
de Frans-Duitse vriendschap op het laatste moment tot Franse goedkeuring voor de Uruguay 
Ronde leidde, zorgde de vocation exportatrice ervoor dat Frankrijk zich in die onderhandelingen 
hevig tegen vergaande liberalisering van de handel in landbouwproducten verzette. Voor de 
doorgaans veronderstelde invloed van de landbouwlobby is in deze casus geen bewijs 
gevonden. De mobilisatie van de lobby was in deze periode nog relatief beperkt en daar waar 
de lobby en de Franse regering gelijke voorkeuren verdedigden, leek de positie van de lobby 
eerder door de regering te zijn beïnvloed dan andersom.
Hoofdstuk 6 laat zien dat Duitsland, in tegenstelling tot Frankrijk, juist wel grote 
economische voordelen van een nieuwe GATT ronde verwachtte. De Duitse landbouw had 
weliswaar geen sterke concurrentiepositie, maar de veel grotere industriële sector juist wel. De 
economische voordelen voor de Duitse economie als geheel die naar verwachting uit nieuwe 
handelsonderhandelingen zouden voortvloeien waren dan ook een doorslaggevende reden voor 
Duitsland om een nieuwe GATT ronde na te streven. Aanvankelijk verzet van het ministerie van 
landbouw tegen de landbouwcomponent in de onderhandelingen werd overstemd door de 
ministeries van economische zaken en buitenlandse zaken. In de Europese besluitvorming en in 
Punta del Este toonde Duitsland zich een van de meest fervente voorstanders van nieuwe GATT 
onderhandelingen en deed het er alles aan om de instemming van andere staten met de 
Uruguay Ronde te verkrijgen.
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Toen de onderhandelingen in 1987 van start gingen, ontpopte Duitsland zich ten aanzien 
van de landbouwonderhandelingen echter tot een van de grootste tegenstanders van 
liberalisering. Deze onderhandelingen vonden binnen de GATT plaats in een afzonderlijke 
'landbouwgroep' en binnen de EG speelde de Landbouwraad (Raad van Ministers in 
landbouwsamenstelling) in deze periode de belangrijkste rol in de besluitvorming over de EG 
landbouwvoorstellen in GATT. Het ministerie van landbouw stond onder druk van de 
boerenlobby om de Europese landbouwsteun te verdedigen en de Duitse minister van landbouw 
bleek in de Landbouwraad een nog meer fervente verdediger van de belangen van de boeren 
dan Frankrijk. De minister van economische zaken verdedigde in de onderhandelingen -  door de 
relatief gebrekkige interne coördinatie van standpunten in Duitsland -  weliswaar een meer 
flexibele positie ten aanzien van de landbouw, maar de minister van landbouw, die zich 
gesteund wist door Bondskanselier Kohl, domineerde in de interne machtstrijd. Duitsland 
verzette zich daarom evenals Frankrijk tegen het landbouwvoorstel van de VS en was niet bereid 
tot concessies. Pas in 1989, toen ook de Duitse industrie- en handelslobby zich in de 
landbouwonderhandelingen begon te mengen en op liberalisering aandrong, stemde Duitsland 
in met concessies tijdens de afronding van de Mid-Term Review in Genève.
Op basis van de lage Duitse interne polariteit en de hoge externe polariteit tussen 1982 en 
1990, was de verwachting dat binnenlandse politieke en economische overwegingen van 
doorslaggevend belang zouden zijn in de Duitse voorkeursvorming. De casestudy liet echter zien 
dat internationale economische overwegingen van doorslaggevend belang waren bij de Duitse 
instemming met een nieuwe GATT ronde in 1986. Aangezien de binnenlandse mobilisatie en de 
gevoeligheid van de regering op dat moment echter beperkt waren, kan hiervoor een verklaring 
gevonden worden binnen het theoretische model. Door het gebrek aan sterke pressie van de 
landbouwlobby en de lage gevoeligheid van de regering, was zij in staat om ook rekening te 
houden met buitenlandse factoren. Het gewicht dat Duitsland vanaf 1987 aan binnenlandse 
politieke overwegingen toekende is in overeenstemming met de op basis van de theorie 
geformuleerde verwachting. De voorkeuren die Duitsland verdedigde sloten aan bij de wensen 
van de gemobiliseerde landbouwlobby, totdat deze lobby concurrentie kreeg van de industrie- 
en handelslobby en het niet meer in het binnenlandse politieke belang van Duitsland was nog 
langer concessies te weigeren.
Hoofdstuk 7 laat zien dat Frankrijk zich in de tweede helft van de Uruguay Ronde (1990­
1993) bleef verzetten tegen vergaande liberalisering van de handel in landbouwproducten. In 
het najaar van 1990 vertraagde onder andere Frans verzet tegen een landbouwvoorstel van de 
Europese Commissie de Europese besluitvorming zodanig dat de EG de door het GATT 
secretariaat gestelde deadline miste. Het Europese voorstel dat de Raad van Ministers 
uiteindelijk goedkeurde was zo verwaterd dat de onderhandelingen op GATT niveau al snel 
vastliepen, omdat derde staten meer concessies van de EG wensten. Het compromisvoorstel dat 
de Secretaris-Generaal van de GATT een jaar later presenteerde om de onderhandelingen vlot te 
trekken, stuitte ook meteen op Frans verzet. Ten aanzien van beide voorstellen meende Frankrijk 
dat ze funest zouden zijn voor de Franse landbouw, zowel voor wat betreft de economische
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ontwikkeling op het platteland als de vocation exportatrice. Daarnaast deed vanaf 1991 binnen 
Frankrijk het argument opgeld dat de gepresenteerde voorstellen te sterk op Amerikaanse leest 
waren geschoeid. Dit was problematisch geredeneerd vanuit de buitenlandse ideologische 
overweging dat een sterk Frankrijk binnen een sterk Europa een goed tegenwicht tegen de VS 
zou moeten bieden. Deze overweging won het in 1992 zelfs van de wens om de Frans-Duitse 
vriendschap niet te beschadigen. In het najaar van 1992 kwam er een landbouwakkoord (het 
zogenaamde Blair House akkoord) tot stand tussen de VS en de Europese Commissie, waarbij 
van beide kanten concessies waren gedaan. Frankrijk sprak zijn afkeuring over dit akkoord uit, 
ondanks het feit dat het gros van de Europese lidstaten, niet in het minst Duitsland, met dit 
akkoord instemden zodat de landbouw niet langer een obstakel zou vormen in de Uruguay 
Ronde. Frankrijk stelde echter dat het akkoord niet alleen de vocation exportatrice op het spel 
zou zetten, maar ook dat instemming met dit akkoord een knieval voor de Amerikanen 
betekende. Het was niet aan de VS om Europees beleid te dicteren. Daarnaast speelden ook 
binnenlandse politieke overwegingen een rol in het najaar van 1992. In maart 1993 stonden er 
namelijk parlementsverkiezingen gepland, waardoor de mate van gevoeligheid van de regering 
relatief hoog was en zij rekening moest houden met de binnenlandse pressie van onder andere 
de boeren tegen het akkoord. Pas in december 1993 kwam er een GATT akkoord tot stand. 
Hoewel er ten aanzien van de landbouw geen aanzienlijke aanvullende concessies waren 
gedaan door de VS, was het niet langer in het belang van Frankrijk om zijn instemming te 
weigeren. Dit was ten eerste omdat het een totaalakkoord betrof waarin ook liberalisering in 
bijvoorbeeld de dienstensector (waarin Frankrijk relatief concurrentievaardig was) was 
opgenomen, en ten tweede omdat duidelijk was geworden dat de Uruguay Ronde als mislukt 
zou worden beschouwd als er in december geen akkoord werd bereikt.
De verwachting dat in de tweede Franse casus internationale overwegingen van 
doorslaggevend belang zouden zijn, is bevestigd in het empirisch onderzoek. De door Frankrijk 
verdedigde positie was economisch gezien in overeenstemming met het belang van een stabiele 
handelsbalans en ideologisch gezien met de vocation exportatrice en de gewenste verhouding 
tussen de VS en de EG. Opvallend is wel dat deze ideologische overwegingen ook een dergelijk 
grote rol speelden, terwijl op basis van de theorie werd verwacht dat vooral internationale 
politieke en economische overweging belangrijk zouden zijn. Pas op het moment dat in 1992 
zowel de binnenlandse mobilisatie als de mate van gevoeligheid van de regering hoog was, 
werd in de casestudy duidelijk dat Frankrijk ook rekening hield met binnenlandse politieke 
overwegingen. Dit is in overeenstemming met de verwachting die eerder op basis van de 
procesvariabelen werd geformuleerd.
De tweede Duitse casestudy (1990-1993), uiteengezet in hoofdstuk 8, wordt 
gekarakteriseerd door toenemende conflicten tussen het ministerie van landbouw en het 
ministerie van economische zaken over de te voeren koers in de GATT onderhandelingen. 
Tegelijkertijd nam in deze periode de pressie van derde staten, zoals de VS, op Duitsland toe om 
de EG tot een meer flexibele positie te bewegen. Het werd hierbij in toenemende mate 
aangesproken op zijn rol als Handelsstaat -  het idee van Duitsland als voorvechter van
366| Against the Grain
vrijhandel dat sterk verankerd was in de Duitse identiteit. Toch was in het najaar van 1990 het 
landbouwvoorstel van de Europese Commissie niet in het belang van Duitsland. De 
binnenlandse pressie keerde zich grotendeels tegen dit voorstel, en wel in een periode van een 
hoge mate van gevoeligheid van de regering door de eerste parlementsverkiezingen in het pas 
herenigde Duitsland, die in december 1990 zouden plaatsvinden. Daarnaast maakte de Franse 
afkeuring van het voorstel het in het belang van de Frans-Duitse vriendschap om dit verzet te 
steunen. De Duitse minister van landbouw keurde het landbouwvoorstel dan ook niet goed 
voordat de Europese Commissie het voorstel aanpaste. Nadat de GATT onderhandelingen, mede 
als gevolg van de Europese vasthoudendheid ten aanzien van de landbouw, vastliepen, raakten 
in Duitsland steeds meer actoren ervan overtuigd dat er concessies in de 
landbouwonderhandelingen nodig waren om een succesvolle afronding van de Uruguay Ronde 
als geheel mogelijk te maken. In oktober 1991 leidde dit tot een kabinetsbeslissing waarbij de 
Bondskanselier Kohl uiteindelijk het ministerie van economische zaken steunde. Duitsland zou 
flexibilisering van de EG positie ten aanzien van de landbouw nastreven. Dit streven uitte zich in 
december 1991 in instemming met het compromisvoorstel van de GATT secretaris generaal als 
onderhandelingsbasis, en in 1992 in Duitse instemming met het Blair House Akkoord, ondanks 
de Franse pressie op zijn Duitse partner om dit akkoord te verwerpen. Uiteindelijk wogen het 
economische belang van een succesvolle afronding van de Uruguay Ronde en de Duitse 
reputatie als Handelsstaat zwaarder dan de Frans-Duitse vriendschap. In 1993 was Duitsland blij 
met de succesvolle afronding van de Uruguay Ronde en steunde het het slotakkoord van harte.
De verwachting ten aanzien van de tweede Duitse casestudy dat het van de waarde van 
de procesvariabelen zou afhangen of binnenlandse danwel buitenlandse politieke en 
economische overwegingen van doorslaggevend belang zouden zijn, is in het empirisch 
onderzoek bevestigd. De hoge mate van binnenlandse mobilisatie en gevoeligheid van de 
regering zorgde er in 1990 voor dat Duitsland de belangen van de landbouw verdedigde. Toen 
de gevoeligheid van de regering in 1991 weer afnam en de binnenlandse mobilisatie 
gekenmerkt werd door tegenstrijdige pressie van verschillende actoren, nam het belang van 
buitenlandse overwegingen in de Duitse besluitvorming toe. Deze verklaren de Duitse 
instemming met het Blair House akkoord en het slotakkoord. Het is net als in de tweede Franse 
casus echter opvallend dat ideologische overwegingen ook een rol van betekenis speelden, 
terwijl de theorie het primaat in deze casus bij politieke en economische overwegingen legde.
Dit onderzoek trachtte een hiaat in de bestaande literatuur te vullen door een theorie te 
ontwikkelen die binnenlandse en buitenlandse variabelen incorporeert en hypothesen genereert 
betreffende de relatieve invloed van beide in het proces van nationale voorkeursvorming. 
Daarnaast was het op basis van het model ook mogelijk om verwachtingen te formuleren ten 
aanzien van de invloed van materiële belangen (politiek en economisch) ten opzichte van 
immateriële belangen (ideologisch). De casestudies lieten zien dat dit model in staat is de 
meeste Franse en Duitse voorkeuren in de landbouwonderhandelingen tijdens de Uruguay 
Ronde te verklaren. Het belang van internationale overwegingen nam toe in Frankrijk en 
Duitsland na 1990, toen de hoge internationale polariteit van het bipolaire systeem plaats
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maakte voor de lage polariteit van het multipolaire systeem. Ook bleek dat in Duitsland met zijn 
lage binnenlandse polariteit, binnenlandse politieke overwegingen een relatief grotere rol 
speelden dan in Frankrijk, dat een hoge binnenlandse polariteit kende. De uitkomst dat de 
invloed van de Franse landbouwlobby op de nationale voorkeursvorming beperkt was is 
opvallend, omdat doorgaans wordt verondersteld dat deze lobby in Frankrijk een grote rol 
speelt. Tegelijkertijd liet de empirische analyse echter ook zien dat het theoretische model de 
invloed van ideologische overwegingen onderschatte. Deze overwegingen bleken in de tweede 
Franse en Duitse casus belangrijker dan verwacht. Toekomstig onderzoek zou zich dan ook 
moeten richten op verdere theorievorming waarin een belangrijke plaats voor ideologische 
factoren is weggelegd. Wat dit proefschrift echter bij uitstek heeft laten zien is dat voor een 
overtuigende verklaring van nationale voorkeuren een eenzijdige nadruk op binnenlandse 
danwel buitenlandse factoren niet voldoet, en dat een relatief spaarzaam model waarin beide 
soorten factoren op systematische wijze worden gecombineerd in staat is zeer accurate 
voorspellingen te genereren.
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